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The Battle of Leyte Gulf climaxed off Samar. The engagement has been called with considerable accuracy, the bravest 2 hours in American naval history. [Thomas] The Japanese Central Force mauled by American carrier aircraft in the Sibuyan Sea had turned around, but Admirat Kurita decided to sail back toward the Leyte landings. This new approach was not detected by American search planes. Admiral Halsey assumed that Kurita's Central Force had been essential destroyed. Kurita sailed back into the Sibuyan Sea and through San Bernadino Straits unopposed. Kurita's force included the Yamato and 22 other ships made up of battleships and heavy cruisers. Admiral Kinkaid assumed that the battleships of Task Force 34 were protecting San Beradino Straits. The Japanese Central Force moving south could have wreaked havoic on the troop transports and supply vessels at San Pedro Bay. They could have also desimated the American forces that had been landed with devestating artillery fire. On the morning of October 25, an early morning anti-submarine aerial patrol from Taffy 3 spotted Kurita's Cebtral Force headed south toward Leyte Gulf. At first they assumed it was Halsey's Task Force 34 until they noted the pagoda structures on the Japanese battleships before the sky turned black with anti-aircraft fire. [Hornfischer] What followed was the most mismattched engagement in naval warfare. The Yamato alone weighed more than all the ships composung Taffy 3. The only force between Leyte Gulf were three small groups of American escort (jeep) carriers and destroyers (Taffy 1, 2, and 3). Admiral Copeland commanding Taffy 3 ordered an attack off Samar Island despite the fact that his force was almost rediculosly small. [Hornfischer] The esort carriers were supporting the landings and protecting the invasion fleet from submarine attack. They did not have armour piercing bombs needed for attacks on battleships, let alone the Yamato. The planes on the esoort carriers did not have armour piercing bombs, they were using anti-personnel bombs to support infantry. Sone pilots attacked without any bombs at all. The destroyers attacked to protect the carriers. The action fought by the Johnson was one of the bravest naval actions in the War and suceeded in blowing the bow off a Japanese cruiser. Destroyers were made known as "tin cans" because they were made of 3/8" steel plate instead of thick hardenened armour. Miraculosly the thin skin of the destroyers may have saved some. Admiral Kurita assumed that he was engaging Halsey's Third Fleet. Kurita had been unable to establish communication with the Northern Force and had not realized that the decoy operation had worked. The ferocity of Taffy 3's reaction had convinced him that he had engaged the main American force. The Japanese were firing armour piercing shells, without protective armour, many shells passed right through the destroyers' thin skin, leaving holes but did not dedtonate. [Hornfischer] Somehow Taffy 3 managed to turn around the Japanese Central Force. It may been the most mismatched victory in naval warfare. Yhe cost to Taffy 3 was considerable--five ships lost. After the battle the Imperial Fleet no longer existed as a creditable naval force. The Battle off Samar has to be considered the ultimate expression of American heorism in the Pacific war. Famed naval historian Samuel Elliot Morrison maintains that the the U.S. Navy never perform more galantly. Admiral Halsey has been sharply criticised for exposing Taffy 3 to the Japanese Central Force. The destoyer and destroyer escorts escorting the jeep carriers were the smallest ships in the navy. They never should have been put in the position of facing Japanese battleships and heavy cruisers. The U.S. Navy at the time was large enough to have engaged the combined fleets of all other countries. An effecctive disposition of the Third Fleet would have prevented this. Halsey could have been cortmartialed for his actions, but Nimtz did not want this kind of controversy and Halsey's action in the early phase of the War had made him enormously popular on the home front.
The Battle of Leyte Gulf climaxed off Samar. The engagement fought there has been called with considerable accuracy, the bravest 2 hours in American naval history. [Thomas] Samar is an island in the Visayas, just east of Leyte in the central Philippines. It is the third largest island in the Philippines, after Luzon and Mindanao. Samar is the easternmost island in the Visayas. The island is separated from Leyte by the San Juanico Strait, which at its narrowest point is only about 2 kilometers (km) across. The San Bernardino Strait separates the Luzon and Samar and is the outlet from the Sibutan Sea to the Philippines Sea ad the Pacific Ocdan. South of Samar is Leyte Gulf, the site of the American World ar II landings to liberate the Philippines.
The Sinuyan sea in the central Philippines is a route by which one can pass from the South China Sea to the Philippines Sea. It is the route selected for the powerful Japnese Navy Central Force to strike at the American landing force at Leyte Gulf. The Sibuyan Sea is surounded by southern Luzon, Mindoro, and the Visayan Islands, incluing Leyte.
American carrier aircraft mauled the The Japanese Central Force (October 24), sinking the supper battleship Musashi and daaging Yamoto. Admiral Kurita as a result turned back. He then decided to turn back toward the Leyte landings.
Admiral Halsey in his desire to destroy the Japanese carrietsspooted toward the north, failed to block or at least patrol the
San Bernadino Straits. This new approach was not detected by American search planes. Admiral Halsey assumed that Kurita's Central Force had been essential destroyed. Kurita sailed back into the Sibuyan Sea and through San Bernadino Straits unopposed.
