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The Imperial Japanese Navy went to war with a peace time merchant marine (Maru) fleet. There appears to have been limited realization that far more cargo vessels were needed for war than for peace time commerce. We see some Maru construction in the years leading up to the War. The Japanese Marus not only had to do the normal pre-war functions but to support military operations in distant battle fields and to supply the military garrisons set up on countless Pacific islands. Marus were not armed and no convoy system was contemplated. The Imperial Navy assumed that they could control the seas in the Western Pacific and the Marus would be untouched. And that there would not be a long war. er initial victories like Tsushima (1905), the Americans would accept defeat and accept Japanese control of the Western Pacific. The Japanese were not interested in using their submarines to wage a commerce campaign. They assumed that the Americans would either do the same or did not have the capability to do within the waters of the Japanese Empire. In the first2 years of the Pacific War only 25 Imperial Navy vessels wee regularly assigned to escort duties. This worked because the American Submarine Service was not trained for commerce raiding and the American torpedoes were defective. Of course submarines were not the only way of interdicting Japanese Marus, but they were by far the most important. These problems were rectified until late-1943. As a result, the Japanese were forced to begin convoying. It proved to be too little and too late. By this time the Japanese had lost large numbers of the destroyers needed for convoy escorting. As the destroyers were not available, the IJN distributed some 40 subchasers to convoy escorting (March 1944). These small vessels were no suitable for high-seas escorting. The subchasers were assigned to naval bases for local defenses. Other vessels assigned to escort duties were older vessels not seen a valuable for fleet operations. Most of the Marus sailed unescorted. The Japanese system was to make naval bases responsible for the Marus passing through its area of responsibility.
The Imperial Japanese Navy went to war with a peace time merchant marine (Maru) fleet. There appears to have been limited realization that far more cargo vessels were needed for war than for peace time commerce. We see some Maru construction in the years leading up to the War.
The Japanese Marus not only had to do the normal pre-war functions but to support military operations in distant battle fields and to supply the military garrisons set up on countless Pacific islands.
Marus were not armed and no convoy system was contemplated. The Imperial Navy assumed that they could control the seas in the Western Pacific and the Marus would be untouched. And that there would not be a long war. er initial victories like Tsushima (1905), the Americans would accept defeat and accept Japanese control of the Western Pacific.
The Japanese were not interested in using their submarines to wage a commerce campaign. The German, their Axis partnes, tried to concnce them tat a commerce camapin would be best stratgy for Japan. In any war with Amerrtica r Britain ter wenemies woulkd have vey long supply lines to defend. If te Japanese attacked them, the Americans and Bitish woulf have to devote huge naval resurces to protect them. They assumed that the Americans would either do the same or did not have the capability to do within the waters of the Japanese Empire.
In the first 2 years of the Pacific War only 25 Imperial Navy vessels wee regularly assigned to escort duties. This worked because the American Submarine Service was not trained for commerce raiding and the American torpedoes were defective. Of course submarines were not the only way of interdicting Japanese Marus, but they were by far the most important.
These problems were rectified until late-1943. As a result, the Japanese were forced to begin convoying. It proved to be too little and too late. By this time the Japanese had lost large numbers of the destroyers needed for convoy escorting. As the destroyers were not available, the IJN distributed some 40 subchasers to convoy escorting (March 1944). These small vessels were no suitable for high-seas escorting. The subchasers were assigned to naval bases for local defenses. Other vessels assigned to escort duties were older vessels not seen a valuable for fleet operations. Most of the Marus sailed unescorted. The Japanese system was to make naval bases responsible for the Marus passing through its area of responsibility.
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