Figure 1.--

Air warfare at the onset of World War II was still in its inefficency. There had neverbeen a strategic bombing campaign before. Some air commanders believed that dropping bombs on major cities would force a country to capitulate. Other theries emerge as the war progressed. The British having to bomb at night turned to area bombing. The Americans were committed to pin-point attacks, althogh given the accuracy of the bombers, the resilts were aoften essentially the same as area bombing. Gradually a similar debate over whether the bombers should hammer a country and do limited damage on a broad range of targets or focus on a few targets. From an early point, oil was seen as a priority, but heavily defended sites deep in the Reich and Romania proved very costly to attack. The earliest priority objective of the stategic bombing campaign was U-boat facililities. Not only was the camapign in the North Atlantic critcal, but U-boat facilities being along the cpast in northem German were easier to find and target. Gradually the priority targets shifted to German aircraft production--especially fighter aircraft. When the campaign against the U-boats begn to turn the tide in the North Atlantic (Mid-1943), increasing emphasis was given on strikes at the Luftwaffe. This at first meant the industrial plants associated with aircraft production. This proved much more difficult than hitting U-boat targets. For one the British were bombing at night and two they were no located in a small area like the northern coat as was the case for U-boat facilities. And as Allied bombing increased, Speer made increasing efforts to move facilities underground and to disperse aircrft production favilities. This had been spelled out in the Pointblank Directive (June 1943). American Air Commander as the P-51 Mustang squadrons began to become operational conceived of a new target, what the Germans had hit on from the onset of the War, the enemy fighter force. The americans would go after the Luftwaffe itself and not just aircaft production plants. Hap Arnold issued a directive to his commanders for 1944, "This is a must. Destroy the Enemy Air Force whereever you find them, in the air, on the ground and in the factories." (December 1943) The objective in 1943 was directed at a general goal of destroying the German ability to wage war. Air commanders in 1944 began to think about a more specific goal, supporting the cross-Channel invasion. Of course this required achieving air superority. The Wehrmacht had powerfl, mobile Panzer divisions in France. The Panzers could fall upon the realitively weak forces landed on the first few days of invasion. Only air power could prevent this. Thus air superority over the invasion beaches and rear areas was essential for the success of the invasion. Thus the campaign against the Luftwaffe took on a level of urgency. The initial projection was May 1, 1944 and given the Winter weather conditions over northern Europe, there was not a great deal of time for the Allied air forces to achieve this objective.

Strategic Thinking

Air warfare at the onset of World War II was still in its inefficency. There had neverbeen a strategic bombing campaign before. Some air commanders believed that dropping bombs on major cities would force a country to capitulate. Other theries emerge as the war progressed. The British having to bomb at night turned to area bombing. The Americans were committed to pin-point attacks, althogh given the accuracy of the bombers, the resilts were aoften essentially the same as area bombing. Gradually a similar debate over whether the bombers should hammer a country and do limited damage on a broad range of targets or focus on a few targets. From an early point, oil was seen as a priority, but heavily defended sites deep in the Reich and Romania proved very costly to attack. The earliest priority objective of the stategic bombing campaign was U-boat facililities. Not only was the camapign in the North Atlantic critcal, but U-boat facilities being along the cpast in northem German were easier to find and target. Gradually the priority targets shifted to German aircraft production--especially fighter aircraft. When the campaign against the U-boats begn to turn the tide in the North Atlantic (Mid-1943), increasing emphasis was given on strikes at the Luftwaffe. This at first meant the industrial plants associated with aircraft production. This proved much more difficult than hitting U-boat targets. For one the British were bombing at night and two they were no located in a small area like the northern coat as was the case for U-boat facilities. And as Allied bombing increased, Speer made increasing efforts to move facilities underground and to disperse aircrft production facilities.

Pointblank (June 1943)

The Allied bomber objectives had been spelled out in the Pointblank Directive (June 1943). Operation Pointblank put German fighter strength at the top of the target list, in a category all its own. This directive, in effect, ordered the Eighth Air Force to destroy the German aviation industry and secure air superiority over the continent, but how air superiority was to be achieved was debatable. With every passing month, more Flying Fortresses and Liberators entered the pipeline, and General Eaker continued to believe his rapidly increasing flock of'self-protecting' bombers would be able to successfully reach, bomb and return from targets over the Reich itself. But the Allied bombers did not have escorts that could accompany them to targets deep in the Reich. The mombers without escorts prived vilnerable. And after the tragic losses of the massed Swinfurt raid (October 1943). Deep penetrtion raids had to be continued until escorts coulkd be provided and they were on the way.