Kurita's force included the Yamato and 22 other ships made up of battleships and heavy cruisers. Admiral Kinkaid commanding the ladings on Leyte assumed that the Haley's battleships of Task Force 34 were protecting San Beradino Straits. The Japanese Central Force moving south could have wreaked havoic on the troop transports and supply vessels at San Pedro Bay. They could have also desimated the American forces that had been landed with devestating artillery fire.
On the morning of October 25, an early morning anti-submarine aerial patrol from Taffy 3 spotted Kurita's Cebtral Force headed south toward Leyte Gulf. At first they assumed it was Halsey's Task Force 34 until they noted the pagoda structures on the Japanese battleships before the sky turned black with anti-aircraft fire. [Hornfischer] What followed was the most mismattched engagement in naval warfare. The Yamato alone weighed more than all the ships composung Taffy 3. The only force between Leyte Gulf were three small groups of American escort (jeep) carriers and destroyers (Taffy 1, 2, and 3).
Admiral Copeland commanding Taffy 3 ordered an attack off Samar Island despite the fact that his force was almost rediculosly small. [Hornfischer] The esort carriers were supporting the landings and protecting the invasion fleet from submarine attack. They did not have armour piercing bombs needed for attacks on battleships, let alone the Yamato. The planes on the esoort carriers did not have armour piercing bombs, they were using anti-personnel bombs to support infantry. Sone pilots attacked without any bombs at all.
The destroyers and detroyer escorts then attacked the massive Japanese force to protect the carriers. The action fought by the Johnston has come down in naval annals. Without hesitation, Lieutenant Commander Ernest E. Evans, steered toward the massive Japanese ships. What followed was one of the epic naval actions of the entire War. The Jognton was one of the famed Fletcher Class destoyers tht formed the backbone pf the Pacific fleets escorts. It was armed with nothing larger than 5 in (130 mm) guns which could not penetrate the heavy armor of the cruisers and battleships. It did have torpedoes. The Johnston led the attack of the escort ships. The Johnston suceeded in blowing the bow off a Japanese cruiser with a well placed torpedo. This significantly dirupted the Japanese formation preparing to attack the Taffey 3 carriers. Destroyers were known as "tin cans" because they were made of 3/8" steel plate instead of thick hardenened armour as used on cruisers and battleships. Miraculosly the thin skin of the destroyers may have saved some. With the Roberts were even smaller ships, destroyer escorts. One was the Samuel B. Roberts. The Roberts also made a virtual suiside run on the Japanese ships. Of the 563 destroyers and destroyer escorts built for the Navu during World War II, the Roberts was the only one that went down with guns blazing. A historian writes, "The shells penetrated Engine Room 2, Brady's battle station, at the waterline and, according to Copeland,'blew it all to hell.' Copeland lost all power, meaning he could no longer maneuver the ship, and no one, including Norbert Brady , who had already been wounded in the face and head by shrapnel, made it out, perishing from either explosion, shrapnel, or steam.... Japanese destroyers, sensing a kill, dshed through the middle of the formation firing into the port side of the disabeled Roberts.Shells ripped into the 20 mm guns and ignited fires all over the ship." [Wukovits]
Admiral Kurita taken back by the verisity of the American attack and already smarting from the action in the Subiyan Sea, assumed that he was engaging Halsey's Third Fleet. Kurita had been unable to establish communication with the Northern Force and had not realized that the carrier decoy operation had worked. The ferocity of Taffy 3's reaction had convinced him that he had engaged the main American force. The Japanese were firing armour piercing shells, without protective armour, many shells passed right through the destroyers' thin skin, leaving holes but did not dedtonate. [Hornfischer] Somehow Taffy 3 managed to turn around the Japanese Central Force.
The Americn survivors of the ngagement off Samar were mnot immddiztey escued. They had to endure 3-days adrift at sea. It was a nightmare in which many of the survivors perished. They had to contront thirst, hunger, sciorching hot sun during the day and bitter cold at night. Than the sharks arrived.
It may been the most mismatched victory in naval warfare. The cost to Taffy 3 was considerable--five ships lost.
After the battle the Imperial Fleet no longer existed as a creditable naval force. The Battle off Samar has to be considered the ultimate expression of American heorism in the Pacific war. Famed naval historian Samuel Elliot Morrison maintains that the the U.S. Navy never perform more galantly. Admiral Halsey has been sharply criticised for exposing Taffy 3 to the Japanese Central Force. The destoyer and destroyer escorts escorting the jeep carriers were the smallest ships in the navy. They never should have been put in the position of facing Japanese battleships and heavy cruisers. The U.S. Navy at the time was large enough to have engaged the combined fleets of all other countries. An effecctive disposition of the Third Fleet would have prevented this. Halsey could have been cortmartialed for his actions, but Nimtz did not want this kind of controversy and Halsey's action in the early phase of the War had made him enormously popular on the home front.
Fletcher, Gregory C. Intrepid Aviators: The True Story of 'USS Intrepid''s Torpedo Squadron 18 and Its Epic Clash with the Superbattleship 'Musashi' (2012).
Hornfischer, James. The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors.
Morrison, Samuel Elliot.
Thomas, Evan. Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign, 141-1945 (Simon & Dchuster: New York, 2006), 414p.
Wukovits, John. For Crew and Country: The Inspirational True Story of Brvery and Sacrifice aboard the 'USS Samuel B. Roberts (2013.
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