Figure 1.--Antwerp was liberated by the Allies (September 1944). It was one of the major pors of Euripe and in Allied hands a majo assett. It was close to the front lines it was of critucal importanve once the allies got the port working again. The Germans knew this and did what they coukld to wreck it before retreating. This is a scene in Antwerp after a V-2 attack (late-1944). A boy was killed. The Germans trargetted Antwerp in an effort to keep the port closed. The Germans could hit Antwerp with the V-2, but not specifically thecall important port. Antwerp for this sanme reason would also be the target of the German Bulge offensive.

The V-1 could be shot down, but there was no defense against the V-2 balistic missile once it was launched. The ballistic trajectory and extreme speed made it unstopable. There was not even the buzzing warning of the V-1s. The German mobile launch system proved highly successful. They were able to fire as many as 100 missiles a day. Despite the massive Allied air campaign, only one mobile launcher was ever observed during the firing process. Their mobility, ability to use virtually any area, and quick firing time made them imopossible to destroy. The static firing sustems could be destroyed, not the nobile launchers. Allied fighters rarely succeeded in catching V-2 convoys on the ground. Thanks to delays in the production phase resulting from the Allied Peenemunde raid, the Germans were unable to deploy the V-2 until several monthas after the D-Day landings when German armies were retreating from France and Belgium. The first V-2 attacks were launched on Paris and London (September 8, 1944). London was perenial German target and after the German commnander in Paris had refused to destroy the city, Paris also became a target. The Germans conducted an 8-month campaign with the V-2s. They fired 3,172 V-2 at London and other Allied cities. Targets besides London included Antwerp, Liege, Lille, Norwich, and Paris. Antwerp became a target because it was within range and a critically important port badly needed to supply the advancing Allied armies. And unlike the French ports was located close to the front lines for the final Allied push into the Reich. (This is also why it was the objective of the German Bulge offensive.) The V-2 had no real value as a military weapon. Not only did they lack accuracy, but the Germans had no ability to determine just where the missle hit so that targeting could be adjusted. Not only was the V-2 not effective, but it was hugely expensive. Meaning that Hitler authorized vast quantities of scarce resources be allocated to the program. The German V-weapons (V-1 and V-2) are beleved to have cost some USD $40 billion (2015 dollars). Incredably this is an estimated 50 percent more than the American Manhattan Project that produced the atomic bomb. [Ordway, et al., p.36. The Germans built 6,048 V-2s. They cost approximately 100,000 Reichsmark (GB£2.4 million -- 2011 inflation adjusted ) each. And this using slave labor. Some 3,225 were launched. The launches at Britain averaged only 2 people killed per launch, almost all civilans. Despite the technical brilliance, the V-2s were arguably the greatest failure in milkitary history. There was an impact on the fighting. Such was the impact on London, that Gen. Eisenhower gave Field Marshall Montgomery the go ahead for Market Garden in the hope of ending the war quickly and denying the Germans launch sites that could hit London. Liberating the soiuther Netherlands did help, but the British unfortunately did not get across the Rhine.

Range and Speed

The V-2 had a range of 320 km (200 mi). While the Germans held France and Belgium, London and much of southern and eastern England was in range. As the Germans were not able to begin the V-2 campaign until the liberation of France was largely completed and most of Belgium was liberated, their launch area was significanylt restricted, basically the western Netherlands. Anbd this was even further restructed after Market Garden to areas north of the Rhine. Other targets like Antwerp and Paris were in range, but it was London that Hitler wanted to hit. After the failure of the Allies to cross the Rhine as part of Market Garden, the Germabns still had areas of the western Netherlands to launch V-2s on London and the southeastern corner of England. The only limit on the V-2 launches was production and the ability of the Germans to trasport the missles to the western Netherland. This gradually declined as the Allies strategic bombing campaign methodically destroyed the German rail network. This made it difficult to both deliver the needed raw mterials to the underground production facility and then to deliver the assembed V0-2s to the launch sites in the Western Netherlands. The V-2 had a maximum of 5,760 km/h (3,580 mph) and at impact 2,880 km/h (1,790 mph). It dropped from an altitude of 100–110 km (62–68 mi) at up to three times the speed of sound. People on the ground had no warning. No air raid warning, just a sudden, maassive blast.

Defense

The V-2 was terrifying because there was no defennse and could not be seen or heard beforehand. The V-1 could be shot down, but there was no defense against the V-2 balistic missile once it was launched. The ballistic trajectory and extreme speed made it unstopable. There was not even the buzzing warning of the V-1s.

Launching

The Allies destroyed the massive fixed launch sites along the coast of France. The German mobile launch system (Meillerwagen) proved highly successful. They were able to fire as many as 100 missiles a day if the missles were delivered to the launch area. Despite the massive Allied air campaign, only one mobile launcher was ever observed during the firing process. Their mobility, ability to use virtually any area, and quick firing time made them imopossible to destroy. The static firing sustems could be destroyed, not the mobile launchers. Allied fighters rarely succeeded in catching V-2 convoys on the ground.

