Figure 1.-- |
|
The French Army complained during the Battle of France (May-June 1940) that the French Air Force did not provide cover. The French pleaded with the British to commit more RAF squadrons. Less publicised at the time is that even as the French pleaded for more FAF squadrons, there were French squadrond that were not committed to the crucial fighting in the north. After the capitulation, Army officers played a major role in the Vichy regime headed by World War hero Marshal Petain. And these officials tended to focus blame on the Air Force to save the honor of the French Army. It was a convenient way of explaining away their failure to defend the country. It was also a way to further direct the blame to the political leadership consisting of many Socialists like Leon Blum who did not build an air force of adequate strength as well as the British who did not fully commit the RAF fighter squadrons. Many World War II assessments still today tend to stress the numerical superority of the Luftwaffe. Modern historians are increasibg coming to the conclusion that the Luftwaffe did not have overwealming superority either in numbers and quality aircraft. Modern research is increasingly coming to the opinion that the Allies had the capacity to counter the Luftwaffe in the air, both in numbers and quality.Rather it was the German tatics and battle doctrine that made the difference, specifically concentrating their forces in a small area that allowed the breakout that led to the fall of France. The problem was the failure of the French General Staff to deploy the available forces effectively. Researchers point out more of the FAF than the French Air Force was deployed in the critical area of northeastern France. Just as the Germans concentrated their Panzer divisions, the Luftwaffe concentrated its forces. Neither the RAF or French Air Forces were prepapred to respond effectively. The fall of France meant that the French Air Force did not play a role in the subsequent conduct of the War. Under Vichy, the Air Ministry was abolished and the limited air forces allowed by the Germans to be returned to Army control. An interesting question is why the Germans did not use the French aircraft industry in their armaments program. Here we do not yet, however, have full details.
The French in their military aviation exercises (1911, 1912, and 1913) worked out techniques of using aircraft to supplement cavalry in reconnaissance) and artillery (spotting). It was the French aircraft that supplied most of the airfraft used by the Allies at the onset of the War. Very quickly it became obvious that that cavalry could no longer provide the reconnaissance meeded by commabders. Although reconissance methods were primitive, the value of aerial rconisance was quickly realized. Although the small size of the air units and primitive air craft were ubable to supply the level of air reconnissance demanded. French pilots did supply importantbinformation. It was aerial rconnisance that led to the Battle of the Marne which stopped the German advance short of Paris. The French air arm was not like the French Army itself devestated and was throughout the War capable of offensive operations. The French air force throughout the war contunued to be unit of the French Army. It developed, however, a prestige esprit d'corps as a result of its achievement and performance during the War. The French air force was in fact largest and most powerful in the world at the end of the War.
The French Air Force rapifly deteriorated after the War. It was the Army that dominated French defense policy. And in the demobilization that followed the War, the Air Force was severely reduced. Conservative thinking Army generals when decesions haf to be made about cuts, repeatedly decided to maintain ground forces and equipment rather than air forces. [Cain] These were problems that were faced by air forces in other countries, especially Ameruca and Britain.
France's Socialist Government nationalized the Aircraft factories building military aircraft (August 1936). The government grouped the factories into geographical regions, setting up several Societies Nationales de Construction Aeronautiques. Each of these groups operated with aegree of autonomy, including sesigning a developing aircraft. A problem here was the reluctance of Socialist officials to take efficency steps shich would cut operations and reduce jobs. Thus many of these ccompanies anhd factories developed their own aircraft. Thus at a critical pointbin history, France wasted its limited resources in the development of several different planes insteading of chosing the best model and effectively using asvailavle resources. Assembly line methods were not used. Nor was there an effort to share out work between factories (like the approach with Air Bus and Boeing). It proved to be a recipe for national disaster. The aviation budget was limited due to the enormous spending for the Maginot Line.
French defense policy was decidely bdefensice, in large measure because of the enormous casualties sustanined in World War I. Famed World War I commander Joseph Joffre conceived of an impregnable defensive line that would make another German invasion impossible. French War Minister Andre Maginot began the construction (1930) and the fortification is mamed for him. The result was a vast, complex defences system.
The role of the French Air Force was to assist the French Army defend the Maginot Line.
French politicans and the public in general strongly supported the Army and the decesion in 1930 to build an impregnable barrier in the northeast along the border with Germany. Air theoridts in France at first tended to envision an offensive and revolutionary use of air power. The same ideas emerged in other major countries (America, Britain, and Italy. These ideas did not appeal to the conservtive French General Staff. As careers were decided by commanders with conservative views, grafually this conservatie, defensive outlook enfused the French Air Force. And these ideas continued to dominate even after the Air Force became a separate force (1933). Tragically for France, the French Air Force in World War II would fail even in this defensive mission. Pierre Cot was the French Air Minister (1936-38). He had a range of modernizing ideas and oposed the idea of using the Air Force for largely defensive operations. He attempted to change this mindset by revising force doctrine, reorganizing the aviation industry, debelopin realistic war games, and more demanding training. He faced, however, auch more limited budget than the resources labished on the Luftwaffe, And entrenched interests made it difficult to reorganize and moderize the companies involved. He was unable to compete with the influence of cobservative-minded Army generals. [Cain]
There were also significant differences among the Army, Navy, and Airforce. The Senior Servies (Army and Navy) demanding most of the defense budget and got it. Enormous sums were spent on the Maginot Line. Major allocations were also made for new battleships. Battleships and other naval spenhding such as on submarines, of course dud nothing to defend the Franco-German border.
