World War II: Pacific Strategic Bombing Campaign--China (1943-44)


Figure 1.--The Japanese committed massive attricities in China, killing millions of civilians in every imaginableway from bayonets to biological and chemical weapons. This little Chinese boy is doing his part to strike back. With his age-old yoke baskets suspended over his shoulder he and thousands of others helped build air bases to bring the War to the Japanese. He symbolizes the spirit of working, fighting China. Behind him is an American B-25 bomber, a symbol of mechanized might needed to defeat the Japanese. The boy is one of the thousands of men women and children of China who carry hand-crushed stones to provide firm runways for this airfield from which the huge bombers fly. The photogrph was taken June 26, 1943 before the arrival of the B-29s Super Fortresses.

The original American plan for the strategic bombing campaign was based on bombing Japan from bases in China. The Americans attached much more importance to China as a war partner than the British. This is one reason the American Volunteer Group (AVG) was sent to Burma and China. After the Japanese seized Burma and cut the Burma Road, the primary American focus in the CBI was to reopen the BurmaRoad. This was one reason that the campaign to take Burma and reopen the Burma Road. As it was, most of the limited supplies flown over the Hump was for the Army Air Corps in China. There was just not the air lift capcity to supply the Nationalist Army. The strategic bombing campaign was launched by the 20th Air Force operating from China. It was named Operation Matterhorn under XX Bomber Command. In preparation tge Chinese began building new airfields for the bombers. Matterhorn was initially commanded by Hap Arnold. China was chosen because in early 1944 with the new airfields built by the Chinese, it had the only airfields within range of the Japanese Home Islands. There were, however, serious problems. The Chinese airfields were extremly difficult to supply. Bombs, fuel, and amunition had to be transported to India and flow over the Hump. In addition, the B-29s operating from China were operating on the outer limits of their range. They could only reach Japan if they carried extra fuel which lowered the bomb load. The first B-29 bombing raid was launched from Chengdu, about 1,500 miles from Japan (June 15, 1944). The results were disappointing. There were problems with the plains, but apoor understanding of wind patterns and the use of high-explosives rather than fire bombs limited effectiveness. The Japanese responded with the Ichi-Go offensive. The Chinese Army defending the airfiekds virtually mdelted away before the Japanese advance. They seized a large area of central China, including the area where the USAF planned to base B-29s to pursue the strastegic bombing campaign.

Opperation Matterhorn (1943-44)

The U.S. Army Air Corps Staff Headquarters prepared a plan to use a new plane bomber developed by Boeing, the ultimate World War II bomber--the B-29 Superfortress. The B-29 has un[recedented range, but in 1943 only bases in China would place the B-29 in range of the Japanese Home Islands. The Americans already had their eyes on the Marinasa in the Pacific, but they were still in Japanese hands. Army Air Corps commander General Henry H. (Hap) Arnold wanted the first B-29's operational in China by April 15, 1944. And the initial run of 150 B-29's were combat ready and on their way to China to meat that deadline. The B-29 was the most advanced weapon of World war II. Some 3,900 B-29's were eventually produced during the War Initial planning for B-29 operations from China envisioned a force of 780 B-29's. They were to be supported supported by the ATC delivering supplies from India over the Hump. They were to target Japanese targets in Manchuria and the Home Islands. This plan was later revised by Generals Stilwell and Stratemeyer to use forward bases in India that could be permanent and secure bases. They hoped to solve the upply problem by having the B-29's carry their own fuel and bombs from India into China. This soon proved unworkable. Controversy arose as to who would command the B-29's. Gen. Chennault in China wanted operational control. Lord Louis Mountbatten, commander of SEAC also wanted command. Gen. MacArthur wanted command and bases in the southwest Pacific. Dividing command ould have ultinately diverted the planes from their main mission--to destroy the Japanese war economy. Gen Arnold solved the problem by assuming command homself and he wasnot allow any fiversion from the min effort. The new B-29 bomber force was designated the Twentieth Air Force and established (April 1944). There were two subordinate commands. The XX Bomber Command operating fom China was placed under Brig. Gen. Wolfe. The XXI Bomber Command was given to Brig. Gen. Hansell and would operate from the Marianas and operations to seize the islands were alreafy being finalized. Events in China and the successful seizure of the Marianas (June-July 1944) meant that they would become the major bases for the strategoc bombing cmpaign.

