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"The American submarine campaign was the single most decisive factor in our defeat. We could replace ships. We could find new sources of oil. We could train more sailors. Bur we could not protect our merchant fleet from sunmarines. They destroyed our ability to wage war."
-- Vice Admiral Takagi Soichi, Chief of the Navy Ministry's Research Section (1937-42). Given his post Takagi was in a unique poition to assess Japan's defeat in the Pacific War.
The submarine and airplane were new weapon systems at the time of World War I. The Germans bet the ranch on submarines to wage a commerce war against Britain. The result was disastrous, bringing America into the War without impairing Britain's war effort. While both impacted World War I, the impact on World War II would be far more important. Learning little, the Germans tried the same in World War II. Both Japan and America had submarine forces, but neither intended to wage a commerce campaign with them. American naval strategists saw the American submarine fleet as serving primarily as a part of fleet operations. The Imperial Japanese Navy had the same idea. They were even more focused on targeting war ships than the Americans, And despite the fact that their German Axis ally tried to convince them to wage a commerce war. Pearl Harbor changed every thing. The United States no longer had a Pacific Fleet to launch operations that the Navy's submarines could support. Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations immediately ordered the implementation of unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor--basically instructing the Navy's submarines to launch a commerce war. We do not know if he got President Roosevelt's approval or even discussed it with the President. And remember that the President had a special interest in the Navy. Nor do we know if he even discussed this with his staff. Adm. King still only commanded the Atlantic Fleet. Nor did he clear it with the State Department. We know there was no study assessing such a fundamental change in mission. We know this because the order was given before there was time. There was, however, a March 1941 assessment by the Naval War College which had been rejected. 【Kalbus】 Stark may have had this in back of his mind. Immediately the orders came out from Washington-- "Commence unrestricted submarine warfare against the Empire of Japan." There is no evidence that those leaders whom we would today call the 'national command authority' participated in the decision to implement this policy. 【Holwit】 The Submarine Force, however had not trained for this and even more importantly, heir torpedoes did not work. And the Bureau of Ordinance refused to fix them for 2 years. Like Britain, heavily populated and resource poor Japan was dependent on its sea lanes. The U.S. Navy submariners succeeded in the pacific while the Germans failed in the North Atlantic. Eventually the American submarines were used to target the Japanese merchant marine (maru) fleet. Tankers in particular were singled out. While the big fleet carriers got the headlines. The American submarines sank over 50 percent of all Japanese vessels destroyed in the Pacific during the War. The Japanese merchant marine was almost completely destroying, cutting the country's war industries off from supplies and bringing the country close to starvation by 1945. The American submarines did to Japan what the German u-boats tried to do to Britain. The Japanese never develop the countermeasures needed to adequately deal with the American submarines. The Japanese failed to develop a convoy system until late in the War and then it was not well implemented. One problem was that the Japanese did not have the technology to conduct successful anti-submarine warfare. The success of the American campaign was greatly aided by the fact that the American Navy by 1943 began to establish air and sea superiority in the South Pacific which it gradually extended northward toward the Japanese home islands. The destruction of the Imperial fleet in 1943 and 44 greatly reduced the Japanese ability to protect sea commerce. Eventually 8.8 million tons of Japanese shipping was sunk in World War II. Over 60 percent of that total was lost to the American submarines. 【Mawn】
The submarine and airplane were new weapon systems at the time of World War I. The Germans bet the ranch on submarines to wage a commerce war against Britain. The result was disastrous, bringing America into the War without impairing Britain's war effort. While both impacted World War I, the impact on World War II would be far more important. Learning little the Germans tried the same in World War II.
Both Japan and America had submarine forces, but neither intended to wage a commerce campaign with them. American naval strategists saw the American submarine fleet as serving primarily as a part of fleet operations. The Imperial Japanese Navy had the same idea. They were even more focused on targeting war ships than the Americans, And despite the fact that their German Axis ally which had actual experience tried to convince them to wage a commerce war. We can only conclude that the Bushido warrior spirit drove the Japanese to focus on combat with American naval vessels. And the Japanese did have some success in the first year of the war, sinking or damaging American carriers ( Saratoga, Wasp, and Yorktown). This left the U.S. Navy with only one working carrier in the Pacific--the badly damaged Enterprise (1942). Such success probably cemented the IJN's focus on combat rather than commerce. And the carrier losses were hugely significant given how few carriers Amerca had at the time (1942). But American anti-submarine warfare (ASW) rapidly improved, Japanese naval strength declined, and Essex class carriers began reaching the fleet in large numbers. Only one ther carrier woud be lost to Japanese sunmaines= -- Liscombe bay (1943).
