Figure 1.--The small Nationalist Air Force was largely destroyed by the Japanese in the first months of the War (1937). For 4 years, Japanese fighters and bombers ranged over China virtually unopposed. Beginning with the American AVG Flying Tigers (December 1941), this began to change. American fighters and bombers began to arrive in numbers over the Hump, both for American air groups and a revived Chinese Air Force. China could not build aircraft, they could build air fields. Few airfields of any importance existed in the rugged mountainous ares of southwestern China to which the Nationalist Army retreated and the Japanese were unable to pursue in strength. And the airfield needed for the new B-29s to bomb Japan, required long improved runways. The Nationalists mobilized a massive workforce to build these airfields, often mostly women and children--including young children. And they built airfields the old-fashioned way--by hand without heavy equipment. Military historians might tend to dismiss the efforts of these boys and the Chinese people in general, but it is undeniable that throughout the Pacific War, the great bulk of the Imperial Japanese Army was in China rather than fighting the Pacific War with America. Photographer: Sergeant Marvin Lawrence who was a photographer attached to the ATC (Air Transport Command) and served in China, Burma, and India (CBI).

To launch a strategic bombing campaign against Japan, airfields were needed--airfields with long runways. America provided the planes, equipment, ordinance and aircrews. The Chinese built the forward airfields. The Chinese began building new airfields for the bombers. Matterhorn was initially commanded by Gen. Hap Arnold--from Washington. China was chosen because in early 1944 with the new airfields being built by the Chinese, it had the only fields within range of the Japanese Home Islands. As it turned out, only the airfields in central China around Chengdu were used by the B-29s. Other airfield built at considerable effort in southeastern China were ultimately seized by the Japanese as part of the Ichi-go offensive. Chengdu was too far inland for the Japanese to reach it. It was, however, a Pyrrhic victory. Matterhorn was an ill-conceived operation. The logistical effort required to fly the vast quantity of supplies over the Hump needed for a massive strategic bombing operation severely limited the attacks that could be staged against the Japanese. The major effort would eventually come from the Marianas. The shipping routes were much shorter and there was no towering Himalayan Mountains to contend with. The B-29s based in India would ultimately be shifted to the Marianas. Supplying the Marianas was a relatively straightforward operation. Supply ships could sail directly from U.S. Pacific ports. a

Desperate Plan

The Mariana Islnds were the most obvious site from which to begin the strategic bombing of Japan once the new B-29 became available. The only problem was that the Unites States did not control Msrianas. They were Japnese islnds and well-defended. After the stunningU.. Navy victory at Miday (June 1942), the Americans ans Australians had made little progfess and were basiclly confined to the South Pacific. Asa esult, plan was to developed to bomb Japan from China where they could build bases. But it was not well coceived plan. The United States could open Indian bases, but bases in China were a very different matter. Men equioe, and ordinannce could be delivered to India by shipping. Getting them to China was a very different matter. There were no overland road connection between India and China and fgo good reason. The twering Himalayan Mounains separated easer India and southern China. This meant all the men, supplies, ordinmce, and fuel would have to be flown into China. This would have to be done by transport aircraft or by the B-29s themselves. This was a logitial nightmare whichwas considered only because no one knew when the Marianas might be taken. Some war planners were talng about 1945 or 46.

Shuttle Bombing

Bombing from Chinese bases was only possible if the American foot print coud be reduced to the bare minimum. The B-29s could not be based there. They had to be based in India where tey coud besupplied. Bombing rids thus has to shuttled. Fuel andvother supplies hasdto be stockpiled at the Chinese adbaned bases. The needed transsport aircraft were unavailble. Some were obtained but the new 20th Air Force with XX Bomber Command had to strip down some of its limited numbers of B-29s to transport supplies and fuel. This sigificantly limited the bombng capability,

