|
"The big air battles had been fought before I got over there. I was fortunate I think to have flown when we had air superiority certainly. But like a friend of mine used to say that was flying with us that well maybe the big shows of 6 months ago or last week, but they're still not throwing snowballs up there at us."
-- Lt. Col. John Keeler, P-47 Thundrbolt pilot, USAF
It became clear in 1943 that raids on targets in the Reich were unsustainable without fighter esort. The American bombers were acompanied to the borders of the Reich where they had to turn back because of limited range. The principal American fighter in 1942 was the P-47 Thunderboldt. The pilots reported seeing the Luftwaffe fighters forming up to attack the bombers just as they had to turn back. Some German cities, especially Hamburg suffered devestating attcks, but the Luftwaffe in 1943 proved that American bombers could not sustain unescoted attacks deep into Germany and by the end of the year was also taking terriblr toles on British bombers during night raids. Göring assured Hitler that the Allied fighters did not have the range to escort the bombers. That was the case in 1943, but it was also what the Allies were were working hard to rectify. Hitler's failure to give priority to the Luftwaffe and the Allied emphasis on air power was to radically change the course of the War in 1944.
President Roosevelt appointed Hap Arnold, who had been taught to fly by the Wright brothers, to command the Army Air Corps (1938). This would become the U.S. Air Forces (USAF). The airplane was still a relatively new weapon, and there was no proven template for air doctrine. The Americans and British adopted strategic bombing. The Germans and Soviets leaned more toward ground support as their primary air doctrine. Early on Arnold became one of the Bomber Boys that dominated the Army Air Corps. Limited budgets focused primarily on bombers. He encouraged development of the B-17 Flying Fortress and later the B-24 Liberator -- both heavy four-engine bombers and the precision training of the crews. After the B-17 Project received the endorsement of Isolationist star Charles Lindbergh, it soon went from a basically experimental aircraft to the major American air program. Arnold sold it to an Isolationist America as a coastal patrol and protection plane. Arnold and the American Bomber Boys like British Bomber Command were convinced that strategic bombing would win the War. The British were disabused of this illusion early in the War when they found that their bombers were basically obsolete and the German air defenses, especially the fighters, were fearsome. Bomber Command Leaders still thought that strategic bombing was a war-winning strategy once they has more capable air craft. Even so, when the Avro Lancaster arrived they continued bombing at night which reduced the effectiveness of the bombers. Arnold dismissed the British experience and thought that the American B-17 Flying Fortress with its awesome armament could fight its way through to th Reich and back. American airmen were trained exclusively for daylight high-altitude operations. Not only that, but Arnold while prepared for a combined campaign was not interested in joint operations with the British which inevitably would have meant sharing resources. As a result, even ore so than in Britain the USAF gave relatively little attention to fighters. Officers like Claire Chennault who advocated for fighters saw their careers stunted. And as a result, the United States entered World War II without a long range fighter capable of escort duties. Eight Air Force raids on lightly defended French targets did not expose the B-17 vulnerabilities. The B-17 was built for daylight precision bombing. The first flight (1935) occurred at a time that it could beat off existing targets and was faster than existing fighters. Even when introduced (1938), it could beat off existing American fighters. Daylight raids into the Reich (1938) proed ere a very different matter (1943).
The Casablanca Directive instructed RAF Bomber Command and the American 8th Air Forces to begin Around-the Clock bombing of the Reich. It became clear that raids on targets in the Reich were unsustainable without fighter esort. The American bombers were acompanied to the borders of the Reich where they had to turn back because of limited range. The principal American fighter in 1942 was the P-47 Thunderboldt. The pilots reported seeing the Luftwaffe fighters forming up to attack the bombers just as they had to turn back. Some German cities, especially Hamburg suffered devestating attcks, but the Luftwaffe in 1943 proved that American bombers could not sustain unescoted attacks deep into Germany and by the end of the year was also taking terrible tolls on British bombers during night raids.
