Figure 1.--Famed World War II photograoher Robert Capa was in Chartres for the liberation of tis beautiful Chartres cathedral town (August 18). Hesnapped this image. The unidentified boy does not seen as exited as the adults. The tank is the Renault R35, the primary French battle tank at the onset of the War. Large numbers of French tanks were turned over to the Germans after the fall of France (June 1940). The Germnans used them for many purposes. They were obsolete in front-line service by 1944. We suspect that the Germans had incoroporated this one into their Atlantic Wall defenses. It may have been recovered by the Resistance. It looks like the turret has been reversed and is facing backwards. You can see large open compartment with a type of shock spring in view and that would never be in the front. Also it looks like there is a small hole in turret next to cannon where a light machine gun might have already been removed. Click on the image for a fuller discussion.

The French built some excellent tanks before the War. They were, however, not equipped with radios nor did the French develop effective tank tactics. The irony of the German victory in the West and the legend of the Panzer Corps is that the French possessed a tank that was superior to the German Mk IIIs, the mainstay of the Panzer Corps during the Battle of France. The French were, however, stuck on fighting World War II like a continuation of World War I and disipated their potential armored strength by spreading out their tanks in small groups assigned to support infantry groups defend the Maginot Line. Only General Charles de Gaulle who commanded an actual armored division had a concept of modern tank war. He used his tanks in attacks on the German flanks and supply columns but never got the support from the high command and used up most of the French tanks. Some of the French tanks that were captured were apparently turned over to the NAZI allies, but we do not yet have any details on this. The only non-German made tanks used by the Panzer corps were made by the Skoda works in NAZI-occupied Czechoslovakia. We do not know if the Germans bothered to study the French tanks for technical innovations that might be useful in their tank design. We also do not have details about the French tank factories and how they were used. Some reports suggest they built substantial numbers of tanks for the Germans. Many were modified as motorized artillery, including tank killers for use on the Eastern Front where the Germans encountered huge numbers of Soviet tanks and other atmored vehicles. We would be very interested in hearing from readers who are knowledgeable about French tanks.

French Tanks

The French Army entered World War II with generally excellent weapons, including tanks and artillery. The French had converted their factories and industrial economy to war time profuction. New weapms systems were being developed. And French companies and design bureaus were actively engaged in weapons research. The French built some excellent tanks before the War. They were, however, not equipped with radios, a vital component of mobile warfare. The irony of the German victory in the West and the legend of the Panzer Corps is that the French possessed a tank that was superior to the German Mk IIIs, the mainstay of the Panzer Corps during the Battle of France. The French built tanks at Renault, Societe d' Ouillage Mecanique et d' Usinage d' Artillerie (SOUMA) in Paris, and other fctories.

Renault UE1 and UE2 Chenillette

The Renault UE Chenillette was a light tracked armored carrier which the French built before the War and during the first year of the War in large numbers (1932-40). Although sometimes classified as a light tank, it was an armored tracked vehicle primarily used as a tow and supply vehicle for use in combat conditions. The French used it to tow and supply small artillery pieces, It was desisned (1930) and the cotract to build it f=given to Renault. Renault also built the associated UK trailer. As the possibility of war increased, France awarded Renault a contract for the mass oroduction of the UE2. The French built over 5,000 of these vehicles. Renault also licensed production in Romania. They were delivered to French infantry divisions to help move artillery. The standard Renault UE was not armored. These vehicles give rise to some misunderstanding in discussion of World War II tanks. We note very large numbers that some authors assign to the number of French tanks or the numbers of French tanks used by the Germans. This usually involved adding the unarmed UEs to the French numbers. The Germans did arm captured UEs, but the French rarely did so.

Char B-1

The Char B1 was a heavily armored French designed to penetrate and break through enemy lines. It was initually designed as a self-propelled 75-mm howitzer. Only later was a 47-mm gun in a turret added, The French adopted this configuration as a Char de Bataille--battle tank to engage enemy armor. It was supplied to French armored divisions which were mostly tied to infantry firmations. Development began after World War I (early-1920s). There were extensive delays and repeated modifications. The result was a vehicle that included dated conceots, very complex, and expensive to build. Production of the Char B1 "bis" began (late-1930s). By this time it was already obsolete. An uparmoured version, the Char B1 "ter", was developed, but large-scale production had not yet begun when the Germans invaded (1940). The Char B-1 had some assetts, it was heavily armored and had a gun capable of destroying German armor. It was however both sloe and a fuel guzzler, characteristics that made it poorly suited for mobil tank warfare.

