** war and social upheaval: Communism the Stalinist era








The Stalinist Great Purges--The Military (1937-39)


Figure 1.--Stalin and his principal instrument, the NKVD, launched the Grwar Purges (1936). He soon got around to the Red Army. He ordered the arrest of General Mikhail Tukhachevsky and seven assiocuiated top officers (May 22, 1937). Mass arrests followed immeduateky after they were siimarikly shot. As an insight into his convoluted mind, we see him holding an invent fir the wives of Red Arny commabders. Note how he is enhouonh he event abnf toying with his targets. It is importanbt to inderstand that wives erecoften akso arrested abd the children shipped off to poorly maintained orohsnafes which in many vases meant dreary labot rather than education. The Western caotion read, "Stalin Aids Youngsrers: Marshal Josef Stalin smiles as he jelps children of Red army commnders to the presiding tabke, at the All-Union Conference of Wives of Red army Commzbdders held in Moscow in 1937."

Stalin and his principal instrument, the NKVD, next got around to the Red Army. Stalin ordered the arrest of General Mikhail Tukhachevsky (May 22, 1937). He and seven other senior Red Army commanders were charged with organizing a 'right-wing-Trotskyist' military conspiracy and spying for NAZI Germany. The arrests were reportedlu based on confessions obtained from other arrested officers. Of course in the Soviet system this meant that these officers were simply tortured until they confessed to what Stalin wanted them to say. Some Western historians until the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), insisted that the case against the Red Army generals was based on forged documents planted by Admiral Canaris' Abwehr in an effort to weaken the Red Army. It was argued that the Abwehr documents convinced Stalin that Tukhachevsky was orcestrating a Red Army plot to depose him. Following the disolution of the Soviet Union, Soviet archieves were partially opened to Western researchers. Most historians now believe that Stalin from the beggining concocted an entirely fictitious plot as [part of his wider program of purges. He chose the best known and most respected of his generals-- Tukhachevsky. And the charges of treason were used to eliminate him and others in a believable manner. [Lukes, p. 95.] There was a German connection. Stalin's ordered NKVD agent Nikolai Skoblin to pass information to Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the German Sicherheitsdienst (SD) intelligence unit fabricated information proving that Tukhachevsky and the other Soviet generals were plotting to depose Stalin. (Heydrich was earlier involved with forging documents in the Night of the Long Knives operation.) Heydrich saw an opprtunity to not only weaken the Red Army, but also undermine his rival, Admiral Canaris. He ordered that documents be forged implicating Tukhachevsky and other Red Army commanders. As a result of the Rapollo Accords, many Red Army commanders had contacts with Wehrmacgt officers. These documents were passed to the Soviets through Czech President Beneš and other neutral parties. Stalin's archives were found to include some of these documents which purport to show a connection between Tukhachevsky and the NAZI leadership. Heydrich and other NAZIs were convinced that they had tricked Stalin into executing his best generals. It now appears that they had simply aided Stalin in pusuing the purge that he had concoted on his own. Of course it could be that they did help convince Stalin that there were in reality traitors working against him. It is difficult to know just what was happening in the dark depths of Stalin's mind. Unlike many other important officials tried as part of the purges, Tukhachevsky and other top generals were not tried in public. The court martial to the extent it actually occurred was conducted in secret (June 11). The German documents apparently were not used, but rather confessions extracted through torture or extortion (threats asgainst the family) were the principal evidence. Tukhachevsky and his fellow officers were shot immediately after the court martial. [Rayfield, p. 324.] While the German role appears to have been minimal. The impact on the Red Army was not. A factor in the purges was Stalin's antisemitism. Half of the accused were Jews: Yakir, Primakov, Feldman and Gamarnik. Still another factor was that Stalin was jealous of Red Army commanders with heroic Civil War military records. Stalin as a mediocre military tactician and war commissar, could neverapproach what these men did. These initials arrests were just the beginning. They were followed by mass arrests devestating the cream of the Soviet military leadership, men that the Soviet Union would desperately need when the Germans struck 4 years later.

