Figure 1.--German war propaganda films were casrefullyb selected by Gioebbels. He loved Panzers, so you see panzers, Panzers nd more Pnzers. Thst is hy World War II diocumentaries are so full of them. But in fact, the German Heer was 80 percent unmotorized infantry. But Goebbels didn't like to show horses and horse carts in his propaganda films. A rational leader might have pasused before sending a largely unmotiorized army into the vast Eurasian Steppe. Hitler was, however, determined to invasde the Soviet Union and with the army at hand. And contrary to what the generals said after the War, they were on board with Hitler's commiment. The spectaculzar Successes in the West convinced them that the Heer could succeed in the East as well. They had defeated the Russian Army in World War I and were sure thy could do it sgsin.

The German Wehrmacht despite its mechanized reputation launched the War heavily dependent of horses as draft animals. The Germans actually used more horses in World War II than World War I. They had more horses than vehicles. The horses all had the advantage that they did not use gas/petrol--something which the German military had trouble obtaining in the quantity needed. German industry did not have the capacity to fully mechanize the Wehrmacht. Unlike the Allies and the Soviets, German factories never fully embraced assembly line mass production. As a result, they were not only outproduced by the Americans, but the Soviets as well. Despite having a larger industrial base, they were also out produced by the Soviets. This is why when the Ostheer plunged into the Soviet Union (June 1941), with them was not only 0.7 million horses, but large numbers of civilian vehicles seized from all over occupied Europe creating a nightmare logistical problem for German motor pools. And even with limited motorization, the Germans were unable to supply the vehicles they had with fuel. There were a range of disadvantages. Horses did no provide the mobility and speed needed for the Wehrmacht's stunning Blitzkrieg tactics. And the fodder needed for these horses further strained the already over-stretched Reichbahn. Another major problem for the Germans was the inability of German horses to withstand the rigors of the Russian winter--and it was in the East that the decisive campaign of the War was being fought--the Ostkrieg. There was a non military factor. European agriculture was largely unmechanized. And seizing so many horses affected the farm harvests. Hitler foresaw a swift victorious summer campaign as achieved in France occurred in France. Soldiers moving with horse-drawn carts was sufficient for the relatively small distances involved in the West. A quick victory was possible. The Soviet Union was a different matter. Moving East into the vastness of the Eurasian steppe with horse-drawn carts was a recipe for disaster. As winter set in at the end of Barbarossa (1941-42), huge numbers of German horses died. The Germans were still using horses in the Stalingrad campaign. There the horses were some of the last food available to Paulus' trapped Sixth Army. And they continued using them throughout the War, although they seem conspicuously absent in the Bulge. There the German offensive was premised on seizing American fuel dumps. .

Created: 1:43 AM 5/8/2023
Last updated: 1:43 AM 5/8/2023