The Hump

The Japanese after invading China proper (1937), seized port after port in China. The Nationalists were eventually left with only a rail link through French Indo China and the Burma Road. The Japanese seized conrol if the northern part of French-Indochina, closing the rail link (June 1940). Then after they launched the Pacific War, sized Nurma, closung the Burma Road (1942). This left the Nationalists completely isolated. It was important for the Allies to keep Chiang and China in the War because the bulk of the Japanese Army was deployed there. And President Roosevelt believed that China could play a major role in the War. The British were more skeptical. It was not possible to supply the vast quantity of equipmnt the Chinese Army needed and foodcivilin nededby by air. The air lift capacity could not begin to meet the needs of the Chinese. Not only did the U.S. Army Air Corps (AAC) not have enough planes and crews to do his, but the route over the towering eastern Himalayas was extrenmely dangerous. The route became known as the Hump. Many planes were lost flying the route. [Diebold] The Allies began supply runs to China from India over the forbidding Himalayan Mountains (April 1942). Among the dangers were the unknown reception of the flyers by people like the Lolo tribesemen. The Himilayas were no problem for the B-29s, but the alditudes were nearing the limits for a C-47 fully laden with supplies. As a result, the Hump was some of the first usage of the new four engine C-54 Skymasters. They wre avaliable, however in only limited numbers. Most of the supplies were delivered by C-46s. The pilots referred to these runs as flying 'The Hump'. The flights because of the Himalayas were dangerous. They were 530-mile flights, longer from airfields furtheraway from the mountains. The flights were conducted as part of the AAC (10th, 14th, and 20th Air Force) operations. Nearly 1,000 men and 600 Air Transport Command (ATC) planes were lost during the CBI operations over the Hump. The China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) lost an additional 38 planes and 88 airmen. After the Japanese seized Burma and cut the Burma Road, the primary American focus in the CBI was to reopen the Burma Road. This was one primary reason that the Americans were interested in Burma. As it was, most of the limited supplies flown over the Hump was for the AAC in China. To supply the Nationalist Army, the Burma Road would have to be opened.

New Airfields

To launch a strategic bombing campaign aginst Japan, airfields were needed--airfiels with long runways. America provided the planes equipmen, and aircrews. The Chinese built the forward airfields. The Chinese began building new airfields for the bombers. Matterhorn was initially commanded by Hap Arnold--from Wahington. China was chosen because in early 1944 with the new airfields built by the Chinese, it had the only airfields within range of the Japanese Home Islands. As it turned out, only the airfields in central China around Chengdu were used by the B-29s. Other airfield built at considerable effort in southeastern China were ultimately seized by the Japanese as part of the Ichi-go offensive. Chengdu was too far inland for the Japanese to attack. It was, however, a Pyrrhic victory. Matterhorn was an illconceived operation. The logistical effort required to fly the vast quantity of supplies over the Hump needed fora massive strategic bombing operaton severly limited the attacks that could be staged against the Japanese. The major effort would come from the Marianasa and the B-29s based in India would ultimately be shifted to the Marianas. Supplying the Marianas was a reltively straightforward operation. Supply ships could sail directly from U.S. Pacific ports.

Ichi-Go Offensive (May-June 1944)

