World War II Pacific naval campaigns -- Pearl Harbor

The Japanese militarists having successfully taken on China (1894-95) and Russia (1904-05) and participating in World War I believed that in possession of a powerful fleet they could now enter World War II to complete their conquest of China and expand their empire with the Southern Resource Zone. They thought that the rich, comfort loving Americans, distracted by the Germans in Europe would not have the will or capability of fighting a war in the Pacific. It was thus the stunning surprise Japanese carrier attack on Pearl Harbor that finally propelled America into World War II. On a bright Sunday morning, the six front-line carriers of the Imperial Navy launched 360 modern aircraft at Pearl Harbor, the base of the U.S.Pacific Fleet. Sleek Japanese carrier aircraft with a distinctive red circle thundered out of the sky just as the American sailors were waking up on a sleepy Sunday morning. They not only changed America, but the world for ever. While Pearl Harbor was a stunning tactical victory, it was a strategic blunder of epic proportions. It was a stunningly successful military success, brilliantly executed by the Japanese. Several hundred aircraft, most of Pearl's air defenses, were destroyed. Most on th ground. Eight battleships, the heart of the American Pacific fleet, were destroyed, sunk, or heavily damaged. Fortunately the ships were at Pearl. A ship sunk at sea is a ship lost. Being attacked at Pearl meant that ships could be raised. Only two of the battleships were actually lost. Other losses included three cruisers and three destroyers. But by the slender thread of chance, the three American carriers, Yamanoto's principal objective, were not at Pearl. The Pearl Harbor attack was perhaps the greatest strategic blunder in the history of warfare. The Japanese attack on the Pacific fleet instantly changed a diverse and quarreling nation, strongly pacifistic into a single, united people with a burning desire to wage war and the vast industrial capacity with which to wage war with unprecedented intensity. The isolationism that President Roosevelt had struggled against for over 7 years instantly evaporated when the first Japanese bomb fell on Pearl Harbor. Even Lindbergh asked for a commission to fight for the United States. America was finally at war.

Road to War

Looking back as a historian, it is almost incomprehensible that Japan decided to wage war against the United States. War with Britain and the Netherlands is more understandable. Britain in 1941 looked like if not a defeated nation, at least a severely weakened one. The Netherlands was occupied by Axis ally NAZI Germany. America is a very different matter. The United States was not at war. It had not been weakened by the War. And Japan had no commitment that the Germany would join them if they attacked America. War with America seems like an extraordinarily reckless dicession for a country already mired down in a war with China and that had experienced a sharp defeat in a short war with the Soviets. Why would Japan have decided on war with America, a country with a larger population and a much larger industrial and scientific base. The road to war began early in the history of modern Japan. Wars with China (1895), Russia (1904-05), and Germany (1914-18) proved both short and profitable, enabling Japan to build a small empire. The rising influence of the military brought to power men of limited outlook who saw military action as a legitimate use of sate power. They were backward looking men who saw the European empires of the 19th century as to what Japan should seek to establish. And they were men who were strongly influenced by the historic image of the Samurai and Bushido which convinced them that Japanese racial superiority and martial spirit could prevail over the material superiority of America. Despite the power of American industry, they saw Americans as a weak, decadent people who would not fight. Most of the Japanese militarists who made this judgement on which the very life of Japan would hang, knew no Americans and had little or no experience with America.

Last Ditch Diplomatic Efforts

Japanese Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori dispatched senior Japanese diplomat Kurusu Saburo to the United States to assist Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburō. He arrived (November 15). It was a last effort to reach a peaceful resolution of the differences between the two countries. There were important Japanese officials, including Emperor Hirohito and Foreign Minister Togo who were deeply troubled by the prospect of war with America. Their concern was the danger that Japan might lose the War. There was not a single Japanese leader of any stature, however, that questioned the correctness of Japan's aggressive foreign policy. The central issue that divided the United States and Japan was China. Not one Japanese leader was prepared to offer an end of the "China Incident" and withdraw troops from China. Some were prepared to offer to withdraw in 25 years or some date that meant no withdrawal. The military, however, objected to even this offer. President Roosevelt was primarily concerned about aiding Britain in Europe and the developing naval incidents with U-boats in the North Atlantic. He toyed with the idea of what he called a "modus vivendi" in the Pacific with the Japanese, to delay the outbreak of hostilities. In the end, however, he was not prepared to abandon China. He had earlier set the "oil clock" ticking. The Japanese military was set on war. While they were unsure about the outcome of a protracted war, they determined that never would their chances be greater than at the present time. Delay would mean their oil reserves would be depleted and the American military buildup would reduce the advantages they currently held. They believed that the anticipated German victory in the Soviet Union would enable the Germans to turn west and fully occupy the Americans and British. Secretary Cordell Hull's ten point response to the proposals presented by Kurusu was delivered (November 26). The Japanese were outraged when it reached Tokyo (November 27). The orders for war were finalized. The Imperial Conference decided on war and the Emperor put his seal on that decision (December 1). The Imperial Navy's strike force was already at sea. President Roosevelt appealed to the Emperor Hirohito for peace (December 6). The Emperor did not reply.

Pearl Harbor

Few Americans before December 7 had ever heard of Pearl Harbor. It was in fact not a particularly impressive naval base until President Roosevelt ordered the U.S. Pacific Fleet from San Diego and other West Coast ports to Pearl in a show of force to dissuade the the Japanese from further aggression (early-summer 1940). Creating a great naval base is not something that is done instantaneously. [Emerson] This was especially true in the conditions of 1940-41 when America was just beginning to rearm and there were shortages everywhere. Most serious was the shortage of reconnaissance aircraft. American involvement in the North Atlantic against the German U-boats made that a priority. President Roosevelt committed the United states to an undeclared naval war against the German U-boats (September 1941). This was an extraordinarily risky commitment and the U.S, Navy at the time hd very limited ASW capabilities. The U.S. Navy at Pearl was still operating on a shoestring and bringing the facilities up to standard required of a major naval base preparing for war. [Wallin] There were some important facilities. There was a Navy Yard with a dry dock capable of holding battleships and carries. There was a marine railway for smaller ships. There was an industrial plant for repairing and maintaining ships. There were adequate mooring and docking locations. This included a berthing area along the eastern side of Ford Island which became known as 'Battleship Row'. The central area of Pear Labor was dominated by Ford Island. This was used as a Naval Air Station for combat land planes and patrol seaplanes. Across Southeast Lock opposite the Navy Yard was a submarine base and nearby was the critical 'farm' of fuel oil stores. Pearl also had a Naval Hospital and other facilities. All of this, however, was not adequate to support the growing Pacific Fleet. There were a range of limitations and deficiencies. All of this was known to the Japanese in great detail. The naval base was located adjacent to Honolulu. Oahu is a mountainous island and the base could be observed and photographed from various positions in the surrounding area. As a result, the Japanese knew a great deal about Pearl as they began planning the attack.

