Figure 1.--

Oil featured prominently in World War II military campaigns. There was no important World War II campaign that was not affected by oil. The Allies had oil and the Axis powers wanted it. This was especially true of the Germans and Japanese. We do not think that oil was at the top of Hitler's focus when he and Stalin invaded Poland, touching off the War, but it certainly was by 1942 when armored warfare had come to define the Ostkrieg. The Germans had sufficient oil for the Polish campaign because it was so short (September 1939). Even so it depleted much of their strategic reserve for oil and other critical materials. 【Tooze】 Germany lacked the oil for a repeat of the World War I war of attrition. Here Stalin provided what Hitler lacked. As part of the NAZI-Soviet Alliance (1939-41), Stalin provided Hitler's military, the vast quantities of oil he needed for his western campaigns: Denmark and Norway and then France and the Lowlands (1940). These victories gained them huge stockpiles of oil and other resources--but not important new oil fields. Britain could only continue the War because America provided the oil it needed. Naval warfare between the Royal Navy and the Italian fleet was in part premised on the Italian need to protect comvoys carrying oil and other supplies to the Axis armies in North Africa. Oil was more important in North Africa than any other ground campaign, because the forces there were all mechanized. In contrast, some 80 percent of the Ostheer was unmotorized infantry, on foot and using horse-drawn carts. Middle Eastern oil supplied the British Army and Navy in Egypt, but the Britain itself were supplied by America. A huge advantage in the Battle of Britain was American high-octane fuel (1940). Throughout the Battle of the Atlantic, tankers were the priority U-boat target. Hitler' primary war goal as explained in Mein Kampf was the vast East. Operation Barbarossa (1941) was fueled by the oil the Soviets had delivered to the NAZIs. This powered the Panzers, but most of the Deutsche Ostheer was unmotorized infantry moving east on foot with horse-drawn carts. Hitler believed that the Soviet Union would collapse in a few short summer months. When this failed, oil became a serious problem for the Germans. As a result, Case Blue, was premised on seizing the oil fields of the Caucuses (1942). Too often it is said that the Germans were overwhelmed by Soviet numbers. This is not the case. If you add the NAZI allies, and people who could be recruited in occupied countries, Hitler had the numbers, what he did not have is oil he needed to fully motorize and supply his and the allied armies. And oil was at the top of the supply shortages. It was the poorly supplied allies on the flanks of the Stalingrad Kessel that led to disaster. After Stalingrad the Germans no longer had the ability to win the War and would have to fight it with dwindling supplies as the Western Allies hammered away at the oil and other infrastructure. Here the inability of the Germans to protect its industrial base was undermined by fuel shortages, they lacked the fuel to train pilots. Fuel shortages were not only a battlefield matter. Lack of fuel (oil and coal) for the NAZI Grossraum was one of the reasons that the Germans could not effectively take advantage of the economies in the countries they conquered. The final German offensive, the Battle of the Bulge, was premised on seizing Allied supply dumps (1944). The Allies also had problems of their own. For the Allies it was not access to oil, it was getting the oil from America to the front. There was a perpetual shortage of tankers. After D-Day (1944), there was a major supply shortage, especially oil. The Germans held or destroyed the major Atlantic ports. Gen. Patton complained to berated Eisenhower that 'my men can eat their belts, but my tanks have gotta have gas.' The British from the outset of the War understood the importance of oil. T hey did not, however, have a bomber forces capable of hitting he Reich's oil infrastructure. Neither did the Americans when they joined the campaign (1943). This would not come until late in the war (1944). And when it finally came it came with a vengeance. Oil was even a greater problem for the Japanese in he Pacific. Japan not only had almost no oil resources, but they were dependent on America for many of the raw materials the war economy needed, especially oil. For the Japanese, it was central, beginning when President Roosevelt embargoed oil exports to Japan. For the Allies, the Pacific War was thus touched off by oil. It did not control the land campaigns, but was a central part of the naval campaigns, both the Battle of the Atlantic and the American Pacific submarine campaign which cut Japan off from the resources of its expanded empire, especially oil. Japan would eventually have to base the Imperial Fleet in Singapore because there was so little oil available in the Home Islands. The Japanese after Pearl Harbor in a stunning 6 month military campaign seized what they called the Southern Resource Zone (1942). This included oil fields in the Dutch East Indies and British Borneo. Unfortunately for the Japanese, American naval victories soon cut the war industries on the Home Islands from the oil and other resources of the SRZ. The stunning American victory in the Battle of the Philippines Sea (the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot) was largely due to the fact that the Japanese like the Germans no longer had the fuel to train new pilots. In contrast the United States no only had the fuel for the world's largest air force and navy, but to supply its allies as well.

