Figure 1.--This is a rare photograph of the German Army invading the the Soviet Union (june 22, 1941). Tbis is not the Ostheer that you commonly see in documentaries about the Ostkrieg -- which commonly show German tanks crashing across the border. This is because that is what Propaganda Minister Goebbels wanted to be photograohed and showm. Actually the greart bulk of the Deutche Ostheer was unmotoruzed infantry (75-80 percent). Here hey are crossing the border on the first day, striking east on foot with horse-drawn supply carts. Notice the far horizon. These men and others like them would move east on foot all the way to the gates of Moscow. The Gernmans had modern tanbks and trucks, but that was a very small part of the Ostheer.

The Battle of Britain in many ways changed the course of the War. An invasion of Britain was impossible without air superiority. Hitler, fearing a cross-Channel invasion, decided that the only way to force the British to seek terms was to destroy the Soviet Union. He began shifting the Wehrmacht eastward to face the enemy that he had longed to fight from the onset--Soviet Russia. Stalin beginning May 1937 began a drastic purge targetting all potential political opponents. The Army because of its potential power was a priority target. Stalin's purge decimated the officer corps and greatly impaired the morale and efficiency of the Red Army. So confident was Hitler of success in the Battle of Britain that on July 21, 1940 he told his top military commanders in great secrecy that he planned to invade the Soviet Union, perhaps motivated by Stalin's annexation of the three Baltic Repyblics on that day. He ordered General Enrich Marcks the next day to prepare the attack paln. World War I had shown the Germans that they lacked the resources for a long drawn out campaign. The Royal Navy's command of the seas allowed them to import resources from America and its overseas Dominions. The NAZI conquest of Western resources had provided Hitler with substantial new resources and industrial capacity, but it was only in the East (Russia) that Germany could obtain the resources to fight a protracted war. Economic factors were also involved. Not only were the resources of the East needed by the German war machine, but it was extremely costly to maintain Germany's immense army. After the fall of France and te expulsion of Briatin from the Continent, this army had sat largely iddle. An army of this size was a huge drag on the economy of the Reich. Mussolini attacked Greece October 28, 1940 through Albania. Although often ommitted in studies of the World War II, this was to prove perhaps the greatest blunder of the War by the AXIS. Mussolini's 1940 invasion of Greece had two serious consequences. First it complicated the time table for Barbarossa. Second it resulyed in tieing down substantial AXIS forces in the Balkans, estimates run as high as 1 million men, that could have been employed in Barbarossa. The nature of the War changed decisevely in the second half of 1941. The Germans invaded Russia in June 1941, launching the most sweeping military campaign in history.

Red Army Purge

Stalin beginning May 1937 began a drastic purge targetting all potential political opponents. The Army because of its potential power was a priority target. Stalin's purge decimated the officer corps and greatly impaired the morale and efficiency of the Red Army. Marshal Tukhachevsky, First Deputy People's Commissar of War and seven other top Red Army generals on June 12, 1937 were found guilty of plotting to betray the Soviet Union to Japan and Germany. Each was summarily shot. Many other generals and colonels were either dismissed or sent to forced-labour camps, in most casses both. [Reese, Red Army] No one knows the precise dimensions of the purges. Even conservative estimates, however, suggest about 30,000 officers were arrested. Three of the Red Army's five marshals were shot, 13 out of 19 army commanders, more than half of the 186 division commanders. Often their families were also arrested. The devestating effects of Stalin's purges were apparent in the serious defeats suffered by the Red Army during the first months of the NAZI invasion. There was an extreme lack of military professionalism as officers had been appointed for political loyalty rather than professional military abilities. Most authors, including Russian sources, maintain that the purges did "monsyorous damage" to the Red Army. [Davidson, p. 435.] Some observers mainatin that the imapct of the purges have been over emphasized. Other factors such as poorly conceived tactical doctrine and the ineffectivness of political indoctrination were other important factors. [Reese, Stalin's] What ever the reasons, whole Soviet armies surrendered en masse to the Germans. The purge of the Red Army was apparently if not inspired, at least intensified by NAZI operatives.

Battle of Britain (July-October 1940)

The Battle of Britain in many ways changed the course of the War. Hitler assumed that the Luftwaffe would clearly bring the British to their sences. An invasion of Britain was a dangerous undertaking and impossible without air superiority. Here the Lutwaffe failed in its mission--its first failure of the War. This should have give Hitler pause as it was a failure of both German technology and his interference in military tactics. When G�ring's Luftwaffe failed, Hitler cancelled the Operation Sea Lion, the cross-Channel invasion. There is some doubt among military historians as to whether Hitler was ever serious about Operartion Sea Lion. He had hoped that the mere threat and the Luftwaffe could force the British to accept a Vichy like end to the War. The NAZIs down played the importance of the Battle of Britain, after all they were the ones who now controlled central and western Europe. The loss of the Battle of Britain was in fact a crusing blow, not only because of the serious losses, but because it was a struggle involving scientific and technical ingenuity in which the Germans had assumed that they had a commanding lead. And largely overlooked at the time, the British were now out producing the Germans in aircraft.

