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Production assessments vary as to the size of various national economies at the time of World War II. One ranks the British economy fourth in the world ($284 billion), behind Ameroiv, the Soviet Union and Germany. [Harrison] This combined with that of France ($186 billion) suggests a nationl output substabtially greater than Germany ($351 billion). We note other assessments suggesting that Germany had the second largest economy. We use data compiled by Mark Harrison at Cambridge University. A complication here is that Germanty annexted Austria, Czechoslobkia and much of Poland (1938-39), expanding its economy. These matters are discussed in detail. [Harrison] The data is only a rough estimate, but it is fairly clear that while Germany had the largest economy, Britain and France combined had the edge. What ever the data set used, it is clear that the Allies (Britain and France) could have matched the Germans. The British in cooperation with France could have built a military more than capable of stopping the Germans. Prime-Minister Chamberlain was, however, primarily concerned with preventing a war through negotiation rather than preparing to fight a war or even pursue it aggresively once Hitler launched the War. As it turned out, it was German tactical doctrine (Blitzkrieg) that would prove desivive when war came. Britain not only had a substantial industrial base, but a very important research and technical establishment capable of developing modern weaponry. As a result, defeating Britian was essential in any German war plan. Hitler wanted to do so, but his focus from the ealiest days in Munich with the fledgling NAZI Party was on the East. And when the Luftwaffe failed to bend Britain to his will (July-September 1940), he could not resist delaying any further the titantic conflict in the East that he was determined to launch. The British war economy hinged on the ability of the Royal Navy to keep the sealanes open, especially the vital North Atlantic routes to America and Canada. Without imported raw material, oil, and food, British industry could not function. Britain's one major natural resource was coal. (The same was true for Germany, although in the German case the imports were delivered by rail.) Thus for Britain, after the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic was the key campaign of the War on which all else depended. As the War played out, Britain did not have the industrial capability to manufacture many of the weaponry and equipments its scientists developed, part because so much of the British industrial effort was focused on the strategic bombing campaign. But America did have the industrial capacity to manufacture eapns devised by Brirish scientists and this began even before America entered the War. Many important American weapons came out of cooperation with the British. America at the time of world War I had very few advanced weapns programs. America provided the economic aid Britain needed to continue the War through Lend Lease. And Britain provided America with a wide range of research results on adanced weapons systems. This was especially important because American arms research and development programs were relatively limited before the War. British industry was similar to German industry in that it has two destinct sectors. There were highly modern corporations using advanced technology and production methods. There was also a less modern sector more like workshops. Unlike Germany, Britain had a fairly efficent agricultural sector. And another difference from Germany was that the Empire provided British industry access to raw materials--ashlong as the Royal Navy could keep the sea lanes open. As a result of the fall of Frnce (June 1940), the British adopted atoning and mobilization policies far more severe than the Germans. The Germans would eventually follow, but by the time they did it proved to late to make a difference.
World War I was first truly industrial war. A World War I division, especially on the Western Front, where massed artillery barages were an important part of the conflict. The Germans had the largest industrial capacity, but not larger than Britain and France combined. After the French Army stopped the Germans on the Marne (September 1914), the war in the West turned into a long grinding war of attrition. Factory output was viatal to sucess on the battlefield. The British thus studied industrial management to maximize factory output. They assessed the effect of working hours on output as well as worker health. Before the War, a 54 hour week was common for British male industrial workers. The Goverrment pushrd amendments to the Factory Act through Parliament to expand or at least maintain the workforce. Women and children could work as long as 65 hours a week. Male workers comonly woorked 70-90 hours a week. The British found that ne new longer hours, found to be 'excessive'resulted in increases medical problems as well as 'lassitude in the workers [which] adversely affected the quality and quantity of their work'. [Kossoris, p. 1339.] After only a year of war, the Minister of Munitions appointed a Committee on Health of Munition Workers (September 1915). Using the Committee's findings, the Government began reducing the extremely long hours and began estoring the weekly day of rest. Towards the end of the War, it was unusual for women to work as long as 60 hours a week, despite the pressing demands of the War and a much larher British Army. This meant that not omly more supplies needed, but that large numbers of workers had to be drafted for military service.
Production assessments vary as to the size of various national economies at the time of World War II. One ranks the British economy fourth in the world ($284 billion), behind Ameroiv, the Soviet Union and Germany. [Harrison] This combined with that of France ($186 billion) suggests a nationl output substabtially greater than Germany ($351 billion). We note other assessments suggesting that Germany had the second largest economy. We use data compiled by Mark Harrison at Cambridge University. A complication here is that Germanty annexted Austria, Czechoslobkia and much of Poland (1938-39), expanding its economy. These matters are discussed in detail. [Harrison] The data is only a rough estimate, but it is fairly clear that while Germany had the largest economy, Britain and France combined had the edge.