Renault R-35

The Renault Char léger Modèle 1935 is commonly referredcto as the R-35. It was a light infantry tank. Desisigning began (1933) and it wentbinto production (1936). It was designed to support infantry operations not to battle enemy armor. Its main armament was a short 37-mm gun. It was assigned to autonomous tank battalions assigned to infantry divisions. For such a purpose it had adequate armor. And it had innivative sloping aemor. It did not, however, have adequate armor or a high-velocity gun to take on German tanks. It was also slow. When war was declared (September 1939), thec French began to realize they needed a tank capable of engaging German armor. The French rushed an upgrade into production with a more powerful gun--the R-40 (April 1940). Plans were underway to develop more powerful, faster variants. At the time of the Battle of France (Msy0June 1940), the R-35 was the orimary tank in the French inventory and its inability to engage German armor left the French infantry exposed. (At gthe time there were no light infantry anti-tank weapons.) The French built about 1,685 of these tanks. The French exported the R-35 to theur allies (Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia) as well as Turkey.

SOUMA S-35

The SOMUA S-35 was built as a medium Cavalry tank. Productiin began (1936) and continued until the German invasion (1940). It was a relatively manuerveable tank which was well armor and armed. It was capable of engaging the German Panzerkampfwagen Mark III, the mainstay of the German Panzer fofce in the Battle of France (May-June 1940). It had advanced sloping armor. The cast armor sections, however, made it expensive to manufacture and maintain in the field. The SOMUA S-35 was an effective tank in 1940, but only about 430 were builtand deliverec to French units. And faulty French battlefield doctrine meant vthat they had little impoact on stemming the German invasion. The French developed an uograde, the Souma S-40. It had improved suspension, lowered hull cast and welded turret armour. The French had planed to begin producion (July 1940). By that time. of course, France had fallen and opriduction never begun.

Tactical Doctrine

The French develop effective tank tactics.The French were, however, stuck on fighting World War II like a continuation of World War I. French battle doctine was fixed on defense based on the Maginot Line. Tanks were to be held in reserve and used to plug any openings the Germans may achieve. To do this they disipated their potential armored strength by spreading out their tanks in small groups assigned to support infantry groups defend the Maginot Line. Like the standard battlefield dictrine of the day, the French believed in dividing their tanks into infantry and cavalry formations and dispersing them in infantry formations. Only the Germans believed in forming armored (Panzer) divisions that could be massed for battle. The French Army based on the huge losses experienced in iffensive operations during World War I, developed a defensive bsttle doctrine structured around the Maginot Line. The French tanks were built and deployed in furtherance of this doctrine.

Battle of France (May-June 1940)

Unlike Poland, France was not surrounded by the Germans and Soviets and it had a substantial armored force. France had one of the largest tank forces in the world. Most of the French tank force, however, consisted of the under-gunned R-35 which was not capable of engaging the German Panzers. The French had not conceived of massed armor battles before the War, beliving that the artillery of the Maginot line would blunt any German armored thrusts. The Char B1 did destroy some German tanks, but the French tanks were positioned to defend the Maginot Line not to stop a German breakthrough in the Ardennes where the Germans had massed their armor. The small mumber of narrow roads in the Ardennes created a huge traffic jam. French air strikes and massed armored could have stopped the Germans during tge first few days of battle, but the dipersal of French planes and armor meant that the French were not caoable of reacung swiftly. Once the breakout from the Ardennes was achieved, it was no longer possible to stop the Germans because so much of the French Army was cimmitted to largely imobile formations defending the Maginot line. The British thrusting north to save the Dutch, were caught ioff guard. They threw their armor into the battle, but did not yet understand the importance of anti-tank guns in armored warfare. Only General Charles de Gaulle who commanded an actual armored division had a concept of modern tank war. He used his tanks in attacks on the German flanks and supply columns but never got the support from the high command and used up most of the French tanks. The German Panzer force in 1940 had serious weaknesses, but it was highly maneuverable and aggressuively commited to battle. France in 1940 had begun a major upgrade of its tank force, but it was too late to save the country.

German Occupation

The German occupation of France was a major factor in the War. Hitler thought he would gain the resources he needed in The East. This proved not to be the case. Rather, the Germans were able to loot the French economy to support their war effort. A U.S. War Department assessment after the fall of France suggested that because of the quality of French military equipment, "It was therefore reasonable to expect not only that large quantities of captured war material would come into general use in the Axis armies, but that the Germans would endeavor to swing the whole industrial resources of occupied France into the manufacture of advanced French designs, in addition to normal German equipment, for use by the Axis." [U.S. War Department] The Germans did indeed use French industry to support their war effort. And this was in part an aspect of Marshall Pétain's policy of collaboration. As far as we can tell, however, they used the existing plants and weapons systems. They did not, however, use French research and scientific capabilities. It is unclear to what extent this was Vichy or German policy. The Germans would have not trusted the French to have conducted advanced research on an important weapons system. The Germans, for example, made no attempt to use the French institutes working on nuclear physics. The Germans modified some of the captured French weapons, but French weapons research and developmnt as far as we can tell, ceased with the occupation. German war goals were to ensure that France would never again be a great power that would threaten the Reich. After the War, France would have been broken up into several separate states under German supervision. They would have used existing provincial divisions which wre once very important. Thus the Germans did not want to preserve any scientific and technical capabilities that France possessed to develop modern weaponry. Inteligence reports indicated that French tanks were being sent to Germany as well as damaged French tanks that had been repaired. In addition the manufacture of French types was continuing on a large scale at the largely undamaged French plants. A report from an Axis industrialist says that by July 1941, French plants had produced 5,000 tanks for the Germans. [U.S. War Department] That sounds like a very high estimate, but we do not yet have any actual documented French production figures. If French production was even a fraction of that for the Germans it would mean that France played a more important role in German war production than is generally recognized. We suspect that the 5,000 figure if it was a realistic estimate at all, probably refers to captured French equipmen and includes the Renault UE Chenillette vehicles which were not really tanks.

