Allied Strategic Bombing Campaign: Attempted German Adjustments

German transport
Figure 1.--The Germans could safely assemble high-priority weapons underground, this included both V-1 and V-2 production as well as the production of jet aircraft. The Germans had to both transport components to the underground plants and then transport the assembled weapons to military units. By the last year of the War, the Allies had begun to get their hands around the German transport system. Here we see a military supply train near Nordhausen after we think P-51s got done with it. We are not sure about what the fuselage-looking items were for, but the sophisticated liquid fuel engines for the V-2 missle can clearly be seen in the foreground. Photographer: Johnny Florea.

The Germans in adition to military measures to stop the Allied bombing, the Germans led by Armaments Minister Speer. There were three major efforts nade to protect war plants, none of which in the end solved the problem. The first adjustment was to decentralize production. Instead of having one large plant as America developed to mass produce weapons, the Germans began breaking down production into modular parts. Creating a large number of small plants meant that the Allies were confronted with a much more difficult problen of finding and hitting many small targets instead of one big, easy to find target. There were howver problem associated with this effort. The Germans lost the advantages of mass production. It also increased the reliance on a transport system that could be targetted, not to mention the problem of food hortages. And there were was the increased he problem of tolerances. The parts did not always fit together perfectly. This proved to be a majpr problem with the advanced Type 21 U-boat. The assemblers coudn't get the parts to fit together. The second adjustment was to go underground. This was a very difficult undertaking carving out underground tunnels. Thus it was only used for high priority weapons, like the V-weapons. But again there was the problem of transport. the V-weapons. And underground production did not solve the transport problem. The third adjustment was camouflage. This was used for large plants that could not be broken up into small steps, like the critically important synfuel plants. The Americans were the primary force to strike at the transport nodes because they bombed during the day when it was possible to acquire specific targets. With the defeat of the Luftwaffe, the bombers needed less cover. The P-51 escorts were given orders the come down to the deck they began to hit trains and barges and other smaller targets. By the emd of the War, the once impressive German transport system essentially no longer existed.

Decentralize Production

The first adjustment was to ddcentralize production. Instead of having one large plant as America developed to mass produce weapons, the Germans began breaking down production into modular parts. Creating a large number of small plants meant that the Allies were confronted with a much more difficult problen of finding and hitting many small targets instead of one big, easy to find target. There were howver problem associated with this effort. The Germans lost the advantages of mass production. It also increased the reliance on a transport system that could be targetted, not to mention the problem of food hortages. And there were was the increased he problem of tolerances. The parts did not always fit together perfectly. This proved to be a majpr problem with the advanced Type 21 U-boat. The assemblers coudn't get the parts to fit together.

Underground Production Plants

The second adjustment was to go underground. This began in 1942 when RAF Bomber Command got the Avro Lancaster and began the strategic boming campaign in earest. Reich Marshal Göring was the Luftwaffe Commander and had pledged the German people that enemy bombers would never bomb German cities. And for the first year of the War that was largely the case. NAZI officaldom and the Geman people got in the habit of thinking that bombing was something that Germany did to other countries and not the reverse. This changed in 1942. The British began doing real damage to German war industries. Then in 1943, the NAZI regime was shocked when Bomber Command not only hit industrial cities, but one of the most secret, highest priority targets in the Reich--the missle reserach center at Peenemunde (August 1943). This convinced the German military to take its most high priority project undrground--such as the V-2 missle project. The V-1 and jet aircraft plants were aslso moved underground. This was a very difficult undertaking carving out underground tunnels. Some underground facilities existed and just needed to be expanded, such as the gypsum mines at Kohnstein. The mining process created tunnels that were converted into assembly lines. This was 3 km from Nordhausen and the NAZI slave labor camp there. Underground works were only possible for high priority weapons, like the V-weapons, on which Hitler and Goebbels set such high hopes. But again there was the insovable problem of transport. Underground production did not solve the transport problem. The components and supplies had to be delivered to the underground plants. And then the completed weapons had to be delivered to the military. This could only be done by the vulnerable rail system. Shifting production sites also delayed production and thus the introiduction of these systems. Just what that delay was we are not sure, but if these weapons had been available a year earlier, especially the second generation of jets, D-Day would not have been ppossible