Emperor Frederick Barbarossa

The code name for the NAZI invassion plan was Operation Barbarossa. Frederick Barbarossa was the Holy Roman Emperor named for his red beard. He died while on crusade, when he dell from his horse while crossing a river in full armor (1190). This may seem like a strange person to choose for the mame oif the invasion. But rembember that the NAZI concept of the invasion, was a crusade against the godless 'Judeo-Biolsheviks' just as Barbarossa was wage war on ythe Islamic infideks. This was how Hitler was selling the campaign in Europe, hoping to drum up msupport for the effort. Of course, Hitler was as godless as the Bolsheviks, but he had not yet outlaweed Chrustinaity. And German legend has it that the Emperor would return to life when his German countrymen needed him to return to glory. The legend told that he had remained hidden at Berchtesgaden, the location of Hitler's Bavarian retreat.

Hitler's Thinking

Hitler's thinking has been the subject of exhaustive historical debate. Hitler had a lot to think about after the major campsigns of 1940 had been comoleted, ending with a less than satisfacory conclusion in the skies over Britain. We know what was on his mind because his subordinates have written about conversations with him. We also have his earlier writings and conversations. Historians have sescribed the various concerns he expressed in some detail. We also note what was not on his mind, but should have been. These issues have been less thoroughly discussed. Hitler's thinking was crucial. There was no great desire in Germany, even among ardent NAZIS, to inade the Soviet Union. Germany like other European countries had been traumitized by Wirkd War I. In the political campaigns before he seized power, the NAZI opponents charged that Hitler meant to launch another war. He assured the German people that this was a lie. Hitler's subsequentb popularity in Germany was largely because he had achieved so much without war. Even as he nuilt a massive military, Hitler assured the German people that this was necessary to maintain the peace, not to wage war. And the great early victories were achieved with only minor casualtues. Most Germans hope that the war would end as soon as possible. There was no great desire for a military victory over Britain and certainly not for an enlarged war with the Soviet Union. As with the war in the first place, Operation Barbarossa and the war in the East was Hitler's personal creation. Thus the workings of his mind is central to World war II histories.

Decession

So confident was Hitler of success in the Battle of Britain that on July 21, 1940 he told his top military commanders in great secrecy that he planned to invade the Soviet Union, perhaps motivated by Stalin's annexation of the three Baltic Republics on that day. He ordered General Enrich Marcks the next day to prepare the attack paln. [Gilbert, p.333.] This is one of many indications that the Soviet Union was from the very beginning Hitler's primary target.

Military Options

There were other military options open to the NAZIs. Admiral Raeder argued for a Mediterranean strategy in which the Navy of course would have a central role. Raeder argued that Germany should first attack and seize Gibraltar through Spain. Malta could be taken by an air assault. (The German capability here was demonstrated at Crete which military historians often refer to as "the wrong island". The Germans could then attack Suez from Italian Libya and seize the Middle Eastern oil fields. German success may have well brought Turkey into the War. There is considerable reason for such a strategy. It would have given Germany access to oil which was its major weakness. It would have, however, involved weakening German forces in Europe. Thisd would have exposed Germany to a Soviet assault. And Hitler's focus was on the East as even a cursory reading of Mein Kampf reveals. Hitler had two military options for Barbarossa. The Whermacht ressponding to Hitler's orders for a plan of attack, presented him with a plan for a limited attack on the Soviet Union (July 1940). The core of the plan was an offensive to severely wound the Red Army. This would largely free Germany to concentrate on Britain without fear of a Russian attack in the East. Hitler rejected it as inadequate. Rather General Plan East was drawn up more in line with NAZI objectives. Barbarossa was the core of General Plan East. It was a massive assault on the Soviet Union designed to destroy the Soviet regime and create a vast colonial empire in the conquered territories in the East. [Lukas]

Preparations

As soon as it was clear that there would be no cross-Channel invasion, Hitler began shifting the Wehrmacht eastward to face the enemy that he had longed to fight from the onset--Soviet Russia. Hitler informed his Luftwaffe Commander Goering that the war against Britain required the control of the Soviet oilfields in the Caucauses. G�ring was told to prepare a massive air assault for May 1. [Gilbert, p. 351] The Wehremacht was instructed to prepare an invasion force that would be one-third motorized providing a force and fire power that the Red Army could not hope to match. Hitler did not see the Soviet invasion as a particularly difficult operation. Here racial prejudices helped to lull him into overconfidence. He saw the Red Army as lederless. (Here as a result of Stalin's purges he was partly correct.) He saw the Soviet soldier as "mindless". Soviet tank forces he saw as "badly armored" and could not stand up against superior German equipment. [Gilbert, p. 353.] Hitler issued Directive No. 18 on December 18, 1940. The goal was a ferrocious quick campaign to be launched May 15 aimed at crushing the Red Army in a quick campaign and establishing a barrier against Asiastic Russia along the Volga-Archangel Line. This as 150 miles east of Moscow which would have made the Soviet Union an entirely Asiastic country.