Axis Usage of French Tanks

Some of the French tanks that were captured were apparently turned over to the NAZI allies, but we do not yet have any details on this. The only non-German made tanks used by the Panzer corps were made by the Skoda works in NAZI-occupied Czechoslovakia. We do not know if the Germans bothered to study the French tanks for technical innovations that might be useful in their own tank design. We also do not know what happened to the French tank factories and how they were used. We have found some intelligence reports, but are not sure just how accurate they are. We would be very interested in hearing from readers who are knowledgeable about French tanks.

German usage

The Germans made various uses of captured French tanks and other tracked vehicles. This addressed a major problem the Germans had when they invaded the Soviet Union (June 1941). The Wehrmacht was not fully mechanized. They relied on horses for both logistics and to move artillery. For the same reason the Germans also utilized the production of French truck factories. We note a variety of reports as to how the French trucks and other French tracked vehicles were used, but we can not yet confirm these reports. We believe that the French tanks were especially important for Barbarossa--the inital German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941). Had it not been for the French tanks and other motor vehicles. Without French equipment, whole German units would have been unmechanized when they entered the Soviet Union. One source reports, "In August 1940, Hitler already decided that in further enlargement of the Army, the possibility of a campaign against Soviet Russia had to be considered. By the time this campaign began in June 1941, 84 more divisions were created. Just before Barbarossa, 88 infantry divisions, 3 motorized infantry divisions and 1 Panzerdivision were largely equipped with French vehicles. Without the extensive booty from the western campaign of 1940, these units would have remained without weapons and vehicles. Motor vehicles in particular played an important role in the motorization the divisions. The 18.PzD was equipped with strictly stock French motor vehicles until the end of May 1941. Among the trucks, the 4.5-ton Citroën Type 45 attained a certain significance. The 1-ton Peugeot was also seen often. The same was true for the French halftrack (Somua MCL and MCG, Unic P107 etc.) towing vehicles, which were used as tractors in the Panzerjäger units, infantry gun companies and motorized artillery units. Most of the motor vehicles (German, French or other booty trucks) massively used for various transports were not to have long lives under the rough conditions of the Eastern theatre of war. The progressive deterioration of the German army's motor vehicle situation already in the autumn of 1941 led to numerous use and new production of French trucks and also to the transformation of about 200 French tanks into towing vehicles/tractors (Renault and Hotchkiss Mörserzugmittel / Artillerie-Schlepper)."[ Captured & Converted French Vehicles] While tanks often get the most attention, French trucks and other vehicles played a major role in Barbarossa.
Renault UE Chenillette tracked carriers: The Renaukt UEs were built in large numbers. They were a light armored tracked tow vehicle and carrier. The French built them in large numbers and the Germans captured many of them. The Germans modified many of them and employed them for a wide range of uses on the Eastern Front. The Germans did not like the idea that they were not armed and often added machine-guns, antitank-guns and rocket artillery. Unlike American boys who had considerable familiaity with cars, trucks, and farm vehicles. As a result, the NAZIs established the Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps (National Socialist Motor Corps-NSKK), originally a SA unit. The goal was to help German youth develop familiraity witnh motor vehicles, both driving and maintaing them. The associated Motor HJ was also one of the Hitler Youth specualized units. One report indicated that that the NSKK was training drivers and mechanics for Heer mechanized units on captured French Chenillette tracked carriers (February 1941). These were small tractors that could tow a tracked trailer in which an 81-mm mortar or lighter artillert like a light antitank weapon could be carried. And as they were armored, they could be used in a combat environment like a Bren carrier.
Char B1 tanks: The Germans reportedly used some of the captured 31-ton French Char B1 (bis) tanks. They were apparently mostly rebuilt as flamethrowers and mechanised artillery. This was part of a wider German effort to mount heavy guns on tank chassis. An intelligence report the CharB1s were being used for this purpose (July 1941). The Germans were fitting a 450-horsepower engine to the French vhasis and mounting their multipurpose 88-mm gun which proved to be a very effective tank killer. [U.S. War Department]
Renault R-35 tanks: The R35 was built by Renault. An the time Barbarossa was launched, there was a report that an estimated 400 French R35 tanks at a factory in the Reich were being modified for use as tank destroyers. The Germans removed the turret and replaced it with an open-roofed armored box shield (June 1941). The Germans mounted a Czech 47-mm antitank gun and a coaxial machine gun. This configuration theoretically provided a traverse of 50 degrees for the main armament. The thickness of the armored shied was said to be 25 mm in front, 20 mm at the sides, and 15 mm in the rear. The Germans were reportedly doung the same for the now outdated Mark I tanks. Photographs from German magazines showed the R35s in use durin Barbarossa. Another report indicated tht French tanks were being used in substantial numbers. There was, however, only one unit confirmed to be using the R35s--the 10th Reserve Tank Battalion. This was a training unit which uses them for training only. Some of the R-35s apparently had been modified with a better suspension, a more powerful Hotchkiss engine, and a somewhat changed silhouette.
SOUMA S-35 and variants: There are reports that the French Somua S35 was used by the Germans. The Germans concococted a version of the S-35 remamed the Char S-40. It had a more powerful engine and a better suspension. Another SOUMA type was the SOUMA S-4O. The Germans mounted a long barreled 75-mm gun in the Souma chasssis. It is unclear if these changes were made in the Reich or at the SOUMA factory in Paris.
Armored cars: The French also had armored cars. A German described that French armored cars with armament 'just like a German Mark II Tank' were being bused. The French Panhard 178 AMD 35 armored car was an 8-ton 4-wheeled type with 18-mm front and side armor and mounting one 25-mm quick-firing gun and one machine-gun. The U.S. War Department reported that this French armored car 'may be in course of adoption by the German armored division. Its speed of 50 miles an hour makes this type a very efficient vehicle for its intended purpose.' [U.S. War Department]

