Figure 1.-- The Versailles Peace Treaty ending World War II severely limited the German military. The Germans were not permitted large artillery pieces, tanks, or aircraft. The Germans even before Hitler, however, conducted all kinds of operations to evade the Versailles limitations. Thus they were not as far behind as might be thought. This was especially the case because the Allies significantly cut back not only on standing forces, but on weapons development. The gun here is the 10.5 cm leFH 18, the standard divisional field howitzer used by the Wehrmacht during World War II. It was used in all the major German campaigns along side that of the 75mm field gun. This one though can be used either in a flat trajectory as a gun or raised as a howitzer. Note the fine detail of the wheels, there were both metal and wood versions. It was designed and developed by Rheinmetall (1929–3 0) and entered service with the Wehrmacht after Hitler began openly rearming (1935). The photograph here looks to be taken about that time. Depending on where and when this gun could be pulled by truck or by horses.

The Germans had excellent artillery weapons in World War II. They fielded 37mm guns up to huge siege cannons, rail guns and howitzers and mortars. The German 88 is one of the best known World War II artillery pieces and arguably the single most important artillery pieces of the War. Prototype 88s were first produced in 1928 and production was increased after the NAZIs seized power. Upgrades and modifications occurred throughout the 1930s and World war II period. It was created as an anti-aircraft weapon, but became a multi-purpose gun, especially formidable as a tank killer. The Nebelwerfer multi-barreled mortar was also a very effective weapon. The German 170mm was intended for counter battery fire with very long range for a relatively mobile weapon. The 210mm howitzer was shorter ranged but fired a heavier shell. There were two major weaknesses of the German artillery arm: mobility and competitive demands. Both relate to Hitler's decesion to launch which would lead to conflict with powers that had greater industrial power than the Reich. the War against powers The Germans began the war, however, still dependent on horses to move artillery. This impeded their mobility and was a factor in the failure of Barbarossa. German draft animals were unable to withstand the rigors of the Russian winter. The Germans devoted substantial resources on giant guns. The effectiveness of German artillery was severely limited as the War progressed by the loss of air superiority. And the Germans with the onset of the strategic bombing campaign were forced to deploy a substantial part of its artillery production in the Reich around major cities, instead of at the front. The expansion of air power to an extent cut into artillery operations. At the beginning of the war, the Germans used the Stuka as mobile artillery. Horse drawn batteries as the Germans used were far more problematic. They simply could not keep up with a mechanized battle. They were slow making them vulnerable to air attack and required too much time to meet urgent needs. Thus German artillery in France and during the later phase of the fighting on the Eastern Front was largely immobile. German batteries that had barely enough transport to move their guns let alone the substantial quantities of ammunition, manpower, and other equipment were not very useful in a fluid battle front.

Industry

German industry had a substantial capacity to manufacture artillery, but it waonly a fraction of the combined industrial capacity of the countries Hitler decided to fight (Czecoslovaklia, France, Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States). The Germans achieved temporary dominance when Hitler launched a massive reamament prigram and the Democracies did not respond. Ths enormous initial gap was further narrowed when the Allies abandioned Czechoslovakia (September 1938) and Hitler was able to take over the important Koda Arms Complex untouched. The gap was further narrowed when France fell (June 1940), although the Germans never fully utilized the industrial capacity of France and other occuopied countries (except Czechoslovakia) to manufacture arms. Even with these gains, the Germans could not match the ability of its adversaries to manufacture arms, including artillery. British industry was fully mobilized by the tinme of the Bliz (September 1940) and the Luftwaffe's shiort range tactical air failed to make a dent in it. Soviet arms manufacture was set back by Barbarossa (June 1941), but arms plants were nove east beyond the Urals where the Lufrwaffe without a stategic boming force could not get at them. And after Pearrl Harbor (Decemmber 1941), American industry fully shifted to war productiion much faster than Hitler and his Japanese allies anticipated. The result was that by the end of 1942 the Germans found themselves outgunned on every front. Amazingly the Germans did not go on a full war footing until Hitler appointed Albert Speer Armanaments Minister (February) and the disaster at Stalingrad (November 1942). Speer produced amazing results, but they did not begin to match the combined industrial power of America, Britain, and the Soviet Union).

German Artilery Pieces

The Germans had excellent artillery weapons in World War II. They fielded 37mm guns up to huge siege cannons, rail guns and howitzers and mortars. The German 88 is one of the best known World War II artillery pieces and arguably the single most important artillery pieces of the War. Prototype 88s were first produced in 1928 and production was increased after the NAZIs seized power. Upgrades and modifications occurred throughout the 1930s and World war II period. It was created as an anti-aircraft weapon, but became a multi-purpose gun, especially formidable as a tank killer. The Nebelwerfer multi-barreled mortar was also a very effective weapon. The German 170mm was intended for counter battery fire with very long range for a relatively mobile weapon. The 210mm howitzer was shorter ranged but fired a heavier shell.

