Figure 1.--Revisionist historians today question the Allied World War II strategic bombing campaign on both moral and effectiveness grounds. Often lost in the debate because of the huge destruction of German and Japanese cities is the simple fact that it was the Axis powers (especially Japan and Germany) that began bombing civilians and destroying cities. This is how the Germans left Warsaw. The press caption read, "Polish 'WAC' directs Warsaw traffic: This Polish Army girl directs traffic at an intersection in war-wrecked Warsaw, the capital of Poland. The wreckage of buildings that were shattered by bombs and now stand like skeletons in the background." The photograph was dated November 11, 1945. Photographer: Henry L. Griffin.

World War II saw the advent of strategic air operations. The combatant countries used aircraft primarily in a tactical role during World War I. The Germans conducted some bombing raids, but they were of only minor importance. The Allies were preparing a massive strategic bombing campaign in 1919, but the War ended, however, before the strategic campaign could be launched. Military experts after the War argued about the future nature of war and the role of air power. One of the most influential thinkers was an Italian strategist, Giulio Doubet. He believed that a strategic bombing force could prevent another terrible land war which had caused millions of death. He argued that the heavily armed bomber would always get through fighter and other air defense systems. And thus a country before all else should build a strategic bombing force because no country would dare invade a country with such a force. He argued that fighter defenses and close air support were wasted resources. [Doubet] It is difficult to assess the impact of Doubet's strategic thesis, but he did establish the basic alternatives available to military planners. The British pursued a dual track approach with both tactical and strategic arms. The United States at first gave great attention to building a strategic bomber, in part to avoid the casualties that would result from a land campaign--just as Doubet argued. The result was the famed B-17 Flying Fortress. The Luftwaffe was first used in Spain. Tactical operations attracted little attention, the world was, however, horrified with the destruction of Spanish cities, most notably the Basque town of Guernica (1937). The new German Luftwaffe was the principal force that cowered the British and French at Munich as well as the Czechs (1938). But it was fear of bombing, not tactical operations. With the outbreak of World War II, the NAZIs turned to terror bombing to subdue targeted nations (Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, Coventry, Belgrade, and other cities). The Luftwaffe flying close air support played a major role in the early German victories. The effectiveness of the Luftwaffe as a terror weapon depended largely on success of ground operations and the absence of a strategic bombing force led to defeat in the Battle of Britain. The fighters and medium bombers could not extend the victory in France across the Channel. Japan it its invasion of China turned to bombing of Chinese cities, apparently believing the terror impact would force the Chinese to surrender. The Japanese bombing killed civilians, but had only a minor impact on the War. The Nationalists simply withdrew into the interior where the the Japanese had difficulty ring their military superiority to bear. Chinese cities did not have industries which were essential to the War effort. More importantly, the Japanese never threatened American industry with a st rategic air campaign that would destroy or even impair the American war economy. Both German and Japanese leaders seemed to assume that only foreign cities would be the target of air raids. What was not clearly understood at the time was during the height of the Blitz, the British were building more planes than the Germans. With America's entry into the War, the initial German and Japanese superiority in the air was soon lost. The assumption that German and Japanese cities would never be bombed proved to be one of the great miscalculations in the history of war. Britain and America had the industrial capacity to build both tactical and strategic forces and the Soviets also had a substantial capacity. Britain and America built substantial forces dedicated specifically to strategic bombing. The results were devastating. Some air commanders believed that air power could be used alone to defeat the enemy. This proved to be unrealistic. The role of air power in winning the war, however, was critical.

World War I

World War I saw the advent of military air operations. The war broke out, however, only a decade after the Wright Brother's first primitive flight. As a result, unlike army and naval weaponry, the various militries had no real idea what to do with the few small aircraf=t they had. At the advent of the war, military aircraft did not even have guns. Pilots began taking up pistols and shotguns and from that begining, dedicated raid-fire guns developed. Throughout the War, aircraft were primarily used at first for reconnaissance and then gradually for limited tactical operations. Soon the ide of strategic operations xarose. The Germans conducted the first strategic bombing raids, first with their Zeppelins. These raids were used by the Allies to demonstrate the evil character of German militarism. In actuality it was probably because the Germans had Zeppelins which were capavle of carrying bombs. Early fixed-wing aircraft did not have the lift capability to carry any substantial quntity of ordinance. Techhnology developed quickly. After the Zeppelinsproved to be vulnerable targets, the Germans introduced the world's first strategic bomber--the Gotha. They proved of only only minor importance, but had a huge impact on British thinking. They carried the War to london and other British cities and when schools began to be hit created an image of the Germans that would have a profound impact on Bitish thinking. While tremendous advances were made in aviation during the War, the planes and engines simply were not adequate for strategic operations. This was beginning to change by the end of the War. The Allies were preparing a major strategic bombing campaign in 1919, but the Germans asked for an armistice, before this could be launched. Strategic bombing thus had no important role in the war, but would lead the British to give some priority to air defenses after the War. British military spending was cut the bone, but money was found for air deenses. The result was the Chain Home Network which became operational just as the Germans launched World War II. .