Pearl Harbor changed every thing. The United States no longer had a Pacific Fleet to launch operations that the Navy's submarines could support. Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations immediately ordered the implementation of unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor--basically instructing the Navy's submarines to launch a commerce war. We do not know if he got President Roosevelt's approval or even discussed it with the President. Which would be surprising. Remember that the President had a special interest in the Navy. Nor do we know if he even discussed this with his staff. Adm. King still only commanded the Atlantic Fleet. Nor did he clear it with the State Department. Normally the State Department would have had severe reservations, given how inflammatory the issue was in World War I. But the shock of Pearl Harbor was so shattering that as far as we know, there were no protest from State. There was no study assessing such a fundamental change in mission. We know this because the order was given before there was time for any study. There was, however, a March 1941 assessment by the Naval War College which had been rejected. 【Kalbus】 Stark may have had this in back of his mind. immediately the orders came out from Washington-- "Commence unrestricted submarine warfare against the Empire of Japan." There is no evidence that those leaders whom we would today call the 'national command authority' participated in the decision to implement this policy. 【Holwit】
Orders are one thing. Implementation a very different matter. The American Submarine Force, however had not trained for a commerce war. The pre-War emphasis had been on safety/caution, not aggression. And even more importantly, their torpedoes, the most important weapon, astonishingly did not work. Not only that, but the Bureau of Ordinance refused to fix them for 2 years. Like Britain, heavily populated and resource poor Japan was dependent on its sea lanes. The U.S. Navy submariners succeeded in the Pacific while the Germans failed in the North Atlantic. Eventually the American submarines were used to target the Japanese merchant marine (maru) fleet. Tankers in particular were singled out. While the big fleet carriers got the headlines. The American submarines, an astonishingly small portion of the U.S. Navy (less than 2 percent of Navy personnel), were responsible for sinking over 50 percent of all Japanese vessels destroyed in the Pacific War. The Japanese merchant marine was almost completely destroyed, cutting the country's war industries from the vial resources obtained in the SRZs. This not only destroyed Japan's ability to make war, but brought the country close to starvation by 1945. The American submarines did to Japan what the German U-boats failed to do to Britain. The Japanese never developed the countermeasures needed to adequately deal with the American submarines. The Japanese did get very good at killing submarines with the technology at hand. Over 20 percent of the American submarine force was destroyed--the highest proportion of any U.S. military section, but the IJN simply could not destroy enough submarines to prevent the destruction of their vital merchant marine. The Japanese also failed to develop a convoy system until late in the War and then it was not well implemented. One problem was that the Japanese did not have the technology to conduct successful ASW operations at the level needed. At the same time, the Americans got very good at killing Japanese submarines. Both radar and Ultra were hugely important. When discussing Ulta, Midway of coure gets ythev headlines. Ctacking the Maru codes may have been of equal if mot grrater significance. And the submariners finally got a working torpedo (late-1943). Training improved enormously as did the selection of aggressively oriented captains. The success of the American campaign was greatly aided by the fact that the American Navy by 1943 began to establish air and sea superiority in the South Pacific which it gradually extended northward toward the Japanese Home Islands. The destruction of the Imperial fleet in 1943 and 44 greatly reduced the Japanese ability to protect sea commerce. Eventually 8.8 million tons of Japanese shipping was sunk in World War II. Over 60 percent of that total was lost to the American submarines. 【Mawn】
Holwitt, Joel Ira. Execute Against Japan: The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2009). 262p.
Kalbus, Edward. A memorandum researched by Naval War College faculty and students, recommending a strategy of unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against Japan (March 1941). It was rejected by the General Board.
Mawn, Paul E. "Oil & War."
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