Hawaiian Population

Hawaii today is the only American state in which the largest segment of the population is of Asian origins. The Asian portion of the population has declined in recent years, but primarily because of inter-marriage. Nearly a quarter of the Hawaiian population now has ancestry including two or more ethnic origins. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the single most important ethnic group was Japanese. These were the ancestors of the substantial emigration from Japan during the period of the Hawaiian Kingdom during the 19th century. The first Japanese in Hawaii are believed to have arrived aboard a damaged ship (1806). It was somewhat controversial at the time, primarily on the part of the new Japanese Meiji monarchy. The Imperial Government was concerned that the emigrationof so many Japanese laborers to Hawaii would lower the image of the Japanese nation around the world. The Imperial Government for a time actually banned futrher emigration (1869-85). King David Kalākaua visited Japan to arrange for an end to the ban and a royal marriage for one of his daughters. In the background was a desire to establish international connections to balance growing American power. The United States helped negotiate an end to the Russo-Japanese War (1905-06). As part of the extensive diplomatic contacts, American and Japanese diplomats also negotiated a series of notes, collectively known as the Gentleman's Agreement (1906-07). This was never legislated, but became Government policy. The result was to stop the further immigration of Japanese workers. The Japanese Government agreed to control emigration from Japan. The agreement did not legally ban Japanese immigration, as the Chinese Exclusion Act had done, but in practical terms Japanese emigration ended. But there was already substantial Japanese population in Hawaii and California. In California it was a small percentage, in Hawaii the Japanese had become the largest ethnic group. It is at this time that Filipinos began to become an important part of the Hawaiian population. The Philippines at the time was an American Commonwealth which continued to be the case until after World War II. As a result, of the Japanese emigration to Hawaii, the large Japanese population on Hawaii was of concern to American military commanders as Japan and America moved toward war. The disposition of American aircraft when the Japanese struck was more aimed at preventing sabotage than repulsing a Japanese attack.

American War Asessments

American officials through the Magic intercepts concluded that a Japanese attack was imminent. They believed that the Japanese were most likely to strike somewhere in Southeast Asia. Naval planners did not believe, however, that the Japanese would dare or have the capability of striking the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. They thought the strong air defenses on Oahu would prevent the Japanese from risking their carriers. Nor did they understand the striking power (number of planes) carried aboard the carriers. And the did not understand just how good the Japanese planes and pilots were. They also believes that the shallow water at Pearl would prevent torpedo attacks. (This despite the fact that the British carried off a carrier torpedo attack on the Italians at their base in Torrento (1940). This was another instance of the American underestimating the capabilities of the Japanese. The Japanese in fact had developed one of the best torpedoes of the War. And they had adapted them torpedoes for shallow runs. In preparation for the attack, their pilots trained in low-level reduced speed deliveries. The American tactical doctrine was to separate their carriers. Thus they did not believe that the Japanese could organize a strike with a sufficient number of aircraft so far east to effectively overwhelm Pearl's considerable defenses.

Code Breaking: Magic (1939-42)

Code breaking played a major role in World War II. And like radar, American code breakers almost alerted Pearl Harbor of an impending Japanese attack. American code breakers broke into the Japanese Foreign Office's top secret system for sending messages (September 1940). The American cryotolgists named it Purple. The information gained from Purple decryption came to be called Magic within the U.S. government because the Foreign Office used it for only their most important messages. The location of the Magic operation in Washington meant that information from the decrypts were not sent to Pearl Harbor unless the War Department decided to send some of the intelligence obtained. The Purple machine was a successor to earlier machines used to read Japanese diplomatic messages. Station Hypo code beakers at Pearl were working on JN-25, the Imperial Navy code, but had not yet broken into it. Only after the Japanese attack did Station Hypo begin to make real progress with JN-25.

American Aircraft

The American defense of the Pacific Fleet base at Pearl Harbor was based in large part on air bases scattered around the island. It was widely assumed that a Japanese naval force would be detected by naval patrols and engaged by American aircraft. The first-line American fighter was the P-40 Tomahawk. It could match the Zero in speed and was more rugged. It had armor protection for the pilot and self-sealing fuel tanks. It was armed with six machine guns and two cannons. It was not, however, as maneuverable as the Zero. Using appropriate tactics, the P-40 could be effective against the Zero. The P-40 with its limited maneuverability could not be used for dog fights against Zeros.

North Pacific

North of Hawaii was the vast stretches of the North Pacific, a largely empty sea with no islands. There was nothing until one reached Alaska, 2,000 miles away. There were some shipping lanes, but usage of those lanes were a small fraction of the level of modern commerce. The Depression had reduced international commerce. And with the Japanese invasion of China, most Chinese ports were in Japanese hands, sharply reducing trade. Trade with the Japanese in addition had been sharply reduced by the American economic sanctions. Thus the North Pacific which in the best of times was lightly traveled was by December 1941 a vast empty sea.