Chronology

The U.S. Navy began its Central Pacific Campaign with Marine landings on Tarawa (Novembr 1943). It was a blody enterprise tht did not boe well for the drive toward Japan. The losses shocked the American people and President Roosevelt, higtening the desire to bring the war home to Japan which the B-29 could do. The only territory in Allied hands where needed bases could be built was China. Presient Roosevelt discused theenterprise with Generralismo Chiang Kai-sheck at thevCairp Conference (November 1943). Chiang agreed. Amerca would have to finance the operation, but Chiang would ptob=vide the labor. An advance U.S.Air Force tean arrived in India to begin preparations for the needed bases in India and China. bases (December 1943). The losses at Tarawa did not suggest a rapid execution of the Central Pacific Campaign. The first B-29s reached India (April 1944). Within a few weeks, the B-29s began to fly on to Chinese bases. The first B-29 combat mission was flown as a kind of dry run (June 1944). It included 77 out of 98 B-29s launched from India bombing the railroad shops in Bangkok, Thailand. This was a heavy locomotive and railway car repair shop on the Japanese Burma-Thailand rail system. 【Cate, p. 95.】 B-29 raids on Japan using these bases continued for months, but on a much lower level than had been planned, primarily because of the lgistical difficulties. The B-29s hit Japanese targets on the Home Islands as well as Formosa, and Manchuria. In that same month that he bombing from China began, the Americans landed on Saipan (June 1944) and a month later on Guam (July 1944). The Japanese Army Operation Ichi-Go offensive advanced steadily toward the B–29 and ATC bases around Chengdu and Kunming. 【Romanus & Sunderland, pp. 316–20.】 Construction of the airbases in the Marianas began even before the islands were secure (August 1944). The bases were nearing completion and the plnes, aircrews and equipment began arriving (October 1944).The B-29s flew their last mission vom CHINA (January 1945). They were removed from India (February 1945). They were added to the B-29 fleet operatiung from the then fully developed bases on the Marianas Islands. This ended American use of B-29 operations ftom the Chinese forward bases. The American 20th AirForce which transferred to the Marianas began raiding Japan from the Marianas (November 24). The number of planes vatly exceeded those launched from India/China and and grew steadily. 【Mann, p. 140.】 This meant that the difficult operation from India/China were no loger needed. The last B-29s were removed from Chinese operations (February 1945). This same month the first Amrican road convoy over the Ledo/Burma Rod reached Kunming (February 4, 1945.) 【Romanus & Sunderland, pp. 140-41.】 The B-29 effort was gradually shifted to the new bases in the Marianas The last B-29 combat mission from India was flown (March 1945).

Construction

The costrution of the ai bases in China was one of the most amazing construction projects of the War. Some 300,000 Chinese peasants were conscripted and 75,000 contract workers. 【 Romanus & Sunderland 1956, p. 115.】 Some estimates are as high as 500,000 pesants. 【Atkinson】 In India heavy equipment could be brought in by sea to help build the bases there. Concrete and asphat were avaiialble. None of this was availble in war-ravaged China. Heavy equioment could not be flown in over The Hump. But China had people, highly motivated to resist the Japanese. So what the Chinese did was to break up rocks, all done by hand, to create the basic bed of the runways. This was a huge, labor-intensive operation because of the length of the runways needed by the B-29s. Than clay and sand waspcked on top to create a smooth surface. You might think that all of this would take for ever, but because of the huge work force, the Chinese air strips were completed in about the same time as the Indian runways using heavy equipment. All of this was paid for by the United States. The United States paid China $210 million (equivalent to $2,900 million in 2023 dollars)--although this amount included payment for other works. 【Cate, p. 70.】 Unfortunately the workers were not paid directly to the workers and many did not get the pay promised or in some cases virtually nothing, creating enormouse reseentment. Therunways were fully functioal. The enginnering supervised by American specilists was sound, but thee was problem -- the amount of dust kicked up by not having concretee/asphlt paving. This severely hampered B-29 flight operations.

