Figure 1.--. |
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Hitler's thinking has been the subject of exhaustive historical debate. Hitler had a lot to think about after the major campsigns of 1940 had been comoleted, ending with a less than satisfacory conclusion in the skies over Britain. We know what was on his mind because his subordinates have written about conversations with him. We also have his earlier writings and conversations. Historians have sescribed the various concerns he expressed in some detail. We also note what was not on his mind, but should have been. These issues have been less thoroughly discussed. Hitler's thinking was crucial. There was no great desire in Germany, even among ardent NAZIS, to inade the Soviet Union. Germany like other European countries had been traumitized by Workd War I. In the political campaigns before he seized power, the NAZI opponents charged that Hitler meant to launch another war. He assured the German people that this was a lie. Hitler's subsequentb popularity in Germany was largely because he had achieved so much without war. Even as he nuilt a massive military, Hitler assured the German people that this was necessary to maintain the peace, not to wage war. And the great early victories were achieved with only minor casualtues. Most Germans hope that the war would end as soon as possible. There was no great desire for a military victory over Britain and certainly not for an enlarged war with the Soviet Union. As with the war in the first place, Operation Barbarossa and the war in the East was Hitler's personal creation. Thus the workings of his mind is central to World War II histories.
Hitler had a lot to think about after the major campsigns of 1940 had been comoleted, ending with a less than satisfacory conclusion in the skies over Britain. The general concensus is that Hitler acted out of his pathological hatred of what he saw as "Jewish-Bolshevism". He saw the Soviet state as a Jewish entity. There was reason to fear the Soviet Union, but of course the Jewish conspiracy was a figment of Hitler's imagination. Here it is difficult to know if Hitler really rationally believed there was a Jewish conspiracy against Germany, or if he just used it to encite German attitudes against the Jews. The most likely senario is that Hitler knew that many important early Blodhevick leaders were Jews. And once this opinion was formed he took it as a given. Subordinates were unlikelty to question him on the issue--if they wanted to retain or advance their careers. More common in the NAZI political structure is that subordinates competed by brining schemes to Hitler using support for Hitler prejudices as a way of gaining favor. Economics must have been a factor. Armies are expensive, especially armies on the scale that Hitler had assembled. The Wehrmacht was an expensive ornament. The cost of the military must have been a factor in Hitler's deciusion. There never was any doubt that Hitler would attack the Soviet Union, it was only a question of time. Economics simply argued that it should come earlier rather than later. Another factor was raw materials. Hitler launched the War without many of the raw materials needed for a lengthy war. The most important weakness was petroleum, but there were others. As part of the NAZI-Soviet Non-Agression Pact, the Sioviets supplied large quantities of petroleum and other materials. Hitler was aware that Roossevelt was gradually preparing the American people for war. And that if there was a war in the West with America and Britain that Stalin could easily cease these shipments. This argued for seizing the resources of the East before America entered the War. Some historians argue that the attack on the Soviet Union was motivated by a frustration with being able to force Britain out of the War. And that removing the Soviet Union which at the time was the only remaining potential ally for Britain in Europe. [Lukas] The fact that Hitler was thinking about invading the Soviet Union when he thought Britain was about to fall seems to refute that this was this thought process. Rather it seems Hitler was anxious to defeat or make peace with Britain so he could begin to execute his plans in the East. Once he convinced himself that defeating the Soviet Union was the only way to force Britain to make peace. He seems unaware that after reniging on his poromises at Munich, there was no way the British woukld trust any peace feelers. And of course the only European leader to trust Stalin after Munich proved to be Stalin and Barbarossa would be Hitler's answer. Hitler had painted himself in a corner. He had gained great victories, but the only way to convert the gains into permanent hegonmy in Europe was further military adventures to defeat the Soviets and British.
The general concensus is that Hitler acted out of his pathological hatred of both Jews and Slavs. The Soviet Union combined both in his mind along with Communism. He called it "Jewish-Bolshevism". He saw the Soviet state as a Jewish entity. There was reason to fear the Soviet Union, but of course the Jewish conspiracy was a figment of Hitler's imagination. Here it is difficult to know if Hitler really rationally believed there was a Jewish conspiracy against Germany, or if he just used it to encite German attitudes against the Jews. The most likely senario is that Hitler knew that many important early Blodhevick leaders were Jews. And once this opinion was formed he took it as a given. Subordinates were unlikelty to question him on the issue--if they wanted to retain or advance their careers. More common in the NAZI political structure is that subordinates competed by brining schemes to Hitler using support for Hitler prejudices as a way of gaining favor. The hatred of the Slavs was kless pathological, but no less lethal. He saw the Slavs as threat because of their increasing numbers and posswssion of a powerful state that could threaten Germany. The central theme of Mein Kampf was the dangers to Germany posed by Communism, the Jews, and Slavs. Invading the Soviet Union was the way to get at all three.
Economics must have been a factor. Armies are expensive, especially armies on the scale that Hitler had assembled. The Wehrmacht was an expensive ornament. The cost of the military must have been a factor in Hitler's deciusion. There never was any doubt that Hitler would attack the Soviet Union, it was only a question of time. Economics simply argued that it should come earlier rather than later. The economic issue was not as strong as it had been in 1939, because he had the economies of occupoied ciuntries to exploit, especially France, but it was still a factor to be considered. At the Wehrmacht was being emlarged, increasing the costs.