Inter-War Air Power Theories

Military experts after World War I argued about the future nature of war and the role of air power. In many ways this was theoretical because air ower was not fully developed durng the war and aviation technology was still at a very basic level of development. One of the most influential thinkers was an Italian strategist, Giulio Doubet. He was an Italian Fascist who argued that a strategic bombing force could prevent another terrible land war which had caused millions of death. He believed that the heavily armed bomber would always get through fighter and other air defense systems. At the time, radar had not yet been developed. Air defene systems were basically fighter patrols which requird the exendture of enormous resourcs and Doubet was correct could not prevet the bombers from getting through. The German Luftwaffe proved this. They scored great victories before having the confront the British Chain Home Network. While inter-War theorists did not take radar into acount, they were concened about chemical weapons. Despite the Geneva Cnventions, most theirits thought that the chemical weapons would be used in any future war. Doubet argued that a country before all else should build a strategic bombing force because no country would dare invade a country with such a force. He argued that fighter defenses and close air support were wasted resources. [Doubet] Early airmen like Billy Mitchell and Hugh Trenchard tended to agree with Doubet. British airmen like Hugh Trenchard and Arthur 'Bomber' Harris focused on the pdycological aspects of strategic bombing. Hitler who was only vaguely aware of th toretical debate tended to agree with the British beaue of his psycological oenhant for terror and destruction. He showed thisafter Munih when he pressured the elderly Czech President Havel by threatening to level Prague. As a result of the chaotic nature of the NAZI state, however, his air commanders built a tactical force without the ability to conduct a strategic bombing campaign. The leadership which emerged in America as Europe moved toward war was strongly influenced by Donald Wilson, an influential instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School. He promotedtheida that strategic bombing was the most effetiveuse of air power. He argued that by attacking well selected vulnerabilities such as oil or ballbearings, whole war industries could be brought to a stand still without having to destroy every factory and whole cities. Stalin s he built amassive military included the word's largest airforce, but theoretical thinking was complicated by his Great Terror which destroyed the leadership of the Red Air Force. We are unaware of Japanese air power theoriss, but as far as we can tell there was no advovates of strategic bombing nor was Japan capable of building a strategic air arm. The Japanese air fore that emerged (separte armyand navy services) were closely integrated with land and naval forces. It is difficult to assess the impact of Doubet's strategic thesis, but he did set out the basic alternatives available to military planners.

Inter War Air Forces

As a result of tethoretical dus cussions of air powe, countries pursued various air power stategies in the inter-War era. The British pursued a dual track approach with both tactical and strategic arms. The British generally accepted his arguments, giving more attention to bombers thn fifgters. The Germans ignored his argument and chose to build a tactical airforce, not having the indutrial capacity to build both a tactical and strategic force. The choice of a tactical force was not Hitler's idea. He almost certainly would have chosen a strategic bombing force. It flowed from the fact that the Luftwaffe's commanders were recruited from the Heer who were primrily interested in ground support. An Hitler seems happy enough with the medium bombers that the Luftwaffe built. Luftwaffe commanders were astute enough to know that they could build many more two engine medium bombs than four-engine heavies. Thus Hitler's penchant for destruction was appeased with numbers. American air commanders also bought the trategic bombing argument nd the idea that heavily armed bombers could fight through fighter screen to emeny targets. The United States gave great attention to building a strategic bomber, in part to avoid the casualties that would result from a land campaign--just as Doubet argued. The result was the iconic B-17 Flying Fortress. Donalls Wilson's students (Hap Arnold, Ira Eaker, and Curtis LeMay) would put his theories into pracice. They strongly sudscribed to the idea an independent air arm and the strategic projection of air power. They are now know by their setractors as the Bomber Mafia.

Public Fears

The Luftwaffe was first used in Spain. Tactical operations attracted little attention, the world was, however, horrified with the destruction of Spanish cities, most notably the Basque town of Guernica (1937). The new German Luftwaffe was the principal force that cowered the British and French at Munich as well as the Czechs (1938). But it was fear of bombing, not tactical operations.

World War II

With the outbreak of World War II, the NAZIs turned to terror bombing to subdue targeted nations (Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, Coventry, Belgrade, and other cities). The Luftwaffe flying close air support played a major role in the early German victories. The effectiveness of the Luftwaffe as a terror weapon depended largely on success of ground operations and the absence of a strategic bombing force led to defeat in the Battle of Britain. The fighters and medium bombers could not extend the victory in France across the Channel. Japan it its invasion of China turned to bombing of Chinese cities, apparently believing the terror impact would force the Chinese to surrender. The Japanese bombing killed civilians, but had only a minor impact on the War. The Nationalists simply withdrew into the interior where the the Japanese had difficulty brining their military superiority to bear. Chinese cities did not have industries which were essential to the War effort. More importantly, the Japanese never threatened American industry with a st rategic air campaign that would destroy or even impair the American war economy. Both German and Japanese leaders seemed to assume that only foreign cities would be the target of air raids. What was not clearly understood at the time was during the height of the Blitz, the British were building more planes than the Germans. With America's entry into the War, the initial German and Japanese superiority in the air was soon lost. The assumption that German and Japanese cities would never be bombed proved to be one of the great miscalculations in the history of war. Britain and America had the industrial capacity to build both tactical and strategic forces and the Soviets also had a substantial capacity. Britain and America built substantial forces dedicated specifically to strategic bombing. A major factor in effectuveness was ordinance. Strategic bombing commanders tended to opt for the big bang--high explosives. Only slowly did the far greater destructive capacity of incendaries become accepted. The results were devastating. Some air commanders believed that air power could be used alone to defeat the enemy. This proved to be unrealistic. The role of air power in winning the war, however, was critical.

Sources

Doubet, Giulio. Command of the Air. Doubet, an Italian Fascist, was one of the first theorists of air warfare. At the time, no one really knew how civilian populations would react to bombing.

Created: 3:05 AM 5/22/2014
Spell checked: 5:44 PM 5/22/2014
Last updated: 2:43 AM 5/9/2016