A Britain braced for war against a better armed Gernan military and a larger German industrial sector, British indistrila experts based on World War I and inter-War studies experience had calculted the optimal hours for industrial workers. For women in jobs where hand work was imprtant, the optimal work week was 48 or less. Where less hand work was needed, a 54 hour work week was found to be optimal. For men in skilled jobs, requiring little physical effort, a 60 hour work week could bemaintained. Men involved in heavy physical labor shild not have work weeks exceed 48 hours. [Vernon] An imprtant point is that that industrial policy is not just affected by opgysical factors. Culture is akso a factor. One reseeacher postuated that because the tempo of industrial operatiins is slower than in America. This suggested that efficiency can be maintained over a somewhat longer workweek in Britain than would be possible under the technological conditions in America. [Kossoris, p. 1338.]
It was clear by the time of Munich that Britain faced a serious military challenge from NAZI Germany. There were some efforts to ramp up miltary production, but not major efforts. The normal work week for both men and women in Britain at the outbreak of World War II was about 47-48 hours (9 hours a day). Most collective bargaining agreements provided for overtime pay. Overtime pay was usually time and a quarter for the initial 2 hours and time and a half for longer hours worked. In some industrie thaere was slightly jigher rates. Double time was the standard for Sunday work. Some collective bargaining agreements placed a limit on overtime work, about 8 hours a week, but additional hours could in emergency situations. The Government based on the various industrial studies planned to avoid excessive factory hours, and in temprary emergency situations. The Government persuaded the trade union leadership to accept longer hours beyond that allowed in collective baragaining contracts currently in place.
The War after the NAZI invasion of Poland settled to the surprise of many settled down to a quiet Western Front. The newspapers began calling it the Phoney War. The Government began granting permits granted for longer hours, commonly establishing a 57 hour week (February 1940). This replacing the previously authorized 60 hour limit. This began to change with the NAZI invasion of Denmark and Norway (April 1940). Than then the NAZI Western Offensive and fall mof France completely changed the war situation (June 1940). The British Expeditioinary Force (BEF) was saved at Dunkirrl, but all its equioment and arms had to be abandoned. As Britain braced for a German invasion, there was a desperate need for the weaponry to equip the British Army. And as the Battle of Britain shaped up the need for aircraft became a priority. This brough on sewsperate appeals for a 7-day. Suddenly 70-84 hour weeks became common. The immediate impact was a desperately needed increase in productioin. One Parlimnentary study indicated that the workers understanding what was at stake increased hourly as well as daily output. [House of Commons Select Committee on National Expenditure] This was, however, not level of work which could be sustained. Churchill had come to power (May 10). He had forned a natuinal unity government with Labour Party participation. One of the key Labour cabinent members was Ernest Beven who became Minister of Labour. Bevin told Parliament that production was tailing off and absenteeism increasing. Industrial accidents also increased. Beven insisted that hours needed to be reduced which would increase output over the long term as well as protect the health of the workers. He announced that hours of women and children would generally return to the prewar standard 48 hour week, behinning August 1. Bevin reported that 'experience in manufacturing fields points to 55 or 56 hours being the optimum hours of a working week [for men]' (July 30). He urged manufactures to adopt it as soon as possible. Bevin also reported that he was siscontinuing the 7 day week in Royal Ordinance factories. Thiese ofcourse were government fctories wherebhe could set the rulks. All of this was a brave public stance in the middle of the Battle of Britain. We are not sure that Chirchill was no all that pleased with suhc statemnts, but Labour Prty support was vital fgor the war effort. Bevin was ultimately proven right. One study found in October, 1942, that the standard weekly hours 'in nearly all' Royal Ordnance factories 'are now 55 for women and 60 for men.' And most importantly 'the output per worker is as good now as when longer hours [70 or more a week] were maintained.' ["Shorter hours..."] As the War progressed Britain would move toard the vstandards Beven suggested.
What ever the data set used, it is clear that the Allies (Britain and France) could have matched the Germans. And this is not even accounting for the Empire whichb had an economic capacity approximtely eual to Britain itself. The British in cooperation with France could have built a military more than capable of stopping the Germans. Prime-Minister Chamberlain was, however, primarily concerned with preventing a war through negotiation rather than preparing to fight a war or even pursue it aggresively once Hitler launched the War.