Protective Measures

One might assume that Peal Harbor as the home base of the U.S. Pacific fleet would be protected by a secure ring of impenetrable surveillance. The United States certainly had the technology to so so. A long range ring of reconnaissance air craft using the PBY which helped find the Bismarck in the North Atlantic was an excellent reconnaissance platform. And an inner rings of radar stations was possible given the technology provided by the British. Tragically this was, however, not the case. There was no serious effort made by either the U.S. Navy or the Army Air Corps to establish a protective security ring. That may sound strange today, but such was the situation in 1941. There were no American naval security patrols in the North Atlantic. Adm. Kimmel had a few PBYs, but not nearly enough to put up a security arc around Pearl. Or to maintain it because of the wear on crews and engines. The PBYs were only used to surveil operational areas which in 1941 meant sea areas to the south of the Hawaiian Islands where the fleet normally conducted practice exercises. Radar had provided the British the decisive edge enabling it to defeat the vaunted NAZI Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain (August-September 1940). Britain and the United States had already began to share research on military equipment. The effectiveness of radar was not yet fully appreciate by either the Army Air Corps or the Navy. The Army had installed SCR-270 Radar sets on Oahu. Not all around the island, but there were six mobile units scattered around the island, the beginning of a radar net. As luck would have it, one was set up at Opana on the northern coast--the perfect spot to detect the Japanese air squadrons. And about 7:00 am, the two enlisted men at Opana detected a massive blip, bigger than any thing else they had ever seen. The problem was that there was no system established to asses an intercept attacking squadrons. This was the key element that main the British Chin Home Network so successful. The United States had the radar sets, but not system in place to respond. The radar men at Opana were not instructed what to do if they detected something. So they called the Information Center at Fort Shafter near Pearl Harbor. They were told to forget about it. Then as the first Japanese wave approached the coast, the radar signal got lost in the ground clutter.

American Preparations

The Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was not on high alert. Naval commanders at Pearl believed based on available intelligence that a Japanese attack was not imminent. As a result, some preparations are based on fear of sabotage from the Japanese living on Oahu rather than a naval attack. Planes at the airbases were left wingtip to wingtip on airfields to make them easier to guard. Anti-aircraft guns were unmanned. Ammunition boxes kept locked following peacetime Army regulations. Navy planners do not believe a torpedo attack is possible in the shallow waters of Pear Harbor--despite a successful 1940 British carrier attack at Taranto on the Italian fleet. Thus there were no torpedo nets protecting the battleships. The Navy was still operated on a peace-time schedule. On Sunday morning, many officers and crewmen were not at duty stations, but ashore or a variety of leisure activities.

Japanese Plan

Historians focus on Pearl Harbor because the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl was the only substantial military force in the Pacific that could oppose the Japanese. It was thus the centerpiece of the Japanese offensive to lunch the Pacific War. The Imperial Fleet issued Combined Fleet Order No. 1 (November 7, 1941). The order sets out a vast military operation to seize control of the western Pacific. The massive Japanese carrier fleet gave them the ability to initiate operations throughout the western Pacific. At the heart of the operation, the 1st Air Fleet with about half the Japanese carriers was ordered to to attack and destroy the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. The 2nd Fleet was ordered to attack and seize the Dutch East Indies, British possessions in China (Shanghai and Hong Kong) British Malaysia, and the American Philippine Islands. The 4th Fleet was ordered to attack and seize Guam. Attacks were also planned on Wake and Midway Islands. A Northern Force was to guard the Japanese home waters. This was an offensive over a greater geographic than ever before attempted. In terms of the extent (area) of the invasion, it was only exceeded by the NAZI Barbarossa invasion of the Soviet Union.

Flash Warning (November 27)

The United States was not going to begin a war against Japan. This was Japan's choice. The Unites States did have a warning that the Japanese were preparing a strike. The Japanese JN-25 had not yet been broken, but the volume of radio traffic picked up from listening posts in the Far East clearly indicated that something big was about to happen. While the code breakers could not read the messages, they could tell where they were coming from and the direction. And they were moving south toward the Philippines and Southeast Asia -- not toward Pearl Harbor. What American intelligence did not detect was the carrier task force that departed Hitokappu Bay in the Kuriles (November 26). The Japanese observed strict radio silence. They did not even launch scout planes for fear that they might need to use their radios if they got lost. Based on the the radio signals that were detected, Adm. Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations in Washington flashed this message, to all Pacific outposts:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward the stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippine Islands ,Thai or Kra [Malay] Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46.

Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (1887-1944)

Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (1887-1944) at the time the war broke out in Europe, was the respected head of the Naval War College in Tokyo. Before Japan laundered the Pearl Harbor attack he was promoted to the rank of vice admiral. He was then named the commander of the First Air Fleet, the most prestigious command in he Imperial Navy. It was a matter of seniority. Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (1887-1944) at the time the war broke out in Europe, was the head of the prestigious Naval War College in Tokyo. Before Japan launched the Pearl Harbor attack he was promoted to the rank of vice admiral. He is generally considered a competent, but not innovative or creative commander. Some of his colleagues questioned his intelligence, but these seems unfair. Reports suggest he was more level-headed than many if his colleagues. Nagumo was then named the commander of the First Air Fleet, the most prestigious command in the Imperial Navy. Yamaoto was concerned about his appointment. The two were not close. Nagumo had been very critical of the Washing on Naval Accords which Yamamoto supported. Yamanmoto would have liked a different commander, but after locking horns with the Naval High Command in Tokyo was not able to prevent Nagumo's apportionment. The appointment was a matter of seniority. Nagumo thus commanded the all important First Air Fleet at the two most important points of the Pacific War. And both commands proved controversial. The stunning success of the Pearl Harbor attack made Nagumo a national hero (December 1841). His decision to cancel the third strike wave, however, meant that Pearl was left a potent forward naval base with its fleet battered, but the base facilities largely intact. Yamamoto personally criticized him for his lack of aggressiveness.

Japanese Strike Force

The Japanese strike force of six carriers has a complement of 423 planes. It was the most powerful carrier strike force ever assembled. The Japanese used all six of their first-line aircraft carriers: Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo commanded the operation. The Japanese Pearl Harbor Striking Force also included fast battleships, cruisers and destroyers, with tankers to fuel the ships during their passage across the Pacific. There was also an advanced force of I-class submarines, including midget submarines carried by conventional submarines. They were to scout Hawaiian waters. The midget submarines were ordered to penetrate Pearl's harbor defenses, both to press the attack and engage ships trying to escape the air attack in the harbor. Each was equipped with two effective type 95 torpedoes. These carried a larger charge than those carried by aircraft.