Another factor was raw materials. Hitler launched the War without many of the raw materials needed for a lengthy war. The most important weakness was petroleum, but there were others. As part of the NAZI-Soviet Non-Agression Pact, the Sioviets supplied large quantities of petroleum and other materials. Hitler was aware that Roossevelt was gradually preparing the American people for war. And that if there was a war in the West with America and Britain that Stalin could easily cease these shipments. This argued for seizing the resources of the East before America entered the War.
Some historians argue that the attack on the Soviet Union was motivated by a frustration with being able to force Britain out of the War. And that removing the Soviet Union which at the time was the only remaining potential ally for Britain in Europe. [Lukas] The fact that Hitler was thinking about invading the Soviet Union when he thought Britain was about to fall seems to refute that this was this thought process. Rather it seems Hitler was anxious to defeat or make peace with Britain so he could begin to execute his plans in the East. Once he convinced himself that defeating the Soviet Union was the only way to force Britain to make peace.
We also note what was not on his mind, but should have been. These issues have been less thoroughly duscussed.
Hitler's seems unaware that after ruthlessly reniging on his poromises at Munich, there was no way the British would trust any peace feelers. Chamberlain would have been sympathetic to further German demands after Munich to bring Germans, such as in the Polish Corridor, into the Reich. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in violation of the Munich Agreement was different (March 1939). Even Chamberlain could not contince it. There were few Germans left in Czechoslovalia. This meant not only could Hitler not be trusted, but his goals went far beyond uniting Germans, he wanted to dominate other European peoples. The only European leader to trust Hitler after Munich proved to be Stalin and Barbarossa would be Hitler's answer. It is probably not right to say Stalin trusted Hitler, but he did believe that the logic of events argued for him adhering to the Non-Aggression Pact.
Hitler had painted himself in a corner. He had gained great victories, but the only way to convert the gains into a permanent hegonmy in Europe was further military adventures to defeat the Soviets and British. One respected historian writes of the last weeks of 1940 after Hitler had made his decesion,"There was an extrodunary and protracted lull in major operations, a loss of momentumunapparent to most of the world at the timebut critical to the course of the war. Hitler failed to convert the greatest miliyary victory in history into a durable hegemony. The German navy was to weak to either support an invasion of Britain, or to sever its Atlantoc lifeline. The Luftwaffe campaign against Britain had failed. It seems almost frivalous to suggest that Hitler determined to invade Russia because he could not think what else to do, but there is something in this. Many more German military triumphs still lay ahead, but some German generals privy to their Führer's intentions already understood the fundamental difficulty: anything less than absolute hemispheric domination threatened disaster for the Third Reich." [Hastings]
Hitler in planning the War had to contend the problem that Germany while not a small country was only s small pert of Europe. Thus he hadto win the War with a military drawn from only a small part of the European population. He faced adversaries with larger populations, greater industrial capacity, and more access to key raw materials. It seemed an impossible task. His answer was diplomacy that would enable him to fight his adversaries on by one. This worked with Czechoslovakia. It also worked with Poland as he was able to duisengage the Soviet Union as a possible adversary.
But still the task was daunting. Hitler's view that the Germany would win because the German military had more fighting spirit and a technological edge. This again worked in France, largely because of German military doctrine and an unwillingess to fight. The siutuation changed in the Battle of Britain. Any assessment of the battle showed that not inly were the British willing to fight, but that they had the technological ability to produce weapons as good as if not better than the Germans. And at the time were passing tht technology to the United states which had the industrial power to produce weaponry in quanties tht the Germans could only dream of. What should have crossed Hitler's mind was that if Germany had lost the technological edge, one of the cornerstones of his war policy, should he expand the war by attacking the Soviet Union with its huge human, industrial, and raw material resources. With a significant technological edge, he could argue that he might just pull it off when the available resources. Without that edge such a risk would be fool hardy indeed.
German military intelligence had played a major role in the Low countries (May 1940). This was less true in France, but the victory was so overwealming that no one really asked questions. The Battle of Britain was a very different mtter. Germnan intelligence proved to be aisaster. They failed to understand the importance of radar. And military onmtelligence costantly under estimated the strength of the RAF as well as the impsct they were chaving on the RAF. As aresult, tactics were abandoned that might have worked if pursued for a longder period. This migght have given Hitler paused as he prepared to invade the Soviet Union. Luftwaffe aerial over fligfhts (wjich Stalin permitted to show that he was not preparing an attack) provided information on Red Army and Red Air Force dispositions along the border, but Hitler and OKW knew nothing about the situation beyond the extreme western boirder area of the Soviet Union. Goiven the consequences of the lack of good intelligence on the Battlke oif Britain, one woukd think that the lack of knowledge anout the Soviets would give pause. With Hitler it did not.
Hastings, Max. Inferno: The World at War, 1939-1945.
Lukacs, John. June 1941: Hitler and Stalin (Yale University Press, 2006), 169p.
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