Figure 1.--German films showing military operations focus on the Panzers and Luftwaffe. That was what Propganda Minister Goebels wanted for the weekly newsreels--'Die Deutsche Wochenschau'. But that was not an accurate depiction of the German Army, including the Ostheer. Most of the Ostheer was unmotorized infantry that moved east on foot. Part of the reason for this was that so much of German industry was primarily supporting the war in the West. Here we see a German supply column crossing the Dnieper at Smolensk about Octoberr 1941. The 0.6-0.7 million horses were vital to the German infantry divisions. They both pulled their artillery and supplies. Source: Imperial War Museum.

NAZI Germany invaded the Soviet Union as part of Operation Barbarossa (June 1941). Until that the Germam Army was mostly deployed in the West and had not sustained major casualties. Beginning With Barbarossa The German Army was primarily committed to the East --the Ostheer. The Ostkrieg bevame the decisive campaign of the War. The German Army is often represented as a throughly mechanized, modern force. Nothing could be futher from the actual situation. They certainly had some powerful Panzer dividsions with motorized infantry. As the war progressed, the tank compliment of the divisions stradily declined. These modern, mechanized units, however, were a small part of the Ostheer. This would be about 20 percent of the Ostheer. (Here we are comuting the number of divisions. If you calculate theb numbrr of soldiers the unmotorized infantry is an even larger number because the number of soldiers vin an infantry division is larger than in a Panzer division. The rest, the great bulk of the Ostheer, was unmotorized infantry which moved east with horse-drawn carts carrying their supplies as well as moving artillery. This is all well documented. Military History Visulaized has created visual depictions of this includung the nuber of men along with the vehicke and weapoins compliment. This is why that 0.6 million horses were part of Whermacht infantry divisions, including the Barbarossa force. This was not the officials images you see in OPropaganda Minister Goebbels' news reels. All those thorses also meant that German logistics had to include using valuable transport shipping space for the huge quantity of fodder needed for those horses. Notice that German war films give little attention to the unmotorized infantry and horses. Rather the official photohraphers focused on the Panzers and Luftwaffe. Not doubt they had orders to do this. It was not the image that Goebbels wanted to depict in thee weekly newsreels--'Die Deutsche Wochenschau'. He eanted images of the fast moving, action-packjed Panzer divisions--not dradt hioeses plodding along. But it means that existing footage gives the wrong impressiion. Rarely pictured was the great mass of the Ostheer moving east on foot. Images do exist, but mostly the snapshots taken by individual soldiers who brought their cameras along. And it does not take much industry to build horse carts. A major reason for this was that most of German industrial production supported the War in the West. 【Weinberg】 This left the Ostheer poorly equipped and supplied. And it meant that they were vulnerable as the Red Army recovered from the Barbarossa disasters and began to become increasingly well armed and led.

Ostkrieg

NAZI Germany invaded the Soviet Union as part of Operation Barbarossa (June 1941). Until that the Germam Army was mostly deployed in the West and had not sustained major casualties. Beginning With Barbarossa The German Army was primarily committed to the East --the Ostheer. The Ostkrieg became the decisive campaign of the War. And in the East , especially after the first month, real casualties began. A few weeks earlier, Hitler has been horified by the casualties suffered when Airborn forces had assaulted Creete (May 1941). Some 3,000 men were missing or wounded in action. Beginning with Barbarossa, not a weeks went by when two to three times that amount were not lost weekly, and often much more. The first two months were exilerating, with whole Soviet armies destoyed amd vast numbers of Red Army soldiers taken pridoner. German commanders seeing the endless lines of POWs being driven behind the lines, were sure they had won the War. But each week as the Germans drove further East, their casualties began to mount. They were far lower than Red Army casualties, but more difficult to repalce. Huge areas of the Western Soviet Union were occupied, but only by Septemver did the Germans begin to penrtrate the Russian heartland. But the advances slowed and the losses increased.