The Red Army

Tsarist Russia in World War I had a massive army. It was a major factor on the war. If the Russuians had not occupied a sizeable part of the German Arny and most of the Austrian Army it is very likely that the Allied Western Front could not have held, especially in the first year if the War. The Russian Army was huge, but they did not have the industrial capacity to fully arm it like the German Army. The result was nassive casualtlies. This was a major reason why it broke and largely disentregrated (1917). After the Russian Civil War in which Trotsjy placed crutivcak role, the Bolsheviks were left with abasically militia force. The Red Army had a force if some 560,000 men. That firce by the nid-1930s had been turned into the largest and well armed force in the world by the mid-1930s. Soviet industrialization effits and given the ciuntry the ability to arm its military like no other force in Russian history and no other military in Europe--including the Germans. The Germans had a larger industrial base, but the Soviets directed more pf their industry at the Army. (Steel output is a good indicator of potential.) The Germans had to orepare for war with the Western Allies. Stalin's Five Years Plans wa part of the industrial effort to exoand the haeavy industry needed to produce miklitary rquipment. Anothger key part of constructing the Rdd Army was the leadership of General Mikhail Tukhachevsky. He had an enormous impact ob the Red Army's tactics and strategy. And as oparially the resuklt if the Rapallo Treaty with the Germans thus srressed mobility. And the equipment flowing out of Soviet factories (aircraft, tanks, and motor vehicles), the Red Army was becoming a formidable force. Tukhachevsky was first commander to use organize and airborne forces in maneuvers. One source reports, "... after a decade of open and honest military-theoretical debate, Tukhachevsky organized the persecution of his main rival in the area of strategy." [Global Security] This is how the Soviet Unuin worked. It was moy just the German swjo devekped the concept of Blitzkrieg. Red Army commanders led by Tukhachevsky also developed the concepr/ He called it 'Deep Operations'. There is evidence emerging from Soviet archives that it was Tukhachevsky and other senior commanders to remove Kliment Voroshilov who Stalin appointed People's Commissar for Defence (1934) was a factot in the ourges. Tukhachevsky believed Voroshilov to be an imcompetent political appointment. who has Stalin's trust turned the tables on Tukhachevsky and played a central role in the purges.

Spanish Civil War (1936-39)

Both NAZI Germany and the Soviet Union experimented with the ,obil armored tactics developed as part of Rapallo. One siyrce reports that, "From October 1936 to February 1937, as Francisco Franco's Nationalist rebels laid siege to Republican Madrid, contemporary military theories on the use of the tank were proven wrong. Neither the German Imker Drohne group aiding Franco nor the Soviet Krivoshein Detachment, which brought the tank to the Republic's Popular Army (Ejercito Popular), possessed enough tanks to execute the tactically independent exploitations envisioned by interwar theorists." [Global Security]

Origins

Most historians now believe that Stalin from the beggining concocted an entirely fictitious plot as [part of his wider program of purges. He chose the best known and most respected of his generals-- Tukhachevsky. And the charges of treason were used to eliminate him and others in a' believable' manner. [Lukes, p. 95.]

NKVD Confessions

The arrests were reportedly based on confessions obtained from other arrested officers. Of course in the Soviet system this meant that these officers were simply tortured until they confessed to what Stalin wanted them to say.

The Germans

Some Western historians until the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), insisted that the case against the Red Army generals was based on forged documents planted by Admiral Canaris' Abwehr in an effort to weaken the Red Army. It was argued that the Abwehr documents convinced Stalin that Tukhachevsky was orcestrating a Red Army plot to depose him. Following the disolution of the Soviet Union, Soviet archieves were partially opened to Western researchers.There was a German connection. Stalin's ordered NKVD agent Nikolai Skoblin to pass information to Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the German Sicherheitsdienst (SD) intelligence unit fabricated information proving that Tukhachevsky and the other Soviet generals were plotting to depose Stalin. (Heydrich was earlier involved with forging documents in the Night of the Long Knives operation.) Heydrich saw an opprtunity to not only weaken the Red Army, but also undermine his rival, Admiral Canaris. He ordered that documents be forged implicating Tukhachevsky and other Red Army commanders. As a result of the Rapollo Accords, many Red Army commanders had contacts with Wehrmacgt officers. These documents were passed to the Soviets through Czech President Beneš and other neutral parties. Stalin's archives were found to include some of these documents which purport to show a connection between Tukhachevsky and the NAZI leadership. Heydrich and other NAZIs were convinced that they had tricked Stalin into executing his best generals. It now appears that they had simply aided Stalin in pusuing the purge that he had concoted on his own. Of course it could be that they did help convince Stalin that there were in reality traitors working against him. It is difficult to know just what was happening in the dark depths of Stalin's mind.

