Figure 1.--. |
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With the expanded U-boat construction, Dönitz finally ad the force he needed to wage a major U-boat campaign.
After Operation Drumbeat saving shipping off the U.S. Atlantic coast, Dönitz moved the U-boat campaign into the mid-Atlantic Gap beyond the reach of Allied aerial patrols. Given the success of the U-boats, the Germans stepped up production even further. The principal German tacic was the Wolf Pack which was often a grouping of 10-12 Uboats, but some were as large as 50 U-boats. The German effort was conducted from a command center in Paris. The Germans would establish a kind of picketline of U-boats along the convoy routes. Then when a convoy was detected Doenitz in Paris would give orders for each U-boat to converge for a coordinated attack. The U-boat which first spotted a convoy would not attack, but instead shadow it so that it could continue to relay its position. The U-boats were fast on the surface, about 17 knots. U-boats would find the convoys visually by smoke and ten then they could see the tasts and funnels submerge. One they could see the bridge than the convoy vessels could see he conning tower of the U-boat. The stategy would be for a Wolf Pack to draw off the escorts and then attack from all sides. Some U-boats even entered among the convoy ships to attack from within. The Germany developed the Leut torpedo which could zig zag, increasing the chances of hitting a vessel within a convoy. The Germans also itroduced a new type of U-boat, the Milk Cow which could carry 700 tons of fuel and supplies which could resupply U-boats at sea. Even after America entered the War, U-boat sinkings of merchants vessels increased. The tonnage sunk set a new record in 1942. The Germans by the beginning of 1943 had a U-boat fleet of 393 vessels, a force Doenitz believed could bring victory. Not only was the fleet greatly expanded, they were improved types capable of operating as far as the U.S. coast, and they had elaborate bases in French ports, greatly facilitating Atlantic operastions. Total sinkings by the end of 1941 had reached 1,094 ships resulting in the loss of over 10,000 seamen.
Donitez after the declaration of War dispatched a U-boat force to the coast of America (December 1941). The U.S. Navy was unprepared. Naval planners did not expect an attack off the U.S. coast. There wee no convoys at the time. The U-boats mostly attacked at night. City lights were kept on, coastal shipping used the lights. The lights also perfectly siloutted the American ships. The U-boats in particular focused on the tankers. The U-boats attacks began January 13 and they sank around 400 merchant vessels and tankers--about 2.5 mullion GRT of shipping. All that damage was done with an incredibly small force, never more than 12 U-boats. Blimps, yachts, PT boats, and other vessels were deployed for coastal patrol. Amrican Naval commander Ernest King was not as committed to convoy as the British. This was especially the case because the Navy did not have sufficent escort vessels to both convoy troop ships and war equipment to Britain and to convoy coastal merchant vessels. King decided that poorly defended convoys were worse than no convoys at all. While coastal shipping suffered, America did not lose troop ships to the U-boats. The U.S. Navy began organizing coastal convoys when more escort craft became available (May 1942), after which the attacks ceased.
With the expanded U-boat construction, Dönitz finally ad the force he needed to wage a major U-boat campaign. Given the success of the U-boats, the Germans stepped up production even further.
Even before Operation Drumbeat had wound down, Dönitz began moving the U-boat campaign into the mid-Atlantic Gap which became known as the Black Gap. Here the U-boats could operate beyond the reach of Allied aerial patrols.
Here the Battle of the Atlantic reached a fever pitch and Dönitz achieved his greatest success. The U-noats sank 1,006 merchant ships in 1942, totaling 5.5 million metric tons of shipping, losing 86 U-boats. The great bulk of the merchant ships sunk were sunk in the deadly Mid-Atlantic Gap. The Gap would have to be closed to defeat the U-boats. And the Allies worked feverishy to bring increased escort protectiin and air cover into the gap. The Canadian Navy was becoming a major force and focused primarily on comvoy escorts. The new escorts were better armed with improved radar and new weapons like hedgehogs. And The Royal Canadian navy was increasingly proficent as crews gained experience. And the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic were expanding air coverage, both long range patrols from ground vbases as well as new escort (jeep) carriers. At the same time, German shipyards steadily increased the number of U-boat Dönitz had to throw info the battle. The strategic bombing campaign was beginning to bring the War to Germany, but had not yet reached a level to impair U-boat construction.