Japanese Planes

The American military generally disparaged Japanese industry and their ability to produce modern weapons, especially war planes. The Jaapanese, however, had a competent aircraft industry which had received technical assistance from the Germans. Japan thus entered the War with modern aircraft that in many ways out preformed American aircraft. The Mitshbishi A6M2 Zero had a top speed of 362 miles per hour and a range of 1,200 miles. It was armed with two light machine guns and two 20 mm cannons. It entered into service in 1940. Japanese weapons were named based on the year they entered into service and thus the last digit of 1940 became the common name for the plane. The great characteristic of the Zero was its maneuverability. This was achieved in part through light weight. The Zero was poorly armored and did not have self sealing fuel tanks. This cavalier attitude toward protecting highly trained pilots proved to have a devastating long term impact on the competence of the Japanese air arm. At Pearl and during the first year of the War, however, American pilots faced highly-trained pilots in modern high-performance aircraft. The Japanese also used the BFN2 Kate torpedo bomber. Kate was the designation given the plane by American intelligence classifying Japanese aviation. The Kate had retractable landing gear and an innovative variable pitch propeller. It proved highly effective at Pearl.

The Attack

The Japanese plan was to launch three massive waves of carrier aircraft to devastate the American naval base and Pacific Fleet berthed there. Admiral Nagumo launched the first two waves as planned. The first wave of 183 planes was launched at 6:00 AM 230 miles north of Oahu to strike the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. It consisted of 51 'Val' dive bombers, 40 'Kate' torpedo planes, 50 high level bombers, and 43 'Zero' fighters. Two Army radar operators at Oahu's northern shore station at 7:02 AM detect the Japanese planes. A junior officer decided they were B-17 bombers arriving from the U.S. west coast. They achieved total surprise anbd destroyed Pearl's air defenses nd began attacks on the main target, the ships of the Pacific fleet berthed at Pearl. At sea, Nagumo after receiving the preliminary reports of success from the first strike group at 7:15 AM launched the second wave of 167 planes. They went after what ever ships that were still afloat.

First wave (7:53 AM)

The first wave reached Pearl and began the assault at 7:53 AM Flight commander Mitsuo Fuchida radioed "Tora! Tora! Tora!" (Tiger! Tiger! Tiger!). The Japanese surprise was total. The first wave targets airfields, carriers, and battleships--only the carriers to the Japanese surprise were not at Pearl. Seven of the eight battleships of the Pacific fleet were moored on Battleship Row locted along the southeast side of Ford Island. The Pennsylvania was in dry dock across the channel from Ford Island. Within minutes the seven battleships along Ford Island were hit by bombs and torpedoes. The West Virginia settled into the water. The Oklahoma capsized. An armor piercing bomb hit the Arizona's forward ammunition magazine at about 8:10. The ship exploded in a ball of fire. Many of the Pearl Harbor casualties came from Oklahoma and Arizona. On the Arizona alone, 1,177 men were killed. The Japanese also hit the California, Maryland, Tennessee, and Nevada, although the damage was not as devastating as that done to Arizona and Oklahoma. The Nevada tried to get underway and exit Pearl to the open sea. Just at this time the second wave of 170 carrier planes reached Pearl (8:30 am). They immediately focused on the one moving battleship. To prevent Nevada from being sunk in the channel and blocking the entrance to Pearl, the Nevada was beached at Hospital Point.

Second follow-up wave (8:40 AM)

While the first wave was ravaging Pearl Harbor, Nagumo brought up the second wave and prepared it for launch. The second wave consisted of 171 planes (54 B5Ns, 81 D3As, and 36 A6Ms) and was commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki. They launched as the first attack group was returning to the carriers. The second wave reached Pearl some 25 minutes after the first wave had departed (about 8:40 AM) and continued until (9:45 AM). The second wave was divided into three attack groups. One was assigned to attack the Kane‘ohe Naval Air Station where the Navy's long range PBY Catalina reconnaissance planes were based. The rest of the Japanese strike force headed for Pearl Harbor itself. The three attack groups reached their assigned attack point almost simultaneously, but from from several directions.

The Third Wave

The Japanese based their attack plan on surprise, allowing them to knock out Pearl's air defenses and carriers. This accomplished, the Japanese air groups would be free to launch a third strike to destroy the base facilities supporting the Pacific Fleet. As the air defenses and American carriers were destroyed, the Japanese carriers should be free to launch a third wave without fear of attack. It is at this point that Nagumo wavered. Unexpectedly the American carriers were not at Pearl and Nagumo had no idea where they were. Thus Nagumo had to consider the possibility that the American carriers were grouping for a counter stroke. As a result, he made one of the key decisions of the Pacific War. He decided to cancel the planned third wave and settle for the damage done by the first two waves. It was understandable, but proved to be a huge mistake. It left Pearl a battered, but fully intact naval base from which the surviving carriers could operate. Without Pearl, the United States would have no advance base of any importance in the Pacific. Nagumo's decision was not just based on the possibility of an American attack. It reflected Japanese naval doctrine which focused on enemy warships. Port facilities were valued much less highly by naval commanders. The dream of every Japanese commander was to destroy the American Pacific fleet in one great, decisive naval engagement. There was no glory in bombing ports. Admiral Nagumo as a result of the Pearl Harbor attack instantly became a national hero, an important development to be considered as the popular concept is that Japan's military leaders brought a peaceful population unwittingly to war.

The American Carriers

The Pacific fleet had three carriers. This meant that the Japanese had a carrier force in the Pacific that was four times larger than the American force. But if you just count the six fleet carriers of First Air Fleet, it was only twice as large. While the Japanese victory was a great shock at the time, looking at this overwhelming force, the Japanese success was in fact a forgone conclusion. The fact that American Army Air Corps forces were poorly handled at Pearl and in the Philippines is what turned the attack on Pearl into a disaster. Only by great fortune did the two of the three carriers of the Pacific fleet escape destruction (Lexington and Enterprise). Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Kimmel had ordered Rear Admiral Willliam Halsey to take Enterprise to deliver Marine Corps fighter planes to Wake Island (November 28). Halsey delivered the planes (December 4) and was oi his way back to Pearl. He would have been back in Pear December 7, but heavy weather made it difficult for the screening destroyers to keep up with Enterprise. He slowed down which made him a day late arriving back in Pearl. Admiral Kimmel had also ordered Rear Admiral Newton to take a Task Force 12 built around the Lexington to deliver 25 scout bombers to Midway Island (December 5). Saratoga was still at San Diego having just undergone maintenance and repair. The United States did have four other carriers: Ranger, Yorktown, Wasp, and the brand new Hornet. They were in the Atlantic where the United States was engaged in an undeclared naval war with German U-boats. Yorktown would be the first Atlantic Fleet carrier to be transferred to the Pacific and sailed (December 16).