Baisic Calculation

Oil featured prominently in World War II military campaigns. There was no important World War II campaign that was not affected by oil. The Allies had oil and the Axis powers wanted it. This was especially true of the Germans and Japanese. Too often it is said that the Germans were overwhelmed by Soviet numbers. This is not the case. If you add the NAZI allies, and people who could be recruited in occupied countries, Hitler had the numbers, what he did not have is oil he needed to fully motorize and supply his and the allied armies. For the Japanese, oil was at the center of their of their war effort from he beginning of yhe Pacific War. They were depebent on American oil imprts. And the United States demanded that thgey withdraw from China. This left the Japanese a choice, wihdraw from Cgina or wage war. They chose war.

Germany

German 1941 Summer Campaign--Operation Barbarossa

At the time German arillery opened on the Soviet Union (June 22, 1841), a trin with oil tankerswas rumbling into NAZI-controlled Poland. That would be the last oil that the Germans would receive from the East. FRom this point they would be on their own with Romanian and thir oen ynthetic oil. , Hitler' primary war goal as explained in Mein Kampf was the vast East. Operation Barbarossa (1941) was fueled by the oil the Soviets had delivered to the NAZIs. This powered the Panzers, but most of the Deutsche Ostheer was unmotorized infantry moving east on foot with horse-drawn carts. Hitler believed that the Soviet Union would collapse in a few short summer months. When this failed, oil became a serious problem for the Germans. German Panzer commnders achieved great victories, but they opeated under fuel constraints.

German 1942 Summer Campaign--Operation Blue

As a result of the failure to destroy the Soviet Union in 1941, Case Blue, was premised on seizing the oil fields of the Caucuses (1942). The primary aim was control of the Caucasian oilfields. There is some conusion about the main objective. Banku was prbabkly nit the main onjective. German goals may have been more modest. It may have been the smaller and more accessible oilfields of Maikop (whivh they reachd) and Grozny. The Germans also sought to deny the Soviets access to Caucasian oil by severing transit along the Volga. This may have been just as imprtant as secure the oil for their own use. 【Toprani】 We do not think that oil was at the top of Hitler's focus when he and Stalin invaded Poland, touching off the War, but it certainly was by 1942 when armored warfare had come to define the Ostkrieg. The Germans had sufficient oil for the Polish campaign because it was so short (September 1939). Even so it depleted much of their strategic reserve for oil and other critical materials. 【Tooze】 Germany lacked the oil for a repeat of the World War I war of attrition. Here Stalin provided what Hitler lacked. As part of the NAZI-Soviet Alliance (1939-41), Stalin provided Hitler's military, the vast quantities of oil he needed for his western campaigns: Denmark and Norway and then France and the Lowlands (1940). These victories gained them huge stockpiles of oil and other resources--but not important new oil fields. And oil was at the top of the supply shortages. It was the poorly supplied allies on the flanks of the Stalingrad Kessel that led to disaster.

Battle of Britain (1940)

The Germans could and did conduct land operations primrily with horse-drawn carts. Air operations were very different. You neeed oil. A huge advantage in the Battle of Britain was American high-octane fuel (1940). The Germans fought much of the battle with oil delivered by Stalin as part of the NAZI-Soviet Pact. Stalin comstantly complaind during the War that the Western Allies were not doing enough. Never did he mention that the Fall of France (June 1940) was made possible in large part by Soviet suppled oil which also very nealy brought Britain to its knees. Without the Soviet oil, the Luftwaffe could not have begun he Battle of Britain in July and Britain woiuld have had more time to prepare.

Battle of the Atlantic (1939-45)

The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest and most important campaign of the War. Britain could only continue the War because America provided the oil it needed. Throughout the Battle of the Atlantic, tankers were the priority U-boat target. The Battle of the Atlanticwas not just about oil tankers, but Britain could cut back on other supplies like food and it would take time to force caspitulation. Cutting off oil would end Britain's abiliy to wage war in a few months. Britain had virtually no domestic oil fields or like he Germns a syn-fuel industry. There wuld be no Ryal Navy o re[pll n invasion or Royal Air Force to repell German bombers. Many will argue that the Ostkrieg was the most important campasign of the War. But the Ostkreieg only defeated one of the twi great titalitarian powers--NAZI Germany. Victoybin the Bttle of the Atlantic helped defeat the NAZIs and stop the Soviets at the Elbe.

Western Desert (1940-42)

The Western Desert Campaign was an anomally The German and Italian forces had to be supplied by convoy. It wasc the Royal Navy that was hunting comvoys, including sunmarine operations. Itis the Germans that are usually associated with submarines. (Churchill gave orders that the term 'submaine' never be used as regard the Germans--always the more sinister 'U-bpoat'.) Naval warfare between the Royal Navy and the Italian fleet was in part premised on the Italian need to protect comvoys carrying oil and other supplies to the Axis armies in North Africa. Oil was more important in North Africa than any other Axis ground campaign, because the forces there were all mechanized. In contrast, some 80 percent of the Ostheer was unmotorized infantry, on foot and using horse-drawn carts. Horses could be fed on grass and fodder. This was not availblke in Egypt and Libya. Middle Eastern (Iraqi) oil through a pipeline to Palestine supplied the British Army and Navy in Egypt, but Britain itself was supplied by America through the NorthAtlanic convoys. .

