The Cold War: Taiwan--The Second Taiwan Straits Crisis (1958-60)

Figure 1.-- Quemoy and Matsu, just a few miles of the coast of China. Quemoy was only a mile off the coast, within easy range of Communist artillery fire. This gave Mao the ability to turn a crisis on and off. Photographs like this appered in Americn newspapers. The press copy read, "Fortified Home on Quemoy: Woman with four-yearold son looks out from entrance to one od the shelters in Kwan Li, Quemoy small village of some 45 families which is one of the hardest hit by Red artillery fire from Communist China mainland. The natives are kept busy digging additionl trenches and shelters to protect them against heavy shelling by the Reds." The photograph was dated October 2, 1958.

Mao as a result of the American military commitment to Taiwan, began for a while to rethink his strategy of PRC military invasion, he bgan talking about a peaceful settlement (1955-56). Chiang was, however, adament about the ROC garisioning Quemoy and Matsu. Mao began to rethink his Taiwan policy again (1958). A range of factors probably affected his decesion. Here Sinologisdts can only speculate. The Great Leap Forward was probably a major factor. This effort to monilize the Chinese masses to rapidly transform the Chinese economy and industry was a huge effort. Seizing Taiwan by military force would have help to achieve popular support. But as the effort began to go bad, Taiwan became even more important. Using foreign advedntures to divert people from domestic failure is a time-honored tradition of dictators. And success on Taiwan would be a major achievement for his regime. The increasing American opresence in Taiwan and the lack of any progress as a result of his moderate approach. He decided to adopt more confrontational policies. Mao claimed he wanted "to teach the Americans a lesson" for interfearing in Chinese affairs. The developing Chinese-Soviet rift was probably another factor. Mao's saw the use of force as a matter of status and a way of demonstrating his independenve from the Soviets. After Stalin;s death he saw himseldf as the senior Communisdt leader. Mao ordered the shelling of the offshore islands to be resumed (August 1958). Communist Chinese peropaganda painted the Americans as imperialist aggressors. The United States responded forcefully. President Eisenhower restated America's commitment to defend Taiwan and added a commitment to the offshore islands which were not specifically mentioned in the Formosa Resolution. He enforced his verbal commitment by sending a substantial naval contingent to the Taiwan Straits. Mao decided to end the shelling and pursue a peaceful settlement (October 1958). While Mao turned the Taiwan Straits crisis on and off, he carefully limited hostilities to shelling Nationalist positions on the offshore islands. There were no attacks on American ships or planes. The Chinese made wide use of the shelling in both domestic and foreign propaganda. There was also aircombat because the distances gave the Chinese an advntages over the islands. The United States reacted by supplying Sidwwinfer missles to the ROC Air Force, redressing the advantage in numbers the PRC had. Quemoy and Matsu although of minimal importance was given enormous attention in the American media and even figured in the Kennedy-Nixon presidential debates (1960). After that they faded from Cold War discussions.

Created: 1:58 PM 3/8/2016
Last updated: 1:58 PM 3/8/2016