Reichmarshal Göring was the most popular figure other Hitler in the NAZI heierarchy. He also had perhaps the cloest asocition with the Führer. After making a number of assurance to Hitler that poved disaterous (Dunkirk and Stalingrad), his influence with the Führer had suffered. As the Allies expanded the Strategic Bombing Campaign, Göring assured Hitler that the Allied fighters did not have the range to escort the bombers. That was the case in 1943, but it was also what the Allies were were working hard to rectify. Legendary Luftwaffe pilot Adolf Galland was the first to notice this. He found spare fuel tanks on P-47 Thuundebolts that had been shot down near Aachen (September 1943). Galland immediately understood the significance. At a subsequent meeting with Hitler to discuss actions to deter the Allied bombing raids, Gallad stressed the need to expand the Luftwaffe fighter force. Galland estimated that to prevent the American day-light raids that a fighter force three to four times the bomber force was needed. Galland was one of the most respected fighter commander in the Luftwaff and one of the few military commnders Hitler at this stage of the War allowed to speak fratkly to him. Galland added that even more fighters would be needed if the Americans began sending fighter escorts to accompany the bombers into the Reich. Hitler remained passive when Galland was estimating the fighter force needed, but objected when Galland began discussing the possibility of fighter escorts. He interupted Galland and pointed out that Göring (Galand's commander) had assured him that the Allies did not have fighters which had the capability to escort the bombers. Hitler then dismissed Galland. Later that day Galland called on Göring. Speer who was present recorded the encounter. Göring of course was furious because his Lufwaffe, after early victories, had repeatedly failed the German War effort and now Galland was further undermining his esteem. Galland was surprised to find that he was furious and demanded to know why he had warned Hitler about American fighter escorts. Galland pointed out it was already happening and would become an increasing problem. The two argued. Finally an exasperated Göring shouted, "I herewith give you an official order that they weren't there! Do you undrstand? The American fighters were not there!" Galland replied sarcastically, "Orders are orders, sir." Of course Göring could not order the American pilots. 【Speer, pp. 377-78.】
Galland was not the only German to have such an experience. Göring used his influence to try to stop Gaulitier and mayors from reporting bomb damage to the Chancellry
NAZI Führer Adolf Hitler even after the disasters in the East, considered himself to be the greatest military commander of all time. As was often the case after the French Campaign (1940), Hitler proved to be one of the Allies' greatest assetts in ensuring his own demise. This beganwith his interference in the Battle of Britain. The disasters he was largely responsible for he blamed on others. The Führer's failure to give priority to the Luftwaffe and the Allied emphasis on air power was to radically change the course of the War in 1944 as the War came home to the German people. In actuality, Hitler could do little to reinforce the Luftwaffe by increasing fighter production by this time. And trained pilots were not even available for the planes which they did have. Hitler did have, however, the ability to determine how existing assetts would be used. He at first committed to both Speer and Göring that a figher force being assembeled be used to defend the Reich from Allied bombers. After D-Day changed his mind and the fourse was expended to no real avail. 【Speer, p. 518.】 Hitler also could determine how the new ME-262 jet be used. It was belt as a high speed fighter and was clearly the most capble fighter of the War. To Galand's amazement, Hitler insisted that the ME-262 be used as a bomber. He was more interested in punishing the Allies than in porttecting Germmn cities and the people in them. Galland who flew the ME-262 and was amazed with it was only one high raking Luftwaffe officer who triend to focus the ME-262 on fighter operations. Both Speer and Göring attempted to disuade Hitler to no avail. 【Speer, p. 465.】
American planners as late as early-1943 were still convinced that their B-17 Flying Fortress had the armament to fight through to the targets alone. They also thought the air-cooled Merlin made the plane suseptable to emnemy fire. As the losses in the skies over Germany escalate, these assessments chnaged and a priority was given to the production of long-range fighter escort. Arnold and the 8th Air Force Commnders were quickly disabused of their illusions about the B-17 ability to fight into the Reich with itts on fire power. Te Eighth Air Force began experencing very heavy, unsustaiable losses. This culminate in the Sweinfurt Raid (October 1943). The Eigth had to suspand deep penetrtion raids. Arnold was, however, not about to give up on his commitment to strategic bombing. He did suddenly realize the need for long range escorts. While fighters had been priority there were several Ameican fighter projects.
