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Japan did not have an adequate Maru fleet to move men and equipment nor to supply them once in place even before the War. And the the War along with the expansive possessions won in the first 6 months of the War increased the demands on the Maru fleet exponentially. But then the situation got much worse beginning with Guadalcanal (August 1942). Here we see a starving Japanese soldier who managedvto survive only because he was captured by the Marines (figure 1). The success of the American submarines was a factor in limiting the redeployment of the very substantial Japanese Army in China to man and then supply the Japanese Pacific bastions and the Philippines. 【Parish】 Putting men and supplies on a Maru exposed them to American attack, both sea and air attack, but submarine attacks were the most destructive. The Submarine Service permitted the Americans to hit Japanese shipping well into Japanese-controlled sea and air space, even in the Sea of Japan. The American submarines were not a serious problem for the Japanese in 1942 when the American torpedo problem was not yet solved. But the American submarines began to bite in the woefully inadequate Japanese logistical system by 1943, especially by mid-1943. And this was when the American offensive began to gather strength with the successful mobilization of industry and manpower for war. The Japanese needed to strengthen their bases in the southwest Pacific which were under increased Allied (American and Australian) attack. And the Americans opened a new front in the Central Pacific (November 1943). The size and strengths of these offensives caught the Japanese off balance. It was not what they had bargained for when they attacked Pearl Harbor. The American subs also made it difficult to supply the troops that were already deployed to the Pacific. This was something that Imperial Headquarters needed to consider as the power of the Imperial Fleet declined. Getting men on a Pacific island, was just part of the problem for the Japanese. They then had to be supplied. And on New Guinea and most small islands, local food was scarce or unavailable. Orders from Tokyo were 'self sufficiency'. This essentially ordered many garrisons to starve. By the end of the War, hee were reports of canabilism. One historian describes the situation, "The effect of that was critical, it cut off the Japanese ability to supply oil. It also meant that is was very difficult for the Japanese Home islands to supply any thing to the Japanese garrisons in the South Pacific, in Southeast Asia, or in China. It is estimated that more than a million Japanese soldiers actually died of starvation during this period because they simply could not be supplied with food." 【Overy】 Not only could they not ship food to their garrisons, but the food situation on the Home Islands was also becoming critical both because imports were being cut off, but also because of decling harvests. .
Overy, Richard. Documentary "Japan's World War II Strategy: WWII--Witness to War" S01 EP108.
Parish, Thomas. The Submarine: A History (Viking, 2004), 576p.
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