The Heer

The German Army (Heer) is often represented as a throughly mechanized, modern force. Nothing could be futher from the actual situation. They certainly had some powerful Panzer dividsions with motorized infantry. As the war progressed, the tank compliment of the divisions stradily declined. These modern, mechanized units, however, were a small part of the Heerr. This would be about 20 percent. (Here we are comuting the number of divisions. If you calculate theb numbrr of soldiers the unmotorized infantry is an even larger number because the number of soldiers in an infantry division is larger than in a Panzer division. The rest, the great bulk of the Ostheer, was unmotorized infantry which moved east with horse-drawn carts carrying their supplies as well as moving artillery. This is all well documented. Military History Visulaized has created visual depictions of this including the nuber of men along with the vehicle and weapoins compliment. This is why the Geramns needed so mmany horses. There were over 0.6 million horses needed for Barbarossa. One historian writes, " "Although contemporary audiences like to picture the German infantry as a mechanized fierce, in actual fact all regimental vehicles were horse-drawn with the exception of the machinegun company in each infantry battalion. All rear services (butchery, bakery, postal services, ammunition trains, etc.) were dependent on horse-drawn wagons. Thus the German Army that marched into Russia (as opposed to the armored and mechanical units that drive ) could proceed at approximately the same pace as a Roman legion nearly 2,000 years earlier." 【Mc Nab, pp.190-91.】

Mechanization

Strange as it may seem given the modern German car industry, at the time of World War II, German car production and ownership was a fraction of that of France and Britain and minute compared to the United States. Germany simply did not have the manufacturing capability to motorize its army or sufficient oil to power the limited number of vehicles it had. The German automotive industry made excellent cars like the big Mercedes that Hitler liked to tool around the Reich, sieg heiling his adoring followers, only not very many of them. In fact, that was a major reason Germany lost the War, they were not very good at mass production. You can get an idea of this if you look at pre-War photographs and film clips, there were very few cars and trucks on German streets and roads and the Autobahns were nearly deserted. Tthe Germans invaded the Soviet Union with 0.6 million horses (June 1941). Acording tom Wiki, "The Germans deployed one independent regiment, one separate motorized training brigade and 153 divisions for Barbarossa, which included 104 infantry, 19 panzer and 15 motorized infantry division ..." That means that unmotorized infantry was 68 percent of the Ostheer on day one of Barbarossa. Now that was nearly 70 percent. I base my 80 percent figure on the fact that German divisions lost vehicles and oil supplies as the War progressed. A very sizeable part of the Ostheer was Axis allies: Finnish, Italian, Hungarian, Romanian, Spanish, and others. Almost all of these units were unmotorized infantry--bringing the total up to my 80 percent figure even at the time of Barbarossa. Now if you know anything about the Soviet Union, there were no autobahns and developed roads as was the case in Germany and Western Europe. Many of the vehicles the Ostheer had on day 1 were not military-grade vehicles. They were cars and trucks seized in occupied Western Europe and few could hold up to the rigors of the vast Russian Steppe. Not only did the vehicles break down in huge numbers, but parts were not available for the great variety of models. The tanks which were more difficult to maintain began breaking down in addition to combat losses. And this was before the fall rains and snow. And then the Soviet counter-offensive (December 1941), destroying many of the vehicles and tanks that had survived the summer campaign. The limited German automotive industry was never able to even begin to make up for the losses. Thus the Ostheer was never again as mechanized as it was on day one of Barbarossa. And Barbarossa was the height of German power. There were fewer vehicles in 1942. And a much greater use of the unmotorized Axis Allied troops. And because of the losses, the number of tanks and motor vehicles allotted for each Panzer and Motorized infantry division was reduced. This meant that the motorized units were less motorized. And After 1942 the motorized allotments were reduced even further. In the Bulge campaign, for example, they had to base it on seizing American fuel dumps (December 1944). One historian gies intongreat detasil about German divisions, incuding the level of mechanization. 【Muller】 He explains just how important horses were in the German Army.