Arnold promoted Lieutenant General Barney Giles (May 1943). He was named named deputy USAF commander (July). It is at this time that Arnold gave Giles the task of finding a long range escort for the B-17. America had several aircraft to chose from, but none had been designed as escort fighters. It was believed that the B-17 Flying Fortresses with its fire power did not need to be escorted The P-38 Lighting did not have the firepower needed. The p-39 Aircobra did not have the altitude capability needed. It saw some use in the Pacific, but mainly was used by the Red Air Force for low level close-ground support. The American primary American fighter early in the war was the P-40 War Hawk, but it was not up to European interceptor standards. The top-line American fighters in Europe during 1943 were the P-38 twin engine Lighting and the the P-47 Thunderbolt. The P-38 did not have adequate fire power. The P-47 had fire power galore and was used as an escort, but did not have the range into the Reich and was very expensive to produce. This problem was solved by drop tanks. The P-47 was, however, a beast--the largest fighter of the War. It was huge, powerful, but very complicated and expensive to manufacture. It was used as an escort (1943 and early-1944 ) because it was available, but was for the most part could not accompany the bombers into the Reich where they were most needed. Gradually the P-47s were replaced with P-51 Mustangs. It would be the P-51 that Giles would give the nod to be the primary American escort. The P-51 began as a moderately successful American export to the British which in 1940 was desperate for anything that flew. It was the P-51 Mustang that proved to be the solution to the American escort problem. The P-51 is generally considered to be the finest piston-driven fighter of the War. The P-51 in many ways epitomizes the Anglo-American war-effort. The plane was an American design, but performed sluggishly with the under-powered American Allison engine. The plane had been available as early as 1941. The British deployed it first as the Army Air Corps was not impressed with it. Upgraded with the British Rolls Royce Merlin engine, the performance was spectacular. With drop tanks it had a range equal to that of the Allied heavy bombers. The P-51s could not only reach targets anywhere in the Reich, but they could accompany the bombers to targets as far east as Poland. The reasons were that the P-51 was a relatively light plane and the design achieved laminar flow. Thus the P-51 used fuel much more efficiently than ether the P-38 or P-47. The 8th Air Force began to receive the new P-51s at the end of 1943. The first P-51s arrived in England (late-November 1943), not long after Galland's heated encounters with Hitler and Göring. The P-51 had a longer range than than the P-47 and was faster and more maneuverable. Fitted with drop tanks it could easily reach and conduct air battles over Berlin. It was the apex of propeller driven aviation--only out-classed by Germany's Me-262 jet which arrive too late and in too small numbers to impact the War. Göring would say after the War that when he saw the P-51s over Berlin, he knew that the war was lost.
Göring's orders by early-1944 were largely moot. The American bombers were entering the Reich with fighter escorts. At first the escorts were primarilt P-47s and to a lesser extent P-38s with drop tanks. It was the discoveru a shot down P-47 with drop tanls near Achen which led to the confrontation between Göring and Galand descrobed above. These escorts covered some of the bomber stream, but not deep into the Reich. It was the P-51s, however, that would be with the bombers all the way to the target. At first the number of P-51s was limited, but they were arriving from the States in ever increasing quantities. The American bomber crews called them "Little Friends". Luftwaffe pilots called them "Indianer"--referring to the savage Indians of the American frontier. (German boys grew up reading stories about the Wild West and playing Cowboys and Indians. Western films wre also popular.) One historian provides a description of the combat that broke out in the skies over the Reich. "with the Merlin engine of his sleek, pointy fighter turning over smoothly in front of him. Gummpeered upward toward amercilessly bright sun in a region where the weather was usully gray and wet, He squinted. They were only small blemishes at first, but they were getting larger. He was looking at four Messeschmitt Bf 109 [another designation or the ME-109] fighters jockeying into position to attack a box of bombers. 'Looks like we'll have to climb into them,' said the voice in Gumm's earphones. That was 1st Lt. Gilbert F/ "Deacon" Talbot. His olive-drab P-51B was glinting in the sun off Gumm's wing. The two men could look at each other, but not see the other's facial expressions because of their helmets and oxygen masks. Gumm flicked a switch to arm his plane's four .50-caliber M2 machine guns and knew Talbot was doing the same." 【Dorr】
Gen. Jimmy Doolittle changed orders for the P-51 escorts. Once the bombers delivered their bombs. The P-51s were turned loose on the Reich. After Big Week (February 1944), the bombers normally no longer needed to be escorted home. The P-51s came down and at first attacked Luftwaffe air fields and any aircraft on the ground. Then they went after anything that moved: trains, barges, and motor vehicles. At this stage of the War, any motor vehicle allotted gasoline was probably military or carrying soldiers and military supplies The German Reichbahn (train system) was, however, the primary mode of transport in Germany. The Reich became a vast shooting gallery for the thousands of escort fighters. And destroying German locomotives and the carriages they pulled with product and raw material meant destroying the German war economy. The Germans has sought to reduce the impact of bombing by dispersing production, but this meant that more transport was introduced into the production process. So now the fighters went after the transport system. Agterthe breakoutfrom Niormandy (August 1944), the the Royal Air Force established basesin France from which their fighters could join in on thw ground attack on the Reich. This also broughtb thev Luftwaffe night figters that had been savaging British bombers under attack for the first time as they could be caught on the ground.