Military Doctrine

The Germans and other countries developed similar artillery doctrines in World War I and artillery was the single most important killer during the War. Artillery arms faced a range of problems. One of the most important was the lack of radios. Radio technology was developing, but not sufficently to equip front line units, especially those in motion. Telephone lines had to be strung. Artillery battery were positioned in safe locations behind the lines. On the the Western Front this meant behind the tenvhes. Often cover was sought such as a woods. The forward observer in observation posrs (OPs) were located in the trenches and connected with the battery by stringing field telephone wire. The OPs could help target enemy trenches, but was generally unable to find targets beyond the front lines. This included transport lines, supply depots, troop concentrations, artillery batteries, ect. This is what the air war was all about, especuially in the first 3 years of the War--finding enemy targets andd avanced information on ememy attacks, also potential artillery targetrs. In World War II, the German artillery arm played a much less important role than in World War I, with the exception of its used in tanks and motioruzed gyns. Much of the German artillery was moved by horses and much too slow to effeectively partucipate in Blitzkrieg agains a well prepared enemy force. The Germans used their artillery fir a range of purposes in destroying anti-tank guns, tanks, and artillery. Lesser uses included counterbattery, smoke screens, and harrassment fire. The Germans had several novel inovations: special artillery observation tanks (Beobachtungswagen) as well as halftracks. The Germans sought tomachieve fire superiority by coordination infantry and artillery attacks as well as air attacks. This was the key to the early German victories. The Luftwaffe was developed as a ground support force, essentially highly mobile artillery. Thuis required achieving air superiority which the Germas gradually lost as the war progressed. Germans artillet doctrine included the the coordination of flat and high-trajectory weapons so that all 'dead spaces ' were covered by fire. Shortages of communicatuin equipment (especailly radios), commonly impeded the full application of this objective. German military doctrine stressed the importance of combined arms, tanks (mobile artillery) and infantry. Static artillery was seen as playing a supporting role, in contrast to the central one that was part of their military doctrine on the Eastern Front where the War was in large measure decided. German deployment of artillery assetts was also different from that if the Sovviets.

Technology

Most of the major advances in artllery technology occurred in the early 20th centyury, before and during World War I. There were subsequent refinements, but not major advances. Thus the Germans did not have a technical superority over the artilery arms of the various armies they encountered on the battlefied. And after the falm of France they encountered major armies with well equipped artillery forces (Britain, Soviet Uniin, and the United States). Worse still from the German point of view, these countries fielded much larger artillery arms than the Germans could muster. There were two important artillery technical advances during the War: anti-tank guns and proximity fuses. In terms of anti-tank guns, including the guns mounted on armored vehicles, the Germans had a clear advantage. The 88-mm gun was a superb tank killer and the Allies stryggled to match it. The Germans were, however, unable to fully exploit thei technical advantage for a number of reasons. The Allies produced tanks in such numbers that they overwealmed German defennses, even those armed with the 88s. And the different battle fields as well as the need to defend their cities fronm air attack meant that the 88s were never available in the numbrs needed on the frontn line. And growing Allied air power gave the Allies tank killing and artillery projectiion that the Germans could not match with staic 88 and other artillery pieces. This was matched by a growing disparity in the overall artilery arms and the grradual develoopment of effective Allied anti-tank guns. The other major technical advances was proximity fuses, but this was an American advance at first only used in the OPacific (out of fear that thev secret would fall into Axis hands). The Americans only introduced the proximity fuses in Europeafter the Germans launched the Buklge Offensive (December 1944).

Weaknesses

There were two major weaknesses of the German artillery arm: mobility and competitive demands. It was not the quality of German artillery, but rather the ability to deoploy it and compete with alrger artillery arms of the countries the Germans attempted to defeat. Both relate to Hitler's decesion to launch which would lead to conflict with powers that had greater industrial power than the Reich. This might have worked if the Whermacht gained quick victories like the one in France (June 1940). But the Panzers were stopped at the Channel and then failed in the Sioviet Uniion (December 1941). The Whermach found itself having to fight the combined output of British, Soviet and American German industry. German artillery suffered from poor mobility. The Heer was not a fully mechanized force. The Germans were still dependent on horses to move artillery. This impeded their mobility. This was a factor in the failure of Barbarossa. German draft animals were unable to withstand the rigors of the Russian winter. The expansion of air power to an extent cut into artillery operations. At the beginning of the war, the Germans used the Stuka as mobile artillery. Horse drawn batteries as the Germans used were far more problematic. They simply could not keep up with a mechanized battle. They were slow making them vulnerable to air attack and required too much time to meet urgent needs. Thus German artillery in France and during the later phase of the fighting on the Eastern Front was largely immobile. German batteries that had barely enough transport to move their guns let alone the substantial quantities of ammunition, manpower, and other equipment were not very useful in a fluid battle front. The Germans devoted substantial resources on giant guns which diverted already scarce resources. The effectiveness of German artillery was severely limited as the War progressed by the loss of air superiority. And the Germans with the onset of the strategic bombing campaign were forced to deploy a substantial part of its artillery production in the Reich around major cities, instead of at the front.

Sources

Poeland, Daryl and Kat. "Artillery notes: National doctrine and procedures.

Created: 10:26 PM 1/22/2014
Spell checked: 1:53 PM 1/23/2014
Last updated: 1:53 PM 1/23/2014