World War II: National Military Combat Effectiveness


Figure 1.--Field Marshal Montgomery was susposed to take Caen on the first day of D-Day (June 6, 1944). It took him 6 weeks. The British and Canadians fiinaly entered Caen (July 20). The reason for this was the incredible resistance of the 12th SS Hitler Youth Division. It was a newly formed, but an incredibly effvctive unit. The Division was basically destroyed because the boys literally fought to the death. Here are three boys of the 12th SS Hitler Youth Division who have just been awarded their Iron Crisses.

National pride complicates the assessment of combat effectiveness. Stephen Ambrose writes eloquenly about the soldiers of democracy when describing the U.S. Army. Unfortunately the facts clearly suggest that the German Wehrmacht, especially the Heer was the most effective armed force in World War II. Given the brutality and criminal nature of the Wehrmacht, this is a bitter pill to swallow, but the facts lead to no other conclusion. In The opening campaigns the Germans were able to prevail without numerical superiority. In the all important Western campaign, the Germans had numerical superiority at the point of contact, but this was only because of Allied incompetence. The Germand and Allied (Polish, Dutch, Belgin, French, and British) were comparable, but the failure to develop an effective Allied strategy led to German victory. Beginning with Barbarossa, the Germans never faced a comparable force. The Soviets had a much larger army an once American entered the war, the Germans faced forces tht were better supplies with superior air support. In the East the Germans could prevail if they faced comparable forces or eevn forces twice as large, fortunatly for humanity, they commonlyfced forces three time or ben larger. And as Anerican Lend Lease arrived in quntity, a Red Army with greater mobility. In the West they faced an emeny with resources that the German war economy could not bagin to match. German divisions requited only a fraction of the supplies an American division required. But the Western Allies so outnumbered the Germans that the fight proved hopeless. Ground down in the ast, the Germams in the West could do little more than bottle up the allies in Normabdy for a few weeks. What is not fully understood is how the Wehrmact could fight as long and effectively as they did for so long, even as the War was clealy lost. The Japnese soldier was alo effective, fantically committed, bur unlike the Germans, the Japanese Army leadership was largely incompetent and the soldiers were poorly armed.

National Pride

National pride complicates the assessment of combat effectiveness. Authors commonly want to put theur country's soldiers in the best light. Stephen Ambrose writes eloquenly about the soldiers of democracy when describing the U.S. Army. Unfortunately the facts clarly suggest that the German Wehrmacht, especially the Heer was the most effective armed force in World War II. Given the brutality and criminal nature of the Wehrmacht, this is a bitter pill to swallow, but the facts lead to no other conclusion.

Germany

The Wehrmact had many strengths which were on display from the first day of the War (September 1, 1939). German military strengths brought great victories at the beginning of World War II as they had at the start of World War I. The Germans had the most competent officer corps in the world. The Gro�er Generalstab (Great General Staff) was a key element in the strnth of the Garman Army. Erwin Rommel got a lot of attention becauses of his successes in the West. There were a substantial number of German commanders in the East of comparable skillm byr did not get the attention Rommel got, not only because they were not facing the Western Allies, but because the Soviets neither allowed Western journalists to report on military campigns or released much detail about the fighting on the Eastern Front. This level of skill was the work of the work Gro�er Generalstab. The Germans were well armed thanks to the massive NAZI rearmameht porogram. The Germans were better prepared because other countries were trying to avoid fighting another war and limited military spending. The Gro�er Generalstab had also developed the highly effectivectactical battle doctrine known as Blitzkrieg--combined mixed arms tactics, essentially modern warfare. It would take the British nearly 4 years tomadopt thee tactics. The Soviets and Americans were faster learners. And if all of this was not enough, the NAZIs added an ideological construct that appsaled to many Germans and was imposed on those who did not share their values. The Hitler Youth (HJ) program was very effective in preparing German youth for the War, both ideologically and the skills needed.