German Strategy

World War I had shown the Germans that they lacked the resources for a long drawn out campaign. The Royal Navy's command of the seas allowed them to import resources from America and its overseas Dominions. The NAZI conquest of Western resources had provided Hitler with substantial new resources and industrial capacity, but it was only in the East (Russia) that Germany could obtain the resources to fight a protracted war. The grain of the Ukraine, the mineral resources of the Don Blast and the oil of the Caucusses could fuel a war machine that might be impossible to dislodge from Western Europe. The Red Army was, however, the only military force on the Continent that rivaled the Wehrmacht. Attacking the Soviet Union with Germany's limited resources was a huge gamble. To succeed, Barbarossa had to destroy the Red Army and cripple Soviet war production. Only then could Germany secure the rich agricultural and mineral resources of the East needed to fuel Germany's war economy. World War I had also shown Germany that it must never again fight a two-front war. The world was shocked when Hitler invaded Russia. The invasion was not in fact surprising. Hitler had talked about expansion east in the 1920s and clearly explained his eastern goals in Mein Kampf. What was surprising is that he would strike east before resolving the war in the west. [Bullock] Hitler was, however, convinced that the only thing keeping the British in the war was the hope of an alliance with the Soviets. He believed that the Wehrmacht could easily defeat the Soviets within 3 months at the most. It was an enormous gamble. Failure to achieve these objectives before the onset of winter would expose the Wehrmacht and the NAZI Germany to a war of attrition that Germany did not have the resources to wage. The invasion was thus a enormous gamble, especially as it lay Germany open to a two-front war. Hitler hasseen this as a mistake made in World War I and pledged that he would never make a similar mistake. That said, from Hitler's pont of view, it was a gamble that had to be taken. The resources of the East were just too aluring. While Stalin was supplying the Germans, Hitler knew that Stalin could turn the tap off at any time. Both Hitler and Stalin knew that war between the two powers was inevilatable. From Hitler's poin of view, it was the time to strike while the Whrmacht was at a peak of its power and the Red Army still reeling from purges and not yet well equipped with modern weapons.

Economic Factors

Economics played a central role in World War II. Hitler's rearament program was bankrupting NAZI Germany. It is questionable how long Hitler could have continued his rearament program if he had not taken Germany to war in September 1939. Germany proceeded to loot the national banks of the conquered nations. The persecuution of the Jews and the Holcaust was also used in part to finance the War. The NAZIs very effectively integrated the economiy of Czecheslovakia into the German arms industry. Germany did not go to a full war footing until late in the War. Not did Germany effectively cooperate in war prodyction with its Axis allies. Germany also did not effectively used the economies and industries of the captive nations, especially the countries occupied in Western Europe. The Germans did use te conquered countries as a source of slave labor. German ineffiency in coordinating with Allies stands in sharp contrast to the close copperation between Britain and America. President Roosevelt began mobilizing the Arsenal of democracy, the vast American economy well before America went to war. Very extensive cooperation in weapons development and production also began between Britain and American before American ntered the War. Hitler avoided putting Germany on a full war footing, because he thought the War had been won and he did not want shortages and rationing to deminish domestic support for the War. Only after the setbacks in Russia, especially Stalingrad, did Hitler turn to Speer and give him the authority to fully convert the German economy for war. Fortunally for the world, by then it was to late to stop the expanding force of the Soviet Union in the East and the Western allies in the West.

Greece and Yugoslavia (April-May 1941)