Industrial Production (1942-45)

After Stalingrad the Germans no longer had the ability to win the War and would have to fight it with dwindling supplies as the Western Allies hammered away at the oil and other infrastructure. Here the inability of the Germans to protect its industrial base was undermined by fuel shortages, the Germans lacked the fuel to train pilots. Fuel shortages were not only a battlefield matter. Lack of fuel (oil and coal) for the NAZI Grossraum was one of the reasons that the Germans could not effectively take advantage of the economies in the countries they conquered. Under NAZI control industrial production plummeted. (Production held up best in Denmark.) German industrial production did not immeitely fall when the Alled began in earnest (1942). There were too few heavy bombers (1942). When the American enered the campaign, effective German fighter defenses were limiting the impact (1943). The Americans effectively desrtoyed the Luftwaffe (February 1944), but Gen. Eisenhower demanded control of the bonbers to prepare for D-Day (March 1944). Only after Eisebhower relinquished control, did the bombing resume in earnest. By this time America and Britain had huge fleets of heavy bombers and expeienced, well-trained crews. In less than 2 months German industrial prodution plummeted (October 1944). In World War I, German civilians expeienced little of the devestation viited on other countries. World War II would be very different.

Liberation of Europe (1944-45)

The Allies also had problems of their own. For the Allies it was not access to oil, it was getting the oil from America to the front. There was a perpetual shortage of tankers. After D-Day (1944), there was a major supply shortage, especially oil. Operation Pluto carried oil to France bia pipeline,but it did not supply the quantities needed by the Allies armored divisions and tctical air forces. The Germans held or destroyed the major Atlantic ports. Gen. Patton complained to berated Eisenhower that 'my men can eat their belts, but my tanks have gotta have gas.' Freight wa normally carried by rail in Europe. Byt as part of the prepration for D-Day, Allied bombing had largely destroyed theFrenh rail system. TheAmericans organized the Red Ball Exoress to deliver oil o the rsapifly moving front.

Battle of the Bulge (1944)

The final meaningful German offensive, the Battle of the Bulge, was premised on seizing Allied fuel supply dumps (1944). Not only had Ploesti been reduced to rubble by American bombers, but the Americans has successfully bombed most of the German synfuel plants. Oil was a priority target for RAF Bomber Command from early in the War, but the syn-fuel plants could only be found and bombed by day-light raids. The Germans were so short of oil by late-1944 that their battle plbn involved seizing Allied supply dumps to fuel their panzers. And the Germams as te War progressed built increasingly large fuel guzzling panzers.

European strategic bombing campaign (1942-45)

The British from the outset of the War understood the importance of oil. And putoil at the top of their list of targets. They did not, however, have a bomber forces capable of hitting he Reich's oil infrastructure. Infact, they did not actually began acquiring capable bombers until (1942) that could hit any targets in the Reich. Even when the Lncaster arrive, however, it could not target the German oil infrastructure. Bomving at night, you could find cities, but not specific plants lovated outsude of the major cities. The Americans had the aircraft and oil was apriorityb target, but German fighter opposition limited the ctual damage caused when they joined the campaign (1943). This would not come until late in the war (1944). And when it finally came it came with a vengeance.

Japanese

Oil was even a greater problem for the Japanese in he Pacific. Japan not only had almost no oil resources, but they were dependent on America for many of the raw materials the war economy needed, especially oil. For the Japanese, it was central, beginning when President Roosevelt embargoed oil exports to Japan. For the Allies, the Pacific War was thus touched off by oil. It did not control the land campaigns, but was a central part of the naval campaigns, both the Battle of the Atlantic and the American Pacific submarine campaign which cut Japan off from the resources of its expanded empire, especially oil. Japan would eventually have to base the Imperial Fleet in Singapore because there was so little oil available in the Home Islands. The Japanese after Pearl Harbor in a stunning 6 month military campaign seized what they called the Southern Resource Zone (1942). This included oil fields in the Dutch East Indies and British Borneo. Unfortunately for the Japanese, American naval victories soon cut the war industries on the Home Islands from the oil and other resources of the SRZ. The stunning American victory in the Battle of the Philippines Sea (the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot) was largely due to the fact that the Japanese like the Germans no longer had the fuel to train new pilots. In contrast the United States no only had the fuel for the world's largest air force and navy, but to supply its allies as well. .

Sources

Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of th Nazi Economy (Penguin Group: New York, 2007), 800p.

Toprani, Anand. "The first war for oil: The Caucasus, German strategy, and the turning point of the War on the Eastern Front, 1942," Journal of Military History (July 2016), Vol. 80, Issue 3, pp. 815-54.

Created: 2:42 PM 4/6/2026
Last updated: 2:42 PM 4/6/2026