Arrest (May 22)

The purging of the Red Army and the other services like the purges in genaerral were carefully planned in advance. Soviet prisons were reequipped beforehand to accomadate karger numbers of pisiners. [Solzhenitsyn, p. 68.] The purging of the Party and Government had begun a year earlier, but had not toiuched the military. Stalin negan the pirging of the Red Army at thge very top. Tukhachevsky had a major stike against him--an aristocratic background. [McGranahan] That was very important matter in the Soviet Union, even before Stalin took control. In Stalin's eyes it meant a man who could not be fully trusted. Stalin personallky irdered thge arrests. The NKVD arrested Tukhachevsky and the other officers, suddenly arrested without any warning (May 22, 1937). He and seven other senior Red Army commanders were charged with organizing a 'right-wing-Trotskyist' military conspiracy and spying for NAZI Germany. A whispered joke, Voroshilov: "Simeon, they're arresting us all!!" Budenny: "Don't worry, they're only taking the smart ones."

Trial (June 11)

Unlike many other important officials tried as part of the purges, Tukhachevsky and seven other top generals were not tried in public. The court martial to the extent it actually occurred was conducted in secret (June 11). The charges were all trumped-up. Shaposhnikov, Budyonny and other former colleagues took part in the interrogation. The German documents apparently were not used, but rather confessions extracted through torture or extortion (threats asgainst the family) were the principal evidence.

Execution (June 12)

Tukhachevsky and his fellow officers were shot immediately after the court martial. [Rayfield, p. 324.] The execuktiin took polace at dawn (June 12). It was done by the standard NKVD method, a gunshot to the head. It would open up the floodgates of NKVD summary executions.

Mass Arrests

After Tukhachevsky and the seven other commanders were shir, People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov issued a directive to purge of the Red Army of all participants in the 'military plot'. This was the begimming of mass arrrests both in Moscow and units througout the Soviet Union. Multiple waves of military purges followed. The great bulk of the arrests occured (1937-38). Stalin managed to liquidated most of the Red Army's most competent theoreticians and senior commanders. The arrests defy any rational understanding. The senior ranks were especially targetted. There were 11 of 13 army commanders shot as well as 57 of the 85 corps commanders and 110 of the 195 division commanders. The greatest numbers of victims were the subordinate officers associated with the senior officers arrested. Men wh0 might be on the wrong staff or assigned to the wrong mission. There is no exact accounting. Estimates of the carnage are 15,000 - 30,000 men. Sources vary and the date range also causes vbariances. To this total should be added the 1.8 milliom Red Army soldiers who survived the Geramn POW camps that were basicallly death camps. Many after liberation were dispatched to the Gulag as 'traitors to the motherland'. And it was not just the military men. The NKVD also went after the families, friends, and colleagues of the condemned. And even if not arrested, they had to live in terror not knowing if or when the NKVD would come for them.

Motivation

There never was any coup attempt or plot with the Germans. The slaughter of thousands of invaluable cimpetent military officers was simply a manifedstruin of Stalin's paranoia. Afactor in the purges was Stalin's antisemitism. Half of the accused were Jews: Yakir, Primakov, Feldman and Gamarnik. Still another factor was that Stalin was jealous of Red Army commanders with heroic Civil War military records. Stalin as a mediocre military tactician and war commissar, could never approach what these men did. But the primary factor seems to have been the Soviet Dictator's paranoina. The same paranoia that resilted in the liquidation of millions as desribed by Solzhenitsyn.

Result

Stalin's purges came close to fatally undoing the the entire Red Army development program so carefully orchestrated by Tukhachevsky. And it was not just Tukhachevsky and a handsful of officers close to him -- but the cream of the Red Army officer corps, as well as the Red Air Force and the Red Army. While the German role appears to have been minimal. The impact on the Red Army was not. These initials arrests were just the beginning. They were followed by mass arrests devestating the cream of the Soviet military leadership. Especially targetted by Stalin was the Red Army officers particiapting in Rapallo because they had developed relationshiops with the Germans. This means that most the Red Army commanders killed and knwowledgeable about mobile armored warfare were either shot or sentenced to the Gulag. Somee 25,000 mostly high-ranling offers were cinsumed in Stalin's deadly camapign. They were replaced with many men who were poorly trained and in many cases political hacks of limited competence. The Red Army and the other services was thrown into a state of near chaos. It was not just the loss of life, although that was bad enough. It was the ideas and technival coppetence that was lost--Blizktieg/Deep Pperations tactics. . As a result, their ideas homed as part of Rapallo mot only fell into disuse, but were actually discreduted because of the associated with accused traitors. Red Army officers were noit only afraid of assiciating withy officers who promoted Deep Ppperations, but any expression of support for thode tactics. One source concludes, "... Soviet operational maneuver concepts and forces suffered severe damage in the late 1930s, in part because Stalin purged their creators. [Global Secirity] These were the very men that the Soviet Union would desperately need when the Germans struck 4 years later.