Camouflage Plants

The third adjustment was camouflage. As the Allied air offensive increased with strikes into the Reich. It became clear from an early point that the Luftwaffe alone not prevent such strikes, although it could take a heavy toll on the raiders. Substantial resources were diverted to defending German cities and other targets. This included massive belts of FLAK guns. The German turned to another definsive measure--camouflage. There were two ways in which camouflage was used. One was to hide important facilities. The second was just the opposite, to create decoy targets that drew Allied from valuable targets. There were several different methods of camouflage depending on the target to be hit. Some were very simple such as hanging camouflage netting over gun emplacements or other potential targets. And camoflage was used both tatically on the battlefield and strateically to hide bombing targets. The German effort went so far as tgo try to hide whole cities or at least confuse the raiders trying to find their aiming points. The Germans, for example, build a massive structure on the Charlottenburger Chaussee in Berlin. This is broad avenue clearly visible from the air that led westward from the Tiergarten park into the heart of the Government area in the center of Berlin. It was like an arrow pointing to valuable targets. The Germans along the 5 mile length of Charlottenburger Chaussee built wire netting which they covered with green cloth. The Germans built a fake city outside Berlin in a forest which has been cut through with lanes so that at night, from the air with a few added lights it could pass for the Tiergarten. Fake roofs were constructed with cloth and paper and stretched between the trees. Lights on the ground gave the impression of a blacked-out city. Efforts were made in other cities with varying results.

Transport Problem

Germany began the War with one of the finest transporation systems in the world. At the center of that transportation was the German rail system. There were very limited road connections between cities. Germany had begun a transport revolution with the Autobahns, but in fact they were show cases and little used. The American Armies pouring into the Reich in 1945 was the first major use of the Authobahns. The British bombing at night were unable to hit transport targets. The Americans who bombed during the day became the primary force to strike at the transport nodes because they bombed during the day when it was possible to acquire specific targets. This began with the Allied Transportation Plan which sought to cut off the famed Atlantic Wall from the war industries of the Reich. It proved to be an amazing success. When Eisenhower turned control of the bombers back to the air commanders, tranportation targets became a high priority. With the defeat of the Luftwaffe, the bombers leveling Germn cities needed less cover. The P-51 escorts were given orders the come down to the deck they began to hit trains and barges and other smallr targets. By the emd of the War, the once impressive German transport system essentially no longer existed. This was of little interest to the Germans when they dominated the skies, but increased in importance as they loss control. Eventually the Luftwaffe itself was reduced to Camouflaging its facilities and aircraft. They also camouflaged FLAK batteries. The Germans also developed measures to camouflage industrial facilities the Allies were attempting to destroy. The decoy targets could not be built in lightly inhabited rural areas. That was too obvious. More commonly they were built near actual targets and had the impact of sopreading out the area hit by the Allied bombers and thus decreasing the effectiveness of the raid. These measures were used to protect the vital synthetic fuel plants. The decoys commonly took the form of fake reproductions of vital installations or areas. >







CIH -- WW II







Navigate the CIH World war II Section:
[Return to Main World War II Allied European strategic bombing campaign page]
[Return to Main World War II air campaign war essay page]
[Return to Main World War II page]
[About Us]
[Biographies] [Campaigns] [Children] [Countries] [Deciding factors] [Diplomacy] [Geo-political crisis] [Economics] [Home front] [Intelligence]
[POWs] [Resistance] [Race] [Refugees] [Technology] [Totalitarian powers]
[Bibliographies] [Contributions] [FAQs] [Images] [Links] [Registration] [Tools]
[Return to Main World War II page]
[Return to Main war essay page]
[Return to CIH Home page]




Created: 5:27 PM 9/18/2016
Last updated: 4:43 PM 10/21/2016