The nature of the air war changed dramatically. Three principal factors were involved. First was the steadily expanding strength of the Allied air forces. The 8th Air Force was steadily expanded in 1943. By 1944 the 8th Air Force was reaching parity with Bomber Command and was now capable of 1,000 bomber raids. Second was the deployment of fighter escorts for the bombers. Techniques were developed for using existinf fifghters (P-38 Lightenings and P-47 Thuunderboldts) and the arrival from America of the improved long-range P-51 Mustangs. Third was a shift in targeting from aircraft plants to the German petroleum industry. In the end the Luftwaffe never run out of planes. It did run out of trained pilots and fuel. The turning point in the air war was Big Week (February 1944). The Luftwaffe sustained such severe losses that they could no longer strongly oppose all Allied bombing raids. After Big Week German fighter opposition even on raids targetting Berlin steadily declined (March 1944). The Luftwaffe became increasingly cautious, declining major confrontations with the growing number of fighter escorts. The American escorts began to go down to ground level to attack Luftwaffe bases (April 1944).
The importance of the Allied air campaign can not be overstated. Many authors dismiss the Strategic Bombing Campaign saying that it did not reduce German war production until the end of the War and Germany was already defeatd. Others maintain that the bombing was imporal. Nothing coukd be further from the facts. Is is true that thanks to Speer's efforts, German war production did increase. The falacy of the critics is, however, what could Speer achieved had he not had to work unfer the stress of the strategic bombing campaign. And in his book published after the War, he wonders why the Allies did not pursue the campaign more agressively. And most critics of the Srrategic Bombing Campaign's fail to understan its true accomplishnents. The Campaign was not just to detroy war plants, but was to destroy Germany's capacity to mske war--and this meant the destrucion of the Luftwaffe. While histories of the Strategic Bombing Cmpaign focus on the bombing, it is the work of the escorts that had the most critical mission--destroy the Luftwafe. This was absolutely essential for the Allied D-Day landings, the beginning of the liberation of Europe. Just as Hitler could not invade Britain (Operation Sea Lion) without defeating the Royal ir Force (1940), the Allies could not invade France without defeating the Luftwaffe 1944). This the combat in the skies over the Reich determuned whether the Allies could attack the Atlantic Wall and Liberate Europe. 【Door】 And as for the moral argument. Some 0.3 million Germans were killed in the Strategic Bombing Campaign. Hitler and his minions murdered some 12 million people (not counting battlefield deaths)--and chillingly this was a small fraction of the people slated for death. And severl hundred million people were still in NAZI hands in 1944. Can anyone seriously argue that would have been moral to forego the use pf air power and leave the people in the occupied countries to the tender mercies of the genocidal killers who organized the Hunger Plan, Holocaust, and Generalplan Ost.
Door, Robert F. Fighting Hitler's Jets: The Extrodinary Story of the American Airmen Who Beat the Luftwaffe and Defeated Nazi Germany (2013).
Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich (Avon, New York, 1970), 734p.
Navigate the CIH World War II Section:
[Return to Main World War II Allied combined air campaign 1942-44 page]
[Return to Main World War II Allied European strategic bombing campaign]
[Return to Main World War II page]
[Biographies]
[Campaigns]
[Children]
[Countries]
[Deciding factors]
[Diplomacy]
[Geo-political crisis]
[Economics]
[Home front]
[Intelligence]
[POWs]
[Resistance]
[Race]
[Refugees]
[Technology]
[Totalitarian powers]
[Bibliographies]
[Contributions]
[FAQs]
[Images]
[Links]
[Registration]
[Tools]
[Return to Main World War II page]
[Return to Main war essay page]