Impact

The actual impact od difficut to measure with any precussion. It is impossible to deny that Sralin severely damaged the Red Army which Marshal Tukhachevsky had so professionally built up. How badly he damaged it vam be argued endlessly. And can probably never beansered seriously as any asessment of Stalin is highly political in Russia. Incredably, Stalin's pipilarity has significantly increased in recent years, a development promoted by the Putin Government. So any serious scholarship criticiaing Stalin at this time is unlikely. The one undeniable fact is tha this was a very dangerous time to weaken the Red Army. Hitler and the NAZIs had seized powrr in Germany and launched a massive rearmament program. And Hitler had explained in Mein Kampf (1924) that his primary goal was to seized the land and resources of the East--meaning the Soviet Union. The only way that we can assess the impact is the actual performance of the Red Army. Stalin as a NAZI ally ordered an invasion of Poland (September 1939). This was, however, not a real test. The Germanswho invaded first had already largeky defeated the Polish Army. The Polish Government ordered what remained of its Army not to resist the Red Army. The first real test of the Red Army was Finland, a small agricultural country with a minute, poorly armed army and no substantial arms industry. The Winter War was an historic mismatch, but the massive, well armed Red Army invasion was a catastophe. The Finns managed to hold for some time and the Red Army suffered grevious casulaties. The Finns could not hold out for long, but the Red Army failure was being closely watched in Berlin. And the conclusion of Hitler and the Whermacht commanders was that the Red Army purge had a major impact on the Red Army's performance in Finland. [Edwards] And NAZI racial theory along with German arrogance has caused them to denegate Soviet capabilities in the first place. The same was true of the other branches, including the Red Air Force and the Red Navy. The Red Army's performance in Finland was a major factor in convincing Hitler and Wehrmacht commanders after a series of spectaularly successful militaty campaign (September 1939-April 1941) that the Soviet Union could be easily defeated in another short summer campaign. The Germas duscounted the vert real importance of the Battle of Britain. As Hitler phased it the whole 'Jewish-Bolshevik enterprise' will 'collapse like a House of cards'. The professional core of the Red Army was consumed by Stalin's purges. The most modern, competent officers were targetted--the officers involved in the Rapallo program. They had worked with the Germans. And it was just these very officers who understood what we now call Blizkrieg that were needed when the Germans launched Barbarossa. The result was a disaster for the Red Army--the greatest military losses in the history of warfare. It is hard not to believe that Stalin's gutting of the Red Army officer corps was not a major factor in that disaster. It was of course was not the only factor. Another major factor was Stalin's failure to understand the mountain of evidence that Hitler was preparing a huge invasion.

22nd Party Congress

Nikita Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress began the Destalinization process (1956). The purge of the Red Army was taken up by the 22nd Party Congress (1961). Khrushchev was still in charge. The Sino-Soviet split was hardening. The Destalinization efforts was a majot issue leading to the split. The 22nd Party Congress condemned the crimes and repression of Stalinism, including the purges if the Red Army and other services. They found Voroshilov guilty of reprisals against the command of the Red Army. Tukhachevsky and other marshals executed in 1937, were rehabilitated during the first Khrushchev Destalinization campaign. Soviet historians with Destalinization began changing their description of the disaster that almost destroyed the Red Army during the first 5 months of Barbarossa. They began to reevaluate the work of Tukhachevsky inb building the Red Army.

Sources

GlobalSecurity.com. "1937-41 - Military Purges".

Lukes, Igor. Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Beneš in the 1930s (Oxford University Press, 1996).

McGranahan, William J. "The fall and rise of Marshal Tukgachecysky," Journal of the Army War College Vol. 8, No. 4 (1978), pp. 62-72).

Rayfield, Donald. Stalin and His Hangmen: The Tyrant and Those who Killed for Him (New York: Random House, 2004).

Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr. The Gulag Archipelago.







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Created: 1:20 PM 6/25/2020
Last updated: 4:34 AM 6/26/2020