Critical facilities

While the Pacific Fleet battleships were devastated, the Japanese did not destroy the principal shipyards or base fuel tanks. Perhaps even more important than what the Japanese destroyed at Pearl was not they did not destroy. The Japanese did not destroy: 1) the large dry docks and other repair facilities, 2) the submarine pens and other facilities, and 3) ship fuel storage facilities. This meant that Pearl continued as an operational naval base. The third wave was planned to hit these facilities, but Admiral Nagumo's decission to withdraw left these facilities in tact, meaning Pearl was still a fully functioning naval bases. And planes rushed from the mainland quickly reestablished Pearl's defenses meaning that a further attack on the base would be a much more costly undertaking. The result was that the Pacific fleet could begin repairing the damaged ships. It also meant that it had the fuel for the surviving ships, especially the carriers to conduct operations. The American submarine fleet was one of the most important elements of the naval war, but could not be effective without an advanced base like Pearl. The Pearl repair facilitates proved critical in ensuing battle of Midway, also fought by Admiral Nagumo. The battered Yorktown returning from the Coral Sea was patched up in hours and sent to join Enterprise and Hornet with the repair crews still aboard. Some military historians suggest that criticism of Nagumo for not launching the third wave affected chis decision making at Midway.

Secretary Hull

At the time a kabuki-like drama played out in the State Department. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull took the lead in the effort to convince the Japanese to end their aggression in China without a war. His diplomatic proposal to Japan, now known as the 'Hull note', demanded that Japan withdraw from China and now French Indochina. Japan's negotiators received this note -- 'Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan' (November 26, 1941). They immediately recognized that it would mean war. They transmitted it to Tokyo. As already planned, the Kido Butai slipped anchor from Hitokappu Bay and proceeded under radio silence toward Pearl Harbor. The Tojo Government of course rejected Hull's note. Prime-Minister Tojo and his minsters were actually insulted with it. It only confirmed their decision for war. They saw it as an ultimatum. It was not. The United States was not threatening war. I was conforming that unless Japan ended its aggressive actions, there, economic sanctions would remain in place. Now fundamental Samurai thinking did not require a declaration of war before attacking. But Japan had evolved to the point that even Tojo understood this was necessary. So the plan was to deliver the 14 part Jaoanese respone breaking off negotiations to Hull just before the attack. The slim notice would mean that the United States Government would not have time to alert its forces in th Pacific. The problem with this was the document that would be delivered was very long and it would take time to translate and type it up. the Japanese Government instructed their ambassadors to meet with Secretary Hull and convey the war message at 1:00 pm (7:30 am Pearl Harbor time). The Japanese strike force appeared over Pearl at about 7:55 AM--that was cutting it close. Because of the translation/typing delay, the Embassy had to ask Secretary Hull for a slight postponement in their meeting. (At this stage, the United States could decipher and translate Japanese secret messages faster than the Japanese.) Because of Magic, Hull already had a copy of the Japanese response. Japanese ambassadors Saburo Kurusu and Kichsaburo Nomura not yet knowing that their country had attacked Pearl Harbor, appeared in the State Department (2:20 PM)--an hour and a half after the attack on Pearl had begun, but had not yet been announced on the radio to the public. Hull received them in his office politely, but did not ask them to sit down. They apologized for he delay, and explained that Tokyo had instructed them to deliver the message at 1:00 PM. Hull asked why 1:00 was so important. They replied that they did not know. Hull proceeded to examine the document delivered and then told the two ambassadors who did not yet know of the attack, "I must say that in all my conversations with you during the last nine months I never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my 50 years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions - on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them." Ambassadors Kurusu and Nomura turned and departed in silence. One can only imagine their conversation on the ride bavck to the Embassy. The American public was not only incensed that Japan had launched the Pacific War, but bcause it was seen as a 'sneak attack'. President Roosevelt called it 'a day that would live in infamy'. The American public was not much bothered how Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviets had invaded other countries with out declaring war, but fo some reason they were outraged that this had been done to America. But it was now ut of the hands of the diplmats. As in Europe, the issues would be resolved on the far-flung Pacific battlefield.

Results

Pearl Harbor was the most disastrous defeat in the history of the U.S. Navy. The Pacific Fleet, the major striking force of the U.S. Navy was devastated. The United States Navy would become an enormous force during the War. This was not the case before the War. Many World war I ships had been scrapped or mothballed. And Congressional appropriations had been limited during the inter-War period, although not as limited as those made for the Army. Thus the 21 ships sunk or damaged at Pearl were a sizeable part of American naval power and included the battleships. Most of the damage was sustained by the ships of the Pacific fleet and the planes of the U.S. Army Air Corps guarding the base. Battleships were considered the capital ships of the fleet at the time. And every one of the the eight battleship of the Pacific fleet were destroyed, sunk, or put out of action. The losses were devastating, but perhaps even more important than what was damaged was what was not damaged. The vital facilities of the base were left virtually untouched. When the planes of the second wave strike force returned to the carriers, however, Pearl Harbor remained a fully functioning forward base for the Pacific Fleet. And most notably the battleships not only were mostly old and nearing obsolesce were mostly raised and returned to service, but the all important carriers had not been in Pearl and survived untouched. Pear Harbor proved to be a seemingly devastating, but pyrrhic victory.

Personal Experiences

We are collecting personal experiences connected with the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack.