Italian usage

The Germans also turned over some French armor to their Italian ally. The Italians entered the War (June 1940) with a very weak, untested armored component. They were largely obselete light tanks with small guns and thin armor. Their weakness was quickly apparent when the Italians attacked British forces in Egypt (September 1940). The Italians got both the R35 and SOUMA tanks as well as the the obsolete FT type. These were gifts from the Germans, not tanks actually captured by the Italians. These tanks were part of the The Italians promptly equipped two battalions with the R35s. We have no information on modifications if any. Italian units were identified with French tanks, including 2d Tank Battalion of the the 4th Tank Regiment at Rome. The Italians also received some SOMUA tanks. There was also a battalion "Somua" with the 4th Tank Regiment at Rome. [U.S. War Deparment] Both R-35 battalions were used to resist the Allied landings in Sicily (1943). Some were dug in and used as fixed fortifications. Others were used in mobile operatiins. Few survived the fighting. Italy subsequently surrendered to the Allies and switched sudes in the War (September 1943). The Germans rpossessed Some of the French tanks at this time. The SOMUAs were reportedly used againsdt the Germans in the fighting for Sardinia. Some units were re-possessed by the Germans after the Italian Armistice in 1943. Modifications are unknown.

Problem

The Germans had a serious problem when they invaded the Soviet Union (June 1941). The Soviet Union was a huge country with a massive, heavily armed military. And if that was not daunting enough, the Whermact in contrast to popular perceptions was not fully mechanized. The Germans relied heavily on draft animals, escpecially horses, for both logistics and artillery. Thus for Barbarossa, the Germans went through the occupied territories, requisitioning cars and trucks needed for the massive operation. This created a huge logistical problem. Spare parts were needed for the huge variety of motorized vehicles the Germans used in their Eastern campaign. And logidtics was not the German strongpoint to begin with. Using French tanks was just one further aspect complicating the German logistics nightmare. Concerning the Fench tanks and trucks, there was a further problem. The French plants were more vulnerable than the plants in the Reich. The air war began to swing against German in 1942 as tghe weight of American aitcraft production began to swing the ballance. This was first seen in the Western Desert, but also in France as the Luftwaffe began to shift forces back to the Reich to defend German cities. And French war plants along with coastal ports servicing U-boats.

Sources

Lehmann, David. "Captured & converted French vehicles in German service".

U.S. War Department. "Axis use of French mechanized equipment," Tactical and Technical Trends No. 9 (October 8, 1942). This is a war-time assessment based on often unconfirmed reports.

"Captured & Converted French Vehicles in German Service in WWII," militaryhistoryofthe20thcentury.com.

Created: 9:44 PM 11/18/2011
Last updated: 11:01 AM 9/5/2012