Figure 1.--Too often, Red Army artillery is credited with victory in the Ostkrieg. As in World War I, artillery was the real killer in combat. (In World War II, artillery generally was responsible for half of casualties and even more of lethal casualties.) It was the failure of Red Army artillery that led to the huge Soviet casualties. It was the Red Army infantry and tank forces that won the Ostkrieg--at huge cost. Even in the great victories like Stalingrad and Kursk the Red Army suffered far more casualties than the Germans--virtually unprecesented in warfare, especially for the defensive force. The reason for this was primarily because the German artillery was so much more effective. The inadequacies of Red Army artillery could only be made up by massive infantry casualties. The Soviet Union suffered far more military casualties than any other World War II combatant. This Red Army officer was killed minutes after the photogograoh was taken--a relection of inadequte Red Army artillery preparation. Superior German artillery support was so often the cause of Soviet casulties. Notice that the soldiers behind him are not bas enthisiastic.

At the time of World War II, the Soviet Red Army had the largest artillery and tank forces in the world. Most of the artillery was not very mobile--moved by horses. (The Gernanbs also mived rtillery with horses, but hd sone highly mobile forces.) The Soviet focus was on producing artillery pieces (tubes), a part of Stalin's industrialization program. There were, however, serious weaknesses. 1) Less attention was given to producing the vehicles to move rtillery. 2) Less attention was given to ammunition, a little more complicated than producing the tubes. The ammunition meant nitrates and the Soviet chemical industry was less advanced than the German. 3) In part because of Stalin's purges, these formations were broken up and the officer corps dispirited. Many high-rnking, experienced commanders were killed or imprisoned in the Gulag. Stalin's purge of the Red Army damaged the artillery branch- but not as much as other branches. Lower ranks responsible for atillery command and control wee not as affected by the purges. These men required training and math skills. These were skills that could not be learned over night. And the Germans had an advantage with a better educated population and more advanced electronics industry. 4) Radio communication was important for effective command and control. Snd here the Germans hd another advntage with a much larger electoonics industry. This was anb rea largelky neglected by Stalin's industriuslization efforts. After the NAZI-Soviet Pact, Stalin moved large forces west into the areas seized in cooperation with their German ally. When the Germans struck (June 1941), Red Army units including artillery had been moved out of prepared positions and into vulnerable positions along the border. Thus large quantities of artillery was destroyed or seized by the Germans. The Soviets did their best to move arms plants east beyond the Urals. These plants gradually began coming on line (1942) and were producing artillery in great quantity (1943). But not ammunition,. The ammunition plants were in Ukraine and could not be moved. As a result of Oprerastion Barbarossa (June 1941), the Soviet Union lost two-thirds of its ammunition productions. Much of the Red Army's ammunition plants were lost during Barbarossa. Artillery tube production was restarted beyond the Urals and much attention was given to it. But much of the production was light 76 mm guns. Actual data on Red Army artillery is difficult to come, but much of it was light 76 mm guns. The Germans had more heavier guns, a great many 105 mm guns. What Soviet data does exist often mixes in motors. The Red Army may have had more tubes, but the idea that the Red Army had a huge advantage in artillery is not born out by actual facts. And the Germans actually had an an advantage because of their greater number of heavy artillery tubes , especially 105 mm guns. We know that even in battles that the Soviets would eventually win that they sustained far greater casualties than the Germans. We wondered about them, just what was causing all those casualties? It was common for Soviet casualties to outnumber German casualties 3-4 to 1. Even at Kursk where the Soviets had built massive defensive belts and fortifications, the Soviet casualties were enormous far in excess of the attacking German forces. One young historian has studied the statistics, explained it. Because artillery was the the major killer, it must have been the difference in the artillery. [Todorov] In the Red Army developed enormously during the War and by the end of the war there were complete artillery divisions. The basic guns were sound and were produced in huge numbers. American Lend-Lease trucks helped greatly with mobility. Russian artillery soon reprtedly surpassed German artillery in numbers of pieces, although reliable data is lacking. Russian offensives involved huge, massed artillery bursts--materielschlacht. This huge initial bombardment actually was a weakener in the artillery branch. [Glantz] Available data shows that whatever the number of tubes, the Germans were constantly firing more tonnage of artillery (130-160 percent). [Isaev] The Germans may have had a smaller artillery components (in number of tubes), but it proved far more deadly because it had heavier artillery and a far more accurate targeting system. The Soviets while they had tubes lacked the larger numbers of heavier artillery the Germans had. The Soviets also had weak fire control systems. Nor were they producing the ammunition they needed. Here American Lend-Lease helped save the Soviets, bith by prividing muniton, but also communictions equipmnt.

Sources

Glantz.

Isaev, Alexiey (2010).

Todorov, Sasho. "Red god of war: Soviet artillery" WW2TV (October 1, 2021).

Created: 10:42 PM 7/31/2022
Last updated: 1:13 PM 8/7/2022