The principal German tacic was the Wolf Pack, a concept perfected by Admiral Dönitz himself. A Wolf Pack was often a grouping of 10-12 U-boats, but some were as large as 50 U-boats. The German effort was conducted from a command center in Paris. The Germans would establish a kind of picketline of U-boats along the convoy routes. Then when a convoy was detected Doenitz in Paris would give orders for each U-boat to converge for a coordinated attack. The U-boat which first spotted a convoy would not attack, but instead shadow it so that it could continue to relay its position. The U-boats were fast on the surface, about 17 knots. U-boats would find the convoys visually by smoke and then when they could see the masts and funnels, they submerged. Once they could see the bridge than the convoy vessels could see he conning tower of the U-boat. The stategy would be for a Wolf Pack to draw off the escorts and then attack from all sides. Some U-boats even entered among the convoy ships to attack from within.
As Allied scientists were making technical advances to improving ASW capabilities, German scientists were also making technical advances to improve the capabilities of the U-boats. The German began using small auto-gyros. These were small primitive helicopters. They could only be used in good weather, but extended vision from a radious of 5 miles to 30 miles. I'm not sure how manu U-boats used these. They apparently were not reported by Allied recognisance. And they had the disadvantage that as the Allies were closing the mid-Atlantic air gap, the helicopters would have bin picked up by air patrols and helped locate the U-boats. The Germans developed the Leut torpedo which could zig zag, increasing the chances of hitting a vessel within a convoy.
Even before America entered the War, the U.S. Navy was deployed in the North Atlantic to protect British convoys. Anglo-American naval and scientific cooperaion resulted in the defeat of the u-boat campain by 1943. Important advances in both RADAR and SONAR were critical. An especially important development was syncronous radar. The British by May 41 had radar which could detect a conning tower from 2.5 miles, despite the weather and lighting conditions. SONAR was developed which could determine the depth to set depth charges. Depth charges had a flaw. Sonar operators could not maintain contact during a depth charge attack. A new weapon, the hedgehog was developed.
The Hedgehog fired a pattern of HE bombs that would only explode on contact with the U-boat so as to not disrupt the Allied SONAR operator. And all it took was one of those charges to hit to sink the U-boat. Nasty little devils and the best was that the German SONAR operator in the U-boat could not hear them coming down like you could hear depth
charges. So to the surface ships the skipper did not have to wonder if that last pattern of depth charges damaged or sunk the sub hundreds of feet below the surface. The Hedgehog would only explode on contact so there was no doubt about the hit.
A torpedo was developed that could be dropped by air craft and could home in on propellars. Throughout the War British and American scientists continued to improve radar and SONAR technology which was deployed on both escort ships and aerial patrol craft.
RAF Coastal Command introfuced the Leigh Light (L/L) to illuninate U-boats identified by radar and Huff-Duff during night attacks.
The U.S. and Royal navies also improved tactics. They began targetting shadowing U-boats by providing air cover behind convoys. Increased attention was given on radio detection to lovate the U-boats. The central direction of the campsaign by made the U-boats vulnerable to detection. Doenitz wanted detailed reports from each U-boat. The huge American production capability hekped expand both the number of escort ship and aircraft. German military planners had prepared for a war with Britain and France, not America. There was a huge miscalulation of the American scientific and industrial potential. This should be viewed in the context of the almost complete lack of cooperation between the Axis paretners (NAZI Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan). Germany possessed advanced weapons system that could have immensly aided the Japanese. One of the most important was radar. American use of radar in the Pacific War was a major reason for the U.S. Navy success. The NAZIs did not, however, begin to share technology with Japan until 1944 when it was to prove to late to play an imnportant role.
The Germans also introduced a new type of U-boat, the Milk Cow which could carry 700 tons of fuel and supplies which could resupply U-boats at sea.
