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"The enemy has complete command of the air over the battle zone ... maneuver by our troops on the field of battle in daylight is thus almost entirely prevented, while the enemy can operate freely. .... neither flak nor the Luftwaffe seems capable of putting a stop to his crippling and destructive operation of the enemy's aircraft."
-- Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, Commander Army Group B (June 1944)
The full extent of growing Allied control of the skies over he Reich was was not completely apparent because the Allies shifted priorities from Germany to France in preparation for the cross-Channel invasion--Operation Overlord. Gen. Eisenhower demanded personal control over both British and American air forces. Here the British objected, but when Ike threatened to resign, Churchill capitulated. Eisenhower also was confronted with resistance down the chain of command. Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force had taken a terrible drubbing from the Luftwaffe in 1942 and 43. Now that they were getting the upper hand, they wanted to pursue the attack over Germany. Harris and Spaatz both argued that they could best contribute to Overlord by continuing th strategic bombing campaign over Germany. Spaatz in particular wanted to focus on the German petroleum industry. Not only would reducing petroleum production restrict the Wehrmacht, bur the Luftwaffe would have to give battle affording the Allied fighter escorts to destroy the remaining fighter force. The Allied air commanders were opposed by a British civilian, a scientist on the air planing staff--Silly Zuckerman. He devised the Transportation Plan which sought to essentially destroy the French transportation system leading to the invasion beaches. The idea was to target 80 railway marshaling and repair centers located in Belgium and northern France. (The targets included the transport system leading to the Pas de Calais as well as Normandy so as not to tip off the Germans as to the location of the invasion.) The Germans could not heavily defend the whole coast. Their ability to defeat the invasion would rest on their ability to rush powerful forces forward and gain control of the invasion beaches before the Allies could land sufficient forces to exploit their manpower and resource superiority. Zuckerman had the support on one air commander--Air Marshal Tedder. Eisenhower decided on the Transportation Plan and backed it even when Churchill expressed concern over possible French civilian casualties. In pursuing the Transportation Plan the Allied bombers proved much more successful at hitting ground targets than one believed possible. Here the Allies improved their target marking techniques. The suppression of Luftwaffe was another high-priority factor factor. Raids on Germany were not entirely ceased. The Luftwaffe by June was so devastated that they were a non-factor.
The Allies in early 1944 succeeded in gaining control of the skies over Germany. The principal factor here was the advent of fighter escorts, particularly the P-51 Mustang. American bombers and the fighter escorts began shooting down substantial numbers of Luftwaffe fighters. The Luftwaffe was unable to replace pilots at the rate they were being shot down.
The full extent of the shift in the air war was not completely apparent because the Allies shifted priorities from Germany to France in preparation for the cross-Channel invasion--Overlord.
Eisenhower as the time for the invasion approached, demanded personal control over both British and American air forces. Here the British objected, but when Ike threatened to resign, Churchill capitulated.
Eisenhower also was confronted with resistance down the chain of command. Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force had taken a terrible drubbing from the Luftwaffe in 1942 and 43. Now that they were getting the upper hand, they wanted to pursue the attack over Germany. Harris and Spaatz both argued that they could best contribute to Overlord by continuing th strategic bombing campaign over Germany. Spaatz in particular wanted to focus on the German petroleum industry. Not only would reducing petroleum production restrict the Wehrmacht, but the Luftwaffe would have to give battle affording the Allied fighter escorts to destroy the remaining fighter force. The Allied air commanders were opposed by a British civilian, a scientist on the air planning staff--Silly Zuckerman. He devised the Transportation Plan which sought to essentially destroy the French transportation system leading to the invasion beaches. The idea was to target 80 railway marshaling and repair centers located in Belgium and northern France. (The targets included the transport system leading to the Pas de Calais as well as Normandy so as not to tip off the Germans as to the location of the invasion.) The Germans could not heavily defend the whole coast. Their ability to defeat the invasion would rest on their ability to rush powerful forces forward and gain control of the invasion beaches before the Allies could land sufficient forces to exploit their manpower and resource superiority. Zuckerman had the support on one air commander--Air Marshal Tedder. Eisenhower decided on the Transportation Plan and backed it even when Churchill expressed concern over possible French civilian casualties.