Dorothy Goo Nahme

One Honolulu resident recalls, "On Saturday, Dec. 6, 1941, I went with my sister and her husband to their newly built house in the countryside near Honolulu. My brother-in-law had decided to quit his city job to establish a piggery. Early Sunday morning, about 7:30, I was helping my sister hang white kitchen curtains when the house shook violently. We ran outside, thinking earthquake. Once outdoors, we noticed what appeared to be white feathers floating to the ground, and we saw in the distance a silver plane spiraling earthward, trailing smoke. Some of my classmates in college were children of military families, and they had told me about Sunday morning military maneuvers, during which they would wave to the pilots from the ground. Seeing the plane crash made me wonder at the extravagance of making the maneuvers look so real. I heard the roar of an airplane at that moment, and I thought I would wave to the pilot with the white curtain still in my hand. I stopped abruptly midway: The plane was not silver, but an ugly dark green with a huge red disc disk painted on the wing. I was so astonished that I did not complete the wave. It was later explained to me that the Japanese plane, after dropping a bomb on Pearl Harbor, flew over our area while circling back to its target. What appeared to be white feathers were actually part of the packaging of the bomb. As these "feathers" fell, so did chunks of shrapnel, many of which we found on the property, large and sharp enough to damage the tin roofs and concrete foundations of the pigpens." [Nahme]

Battle Assessments

Pauling as the casualties at Pearl Harbor were, in actuality the results could have been far worse. Japanese naval doctrine was to employ surprise and cunning, not brute force. This was in part cultural, reflecting principle described by Sun Tzu. It also reflected the idea that Japan in waging war against America would always be fighting from a position of material inferiority. As it was, Japan in launching the Pacific War possessed the most powerful naval air force in the world--the six carriers of the First Air Fleet. In striking power and military competence it was without equal. In choosing military guile and surprise, the Japanese managed to entirely miss their major target--the Pacific fleet carriers. December 7 proved to be a rare weekend that the American carriers were not at Pearl. Genda, Yamaoto, and other Japanese commanders despite the damage done, realized that they had not delivered the planned knockout blow that would give Japan the time and space needed to build an impregnable Pacific barrier to protect their empire. They were thinking it might buy 3-4 years. [Genda] Renaissance was not a strong point of the First Air Fleet. Staging a surprise attack within the confines of Pear Harbor was even more flawed than just missing the carriers. Still little noted even today is had the Japanese not attacked the fleet an anchor in Pearl, the casualties from a high seas engagement would have been much higher. The Japanese carriers at the time had superior air craft types, a highly effective torpedo (the American naval torpedo at the time essentially did not work), and the pilots were better trained. Except for Arizona most of the crews of the American ships survived as most of the ships were not destroyed. This would not have been the case in a high seas engagement. Given the superior Japanese carrier forces, if the Pacific fleet had engaged the Japanese at sea, the crew and ship losses would have been catastrophic. Battleship losses when sunk at sea can be catastrophic. When the Bismarck sunk the Hood, only three sailors survived. Not only did most of the sailors of the Pacific fleet survived, but the battleships with the exception of the Arizona and Oklahoma were refloated and repaired and joined the struggle against the Japanese in the Pacific War. The damage to the Pacific Fleet mean that the wave of Japanese invasion in the eastern Pacific could be carried out without serious naval opposition. Japan's failure to destroy the fleet, however, mean that the core of the fleet existed around which would be built the most powerful naval force in history and within only a few months would conduct fleet actions engaging the Imperial Navy. It would not occur in time to save the Philippines. It would be in time to save Australia.

White House

The Japanese attack began at 7:50 am which was 1:20 pm in Washington. Eleanor Roosevelt after the war described what she observed in the White House. The President's aides and cabinet ministers were rushing in and out with papers in a varying state of excitement, panic, and nervous exhaustion. Eleanor did not yet know what had happened. She noticed her husband and was struck by his 'deadly calm' composure. It was only the second time in their long, eventful life together that she had noticed that expression. The first was in 1921 when a doctor informed him that he had contracted polio, an incurable disease and once of the most feared diseases at the time. The President was seated quietly at his desk absorbing the reports as they came in from Hawaii. He was stained and tired, but Eleanor described how, "he was completely clam. His reaction to any event was always to be calm. If it was something that was bad, he just became almost like an iceberg, and there was never the slightest emotion that was allowed to show." [Goodwin, p. 289.]

Sneak Attack

News of the 'sneak attack' was broadcast to the American public via radio bulletins, interrupting many popular Sunday afternoon radio programs. Many other Americans learned of the attack at movie theaters, a popular Sunday afternoon activity. Many Americans upon hearing of the attack had newsreel images of the smiling Ambassador Kurusa arriving in America a few weeks earlier on a peace mission.

End of Isolationism

The Isolationists were one of the most powerful political movements in American history. Beginning with President Washington, there has always been a strong isolationist movement in America, one that is still present today. For about 4 years President Roosevelt had been fighting the isolationists who had come to see him as a war monger, determined to drag America into the European war. Republican Congressmen were important isolationists. There were also Democrats, including the Ambassador to Great Britain, Joseph P. Kennedy. Perhaps the most important isolationist was aviator Charles Lindbergh. the greatest hero of the inter-War era. He was an influential voice in the most important isolationist group--the American First Committee. The President won the major battles with the isolationists, including repealing the Neutrality Acts, aiding Britain, beginning a peace-time draft, and Lend Lease. Even so, the isolationists significantly impeded his efforts to resist Axis aggression. Even as the bombs were falling at Pearl, the American Firsters staged a major rally in Pittsburgh. In a hall festooned with red, white, and blue wall banners, the American Firsters engaged in anti-Roosevelt cheers awaiting the main address by Congressman Gerald Nye. He brushed aside the first news reports of the attack and delivered an anti-Roosevelt tirade, charging that the President was leading us into War and included the standard isolationist line that the munition makers were behind the War. Immediately afterwards Nye would blame the British. Few of the isolationists including Nye knew as they filed out of the auditorium that their movement that had been so powerful and influential would literally evaporate over night as soon as the American public learned about a sneak attack on America.

Roosevelt Speeches (December 7-8, 1941)

President Roosevelt's speech to the Congress asking for a declaration of War is one of the most memorable in American history. There were actually two Roosevelt speeches. The American people after learning about the Japanese attack heard nothing from the President. The President spent much of the day attempting to learn just what had happened and how bad the losses were. This proved difficult in a country not yet prepared for world war. There was no doubt in his mind that this meant war. He began preparing the war message he would give to the Congress the following day. He called in his secretary, Grace Tully. His speech writers were out of town, so he would have to compose it himself. He was not at a loss for words. The words were there. He knew just what he wanted to say. Tully explains what transpired. The President was calm and told her, 'this will be short'. He asked her to sit down. He dictated the most momentous speech of his presidency without pause or hesitation. The President then met with the cabinet to which he laid out starkly just what he knew. He asked them to not speak to the press. Secretary Hull was unhappy with the draft speech. He wanted a long formal recitation of efforts to avoid war. The President then met with Congressional leaders, but was more guarded knowing that they might speak to the press. Congressmen Connaly began asking awkward questions. But the American people heard nothing from the President that first day of the War. They did hear from Mrs. Roosevelt who had a scheduled radio program. It is almost unbelievable that after such a stunning event, that the American people would hear from the First Lady first. Nothing like this has ever occurred in American history, but Mrs> Roosevelt was like no other first lady. While now over shadowed by her husband's war message, Mrs Roosevelt's radio message was similar to husband's, short, concise, and emotional, but more personal, speaking to the mothers of America. The President's address to Congress is perhaps the most important in American history. America before Pearl Harbor was an economic power, but played a minor role in international politics. After Pearl Harbor, American began to assume its role as a global superpower. The President's speech is the beginning of this transition.