Western Allies

In The opening campaigns the Germans were able to prevail without numerical superiority. In the all important Western campaign, the Germans had numerical superiority at the point of contact, but this was only because of Allied incompetence. The Germand and Allied (Polish, Dutch, Belgin, French, and British) were comparable, but the failure to develop an effective Allied strategy led to German victory. Beginning with Barbarossa, the Germans never faced a comparable force. British commanders from an early point in the War realized that that man for man and unit unit for unit, Germn soldiers and German units out classed them. It was not something that they said in public or even in their mrmoirs, but it was something they discussed among thmselves. Prime-Minister Churchill after hearing a report from Chief of Staff Alan Brooke to the War Cabinet about the fifging in Tunisia said, "Not happy about fighting in the north, we uniformily had the worst of it. Looks as if Germany is beating us unit for unit, despite the fact that we had the greater artillery than the emeny." [Burgis] Several historians have commented on this. One historian who looked into the issue in detail writes, "In 1943-44 the German combat effectiveness superiority over the Americans and British was in the order of 20-30 percent. On a man-for-man basis, the German ground soldiers consistentky inflicted casualties about a 50 % higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had local numericl supperiority and when, as was usually the case, they were iutnumbered , when they had local air superiority and when they did not, whe n they won and when they lost." [Dupuy, pp. 253-55.] The German performance was impressive. A prominent British World War II historian writes, "It was an astoinishing achievement, and one that Brooke and Churchill recognized privately but of course could never publicaly acknowledge. The battles at Kasserine Pass, Anzio, Monte Casino, Caen, Arnhem and the Ardennes forced the deeply uncomfortable fact upon both the British and American High Commands that the Germans even in defeat, were formidable fighters against whom significant numerical superiority on the ground and in the air was needed." [Roberts, p. 454-55.] In the West the Germans faced an emeny with resources that the German war economy could not bagin to match. German divisions required only a fraction of the supplies an American division required. But the Western Allies so outnumbered the Germans that the fight proved hopeless. Ground down in the ast, the Germams in the West could do little more than bottle up the Allies in Normandy for a few weeks.

Soviet Military

The Red Army, Navy and Air Force before the War was severly weakened by Stalin. Stalin ordered a masive purge. Some of the vest minds in the military were simply shot are sebt to the Gulag for lave labor and ofte aslow death. Often caught up in these purges were technically competent individuals not aware of the political dangers. These were often men of inoiative aOne major targe were the bofficers who had worked with the Germans a part of the Rapallo coopertion effort (1922). Here the German and Soviet military worked on mobile armored warfare. Thus the Red Arnmy lost many of it armored warfare experts. It also meant that many commanders with and techniv\cal ininative lost out to non-entiies more disposed to follow orders with out asking questions. This was also promoted by the political commisars asigned to military units. The result was that when the Germans launched the Barbarossa invasion (June 1922), many front line Red Army units did not fire back. They had strict borders not to fire without permission. Stalin was sure that Hitler would not attack as long as the British had not been defeated. He thoughtbthevrepors he had been receiving of a German build up was British and American misinformatin seeking to instigate war between Germany and the Soviet Union. At great cost after Barbarossa, Soviet commanders began to master the combined arms Blitkrieg tactics. Combined with the superb T-34 tanks anf artillery support, the Red Army byn1943 wereable to go toe to toe with the Germans. The massive losses of 1941 and 1942 meant that the infantry never reached the same standards of the other sections of the Red Army. [Weinberg, p. 917.] The Soviets had a much larger army an once America entered the war, the Germans faced forces that were better supplied with superior mobility and air support. In the East the Germans could prevail if they faced comparable forces or even forces twice as large, fortunatly for humanity, after Stalingrad they commonly faced forces three times greater or even larger. And as Anerican Lend Lease began arriving in quntity, a Red Army with greater mobility. The Red Army repeated suffered far greater losses than the Germans even in their great victories. The Soviets proved masterful at disgising amd misdirecting German military intelligenve.