Even after America entered the War, U-boat sinkings of merchants vessels increased. The tonnage sunk set a new record in 1942. The Germans by the beginning of 1943 had a U-boat fleet of 393 vessels, a force Doenitz believed could bring victory. Not only was the fleet greatly expanded, they were improved types capable of operating as far as the U.S. coast, and they had elaborate bases in French ports, greatly facilitating Atlantic operastions. Total sinkings by the end of 1941 had reached 1,094 ships resulting in the loss of over 10,000 seamen.
The northern Arctic route for Lend Lease aid was from Iceland and Scotland to Murmansk and Ark Aangel. This was potentially the most important because it was the most direct route the Soviet front lines. This route at times proved almost suisidal. The Artic convoys convoys faced a daunting gaunlet of German forces because the Germans had occupied Norway (April 1940). The convoys were attacked by U-boats as well as German surface ships and aircraft based in Norway. This combined with the severe Arctic weather made the route the most dangerous one. The Allies organized 78 convoys to the Soviet Union using the northern route (August 1941 and May 1945). The first Allied aid to the Soviet Union was delivered over the northern route. The British organized the first convoy less than 2 months after the NAZI invasion. These were begun by the British even before the U.S. Congress approved Lend Lease aid for the Soviets because of the desperate need of the Red Army. The first convoys were organized from Iceland but eventually (after September 1942), the convoys assembled at Loch Ewe in Scotland. The Arctic convoys had two letter and number identifiers: PQ or JW for the trip north to Russia, and then the inverted QP or RA for the return trip south.
World War II historians writing on the Battle of the Atlantic tend to focus on the German commander, Karl Dönitz. Of course Dönitz commanded the U-boats throughout the campaign. Bu also critical is the man who won the Battle of the Atlantic--Royal Navy Admiral Sir Max Kennedy Horton. Hirton was one of the most experienced Royal Navy commanders. He had postings commanding various ships and commands. He was appointed to command the Royal Navy submarine force (1940).
Horton was appointed Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches (November 17, 1942). It was during his command of Western Approaches that Dönitz's U-boat force ws decisively defeated. Horton benefited from the preparatory work done by his predecessor, Admiral Sir Percy Noble. And by the time he took command, Britain, America, had bedployed a much larger and more powerful naval force, but the U-boat force was also expanded. Admiral Horton threw himself tirelessly into the desperate battle bding waged in the aTlantic. He was an aloof commander who rarely prased his men. He efficently applied the greater resources becoming available, lager more capable and better armed escorts and jeep carriers along with effective tactics. Horton was more familar with submarines than anyone senior commander in the Royal Navy or for that matter the U.S. and Canadian Navies. Horton added Hunter Killer Groups to to the basic convoy tactic. And he was strongly supported by the Very Long Range (VLR) aircraft from RAF Coastal Command. In this life and death struggle, Horton was vastly aided by the Ultra decriopts from Bletchly Park which he efficently put to use.
The Germans had suffered a decisive defeat as a result of the Red army offensive before Moscow (December 1941). The Germans managed to recover somewhat and scored major victories (spring and summer 1942). World War II turned against the NAZIs during late 1942 and early 1943. The first major reverse was the British 8th Army's vistory at El Alemain (October 1942) and the Anglo-American Torch landings in North Africa (November 1942). The Soviet Red Army then surrounded the German 6th Army at Stalingrad (November 1942). And although the Germans had savaged the Arctiv Convoys, large quantities of supplies were eaching the Soviet Union via Iran and these comvoys were arriving vuirtually untouched. As a result, of developments in the East, by 1943 only one major campaign offered any hope of victory, the Battle of the Atlantic. This of course was asurprise as Hitler had given relatively little attention to the Kriegsmarine in the country's massive rearmament program leading to World War II. German U-boats were sinking large numbers od Allied ships during the early months of 1943.
Budiansky, Stephen. Blackett's War (Knopf: 2013), 306p.
Freidel, Frank. Franklin D. Roosevelt: Rendezuous with Destiny (Little Brown: Boston, 1990), 710p.
Lash, Joseph P. Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939-1941 (1976).
White, David Fairbank. Bitter Ocean: The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-45 (Simon & Schuster, 2006), 350p.
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