French fighter units on the critical northeastern front were equipped exclusively with modern aircraft built built since 1937. The American-bult Curtiss 75A fighter began reaching French squadrons (March 1939). This was the most effective fighter used by the French until the Dewoitine D520 became operational (mid-May 1940)
At the time the Germans struck, 18 squadrons were equipped with the Morane-Saulnier MS 406 (May 1940).
considerable difference exists among historians as to the role of the French Air Force in the Battle for France when the Germans struck (May 1940). Following World War II, the standard military assessment was that the Lufwaffe had an overwealming superority which played a major role in the German break through and the fall of France. [Horne, pp. 184-85.] French Army generals complained during the Battle of France (May-June 1940) that the French Air Force did not provide needed cover. Several books published after the War made this claim. [Prioux]. Few assessments by French generals addressed the role the Army played in assigning bedgetary resources before the War. The French as the Germans drove into France pleaded with the British to commit more RAF squadrons. Less publicised at the time is that even as the French pleaded for more RAF squadrons, there were French squadrons in the south that were not committed to the crucial fighting in the north. After the capitulation, Army officers played a major role in the Vichy regime headed by World War hero Marshal Petain. And these officers tended to focus blame on the Air Force to save the honor of the French Army. It was a convenient way of explaining away their failure to defend the country. It was also a way to further direct the blame to the political leadership consisting of many Socialists like Leon Blum who they charged did not build an air force of adequate strength as well as the British who did not fully commit the RAF fighter squadrons. Many World War II assessments still today tend to stress the numerical superority of the Luftwaffe. Modern historians, however, are increasibg coming to the conclusion that the Luftwaffe did not have overwealming superority either in numbers and quality aircraft. Modern research is increasingly coming to the opinion that the Allies had the capacity to counter the Luftwaffe in the air, both in numbers and quality. Rather it was the German tatics and battle doctrine that made the difference, specifically concentrating their forces in a small area that allowed the breakout that led to the fall of France. The problem was the failure of the French General Staff to deploy the available forces effectively. Researchers point out more of the British RAF than the French Air Force was deployed in the critical area of northeastern France. Just as the Germans concentrated their Panzer divisions, the Luftwaffe concentrated its forces. Neither the RAF or French Air Forces were prepapred to respond effectively. The capitulation of France (June 25, 1940) ended the French Air Force as a major World War II military force.
The fall of France meant that the French Air Force did not play a role in the subsequent conduct of the War. Under Vichy, the Air Ministry was abolished and the limited air forces allowed by the Germans to be returned to Army control. An interesting question is why the Germans did not use the French aircraft industry in their armaments program. Here we do not yet, however, have full details. The Vichy Air Force (L'Armee de l'Air de Vichy) was used in an inefectual attack on Gibraltar after the British attacked the French fleet in Oran. Vichy in large measure deployed their air assetts in French North Africa. There it was involved in operations against the British abd Freen French (Syria and Senegal) and was used to resist the Torch bLandings (November 1942). Much of the aircraft was destroyed at that time.
Some French airmen escaped to Britain as the Germans moved south into France. There they formed the Free French Airforce under Charles de Gaulle. After the Torch bLandings, what was left of the Vichy Airforce in North Africa and the Free French air force was reunited and equipped by the Americans and British. One squadron was deployed to the Soviet Union by De Gaulle--the Normandie-Neiman Squadron. This was the the only Allied force to fight on both East and Western Fronts. These fighters flew British and American Aircraft. They participated in the softening up of the German forces prior to the D-Day landings in 1944.
Cain, Anthony Christopher. The Forgotten Air Force: French Air Doctrine in the 1930s (Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), 248p.
Horne, Alistair. To Lose a Battle: France 1940 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).
Larribau, Tim. "A Brief History of the French Air Force, 1939-45"
Prioux, Lieutenant General René. Souvenirs de guerre 1939-1943 (Paris: Flammarion, 1947).
Jane's All the World Aircraft, 1939
Navigate the Boys' Historical Clothing Web Site:
[Return to Main World War II national air forces page]
[Return to Main World War II aerial campaign page]
[Return to Main World War II page]
[Introduction]
[Activities]
[Biographies]
[Chronology]
[Clothing styles]
[Countries]
[Bibliographies]
[Contributions]
[FAQs]
[Glossaries]
[Images]
[Links]
[Registration]
[Tools]
[Boys' Clothing Home]