Japanese Military

The Japnese soldier was fantically committed, even more so than the Germans. And in the case of the Japamese it was noy just elite units like Waffen-SS or paratroopers that were prepared to fight to the death. The average Japanese soldier was not gpinng to surrnder no matter what the circintances. Even severely wounded soldiers refused to surrender. Japanese military commanders, especially the Army commanders lacked basic military skills. The Japanese Army leadership was largely incompetent and wiyh a few exceptions, the tactics they sucesfuly developed in China did not work against well supplied and trained Allied armies. Even so, commanders continued to use them until late in the War. The Japanese fed superior forces into Guadalcanal, but theough away tyhe advantage by reapeated mass charges into prepared Marine positions fefended by machine guns and artillery. It was not until late in the ar that Japanese commanders realized that massed bamzai charges led ny officer with sords and men with bayonets through away man power and did not achieve their goal of bleeding the Americans as well prepared defenses such as thse prepared on Plelieu and Owo Jima. There were many weaknesses asociated with Japanese military operations, epecially army operations. First, was poor qulaity small arms. This resulted from both design and manufacturing. The Japanese soldiers were poorly armed with some of the worst weapons of any World War II belligerant. Second, was the failure to develop combined arts operations. The British were slow enough here, but the Japanese had ben fighting since 1931 and still had not mastered combined arms. One problem was inadequate communications equipment Another was the almost pathological inability of the Imperial Army and Navy to copperate. This was problem in most countries. The Japanese raised distrust of the two services to inprecendented levels. The Navy did not inform the Army about what had occurred at Miday, which is one reason the army was somsuprised by tht Marine landings at Guadalcanal and initially responded su porrly to it. Third, field armies and naval units commonly reported inaccurately about combat actions. Units on Formosa (Taiwan) reported destroying Adm. Halsey's Fast Carrier Task Force (TF 38) (October 1944), affecting Japanese planning for the Battle of Leyte Gulf. We are not sure why this reporing was so poor. It may have been just poor Japanese battle asesment. Or the unwillingness or comader to admit failure. [Weinberg, p. 917.]

Reasons

What is not fully understood is how the Wehrmact could fight as long and effectively as they did for so long, even as the War was clealy lost. They had some excellent weapons, but fought effectively even with toyal Allied air supremecy. By the time of D-Day, the Allies had finally mastered close-air support and used it to great effect. The factor that kept the Germns in the field seems to have been the dogged setrmintion of the German soldier. In some instances such as the Waffen-SS. The performance of the 12th SS Hitler Youth Panzer Division was in part theur tanks, but even more important their ideological preparation. The Hitler Youth Movenent was a ruthless crime against German Youth, but it proved highly effective in preparing boys for war, providing physical conditioning, military training, and ideological preparation. A prominent World War II historian points out that a substanially larger propotrion of a German division was devoted to combat than British divisions and especially American divisiions. [Hastings] Another factor was the desire to defend Germny as the Soviets and Allies got closer and closer to the Reich. Some have argued that the terrible crimes were a factoe, fear of retribution. We are mot sure that was so important. We think the desire to defend the Fatherlnd and German women and children were more important, but this is all a matter of consideranle historical debte.

Sources

Burgis, Lawson. Papers 2/16, 29/3/1943.

Dupuy, Trevor. Genius for War.

Hastings, Max. "Their Wehrmacht was better than our army," The Washington Post (May 5, 1985).

Roberts, Andrew. The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War (Harper Collins: New York, 2011, 712p.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambrige Universit Press: New York, 2005), 1178p.







CIH -- WW II







Navigate the CIH World War II Section:
[Return to Main World War II military force page]
[Return to Main Wehrmacht page]
[Return to Main military force page]
[About Us]
[Aftermath] [Biographies] [Campaigns] [Children] [Countries] [Deciding factors] [Diplomacy] [Geo-political crisis] [Economics] [Home front] [Intelligence]
[Military forces] [POWs] [Resistance] [Race] [Refugees] [Technology] [Totalitarian powers]
[Bibliographies] [Contributions] [FAQs] [Images] [Links] [Registration] [Tools]
[Return to Main World War II page]
[Return to Main war essay page]
[Return to CIH Home page]




Created: 12:21 AM 2/21/2018
Last updated: 3:52 AM 7/27/2019