Mussolini attacked Greece October 28, 1940 through Albania. Although often ommitted in studies of the World War II as a side show, this was to prove perhaps the greatest blunder of the War by the Axis. Mussolini's 1940 invasion of Greece had two serious consequences. First it complicated the time table for Barbarossa. Second it resulted in tieing down substantial Axis forces in the Balkans, estimates run as high as 1 million men, that could have been employed in Barbarossa. Mussolini's invasion was not coordinated with Hitler in advance. (The Axis partners never coordinated their operations like the Allies.) Hitler never involved Mussolini in the German military planning. Mussolini decided to do the same to Hitler. Mussolini announced it when Hitler arrived on a visit. "F�hrer, we are on the march." The Italian troops were beaten back and the Greek troops took over one-third of Albania. Greece had a Fascist Government that could have possibly brought into the AXIS or at least would have remained neutral. Instead Mussolini turned the Greeks into a British ally. The British sent about 50,000 troops to help Greece, which they had to deplete from Egypt. This was important bercause critical to the German invasion was access to the Romanian oil fields. Germany had been relying on Soviet oil deliveries to supplement its synthetic oil production. The Soviet deliveries would end of course when Germany invaded leaving the Germans dependant on Romanian oil until the Soviet Caucauses could be seized. Greek successes against the Italians had created an Allied belingerant out of a sympathetic Fascist regime. Greece was of great strategic importance because it could provide air fields to attack the Romanian oil fields. Hutler thus immediately saw a German intervention to seize Greece and secure Germany's southern flank would be necessary. As a result, German forces in Romania were reeinforced and efforts were made to bring Yugislavia into the NAZI orbit so that the Panzers could move through that country to attack Greece. Hitler had forced Yugoslavia to join the other AXIS Balkan partners, but the Government was overthrown necessitaing a full sacle German invasion. Hitler had to come to the rescue Mussolini. The Germans invaded Greece and Yugoslavia simultaneously on April 6, 1941. Belgrade was subjected to Luftwaffe terror bombing for rejecting an alliance with the NAZIs. The Germans swept through Yugoslavia and Greece and took Crete with a daring, but costly parachute assault. (Hitler never again allowed a parachute assault.) Greece was defeated on April 27, 1941. Crete was seized in a daring paratroop assault in May. Despite the success in the German success, it proved to have been a strategic dissaster. The Balkans diversion delayed Operation Barbarossa by at least 6 weeks. If Hitler had started his invasion to of the Soviet Union May it seems highly likely that they would have seized Moscow if not have defeated the Red Army. As it was the Wehrmacht was stopped on the outskirts of Moscow in December, 1941. After the NAZI invasion of the Balkans a guerilla warfare began and between the Nazis and the two Yugoslavians Tito and Mihajlovic partisans and the Greek guerillas. Tito the communist was from Croatia and Mihajlovic the Serb and the Greeks held up almost 1 million German and other AXIS soldiers fighting the NAZIs. This wa of emmense importance because for Barbarossa to succeed it had to overwealm the Soviets as the Wehrmacht had done in France.

The Deutsche Ostheer

NAZI Germany invaded the Soviet Union as part of Operation Barbarossa (June 1941). Until that the Germam Army was mostly deployed in the West and had not sustained major casualties. Beginning With Barbarossa The German Army was primarily committed to the East --the Ostheer. The Ostkrieg bevame the decisive campaign of the War. The German Army is often represented as a throughly mechanized, modern force. Nothing could be futher from the actual situation. They certainly had some powerful Panzer dividsions with motorized infantry. As the war progressed, the tank compliment of the divisions stradily declined. These modern, mechanized units, however, were a small part of the Ostheer. This would be about 20 percent of the Ostheer. (Here we are comuting the number of divisions. If you calculate theb numbrr of soldiers the unmotorized infantry is an even larger number because the number of soldiers vin an infantry division is larger than in a Panzer division. The rest, the great bulk of the Ostheer, was unmotorized infantry which moved east with horse-drawn carts carrying their supplies as well as moving artillery. This is all well documented. Military History Visulaized has created visual depictions of this includung the nuber of men along with the vehicke and weapoins compliment. This is why that 0.6 million horses were part of Whermacht infantry divisions, including the Barbarossa force. This was not the officials images you see in OPropaganda Minister Goebbels' news reels. All those thorses also meant that German logistics had to include using valuable transport shipping space for the huge quantity of fodder needed for those horses. Notice that German war films give little attention to the unmotorized infantry and horses. Rather the official photohraphers focused on the Panzers and Luftwaffe. Not doubt they had orders to do this. It was not the image that Goebbels wanted to depict in thee weekly newsreels--'Die Deutsche Wochenschau'. He eanted images of the fast moving, action-packjed Panzer divisions--not dradt hioeses plodding along. But it means that existing footage gives the wrong impressiion. Rarely pictured was the great mass of the Ostheer moving east on foot. Images do exist, but mostly the snapshots taken by individual soldiers who brought their cameras along. And it does not take much industry to build horse carts. A major reason for this was that most of German industrial production supported the War in the West. [Weinberg] This left the Ostheer poorly equipped and supplied. And it meant that they were vulnerable as the Red Army recovered from the Barbarossa disasters and began to become increasingly well armed and led.

Sources

Bullock, Alan. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (Harper & Row: New York, 1962).

Davidson, The Unmaking of Adolf Hitler (The University of Missouri Press: Columbia, 1996), 519p.

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf.

Lukas, John. June 1941: Hitler and Stalin (Yale University Press, 2006), 169p.

Reese, Roger Roi. Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers: A Social History of the Red Army, 1925-1941 (Modern War Studies), 272p.

Created: January 19, 2004
Last updated: 4:34 AM 2/7/2021