The Tactical Ninth Air Force was established in England. Its initial assignment was to help execute the Transportation Plan and to destroy Luftwaffe basis and beach defenses. After the invasion it would provide close air support to Allied armies driving toward Germany.
As Supreme Commander Eisenhower demanded control over all Allied air forces took control of the strategic air forces (April 1944). Eisenhower directed the 8th Air Force and Bomber Command to redirect their operations to France. This was a difficult dicesion because with the fighter protection provided by long-range P-51 fighters the Allies were inflicting damage on both the Luftwaffe and German war industries. Under Eisenhower targeting shifted to destroy the Luftwaffe and Luftwaffe facilities in France, the German petroleum industry, and to disrupt rail communications, especially rail lines leading to the invasion beaches. Here the Allies had to bomb lines leading to both Pas de Calais and Normandy so as not to reveal where the landings would take place. The Wehrmacht depended heavily on the French railroads to move men and equipment. Eisenhower ordered the Allied air forces to sever the bridges over the Seine, Oise, and Meuse rivers (May) These attacks were largely successful so that at the time the Allies landed, the French rail system was near collapse. The Allies followed up Overlord with Operation Dragoon, landings along France's Mediterranean coast (August 15). The Dragoon force moving north joined up with southern advance from the D-day landings near Dijon (mid-September).
Operation Dragoon in addition to the amphibious landings included a glider landing (Operation Dove) and a deception (Operation Span). A major accomplishment of Dragoon was the seizure of Marseilles and its important port. The Allied advance after Operation Cobra which destroyed the German 7th Army slowed as the Allies moved into Belgium an northern France and approached the borders of the Reich (September). The major problem was gas (petrol) and other supplies. Allied units consumed enormous quantities of supplies, much greater quantities than comparable German units.
Marseilles and the southern French railways became an important conduit of supplies because of the limited port access the Allies had at the time in northwestern Europe. The Allies brought back the Port of Marseilles and its railroad trunk lines back into service despite the destruction sustained by Allied bombing and German demolition. The southern supply route became very important to the Allies as they prepared to penetrate the Siegfried Line (West Wall) and enter the Reich. The southern route delivered about a third of Allied supplies.
In pursuing the Transportation Plan the Allied bombers proved much more successful at hitting ground targets than one believed possible. Here the Allies improved their target marking techniques. The suppression of Luftwaffe was another high priority effort. Allied air forces flew more than 200.000 sorties in preparing for the invasion. The Wehrmacht was dependent on the French railroad system. The Allies devastated that system. Allied flyers destroyed 1,500 locomotives and in the process also destroyed the military cargoes they were pulling. Bridges were another priority target. Large numbers were destroyed. Of particular importance, the Allies destroyed the 24 bridges over the Seine. This essential cut Wehrmacht forces on the coastal beaches off from Paris and rear areas where reinforcements were based. These bridges were also needed to supply the beach defenses. The Allies were careful not to give away the location of the invasion by targeting sights primarily around Normandy. Thus for every raid in the Normandy area, there were two raids in other areas--primarily the Pas de Calais.
Next to the Transportation Plan, the highest priority given to the Allied air forces was Luftwaffe installations in France. The Luftwaffe bases in France and Belgium were either destroyed or so severely damaged as to be unusable. The Allies destroyed 36 Luftwaffe bases as well as 41 radar installations. These attacks as well as the attacks on Germany had forced the Luftwaffe to withdraw from forward air bases that were needed to defend the landing beaches. Ironically this was the same task that the Luftwaffe had been assigned in the Battle of Britain.
Allied raids on Germany were not entirely ceased. The priority was on targets in France, but the Allies wanted to keep the pressure in the Luftwaffe by continuing some attacks on into the Reich.
