** war and social upheaval: World War II -- logistics








World War II: Logistics

German horse-drawn carts
Figure 1.-- -Nothing so clearly explains why Germany lost World War II than this image. Logistics that included horses and carts much like the Napolonic 1812 invasion. It is not that the Germmans did not have competent logitians, it just that German commanders, especially Hitler, did not pay any attention to them. The planners were told that Germany had the logistical capability to supply the Ostkrieg within 300 miles of the start point, but after that the logistical capability would fall off rapidly. And that estimate proved remarkably accurate. This is a German supply convoy as Army Group Center approched Moscow (November 1941). Horse-drawn carts were important from the beginning, but as the Germans neared Moscow, motorized behicles began feezing up. The Germans did not have cold weather lubricants. The problen with horses is the huge quantity of foder which cloged up already strained German supply lines.

"Amateurs talk about strategy and tactics. Professionals talk about logistics and sustainability in warfare" is today a widely accepted truism, often attrubute to American general Omar Bradely. Logistics, however, commonly does not make headlines are attract detailed attention among militarian historians. It just is not very exciting and it is excitement that tends to sell military history books. Nor does it often attract the most capable commanders--especilayy in countries with an offensive attack ethos (Germany and Japan). Which means that the logitians do not rank high in the military command structure of those nations. It is logistics, however, that commonly determines the outcome of battles and wars. This may not be the case when one side has a clear predominance of power or far surperior tactics and/or equipment. This is why the Germans and Japanese did so well in the opening phase of World War II. Logistical indaquacies doomed the German war efforts to failure when they failed to quickly defeat their major opponents. This was the case in World War I and the Germans reprated the same mistake even more spectacularly in World War II. Logistics would be a key part of the Wehrmacht's failure in the Ostkrieg. And it was with Barbrossa the first months of the Ostkrieg thst the Gemans had their best chance of winning the War. All orevious German successes were achieved in neigboiring countrues or close to neignboring countries. The Sovier campaign was the first impotant German effort fought at considerable distance from Germany. It is not that the Germmans did not have competent logitians, it just that German commanders, especially Hitler, did not pay any attention to them. The planners were told that Germany had the logistical capability to supply the Ostkrieg with 300 miles of the start point, but after that the logistical capability would fall off rapidly. And that estimate proved remarkably accurate. In the end it would be the industrial logistical strength of America and Britain that would gradaully shift the ballance of power. The War in the West played a far more imprtant role in the War than many authors recognize. And the logistical strenth of the Westen powers to bring their industrial power to bear on the Germans. This was a hige logitical undertaking because America was seoarated from the battlefiekd by two great oceans. Abnd oceans separated Britain from the Empire's reporces. Grmany in contrast was connected to the battle field by direct rail lines and the efficient Reichsbahn. Hitler took a real interest in the Reichsbahn, but failed to devote needed resources. America not only had the resources and logistical capability to supply its own forces, but its Allies as well. The Soviets managed to stop the Germans before receiving meaninful logostical support. It was Lend Lease supplies, especilly trucks, that helped transform the Red Army into a modern, highly mobile force able to execute Blitzkrieg on a monumental scale. Japan mananaged to seize the resources it needed at the onset of the Pacific War. It did not have ther logistical capability of getting these resources back to th War industries of the Home Islands. And as the war progressed, the United Star=tes sestroyed what logistical capability Japan possessed wven before the strategic Bombing Campaign destroyed rhose factories.








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Created: 8:11 PM 11/25/2021
Last updated: 8:11 PM 11/25/2021