Figure 1.--

The primary American service air force was the U.S. Army Air Corps. Air commanders focused primarily on stratgic bombing, but air dictrine was not well deceloped. Aftr the rise of the NAZIs, the rmy air Corps was conceived primarily to fight a Euopean war with the German Luftwaffe. The massive expansion of air power help to overcome German professionalism and armaments. More but still limited funding became available with the rise of the NAZIs in Europe and President Roosevelt's recognition of the dangers posed. As the possibility of war increased, the President decided to apply technology rather than massed infantry formations as in World War I. Thus funding became somewhat more available. The public and Congress were less atuned to the dangers from Europe. A range of air craft appeared the wave including the legendary Boeing B-17. Advances were also made with fighters, but nothing matched the German ME-109 (1936) or the British Spitfire (1939). The Army Air Corps chiefs were unaware of how badly they had lagged behind, in part because the American public were so opposed to War that coopertion with the British was limited. In addition, Primeminister Chamberlain was more interested in preventing war than preparin for it. Cooperation ith Britain changed dramtically when Chuchill became primeminister. A major part of the American war effort was the air war. American Air Chiefs believed that the heavily armed B-17 could fight its way through to targets in the Reich. This proved to be a serious misjudgement and American air crews suffered dreadful losses after the Around the Clock Campaign was launched with the British (January 1943). Only with the arrival of the P-51 Mustang (an Anglo-American creation) did the Air War swung decisively for the Allies. Ground forces after Tunisia were increasingly well supported with close-air support. Cooperation with Britain payed off with the P-51 Mustang. American planes drove the Luftwaffe from the skies over northern Europe and strategic bombing reduced the Axis war ecnomies and cities to huge pilles of rubble and cinders. In the Pacific after the sezure of the Marianas, the Army Air Corps long-range B-29 brought War to the Japanese Home Islands. Air commanders before the War were ficused on strategic bombing. And this did not change even after the Germans denonstrated Blitzkrieg with close air support for ground troops. Only after America entered the War did this develop. It was, however, in the Pacific that the defincncies in Ameriacan fighters were first exposed. The U.S. Navy had begun to develop a carrier air arm, but it is only after Pearl Harbor and the sinking of American battleships that carriers became the major American naval striking force. The legendary Mitusbishi Zero dominated the skies fo most of 1942 until American industry began to produce more capable aircraft for both the Army Air Corps and Navy. The United States not only had the army Air Corps and Naval Air servive, but the Marines also developed their own air component. It was the Marines that used American air power, such that it was, for the first time in a close-air support role uring World War I. Unfortunately the Army Air Corps paid little attention. This had to be reinvented begiining on Guadalcanal. This was a force purely dedidated to close air support. The Marine Corps leadership pressed for this because they could not always depend on the Army Air Corps and Navy. This became apparent fom the vry beginning when he Navy withdrew their task force after landing the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal. This was the begiining of what would become an island-hopping campaign.