The Japanese knew about the B-29 and thus took measure to prevent the Americans from obtaining airfields in range of the Home Islands. There was only so many troops that the could cram on the Marianas and growing American air and naval power meant that it was difficultto transport bd supply troops there. China was different. The Japanese prepared a massive offensive to seize the new airfields. Amazingly it was largest Japanese offensive of the War. The principal objective was to seize the new airfields in southern China. There were also secondary objectives. First to preempt any Allied counteroffensive from Yunnan. Second, establish land communications from Korea to Rangoon which would bypass the increasingly effective American submarine campaign curring off raw materials from reaching the Home Islands. Third to destabilize the Kuomintang (KMT) Government with a hope knocking China out of the war. The goal of gaiing control of China after all had been the primary reason Japan lunchd the War in the first place. The Japanese ammassed a force of about 400,000 me. The Chinese had about 800,000 men deployed to defend the area. Japanese preparations were extensive. Even so, Chinese intelligence completely failed to preceive the extent of the Japanese preparations. The Americans had cracked Imperial Army codes (1943), but apparently were not focusing on message traffic to China. The Japanese achieved much of their objectives including the airfields, And they did seriously weaken the Kuomintang military forces. The Japanese admitted to some 30,000 casualties, actual casualties may have been higher. The Chinese sustained huge losses, perhaps as many as 300,000 casualties, including some of the best divisions in the KMT Ntinalist Army. The Chinese Army defending the newd airfieds virtually melted away before the Japanese advance. They seized a large area of south China. It was, however, a phyric victory. It was achiev\ved only by draining manpower from Mnchuria and Korea. It meant that relatively few men were available for the defense of the Home Islands. It also explins why the Soviet offensive in Manchuriaat the end of the War was so successful. In the nd it had no real impact on the strategic bombing campaign. Just as Ichi-Go was unfolding, the Americabs seized the Marianas which provided easily-supplied bases within range of Japan. China at the time was no threat to Japan, yet Japan used the bulk of its reserves to fight in China which had no impact on the massive Ameican forces steadily moving oward the Home Islands. The offebsive did, hiwever, significatly ffect Cguna. The severe damage to the Nationalist Army while it had no impact on the outcome of the War did have an impact on the Chinse Civil War which followed the Japanese surrender.

Raids

The first B-29 bombing raid was launched from Chengdu, about 1,500 miles from Japan (June 15, 1944). The results were disappointing. There were problems with the plains, but a poor understanding of wind patterns and the use of high-explosives rather than fire bombs limited effectiveness. Only 47 of the 68 B–29s that took off managed to find and hit the target area. Four of the B-29s aborted with mechanical problems. Four crashed. Six were forced to jettisoned their bombs as a result of mechanical difficulties. Other B-29s bombed previously planned secondary targets or targets of opportunity. Only one B–29, however, was lost to Japanese air fefenses as a result of the high alditude runs. the B-29s operating from central China (Kiunglai), were operating on the outer limits of their range. They could only reach Japan if they carried extra fuel which lowered the bomb load. Airfilds in southeastern China would have made a difference, but as a result of the Ichi-Go offensive were seized by the Japanese. The high altitude bombing also reduced the effictiveness of the B-29 raids. The Jet Stream over Japan was not yet know and understood by the American commanders.

The Marianas

The Marianas were unique in that they were divided beteen the United States and Japan before World War II. The Americans obtained Guam from Spain as a result of the Spanish-American War (1898). The Japanese seized Saipan and Tinian from Germany during World War I (1914-18). During the inter-War era by international agreement, the islands were not to be fortified. The Japanese began to militaize their islands, the United States did not. Japan immediately after Pearl Harbor seized Guam which had only a tiny Marine detachment with small arms (Decmber 1941). Later in the War, the Marianas became a major battlefield of the War. The Navy's Central Pacific campaign was unopposed by the Imperial Fleet. The Japanese hoped that fortified islands could resist amphibious invasions without the Fleet intervening. After the Ameicans took the Marshalls, Gilberts, and Carolines, it was clear that they could not. For the Japanese the stakes were very high. The Marianas brought the Japanese Home Islands within range of the new B-29 bombers. So when the American landings on the Marianas began, the Imperail Fleet did intervene, setting up one of the climatic battles of the Pacific War--the Battle of the Phillipine Sea (1944). As the Marine and Army troops were going ashore, the B-29 bombers were coming off the assembly line at American aircraft plants.

Sources

"The Matterhorn Missions," The Air Force Association Magazine (March 2009). Lemay was refering to Chendu, the city near the Kiunglai base.







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Created: 12:29 AM 9/13/2012
Last updated: 12:20 AM 8/21/2015