America Enters the War

The United States and Britain, which also was attacked, declared war on Japan the following day (December 8). President Roosevelt in his address to Congress called December 7, "a date which will live in infamy..." Germany and Italy joined Japan and declared war on the United States. This relieved President Roosevelt of the awkward problem of declaring war on NAZI Germany--something the American people had steadfastly resisted. It would have been difficult to explain why a Japanese attack justified declaring war on Germany. Hitler's decision to declare war is one of the unanswered questions of the War.The Axis treaty did not require them to do so. It was a defensive treaty and Germany and Italy did not have to declare war. And Japan did not reciprocate with a declaration of war on the soviet Union.

Presidential Leadership

President Roosevelt delivered one of the most famous presidential speeches when he asked Congress to declare war on Japan. He told the Congress and American people that December 7, 1941 was "a date that would live in infamy". He carefully chose the word. It was also a major turning point in American history. In one stunning stroke the Japanese changed everything, They ended the Depression in America, instantaneously erased the isolationist movement, doomed the Axis war effort, ans swept America into the War. It also altered the course of the Roosevelt presidency. The President had failed to end the Depression, but we would oversee the victorious American war effort. If the Roosevelt presidency had ended in 1941, he would have been classified as a well-intentioned president with a mixed record. With his war record he emerged as one of the greatest presidents in American history. The President was shaken by the enormity of the losses, but we will never know just how shaken. He was outwardly calm. Typically Roosevelt, he was cunning and deceptive. He hid the enormity of the Pearl Harbor disaster from the public and even the Congress. But his leadership away from public view was as described by one historian, steady, sure-minded and decisive. And decisions needed to be made and made fast in the hours after the attack. [Gillon]

Admiral Nimitz

President Roosevelt appointed Admiral Chester W. Nimitz commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet December 17). Nimitz was one of the outstanding American commanders of the war. Of all the American commanders, Nimitz was the only one that was able to craft major victories before the American military buildup provided overwhelming material advantages. The military relieved Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and Army Lt. General Walter C. Short, of their duties for failing to adopt adequate defense measures. Both commanders had, been alerted of Japanese intentions reveled by American code breakers. They did not, however, receive, the final cable warning Pacific commanders that war was imminent.

Consequences

It was the Japanese carrier attack on Pearl Harbor that brought America into the War. While Pearl Harbor was a stunning tactical victory, it was a strategic blunder by the Japanese of incalculable proportions. It was a stunningly successful military success, brilliantly executed by the Japanese. Eight battle ships, the heart of the American Pacific fleet were sunk. But the three carriers were not at Pearl. Despite the success of the attack, it was perhaps the greatest strategic blunder in the history of warfare. The Japanese attack on the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor changed everything. A diverse and quarreling nation, strongly pacifistic was instantly changed into a single united people with a burning desire to wage war. The isolationism that President Roosevelt had struggled against for over 7 years instantly disappeared. Even Lindbergh asked for a commotion to fight for the United States. As for Japan, the NBC documentary summarizes the consequences succinctly, "With the dead lies the vision of a new fleet hidden by the pall and smoke of a shattered fleet--and the vengeance of the United States."

Military Impact

Conventional wisdom suggests that the destruction of the American battleships at Pearl allowed the Japanese to sweep over the Pacific in the 6-months following the attack. This is a misconception. It was not the destruction of the Pacific Fleet's battleships, but rather the massive Japanese superiority in carriers that allowed the Japanese to sweep through the Pacific. In fact had the United States met the Japanese at sea in a fleet engagement, it is likely that the casualties would have been much greater than those experienced in Pearl. Only 3 men survived the sinking of Hood, for example, in the North Atlantic. Most of the casualties at Pearl came from Arizona. In a general fleet engagement at sea, given the Japanese carrier superiority, the American losses could have been disastrous. In addition there would have been no way of raising battleships sunk at sea and all but two battleships sunk at Pearl (Arizona and Oklahoma were raised and rejoined the fleet. At the time of the Japanese attack, the U.S. Navy was still wedded to the battleship. The attack in fact forced the American Navy to radically change it tactics and strategic concept. When the critical engagements came at the Coral Sea (April 1942) and Midway (June 1942), the only ships playing an important role was the carriers. The American Pacific fleet had developed the competence and tactics to take the Japanese on and the code breakers allowed the American carriers to fight engagements on relatively equal terms despite the overwhelming Japanese carrier superiority.