P-51 Mustangs (December 1943)

The North American P-51 Mustang with the Polls Royce Merlin Engine was a solution to the clear need to the need for fightrs to escort the Allied bombers on deep penetration raids. The air frme had internal space for a huge fuel load and like the existing escorts (P-38s nd P-47s), could be fitted With external fuel tanks. This meant that they could could accompany the bombers into the Reich, even as far as Berlin. The first P-51 escort missions began at the end of 1943 (Decdmber 1943). P-51 squadrons were thus available to the 8th and 9th Air Forces during the winter of 1943–44. This meant that the Air Chiefs could newew the Pointblank offensive (early 1944). The initial American escort strategy was layered. The shorter range P-38s and P-47s escorted the bombers during the initial stages of the raid, approximately to the German border where they had to turn back. Only now they handed the escort dutie over to the P-51s. This was to ensure that the Mustangs had full fuel and amunition loads when they entered German air space. The bombers now had continual coverage during the entire raid. The P-51s were so clearly superior to earlier US types Eighth Air Force began to switch its fighter groups to the Mustang. The P-47s still had its uses, as this hugh fighter, affectionally called the Jug, could carry an enrmous amount of ordinance and was highly deffective in close air support of ground troops. The Luftwaffe for its part had been using twin-engine heavy fighters liked ME-110 to attack the unescorted bombers. The ME-110 was effective against unescorted bombers because it could carry a heavy load of weapons and ordinance to attack the bombers. This quickly ceased. The ME-110 Zerstörer had poor manueveribility and were savaged by the fast, sleek P-51s. The Focke-Wulf Fw 190A was an excellent fighter, but lost performance at high-altitude, especially when laden with the ordinnce needed to attack the boimbers, and it was at high altitudes where the bombers were at. The Messerschmitt Bf 109G more evenly matched theMustangs, but was a small lightweight fighter and apoor platform to carry the heavy ordinance load to attack the bombers. This the 109s the P-51s ebcountered were commonly substantially affected by armament loads. The Mustang's lighter armament and more powerful engine was perfectly suited for fighter combat. Thus the P-51 proved able to deal with all the prpeller aitcraft that the uftwaffecould put up.

Eisenhower (January 1944)

General Eisenhower arrived in England (January 15, 1944). He had been in England earlier, but departed with the Torch landing force (November 1942). And spent 1943 in North Africa and the Mediterranean area. Stalin complained at Theheran that the Allies were not serius about opening a second front because a commander had not even been named. President Roosevelt chose Eisenhower even though Marshall had expected the appointment. And as part of the preparations Eisenhower began meeting with the airchiefs. It was immediately apparent that an invasion was impossible without air superiority over the invasion beaches, the same comcclusion Hittler and the Whrmact concluded in 1940. But even as Eisenhower was beginning go lay out Overlord, the Americans were not only obtaining air superiority over France, but the Reich itself. As the time for the invasion approached, Eisenhower demanded personal control over both British and American air forces. Here the British objected, but when Ike threatened to resign, Churchill capitulated.

British RAF Bomber Command

Air Chief Marshall Harris was deeply committed to stratehic bombing. He continued to bebelieve that Germany could be forced to surrender trough bombing. And he opposed any diversion from his bbjective, bombing Germnan cities and destroying morale. Harris insisted that "Overlord must now presumably be regarded as an inescapable commitment." He then pointed out that the "heavy bomber force has been developed as an independent strategic weapon" whose task was "the destruction of the enemy's industrial centers." He claimed that its specialized equipment and training allowed it to attack targets with efficiency and economy. After describing the limitations and navigational problems besetting his force. Bomber Commnddid have limiitation going after the Luftwaffe, primarily because it mostly bombed at night without escorts.

New American Target: The Luftwaffe (January 1944)

American Air Commander as the P-51 Mustang squadrons began to become operational conceived of a new target, what the Germans had hit on from the onset of the War, the enemy fighter force. The americans would go after the Luftwaffe itself and not just aircaft production plants. General Hap Arnold, Chief of staff of the United States Army Air Forces, addressed the commanding generals of the U.S. Air Forces on December 27, 1943 with a New Year's message (December 27, 1943). "Therefore, my personal message to you...this is a MUST...is to, Destroy the enemy Air Force wherever you find them, in the air, on the ground and in the factories." General Jimmy Doolitle took this as his marching orders. He told Major Genreal Bill Kepner, commander of the 8th Fighter Command in Europe, "Before we can invade Europe, we've got to destroy their whole Fighter Command." Kepner told him, "Those are the words I've been waiting to hear." It became the mission of every fighter in the Army Air Force to Pursue and Destroy. Close with the enemy and take him from 30,000 feet down to the deck if you have to, but drive home the victory because the day of reckoning was here. In effect, the Mustang was allowed to stray from the bombers and pursue and destroy the Luftwaffe. The objective in 1943 had been directed at a general goal of destroying the German ability to wage war. Air commanders in 1944 began to think about a more specific goal, supporting the cross-Channel invasion. Of course this required achieving air superority. The Wehrmacht had powerfl, mobile Panzer divisions in France. The Panzers could fall upon the realitively weak forces landed on the first few days of invasion. Only air power could prevent this. Air superority over the invasion beaches and rear areas was essential for the success of the invasion. Thus the campaign against the Luftwaffe took on a level of urgency. The initial projection for D-Day was May 1, 1944. Gven the Winter weather conditions over northern Europe, which often limited operational days, there was not a great deal of time for the Allied air forces to achieve this objective.

Created: 3:53 PM 2/23/2014
Last updated: 3:53 PM 2/23/2014