Army Air Corps

The primary American service air force was the U.S. Army Air Corps. American pilots fought World war I with British abd French aircraft. After the war, th United statres began devlop it own cojmbat aircraft. Air commanders focused primarily on stratgic bombing, but air doctrine was not well developed. After the rise of the NAZIs, the Army air Corps was conceived primarily to fight a Euopean war with the German Luftwaffe. The massive expansion of air power would evetually helped to overcome German Army professionalism and armaments. American defens spending was limited theoughout the inter-Wa period and Ameican servicemen in World war II would pay a heavy price for their coutry's failure tobkeep up with advances in military technology. More but still limited funding became available with the rise of the NAZIs in Europe and President Roosevelt's recognition of the dangers posed. As the possibility of war increased, the President decided to apply technology rather than massed infantry formations as in World War I. Thus funding became somewhat more available. The public and Congress were less atuned to the dangers from Europe. A range of air craft appeared the wave including the legendary Boeing B-17. Advances were also made with fighters, but nothing matched the German ME-109 (1936) or the British Spitfire (1939). The Army Air Corps chiefs were unaware of how badly they had lagged behind, in part because the American public were so opposed to War that coopertion with the British was limited. In addition, Primeminister Chamberlain was more interested in preventing war than preparin for it. Cooperation ith Britain changed dramtically when Chuchill became primeminister. A major part of the American war effort was the air war. American Air Chiefs believed that the heavily armed B-17 could fight its way through to targets in the Reich. This proved to be a serious misjudgement and American air crews suffered dreadful losses after the Around the Clock Campaign was launched with the British (January 1943). Only with the arrival of the P-51 Mustang (an Anglo-American creation) did the Air War swung decisively for the Allies. Ground forces after Tunisia were increasingly well supported with close-air support. Cooperation with Britain payed off with the P-51 Mustang. American planes drove the Luftwaffe from the skies over northern Europe and strategic bombing reduced the Axis war ecnomies and cities to huge pilles of rubble and cinders. In the Pacific after the sezure of the Marianas, the Army Air Corps long-range B-29 brought War to the Japanese Home Islands. Air commanders before the War were focused on strategic bombing, largely assuming that civilians would demand surrender when bombs began flling on cities. The Poles, British, Germans, and Japanese demostrated that civilians ere willing to tolerate major bombing campaigns. The concentration on bombing did not change even after the Germans denonstrated Blitzkrieg nd the effectiveness of close air support in ground operations. Only after America entered the War did the Army Air Corps began to develop this vital componebt if air powerp.

Naval Air Service

The British and Americans began experimenting with aircraft and carriers at the end of World War I. The first U.S. carrier was the USS Langley. The U.S. Navy air squadron designations are a little confusing. The Japanese in the inter-War era also launched carriers. Naval strategists, however, continued to focus on big-gun battleships. The most influentil carrier advocate was the Imperial Navy's Isoroku Yammoto, but even in Japan the bug gun battleships were seen as the capital ship. The British Royal Navy began World War II wih carriers, but without effective carrier aircraft. The United States had more advanced aircraft, but not as effective as the Japanese aircraft, especially the highly maneuveravle Mitsubishi A6M Zero. It was in the Pacific that the defincncies in American aircraft were first exposed. The U.S. Navy had begun to develop a carrier air arm, but it is only after Pearl Harbor and the sinking of American battleships that carriers became the major American naval striking force. As tragic as Pearl Harbor was, given the superority of Japnese aircraft and mastery of carrier tacrics, the death toll would have been much greater had the battle been fought at sea as was forseen in Plan Orange. The American carriers were of high qulity. The carrier aircraft and aur crew trainining, however, was lacking. The legendary Zero dominated the skies for most of 1942. It was not just the poor performnce of American aircraft, but the U.S. Navy had not yet worked out effective carrier tactics. The Japanese had worked out combined carrier tactics. Fortunately for the Pacific Fleet, the Japanese did not press their advantage after Pearl Harbor. Rather than pursuing the American carriers relentlessy, the Imperial Navy's First Air Fleet (six font-libne carriers) was split up given other assignments. This gave the American carrier arm 6 months to prepare for the inevitavle coming battle which it would have to fight with inferior aircraft. The United States, even at the time of the Midway battle was still mot perfected the coordination of several carriers in a naval battle (June 1942). Another serious problem was defective torpedoes. Only the Sanurai-like courage of American aviators using basically obsolete aircraft and the brilliance of Navy code breakers made the decisive Midway victory possible and dramatically changed the ballance of naval powerin the acific. Midway was the only Allied victory achieved against a superior Axis force. The dive bomber becamae the U.S. Navy' primary offensive weapon. American industry was already working on more capable aircraft for both the Army Air Corps and Navy at the time of Pearl Harbor. The Midway victory bought needed time, making it possible for the U.S. Pacific Fleet to hold the line until America's industrial might could begin to turn out the instruments of victory to the fleet--new advanced aircraft and new Essex class carriers. The key aircraft would be the powerful F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair and they began to arrive in prodigious numbers along with new, but adequately trained air crews (1943). The Japanese were never able to replace the superbly trained avitors that brilliantly carried out the Pearl Harbor attack. The result would be the Great Mariansa Turkey Shoot. The Hellcat would become the Navy's mainline fighter, in part because the Navy could not at first figure out how to use it on carriers. After Pearl Harbor, tge Navy's handfull of carriers meant the difference between victory or defeat. At the end if the War By war's end in 1945, the United States Navy had added nearly 1,200 major combatant ships, including 27 fleet carriers and over 120 escort carriers. More were on the way, but were cancelled after Japan's surrender.