Production

Hitler had an innate resistance to innovation, especially if it was beyondchis World War I experiebce. This impaired vital programs like the jet and atomic programs. He sidelined these programs and the V-weapons as too futuristic. He wanted weapons that could be brought on immediately to win the War. He only got interested in the V-weapons when they presented the ability to hit London after the Lufeaffe has lost the ability to do so. This mneant that the weapons wiould only beciome available late in the War. Thanks to delays in the production phase resulting from the Allied Peenemunde raid, the Germans were unable to deploy the V-2 until several monthas after the D-Day landings when German armies were retreating from France and Belgium. The Germans built 6,048 V-2s. They cost approximately 100,000 Reichsmark (GB£2.4 million -- 2011 inflation adjusted ) each. And this using slave labor. Some 3,225 were launched. The launches at Britain averaged only 2 people killed per launch, almost all civilans. Despite the technical brilliance, the V-2s were arguably the greatest failure in military history.

Campaign

The first V-2 attacks were launched on Paris and London (September 8, 1944). London was perenial German target and after the German commnander in Paris had refused to destroy the city, Paris also became a target. The Germans conducted an 8-month campaign with the V-2s. They fired 3,172 V-2 at London and other Allied cities. Targets besides London included Antwerp, Liege, Lille, Norwich, and Paris. Antwerp became a target because it was within range and a critically important port badly needed to supply the advancing Allied armies. And unlike the French ports was located close to the front lines for the final Allied push into the Reich. (This is also why it was the objective of the German Bulge offensive.) The V-2 attacks against English and French targets only ended when the advancing Allied armies pushed back the Germans to an extent that these cities were out of range. The last V-2-attack on England occurred on March 27, 1945. By this time the Allies were crossing the Rhine. The V-2 was capable of inflicting terrible destuction, essentially obliterating a city block. But they could not be accurately aimed. Meaning that the V-2 was a terror weapon, not a military weapon. Most fell in rural aras and dud nothing but create a big hole in the ground.

Allied Misinformation

There was no defense against a V-2, but the targetting capability was the German weakpoint. The V-2 was not accurate enough to hit a specifuc military target or a factory. This severely limited its effectiveness. It was, however, accurate enough to hit a city and that made it a potentilly effective terror weapon. Given its destructive capacity, it could have caused substantial civilian casualties. The British at first assumed tht the V-2 was a guided missle and wasted time and effort trying to block non-exuistent signals. The V-2 was of course a balistic missle and the trajectory could not be adjusted after launch. Thus like artillery, the Germans needed to know where the missles were hitting to know if their plot inputs were accurate. And here the British has considerabkle success. MI-6 sent misleading reports using their Double-Cross System informing the Germans that the V-2s were over-shooting London by 10-20 miles. This significantlky reduced the number of V-2s hitting London. More than half of the V-2s aimed at London landed outside the London Civil Defense Region. [Jones, p. 459.] As a result, the Germans recalibrated their targetting. And large numbers of V-2s aimed at London fell on lightly populated areas in rural Kent. London has few high-rise buildings. Not only does it have a large population, but it is spreas out over a guhe area. You have to be really incompetent to missi t. Without reconisance flights and real agents, all the Germans had to go on was the Double-Cross reports. MI-6 kept up the ruse thriughout the cmpaign, Double-Cross agents continued sending false reports describing missle strikes on London with heavy loss of life.

Value

The V-2 had no real value as a military weapon. The main problem was lack accuracy, but the Germans had no ability to determine just where the missle hit so that targeting could be adjusted. Not only was the V-2 not effective, but it was hugely expensive. Meaning that Hitler authorized vast quantities of scarce resources be allocated to the program. The German V-weapons (V-1 and V-2) are beleved to have cost some USD $40 billion (2015 dollars). Incredably this is an estimated 50 percent more than the American Manhattan Project that produced the atomic bomb. [Ordway, et al., p.36.] Armaments Minister Speer in his book discusses what a wate of resources the V-2 was. Speer explained the absurdity of the effort, "The fleet of enemny bombers in 1944 were dropping an average of three thousand tons of bombs a day over a span of several months. And Hitler wanted to retaliate with thirty rockets that would have carried twenty-four tons of explosives to England daily. That was equivalent to the bomb load of only twelve Flying Fortresses." [Speer, p. 467.]

Impact on the War

There was an impact on the fighting. Such was the impact on London, that Gen. Eisenhower gave Field Marshall Montgomery the go ahead for Market Garden in the hope of ending the war quickly and denying the Germans launch sites that could hit London. Liberating the southern Netherlands did help, but the British unfortuntely did not get across the Rhine.

Personal Comments

Sources

Jones, R.V. Most Secret War (1978).

Ordway, Frederick I, III; Mitchell R. Sharpe, and Robert Godwin. ed. The Rocket Team Space Sries No. 36)(Apogee Books).

Stueck, Rudi. E-mail mesage, Match 13, 2015.

Created: 2:58 AM 3/23/2012
Last updated: 7:41 PM 1/4/2019