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"If hostilities breakout with the United States, taking Guam and the Philippines or evem Hawaii and San Francisco won't suffice. We'll have to head to Washington and sign a treaty at the White House."
-- Adm., Isoroko Yamamoto, Commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet
War with the Untied States was a huge gamble for Japan with a smaller population and much smaller industrial base. Prime-Minister Tojo and the military high command, however, were convinced that they could achieve victory. The Japanese strategic concept was to smash the Pacific Fleet and seize a huge empire with the resources it needed to finish the war in China. They then planned to fortify their Pacific possessions so that it would be enormously costly for the Americans to retake. The Japanese calculated that the resources they obtained would enable them to wage war indefinitely. The Japanese war strategy was premised on two assumptions. First, the Japanese militarists with little knowledge of America were convinced that the United States would never make the sacrifices needed to retake the Japanese conquests. They seem to have believe that the superior fighting spirit of the Japanese soldier was the key to victory. They were convinced that the Americans were not capable of such commitment. It is difficult to say how they came about this conclusion. The familiarity with America among the militarists who made the fateful decision for war was very limited--essentially limited to viewing Hollywood movies. The alleged subservience to women in such movies impressed many Japanese. (As one historian joked, "They must have missed 'Gone with the wind'. Second, the Japanese military planners assumed that the naval and air superiority they used to seize their empire would continue unchallenged. Another reason that they believed they could maintain naval and air dominance is that when the Japanese war plans were being finalized, the Germans had achieved enormous victories in Europe and beginning in June 1941 had launched Operation Barbarossa which looked like it would add the Soviet Union to their conquests. In short the German and Japanese looked posed to dominating the Eurasian land mass. Thus the Japanese planners were convinced that the United States would be faced with a powerful NAZI Germany that would require all of their resources to resist. Ironically, the decision to attack the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor contained the seeds that would undermine the Japanese and overall Axis war plan by bringing America into the War. Japan signed a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. This allowed the Soviets to transfer Siberian divisions west that played a key role in the defense of Moscow and a Red Army Winter Counter Offensive. This proved to be the decisive turning point of World War II. The military aspect of their war strategy was well planned and brilliantly conducted as the launched the Pacific War. Their phenomenal offensive rampage through the Pacific and Southeast Asia was an stunning success. What was not so carefully thought out was just how they were going to end the War. T here was no plan to attack America, only that the Americans would not be willing to pay the coast in blood and treasure to retake the conquered territories. The Japanese calculated that the Americans as a result would seek peace. Yet the surprise (Americans at the time would say 'sneak') attack meant that the Americans would not seek a negotiated peace. President Roosevelt called it 'day of infamy'. And added, "Never will our whole people forget the nature of the onslaught against us." There was not even a hint of negotiation expressed by any American leader. Rather a united nation turned to the business of waging war on an unprecedented level. The Japanese had in effect precluded any possibility of a negotiated settlement as well as created a vengeful enemy that never existed before.
Japanese civilian politicians did not favor ar with Amerrica. They had a better understanding of America's poyentual power than the more provicial military commanders. The Japanese Constution, however, gave the military more influence than any other state than perhaps Prussia. The Army and Navy ministers reported firctly to the Emperor rther than to civilian authority. Japan's two major steps toeard war were taken by reltively low-level commanders (seizing manchuria and launching the war in China) which civilian auhrities were forced to sanctify. The military's influence rose during the 1930s, in part because the Depression show cased the weakness of being depebdent on foreign markets. And the war in China becme a quamire tht the Army cold not finish with the resurces at hand. The Japanese military shold not be seen as a singled-minded beast. The Army was deeply divided with issues going back to Japan's medieval past. It was almost as if they hated each other more than America. The Army was the domint or senior service and as Europe sesended toward War, the Army's Strike North Faction dominated. Soviet Siberia offered the resources the Army needed. Only this all blew up only literally days before war broke out in Europe. Fighting broke our between the Japanese Army and Soviet Red Army in he middle of nowhere--the Mongolian-Manchrian border. TYhe Red Army deivered a desestating blow to the Japense Kwantung Army at Khalkhin Gol (July 1939). Than only a few weeks later NAZI Germany ign ored their allianc with Japan and sigbned an alliance weith Soviets. This left Japan out in the cold when dealing with the Sioviets. Now having found tht the Army was not prepared to fight a major inuril power and mired in the never ending China quamire you might have tyhought that Japan would rethink its a never, you might have thought that Japan would rethink its march toward war. The Army did not. Instead they swllowsed their pride and began to give serious thoght to the Navy's sollution--the Strike South Faction. The Strike South Faction saw the resorces of Southeast Asia alluring, orimrily because hey included oil. Much hs been written about Admiral Yamamoto opposing war with America. But Yamamoto was not the even the highest rnking admiral. Nursing resentment dating to the Portsmouth Treaty (1906) and Washington Naval Treaty (1921), here was huge hostility toward America within the Navy. So much o that Admiral Yamoyo was in danger odf asassination. It is no accident that the attack on the USS Panay was staged by Navy aircraft (1937). NAZI vicgtoiries in Europe meant tht the Briish, Dutch, and French were no longer cple of defending their colonies. China was the linchpin in Japanese policy. By 1941 the United States was supporting China diplomtically and with finacial support and military aid. The America oil embargo was the final straw (July 1941). Japan half to either withdraw from China or go to war. Ultra nastionslist Hideki Tojo was appointed Japan's Prime Minister (October 1941), following the resignation of the Konoe Cabinet. He also took on the roles as Army Minister and Home Minister. This mean that he essentially had dictatorial powrs. And there was no way he was going to wihdraw from China. This mean war. .