Marine Air

The United States not only had the Army Air Corps and Naval Air Aservive, but the Marines also developed their own air component. It was the Marines that used American air power, such that it was, for the first time in a close-air support role uring World War I. Unfortunately the Army Air Corps paid little attention. This had to be reinvented. Marine Corps aviation evolved in the inter-War era to focus on suporting amphibious operations and training was sytmatized. The Marine air arm at the time of Pearl Harbor was, however, can only be described as tiny. It consisted of only 13 flying squadrons and 230 aircraft. Basic Navy practice was to turn over older basically obsolere aircraft to the Marines. The Marines conducted the first American offense of the War, seizing the airstrip the Japanese were constructing on Guadalcanal, the southern-most island of the Solomons. The 1st Marine Division was not yet ready for the assignment and the U.S. Navy was even less capable of supporing the Marines once landed (August 1942). The Japenese responded in force and the result was a series of ferocious naval battles that made it difficult to supply the Marines while the Japanese funelled men and supplies don the lot and hammered the Marimes with ir strikes and navl artillery. The one major asset the Marines had was Hendeson Field which they rushed to completion and the Cactus Air Force. This proved to be the defining momment for Marine Corps aviation. The Marine aviators on Guadalcanal with obsolete aurcraft could not provide vmuxh air support as they were hard pressed to protect American transports and fend off Japanese air strikes and shipping coming down the Slot. Never again were the Marines without air cover, but subdequent poor performance of Navy pilots, untrauned in close air support, at Tarawa (Novembr 1943) cemented the idea that the Marines needed their own air arm with pilots trained in close-air support. Tarawa was the beginning of the Navy's Central Pacific campaign and the Marines paid a heavy price. The Marine Corps leadership pressed for this because they could not always depend on the Army Air Corps and Navy. General Holland Smith recommended, "Marine aviators, thoroughly schooled in the principles of direct air support," should do the job. [Condon, pp. 87-88.] After Guadalcnal, a major exoansion if Marine Air Groups began. The New Georgia Campaign was the first opportunity for Marine Air to provide close air support (June 1943). Not only were more Marine squadrons formed and better aircraft made available, but important improvements were made in operations. A key development was the establishment of air liaison parties (forward air controllers) to coordinate air support with the Marines on the ground. This began with Bougainville (Novembr 1943) and the Phillipines (October 1944). As a result, by the time of the climatic battle for Okinawa (April 1945), Marine Air had afinally honed system of close air support. There was aviation command and control oversen by Landing Force Air Support Control Units. By this time there were 5 air wings, 31 aircraft groups and 145 flying squadrons. Many of the Marine Air units were provided the superb F4U Corsair. This was at firsrt fortuitous, the Navy could not work out how to operate the Corsair on carriers. Marine Air groups shot down 2,355 Japanese aircraft while losing ojly 573 of aircraft. Some 120 Narine pilots achieved ace status abd earned 11 Medals of Honor.

Sources

Condon, John Pomeroy. Corsairs and Flattops: Marine Carrier Air Warfare, 1944�45 ( Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1998).

Created: 12:33 PM 6/14/2015
Last updated: 12:34 PM 6/14/2015