Figure 1.--No county was more vulnerable to strategic bombing than Japan with its highly concentrated population and wood and paper cities. Nor did Japan have the industrial capacity to build a substantial strategic bombing force. But what was more important in Japanese military thinking was the fact that the oher milirary powers did not have bombers that had the range to reach Japan. Also important was that based on Japan's experience in the Russo-Japanese war, a war with America or the Europeans would not be a long protraced war, but would be decided by a climatic naval battle. We know of no Japanese thoretician or military commander that thought a future protracted war would be decided by a newly devloped long range bomber. The caption of this press photo read, "Japan Holds Military Maneuvers: To show the citizens of Japan the country possesses military capabilities, the government recently held land, air and sea maneuvers. In the presence of members of the royal family. The above photo shows members of the First Aid Corps working over the 'wounded' during the gas bomb demonstration near Hibiya Park, Tokyo." The photograph was dated August 27, 1933. Notice the assumption that chemical wepons would be used. at the time this photographwastaken, Japan hd alreay siezed Manchuria and powerful elements in the military which were in the process of seizing control of the government were promoting further action in China itself.

Military experts after World War I argued about the future nature of war and the role of air power. In many ways this was theoretical because air power was not fully evolved durng the war and aviation technology was still at a very basic level of development. One of the most influential thinkers was an Italian strategist, Giulio Doubet. He was an Italian Fascist who argued that a strategic bombing force could prevent another terrible land war which had caused millions of death. He believed that the heavily armed bomber would always get through fighter and other air defense systems. At the time, radar had not yet been developed. Air defene systems were basically fighter patrols which requird the exendture of enormous resourcs and Doubet was correct could not prevet the bombers from getting through. The German Luftwaffe proved this. They scored great victories before having the confront the British Chain Home Network. While inter-War theorists did not take radar into acount, they were concened about chemical weapons. Despite the Geneva Cnventions, most theirits thought that the chemical weapons would be used in any future war. Doubet argued that a country before all else should build a strategic bombing force because no country would dare invade a country with such a force. He argued that fighter defenses and close air support were wasted resources. [Doubet] Early airmen like Billy Mitchell and Hugh Trenchard tended to agree with Doubet. British airmen like Hugh Trenchard and Arthur 'Bomber' Harris focused on the pdycological aspects of strategic bombing. Hitler who was only vaguely aware of th toretical debate tended to agree with the British beaue of his psycological oenhant for terror and destruction. He showed thisafter Munih when he pressured the elderly Czech President Havel by threatening to level Prague. As a result of the chaotic nature of the NAZI state, however, his air commanders built a tactical force without the ability to conduct a strategic bombing campaign. The leadership which emerged in America as Europe moved toward war was strongly influenced by Donald Wilson, an influential instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School. He promotedtheida that strategic bombing was the most effetiveuse of air power. He argued that by attacking well selected vulnerabilities such as oil or ballbearings, whole war industries could be brought to a stand still without having to destroy every factory and whole cities. Stalin s he built amassive military included the word's largest airforce, but theoretical thinking was complicated by his Great Terror which destroyed the leadership of the Red Air Force. We are unaware of Japanese air power theories, but as far as we can tell there was no advovates of strategic bombing nor was Japan capable of building a strategic air arm. The Japanese air fore that emerged (separte army and navy services) were closely integrated with land and naval forces. It is difficult to assess the impact of Doubet's strategic thesis, but he did set out the basic alternatives available to military planners.

Sources

Doubet, Giulio. Command of the Air. Doubet, an Italian Fascist, was one of the first theorists of air warfare. At the time, no one really knew how civilian populations would react to bombing.

Created: 4:44 AM 5/9/2016
Last updated: 4:45 AM 5/9/2016