Prime-Minister Tojo decided on War. The Hay Note demanded that Japan withfraw from China (November 1941). He was not about to do that. It would be disgraced. And the Army ol hve to expolain why the war in China pursued at great cost was all in vain. Bu Tojo had a problem, the Japanese Army had no way to attack the Americans. For this he had to turn to the Navy. resident Roosevelt had conviently moved the Pacific Fleet forward to Pearl Harbor. This brought the Fleet within range of the Kido Butai. But Tojo had a choice to make. He could strike at Southern Resouce Zone (SRZ). The British, Dutch, and French there did not have the force needed to oppose the Jaopanese. Striking the Americans was not necessary. The Japanese admirals opposed his alternative because of Amercan possession of the Philippines. This and the acific Fleet theratened the sea lanes between the SRZ which were needed to deliver SRZ esources to the war factories on the Home Iskands. They insisted that that the Phuilippines had to be taken and the Pacific Fleet destroyed. This led to Perarl Harbor and brining America into the War. It was decided that disabling the Pacific War would give Jpanb time to seize and fortify the SRZ. This would mean retaking it wold reuire a blood letting Ameica wold never counteance. And the War cold be enbded throgh negotiation lk the Russo-Japnese War. Not fully understood by Tojo and theJapanse admirals including Yamamoto was that the nature of the attack would so enranged Amercan public opinion making any kind of peace negotiation impossible. And unforseen event in the frozen plains of the Soviert Union, about as far away from balmy Pearl Harbor as imaginable. At almot the same time the bombs began falling on Pearl Harbor, the Red Army launched a massive counter-offensive. Yje Japanese had decided on war thinking that the NAZIs had destroyed the Red Army and were posed to enter Moscow. Thisbwas sudely belierved at the time. Stalin himelf almost abandoned Moscow. This was important because a NAZI victory in Europe would mean America could not affords a Pacific War. The fact that the Red Army
was not destroyed dusembled a major tennant of Japan strategic thinking. War with the Untied States was a huge gamble for Japan with a smaller population and much smaller industrial base. Prime-Minister Tojo and the military high command, however, were convinced that they could achieve victory. The Japanese strategic concept was to smash the Pacific Fleet and seize a huge empire with the resources it needed to finish the war in China. They then planned to fortify their Pacific possessions so that it would be enormously costly for the Americans to retake. The Japanese calculated that the resources they obtained would enable them to wage war indefinitely. The Japanese war strategy was premised on two assumptions. First, the Japanese militarists with little knowledge of America were convinced that the United States would never make the sacrifices needed to retake the Japanese conquests. They seem to have believe that the superior fighting spirit of the Japanese soldier was the key to victory. They were convinced that the Americans were not capable of such commitment. It is difficult to say how they came about this conclusion. The familiarity with America among the militarists who made the fateful decision for war was very limited--essentially limited to viewing Hollywood movies. The alleged subservience to women in such movies impressed many Japanese. (As one historian joked, "They must have missed 'Gone with the wind'. Second, the Japanese military planners assumed that the naval and air superiority they used to seize their empire would continue unchallenged. Another reason that they believed they could maintain naval and air dominance is that when the Japanese war plans were being finalized, the Germans had achieved enormous victories in Europe and beginning in June 1941 had launched Operation Barbarossa which looked like it would add the Soviet Union to their conquests. In short the German and Japanese looked posed to dominating the Eurasian land mass. Thus the Japanese planners were convinced that the United States would be faced with a powerful NAZI Germany that would require all of their resources to resist. Ironically, the decision to attack the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor contained the seeds that would undermine the Japanese and overall Axis war plan by bringing America into the War. Japan signed a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. This allowed the Soviets to transfer Siberian divisions west that played a key role in the defense of Moscow and a Red Army Winter Counter Offensive. This proved to be the decisive turning point of World War II.
