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One area of World War II cryptology that remains a dark hole is Soviet code breaking efforts. We have only limited information on Soviet cryptographic efforts during the War. The Soviets must have had a substantial effort. And they must have obtained Enigma machines as early as the Red Army offensive before Moscow (December 1941). The Russians are renowned mathematicians, a critical skill for code breakers. They did not, however, unlike the Americans and British did not have 'bombs' (early computers). As far as we know, the Russians have never released information on their code breaking efforts. There are tantalizing clues that the Soviets may have cracked the Enigma codes. Admiral Golokov, the Soviet CinC in the Arctic, wrote in his 1960 memoirs that he knew that Admiral Fraser was planning to send the Scharnhorst to sea (December 1943). One author who has written extensively about Enigma tells us, "No direct evidence but I don't think the Soviets broke Enigma in any quantity." [Sale] We know that the Soviets knew that the Western Allies had cracked both German Enigma and Japanese codes. They knew about Magic in 1941 and passed the information on to the Germans who informed the Japanese. The Japanese apparently dismissed the reports. The British and Americans passed Magic/Ultra information to the Soviets in 1941 both before and after Barbarossa (without an indication of the source). The specificity and accuracy of these communications must have alerted Soviet intelligence that Enigma was penetrated. Cairncross may have provided the first confirmation of this. Cairncross was assigned to work in Bletchley Park. Every week he relayed summaries of British intelligence intercepts which were of the greatest interest to the Soviet Union. Soviets authors have addressed World War II in great detail, primarily the titanic struggle on the Eastern Front. As far as we know, in the vast Soviet literature, the subject of code breaking is not addressed. Hopefully our Russian readers can confirm this or tell us what has been published on the subject. A Russian correspondent has provided us a review of a Russian book on Soviet cryptology. We are attempting to translate it. It discusses Soviet cryptology in some detail, but not code breaking efforts.
One area of World War II cryptology that remains a dark hole is Soviet code breaking efforts. For a brief period after the disolution of the Soviet Union (1992), Western historians were given limited access to Soviet World War II archives. With the rise of Presidnt Putin, this access has been closed down. As a result, we have only limited information on Soviet cryptographic efforts during the War. As far as we know, the Russians have never released information on their code breaking efforts.
The Soviets must have had a substantial effort. And they must have obtained Enigma machines as early as the Red Army offensive before Moscow (December 1941). The Russians are renowned mathematicians, a critical skill for code breakers. They did not, however, unlike the Americans and British did not have 'bombs' (early computers).
There are tantalizing clues that the Soviets may have cracked the Enigma codes. Admiral Golokov, the Soviet CinC in the Arctic, wrote in his 1960 memoirs that he knew that Admiral Fraser was planning to send the Scharnhorst to sea (December 1943). Of course there are other ways this information could have been obtained besides Enigma.
One author who has written extensively about Enigma tells us, "No direct evidence but I don't think the Soviets broke Enigma in any quantity." [Sale] We know that the Soviets knew that the Western Allies had cracked both German Enigma and Japanese codes. They knew about Magic in 1941 and passed the information on to the Germans who informed the Japanese. The Japanese apparently dismissed the reports.
The British and Americans passed Magic/Ultra information to the Soviets in 1941 both before and after Barbarossa (without an indication of the source). The specificity and accuracy of these communications must have alerted Soviet intelligence that Enigma was penetrated. Cairncross may have provided the first confirmation of this. Cairncross was assigned to work in Bletchley Park. Every week he relayed summaries of British intelligence intercepts which were of the greatest interest to the Soviet Union.
There is a vast body of schloraship on Western Eletronic Intelligence (ELINT). There is a great deal that can be learned from ELINT eithout cracking the codes. We have been able to find virtually nothing on Soviet ELINT. A Russian ource tells us, "The Soviet Union developed an advanced ELINT network, radio intercept and jamming units which were (and well, still are) part of Osnaz Red Army Inleligence (GRU)." [Zhiltsov]
Soviets authors have addressed World War II in great detail, primarily the titanic struggle on the Eastern Front. As far as we know, in the vast Soviet literature, the subject of code breaking is not addressed. Hopefully our Russian readers can confirm this or tell us what has been published on the subject. A Russian correspondent has provided us a review of a Russian book on Soviet cryptology. We are attempting to translate it. It discusses Soviet cryptology in some detail. The Soviets would have been interested in the transmissions of several diggerent countries, but the primary focus would have been on the Germans, the only country that had an army that was a major threat. It should be noted that Enigma was not the only encryption systenm used by the Germans. And the Soviets cracked many of these systems. They made some progress with Enigma, but just how much progress is unclear.
Many Germans did not believe their codes were cracked. Rommel fr exmole accepted assuanhces tht the codes were secure. Dönitz was highly suspicious which is why he insisted on a fourth rotor to the naval Enigma. One reason the German Bulge Offensive was so successful was that the Germans did not usecEnigma and other ekectronc messages as they prepared for it. We always assunmed that the German planners believed that the Westen Allies cracked Enigma. But it may well be that the assessment was based more on the Eastern Front. Here we are just no sure yet.
Sale, Tony. E-mail message (February 24, 2011).
Zhiltsov, Konstantin. Moscow University. (January 3, 2019).
oscow
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