Raising the Fleet

In the aftermath of the Japanese attack it is often not understood that the eight Pacific Fleet battleships were not destroyed. Two were destroyed: Arizona and Oklahoma. But the other six were not. Had they been sunk at sea they would have been, but they were sunk at their moorings or beached. This meant that they while battered, they were were salvageable. And while the ships were still warm from the fires started by the Japanese attack, experts from the mainland were flown in to begin the most remarkable salvage operation in the history of naval warfare. The damage varied from ship to ship. There were two groups of ships. The first were those that had been moderately damaged, but could quickly be re-floated. The Japanese had not significantly damaged the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, thus this operation could commence immediately. Tenders and ships' crewmen immediately began repairs. These preliminary actions succeeded in putting battleships Pennsylvania, Maryland and Tennessee to a point that they could sail to shipyards on the mainland for repairs beyond the capability of the Pearl facilities (February 1942). Several smaller vessels were also repaired. This included the cruisers Honolulu, Helena, and Raleigh and the destroyers Helm and Shaw. Raleigh and Shaw the two most severely damaged of this group rejoined the fleet (mid-1942). The second group of ships had been much more heavily damaged. Five more battleships, two destroyers, a target ship and a mine layer were sunk, or so severely damaged as to represent nearly total losses. Arizona and Oklahoma were in these groups. Both were too heavily damaged to rejoin the fleet. Other ships could be refloated, but required very extensive work just to refloat them so repairs could commence. The Navy Yard stripped the destroyers Cassin and Downes of serviceable weapons, machinery and equipment (December 1941 - February 1942). The salvaged materiel was shipped to California ship yards where it was installed on new hulls. These two ships thus returned to the fleet in a symbolic sense (late-1943 and early-1944). For the other ships a salvage organization was formally set up only a week after the Japanese attack (December 1941). Captain Homer N. Wallin, from the Battle Force Staff was given the job of overseeing the Salvage Division (January 1942). They relocated some of the ships and salvaged equipment from the ships that could not be refloated. The battleships Nevada was refloated (February 1942). It would eventually become the flag ship for the D-Day invasion. They refloated California (March 1942) and West Virginia (June 1942). The mine layer Oglala was refloated (April-July 1942). All required extensive shipyard repairs, but eventually rejoined the fleet. Many of the salvaged battle ships played important roles in the Pacific War. They were not fast enough to be used in carrier task forces. They were extensively used for pre-invasion shelling. Their most famous action was to smash the Japanese southern force at Surigao Straits during the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 25, 1941). As the Japanese Southern Force tried to pass through the narrow Surigao Straits six American battleships having executed the classic crossing the "T" maneuver were waiting for them. They included California, Maryland, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and West Virginia--all but Mississippi were Pearl Harbor veterans.

Enduring Impact

Pearl Harbor was seared into the national consciousness. Since the foundation of the Republic, American had considered itself protected by two great oceans. Pear Harbor changed this. The Japanese attack demonstrated that America was vulnerable to the attack from abroad. The isolationist outlook that had so dominated American thought evaporated over night. Pearl Harbor still resonates in the American psyche today. [Rosenberg]

Conspiracy Theories

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor has like the Kennedy assassination spawned a veritable cottage industry in conspiracy assessments. These assessments are notably for their poor understanding of the military and code braking as well as the unprofessional cherry picking of facts and events to make their case and sell books. A good example is the Stinnett book. This and similar books should not be considered real history. Certainly President Roosevelt's conduct of American foreign policy leading up to Pearl Harbor is an important topics, but readers should avoid authors like Stinnett who form an opinion based on ideological grounds and then cherry pick facts and events to prove his case. This is not real history.

Pacific War Naval Base

The Philippine Islands was America's advanced outpost in the Pacific. The Pearl Harbor attack was followed by air strikes from Taiwan that quickly crippled American air power on the Philippines. And with the Pacific Fleet crippled, when the Japanese invaded, General Mac Arthur was forced to retreat to the Bataan Peninsula where the poorly supplied American and Filipino forces conducted a valiant defense for several months. The Japanese took Guam without resistance. The Marines on Wake Island put up a spirited resistance. Guam was taken. This left Midway and the Hawaiian Islands as America's lone outposts in the Central Pacific. The United States rushed planes and supplies to defend the Hawaiian Islands, but the Japanese committed a huge error by not pressing the attack with its powerful carrier force. The Japanese did not resume the attack until 6 months later when the Pacific Fleet was better prepared and the result was the enormous naval victory at Midway (June 1942). This ended the threat of Japanese attack. The United States turned Pearl and the air bases surrounding it into the most powerful advanced naval base in the world. Huge quantities of men, material, planes, and new ships flowed into Pearl. The Pacific Fleet with the seizure of the Gilbert and Marshal Islands began the long march east toward Tokyo and gradually Pearl became a rear area base, but the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet throughout the War.

Japanese Americans

Large numbers of ethnic Japanese lived on the Hawaiian Islands. The first Japanese immigrants were brought to the Islands before the Islands were American territory as contract laborers for the American-owned sugar cane and pineapple plantations (1885). By the time of World War II, there were about 160,000 Hawaiians of Japanese ancestry, about 40 percent of the Islands' population. Most poived to be fiercely loyal to the United States. Unlike the ethnic Japanese on the Pacific Coast, the Japanese on the Islands were not interned in a wholesale operation. We are not sure who made this determination. A small number were arrested by the FBI and interned. They were individuals who belonged to Japanese patriotic organizations or for some reason were considered security risks. (Their families were often interned with them.) The numbers were very small. About 2,000 Japanese Americans in addition to 100 German Americans and Italian Americans (both aliens and U.S. citizens) were interned at eight locations on the Hawaiian. It is not entirely clear why they were not interned because the Japanese threat to Pearl Harbor was much greater than it ever was to California. It is probably because the ethnic Japanese presence on the Islands was so important to the economy that it would have disrupted the Island economy, including the operations of the military bases. Facilities like Pearl Harbor, for example, had many Japanese workers in the shipyards.

Sources

Freidel, Frank. Franklin D. Roosevelt: Rendezvous with Destiny (Little Brown: Boston, 1990), 710p.

Genda, Cpt. Minoru. Guest speaker. Duke University (1966). It was Genda of course who planned the Pearl Harbor attack. Genda was also part of the Midway operation, planning the First Air Fleet's search pattern.

Goodwin, Doris Kearns. No Ordinary Time. Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1994), 759p.

Nahme, Dorothy Goo. "'Feathers' in the sky near Pearl Harbor," The Washington Post (May 28, 2004), p. W11.

Rosenberg, Emily S. A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory (Duke University, 2003).

Stinnett, Robert B. Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor (New York: Free Press, 2000). Stinnett is a highly decorated American sailor. We do not question his bravery or patriotism. He is an acclaimed photographer. He is not, however, a trained historian and this book shows that. He carefully cherry picks facts and events to come with the conclusion that President Roosevelt personally adopted a plan to get Japan to strike the United States and kept the truth from Navy commanders in Hawaii is both preposterous and unproven by historical fact. The books fails to understand either the Japanese military and Foreign Office, code breaking, and the American military. The book is dismissed by most competent historians.

Wallin, Vice Admiral Homer N. Pearl Harbor--Why, How: Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal (Naval History Division: Washington, D.C., 1968).

World War II Pacific Naval Campaign: Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941)

"The time to strike has come. The spirit of the Emperor flies with you. Yours is a scared duty. Your mission divine. Do not fail."