The Allies command of the air proved decisive on D-Day. The Allies used 8,000 planes to fly 14,700 sorties. To the surprise of the Allies, the Luftwaffe did not seriously oppose the invasion. Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh Mallory, who had played a controversial role in the Battle of Britain, faced his headquarters asking, "Where is the Luftwaffe?" Allied air power was, however, a key factor. D-Day began with British glider assaults on key targets and American C-47s dropping paratroopers to seize control of key targets in rear areas to prevent the Germans from reinforcing the beach defenses. Bombers then pounded the beach defenses and fighters hit any German columns attempting to move toward the beaches, especially armored units. Fighter patrols over the actual beaches did not encounter any serious Luftwaffe opposition. The Luftwaffe managed only 300 sorties, few of which actually reached the actual invasion beaches. Several of these sorties were flow at night meaning they could not effectively access targets. The minimal Luftwaffe effort had no real impact on the massive invasion effort. Allied patrols over French roads, on the other hand, were so effective that the Germans were forced to move on foot or at night, meaning that the Allies were able to seize and secure their beachhead before nightfall. The Germans concluded that Normandy was not the main landing site. Here two RAF squadrons helped confuse the Germans by dropping Windows foil strips in a pattern that suggested an armada was crossing the Channel at the Pas-de-Calais. Thus most of the German Panzers were held back in the Pas-de-Calais. The Panzers that were committed were mauled or badly delayed the 2nSS Panzer Division stationed in southern France took 17 days to reach Normandy. This lack of support was the result of the Allies hammering air bases in France. Their reaction was to withdraw and return once the Allies invaded. This meant no air opposition to the all important landings. THe Luftwaffe did return in force and was shot out of the skies. There were Allied casualties as well. Only the Allies could afford them, he Germans could not.
The Luftwaffe by June 1944 was so devastated that they were a non-factor. A few fighter planes mounted a handful of desultory attacks on the invasion beaches, but had no measurable impact and were driven off by the massive Allied air cover, The Luftwaffe was notable primarily from its absence from the skies over the developing beach heads. A measure of the the Luftwaffe's ineffectiveness was Mulberry. The primary impediment to the invasion was the fact that Germans heavily garrisoned the ports so that bringing in supplies was a major problem. The Allied answer was Mulberry--building artificial harbors on the beaches. This involved bringing over great hulking prefabricated concrete caissons (200 feet long by 60 feet wide, by 60 feet high). Now hitting fast moving maneuverable and well armed war ships was one matter. The Mulberry caissons were largely unarmed, very difficult to maneuver, and were towed at a top speed of 3 knots. The Luftwaffe could not even stop these Mulberry caissons (phoenixes) from being towed over and assembled. This was just one more of many Luftwaffe failures after the victory in France (June 1940). The reason of course was not so much the fault of the Luftwaffe, but the NAZI political leadership which decided to wage war against an alliance of nations which far greater industrial capacity than Germany.
The most criticized aspect of the Allied war effort was the strategic bombing campaign. It was is criticized basically on two grounds. One that it was immoral and two that it was ineffective. Morality is of course debatable. and the question rises is what do you do when you are faced with an immoral opponent who began bombing civilians from the first day of the War. Our contention is that the greatest crime of the War given the genocidal nature of the NAZI Regime would have been to fail to destroy Hitler and the NAZIs. We discuss the issue of morality of strategic bombing on a separate page in more detail. The point we want to make here is the effectiveness of the strategic bombing campaign. It is true that the campaign was costly. And it rook some time to destroy the German war economy, in large part because Albert Speer was such an effective Armaments Minister. But the issue of effectiveness can be very simply answered by a simple question--Where was the Luftwaffe on D-Day? The answer of course is that the Luftwaffe was a spent force, destroyed by the Allied bombing and the P-51 Mustang escorts in the skies over Germany. And what was left was hundreds of miles away defending German cities. We all know about bloody Omaha. Imagine what would have transpired had the Luftwaffe contented the landings in force. Not to mention what impact the German Panzer Divisions would have had if they had had air cover and could have moved in force against the landing force. This alone would have justified the strategic bombing campaign.
American air power would delver the coup de gráce to the German 7th Army in Normandy. The 7th Army was fully committed without any reserves behind the lines to plug in the gaps if the front was penetrated. German armor played a major role in prevented an allied break though, but not as mobile force. The Germans in Normandy used their armor eventually as mobile pill boxes. American bombers delivered a concentrated attack on the Germans near St. Lo. The attack was devastating, brutally obliterating th SS-Panzer Lehr Division and creating a massive gap in the German lines. This was the beginning of Operation Cobra and the liberation of France.
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