Chengdu Bases

Chengdu was chosen for the Chinese bases because of its remoteness meaning it was difficult for the Japanese to reach. Advance Army Air Forces personnel arrived in India to prepare for the B-29 operations (December 1943). Their assignment was to to organize the building of the extended airfields needed by the B-29s in India and China. Heavy equipment was availabe for use in India. Thousands of Indians labored to construct four permanent bases in eastern India around Kharagpur. At the same time, 1,000 miles (1,600 km) to the northeast, across the formidable Himalayan mountains, an incredible work force of 350,000 Chinese workers. As men had mostly been conscripted and in the Army, much of the workforce was women and children. They set about building four forward staging bases in western China around Chengdu. Little or no heavy equipment was available for this effort as flying it over the Hump was impossible. Chengdu was formerly romanized as Chengtu which is the name appearing in many World War II histories. It is the provincial capital of Sichuan province in southwest China. (Looking a the map it looks like central China, but this is only with Tibet included. Southwest is more correct if just China proper is considered. Chengdu was a city of ancient origins. Today is a huge modern city in Western China with some 14 million people. It is one of the most important economic, finance, commerce, culture, transportation, and communication centers in Western China. At the time of the war it was much less developed, but food was available. It is located on a fertile Chengdu Plain, known as the "Country of Heaven" / "The Land of Abundance". China built four forward air bases around Chengdu for the American B-29 bombers from from India to operate from for attacks on the Home Islands. Chengdu was far enough west in mountainous terrain to make it difficult for the Japanese to get to them. The mountains are why Chengdu is prime panda territory. It soon became apparent, however, that flying the fuel, bombs, and spares needed to support the forward bases in China over the Hump was a much more difficult undertaking than originally understood. The XX Bomber Command planned to have two combat wings of four groups each, This was reduced to a single wing of four groups because of sufficient aircraft were not avilble. And then the limitations on staging B-29 formation in China became icreasingly apparent. .
Hsinching (A-1): This was the forward base for the 40th Bombardment Group based in Chakulia. India.
Kiunglai/Qionglai (A-5): The 462d Bombardment Group It was known by the Americans as Kiunglai/Kuinglai/Chiung-Lai. The B-29s operated from Piardoba, India. The 462d conducted the first mission against Japan (June 15) at the time the invasion of Saipan was commencing. It was the first American assault on the Home Islands since the Doolittle raid in 1942.
Kwanghn (A-3): This was the forward base for the 444th Bombardment Group based in Dudhkund, India.
Pengshan (A-7): This was the forward base for the 468th Bombardment Group based in Kalaikunda, India.

Yenan/Yan'an

Gen. Arnold reassigned the XX Bomber Command to Gen Curtis LeMay who had been involved with the Eight Air Force in Britain. LeMay soon gained the support of none other than Mao Zedong, the Communist leader also fighting the Japanese. Mao from Yenan controlled enormous areas in the northern and northwest China. Mao hoping to get American aid, provided assistance to downed airmen and even permitted LeMay to install a radio relay station at Yenan. Mao constructed an emergency landing field at Yenan for the B-29s. LeMay wrote, "General Mao offered to build airdromes for us up in the north. "He told me, 'I can construct any number you wish.' I replied that frankly we couldn't supply the ones we already had, down there in Chengtu/Chengdu." 【Matterhorn Missions】

India/China Raids on Japan (June 1944-January 1945)