The military aspect of the Japanese war strategy was well planned and brilliantly conducted as the launched the Pacific War. Their phenomenal offensive rampage through the Pacific and Southeast Asia was an stunning success. What was not so carefully thought out was just how they were going to end the War. here was no plan to attack America, only that the Americans would not be willing to pay the coast in blood and treasure to retake the conquered territories. The Japanese calculated that the Americans as a result would seek peace. Yet the surprise (Americans at the time would say 'sneak') attack meant that the Americans would not seek a negotiated peace. President Roosevelt called it the 'day of infamy'. And added, "Never will our whole people forget the nature of the onslaught against us." There was not even a hint of negotiation expressed by any American leader. Rather a united nation turned to the business of waging war on an unprecedented level. The Japanese had in effect precluded any possibility of a negotiated settlement as well as created a vengeful enemy that never existed before.
The IJN supported the many Japanese actions assiated with seizing SRZ. There was a Kido Butai still led by Adm. Nagumo forray into the Indian Ocen hittig targets as far west as Ceylon (Sri Lanka) to support the poition in newly seized Burm (April 1942). While the Japanese sank significant Allied ships, including the carrier HMS Hermes and cruisers HMS Cornwall and HMS Dorsetshire, they failed to trap the main British fleet, which escaped, forcing the Japanese to withdraw and ceding control temporarily, making it a tactical success but strategic draw with limited follow-up. It is at his point that disagreements between Adm. Yammoand senior admirals intensified. Yamamoto wanted to force a showdown wutgh what was left of the U.S. Pacfic Fleet. The admirals in Tokyo wanted to pursuea campaign to cut off of the Allied pesence in the SRZ. What emeged was a compromise. Yamasmoto got authoization for his plan AF , but first an operation had o be casrred out in ther South Pacfic. Two carriers (Sukaku ansZuikaku woukd be temorarily detached from Kido Butai to support an effort to take Port Moresby and southern New Guinea--the frst step in cutting off Australia. This was angeros. Kido Butai's strengh lay in keeping all six carrits. togther. Thsi led to the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 1942). America lost USS Lexington. The Japanese lost a small varrier, but Suiaku amd Zuilaku were damaged. This mant that Kido Butai would have only four carrierrss for everal months. Yamamoto did not, however, adjust his plan. He like his collesagues were suffering from Victory Disease. He believed that he Americans were so weakened that four carriers (Akagi, Hiryu, Kaga, and Soryu) were sufficient. The result was a diasater at Midway where the four carriers that were the heart of Kido Butai would be lost.
The loss of four fleet carriers crippled Yammotos effort to bring about a major fleet action to destroy the Pacific Fleet, but he Unitd Stes also lost cvrriers snd the Amrican Arsenl of Democracy was only beginning to delver new fleet units. The Japanes continud to pursue Opeation FS to isolate Australia. The tried to take Port Moresy, this time by crossing the Owen Stanly Mountains. And they also moved south in the Solomons, building an air base on Guadalcanal to project air power furher south along the Australian coast. Admiral King was determined despite the Germaby irst ictim to follow up on the Midway victory and seize the iniative from Japan. The First Marine Division landed on the island (August 1942), setting in motion a bruising 6 monhs test of will. On hore the Japanese found that their fierce brutaliy cold be reurned in full measure and by a force with greater fire ower. Thecampaign was decided by series of naval actions around the island dtermining he dlvery of supplies to the island. Somehow the United States with weaker naval force won this struggle. The Japanes apparently hnin about Kanai Kessen refused to commit the needed force. Opeation FS was abandoned.
After Guadalcanl the Japanese lost he initive in the War. Their strategy was simplified. It became just to bleed the Americans. Make the drive toweard the Homne Islaands so expnsive in blood and traesure that the Americans will become so exhausted that hy will eventiually seek a negotiatd peace. They evacuated Guadalcanal, but from then on iskand garrisons wereexpcted to fight to the death and take as many Americans with them as possible. They planned some offensives butwere soon caught boof guard when the Americans opened up a new front in the Central Pacific. There the Japanese plan was tested--first at Tarawa (November 1943). There the Japanese proved that they could bleed the Americans, but the American proved that the Japanese could not hold isolated island fortresses. As Adm. Ymamoto anicipated, the Pacific Fleet was expanded beyond Japan's ability to match. The Pacific Flert was reenforced with the new Essex carriers and advanced aircraft like the F6F Hellcat and the F4U Corsair. At the same time the Pacific Fleet submarine service solved its problems and quickly cut off cargo shipments from the SRZ--the reason Japan ewent to ar n the first place. The Japanese would change their tactical defense operations but continued with their bled the Americans strategy until the end of the War. Prime-minister Tojo was replaced July 1944), but there was no strategic shift. The Marianas was a tuning point (June-July 1944). Seizing hese iskands brought the Home Islands wihin the range of American bombers. The Japanese thought they could not be bombed. But the Americans built the new B-29 Superforresses that could reach Japan. This broght on a new way of bleeding the Ameriacans--the Kamikazee. The ultimate answer to bleeding the Ameicans was atomic bomb.
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