German Photography

All these slow, plodding horses were not the officials images you see in OPropaganda Minister Goebbels' news reels. Notice that German war films give little attention to the unmotorized infantry and horses. Rather the official photographers focused on the Panzers and Luftwaffe. Not doubt they had orders to do this. It was not the image that Goebbels wanted to depict in thee weekly newsreels--'Die Deutsche Wochenschau'. He eanted images of the fast moving, action-packjed Panzer divisions--not draft horeses plodding along. But it means that existing footage gives the wrong impressiion. Rarely pictured was the great mass of the Ostheer moving east on foot. Images do exist, but mostly the snapshots taken by individual soldiers who brought their cameras along.

Logistics

Perhaps the most serious German military weakness was the lack of attention and inability to adequately address logistics. German officers did not want to be in quatermaster service. That was not where careers and professional prestige were established. As a result, the supply sections tended to atract a poorer quality of officers. This is perhaps true in other armies as well, but it was especially true in the German Army. And this was a traditional German tendency. Germany's limited industrial base was a factor in its weak logistical system. As a result, Hitler launched the War before the Wehrmacht was fully mobilized. The Heer still relived heavily on draft animals, both for supplies and artillery. There were in particular, not enough trucks. This was only partially resolved by seizing trucks in France and the other occupied countries. For a military committed to Blitzkrieg mean mobility and speed this was a very serious weakness. It meant that supplies could not keep up with the advansing Panzers. It was an area of lesser importance to an army designed to win a war in a brief period, but was of vital importance to an army involved in a protacted war. 【Citino, p. xiv.】 The Wehrmacht over came this weakness in the short campaigns on relatively small battlefields in Poland and the West. The emense battlefield presented by the Soviet Union was a very different matter. A weak logistical system proved to be a critical weakness on the Eastern Front where the Wehrmacht had to contend with huge distances, hostile weather, and a primitive transportation network. And the planning for Barbarossa did not address this potential problem. Hitler demanded an aggresive invasion plan and planners who raised possible problems were often criticized or removed. The Allies after landing in Normandy had logistical problems. The Wehrmacht struggling to supply armie as far east as the Volga had insurmountable logistical problems. It is not true as often claimed that the Wehrmacht did not have winter uniforms. Warm clothing was stocked at wearhouses in the Reich. What Germany did not have was a logistical train that to could get the warm clothing in the troops. The logigistical system was strained getting fuel, amunitiuoin, and other supplies to the troops and thus winter clothing was given low priority in a campaign that was suposed to be completed in a short summer campaign. The Red Army facd some of the same logistical problemsxthe Wehrmacht fcd, but the Sovier not only had the outputvfrom their own factories ti support them, but huge numbers of American trucks deliverd through Lend Lease.

Gerrman Industrial Production

One has to ask why so little of the Ostheer was motorized. At the onset of the the war the inly fully mechanized army in the world was the British Army. And this was only because the British Armny was so small. As the Brish Army was expanded, it continued to be fully motorized only because of Amerucan Lend Lease. And Britain has the largest motor vehicle industry in Europe. Germany's motor vehicle insustry was a fraction of the size of the German industry. As a result, Germany was incapable of motorizing more than a small part of the Heer. And even while seizing vessels all over occupied Western Europe, even the Ostheer was not highly motorized. And there was no way that Germany could redirect its economy signiicvantly toward vessel construction. This is because so mmuch of Germnan ibdustrial output had to be oriented toward the war vin the West. 【Weinberg】 And it does not take much industry to build horse carts and shoe leather. It did take a great deal of industry to build the planes, ships, and V-weapons used in the West. Aircraft was by far the major industrial effort, but ships includung U-boats were also important. This left the Ostheer poorly equipped and supplied. And it meant that they were vulnerable as the Red Army recovered from the Barbarossa disasters and began to become increasingly well armed and led.

Sources

Citino, Robert M. The German Way of War: From the Thirty Year's War to the Third Reich (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, 2005), 428p.

McNab, Charles. Hitler's Armies

Military History Visualized.

Muller, Rolf Sieter. Hitler's Wehrmacht, 1935-1945.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambrige University Press: New York, 2005), 1178p.

Created: 5:44 AM 1/14/2021
Last updated: 2:18 AM 5/22/2023