The Japanese knew about the B-29 and whan they feared began (June 1944). B-29 Strikes on Japan began (June 15, 1944). At the time, the Ameiaca assault on Saipan in the Marianas had just begun. When the Amricans committed to bombing from China they had anticipated reaching the Marianas would take much longer. Some 68 B-29s from the Indian bases with Chengdu staging bases were launched. Only 47 of which actualy reached and bombed the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yahata Japan. This was the first attack on Japanese Home islands since the Doolittle raid (April 1942). Unlike the air assault on NAZI Germany. Combat losses were minimal. 【Haulman】 Jaapanese fighters destroyed a B-29 on the after an emergency landing in China. The Americans, however did very limited damage to the target. Only one bomb actully hit the factory complex. 【Willis, p. 145.】 Intense nearly exhausted fuel stocks at the Chengdu B-29 bases, resulting in a slow-down of operations until the fuel stockpiles could be replenished. 【Craven and Cate, Vol. 5, pp. 101, 103.】 All of the fuel had to be flowin from India over the Himilayas, often in strippd down B-29s rather than tankers. The missions against Japan continued, but at only low intensity. July was imprtant, because in July Saipan and Yinian were secued and Guam invaded. By August all of the Marianas were secued and the building of a massive air base ws well undrway. This maeant facilities that were much more advanced and far easier to supply than the bases in China. Bombing missions attacking Japan were conducted during 1944: July 74 (14 B-29s), July 29 (70+), August 10 (24), August 20 (61), September 8 (90), September 26 (83), October 25 (59), November 12 (29), November 21 (61), December 19 (36). The last and only 1945 mission was launched January 6 (49).

Southeastern China

The Japanese Army launched the Ichi-go Offensive, its last major ofesive (April 1944). It had twin objectives. First, Second, to create a land corridor to allow the rich resources of the Southern Resource Zone (SRZ) to be transported to the war industries of the Home Islands. By this time in the War the U.S. Navy Submarine Force was destroying the Japanese Marus and cutting off the SRZ those resources from reaching Japanese war industries. This was a papie dream. The rail infrassructure did not exist to transport the immense quantities of material Japan needed. The Japnese moved toward the Chengdu bases, but never reached them. They had more success in the southeast. They ovrran large areas, including productive agricultural areas. These gains had no impact on the Japanese war effort which was being decided by the Americans in the Pacific, ultimately by bombers, but bombers from the Marianas sized (June-July 1944). And in fact, Ichi-go drew down men and resources from the Kwantung Army in the north. This would mean that the Japanese resistance to the subsequent Soviet offensive would be feeble (August 1945). The gains were another Pyrrhic victory for Japan. It did, however, weaken the critical food situation in Nationalist China. In addition the retrearing Nationslist Army seized foof from the peasantry and were as dangerousas the sdvncing Japanese Army. The peasantry resisted, in some cases uccessfully. 【Collingham, pp. 256-57.】 All of this would which wold impact the Chinese Civil War after the Japanese surrendered. Chiang wanted to shift the crack army divisions that the United States had helped build up Burma to eastern China to defend the the air bases built for the American bombers which he thought might being a speedy end to the War. General Chennault supported that strategy, but Stillwell who had overseen the training and equipping of the divisions was adamantly opposed. He was intent on reentering Burma with the British and reopening the Burma Road.

Sources

Atkinson, Brooks. "Hand labor built B-29 base in China; 300,000 to 500,000 peasants were conscripted for gigantic task on airfields local materials used pay was so low families had to help -- Profiteers caused big leap in prices," < New York Times> (June 17, 1944).

Cate, James. "The Twentieth Air Force and Matterhorn" in Wesley Frank Craven and James Cate, eds. The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945 The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. V. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 3–178.

Collingham, Lizzie. The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food (Penguin Books: New York, 1962), 634p.

Craven, Wesley Frank and James Lea Cate, eds. The Army Air Forces In World War II: Volume One: Plans and Early Operations: January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

Haulman, Daniel L. The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II: Hitting Home; The Air Offensive Against Japan (1999).

Romanus, Charles F. and Riley Sunderland. (1959). Time Runs Out in CBI (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1959).

Willis, David. "Boeing B-29 and B-50 Superfortress," International Air Power Review, Vol. 22 (2007), pp. 136–69.

Created: 1:53 AM 6/10/2015
Last updated: 10:46 PM 6/26/2025