As it turned out, it was German tactical doctrine (Blitzkrieg) that would quickly overwhealm targetted countries when war came. Not only woukd strategic bombing take time to erode the eneny's ability to wage war, the Royal Air Force Bomber Command did not have the auircraft capable of long-range strategic bombing until 1942. Even Britain might have rolled over if the Channel had not stopped the Panzers. This meant that as long as America wrote a blank check, Britain could go foreward with its war olan--blockade abd strategic bombing.
Britain not only had a substantial industrial base, but a very important research and technical establishment capable of developing modern weaponry. As a result, defeating Britian was essential in any German war plan. As the War played out, Britain did not have the industrial capability to manufacture many of the weaponry and equipments its scientists developed, part because so much of the British industrial effort was focused on the strategic bombing campaign. But America did have the industrial capacity to manufacture weaappns devised by Brirish scientists and this began even before America entered the War. Many important American weapons came out of cooperation with the British. America at the time of world War I had very few advanced weapons programs. And Britain provided America with a wide range of research results on adanced weapons systems. This was especially important because American arms research and development programs were relatively limited before the War. British industry was similar to German industry in that it has two destinct sectors. There were highly modern corporations using advanced technology and production methods. There was also a less modern sector more like workshops. Unlike Germany, Britain had a fairly efficent agricultural sector. And another difference from Germany was that the Empire provided British industry access to raw materials--as long as the Royal Navy could keep the sea lanes open.
Germany in 1939 had the largest industrial plant in Europe, especially haeavy industry like steel which was vital for arms prodyction. And thus was enlarged by the acquisition of Austria and especially Czechoslovakia. Steel of course is cornerstone of the weaoons industrty. Britain was in seond place. One area in which Britain led was in the automotive industry. We are mot entirely sure why Britain had the largest automotive industry in Erope. It was the Germans who invented the automobile and they manufactured finer motor cars like Mercedes Benz, but they did not buld cars in quantity that otdinary people could buy. And German workers were not as well paid as British workers. But we do not yet have the full story. We suspect it was primarily the buying power of the consumer and the German focus on craftsmanship. Gerrman workers earned less than Btritish workers. And German companies seem intent on producing high quality, hugh-end beautifully crafted cars. (It would be the same approach that they would take with their tanks and other arms during the War with duisaterous cionsequebces fir the German war effiort.) Partly for this reason, Britain would be the only country wih a fully mototrzed army when Hitler and Stalin launched the War. (Even the U.S. Army still had horses in 1939.) Of course another part of the reasomn for that was the British Army was so small. Now of course cars do not wun wars. But a factory than can produce cars can also produce arms, including tanks, guns, and aircradt. As the War played out, Britain did not have the industrial capability to manufacture all of the weaponry needed, especially becuse the Givernment focused so haviky on the air war. This was a decision taken to avoid the huge casualties of World War I. Thus much of the the weaponry and equipment that the Brutish Tommy needed and its scientists developed could not be produced if the British industrial effort was focused on the strategic bombing campaign. But America did have the industrial capacity to manufacture weaappns devised by Brirish scientists and this began even before America formally. Often not recognized is the extebnt to wgich Britauin as well as Anmeruca and Germany ficuses on the air war. Over half of industria prodyction was devoted to the air war. Firtunately for Britain, America provided wgat was needed. Germany had ni such benefactir. It is why over half of German insdustrial output went to support the War in the West rather than supoporting the IOstheer in the call imortant Ostkrieg. British industry was similar to German industry in that it has two destinct sectors. There were highly modern corporations using advanced technology and production methods. There was also a less modern sector more like workshops. Unlike Germany, Britain had a fairly efficent agricultural sector. And another difference from Germany was that the Empire provided British industry access to raw materials--as long as the Royal Navy could keep the sea lanes open.
Britain not only had a substantial industrial base, but a very important research and technical establishment capable of developing modern weaponry. As a result, defeating Britian was essential in any German war plan Many important American weapons came out of cooperation with the British. America at the time of world War I had very few advanced weapons programs. And Britain provided America with a wide range of research results on adanced weapons systems. This was especially important because American arms research and development programs were relatively limited before the War.
Britain was one of the major World War II beigerants and had to fight the Germans on their own for more than a year. It has a much larger fleet than the Gerams and an airforce that could take on the Luftwaffe. And they had a major industrial base as well as an important technological infrastructure. And they had the Channel which stopped the Panzers cold. In terms of food and raw materials, they like the Germans were less well situated. Like Germamy except for coal, Britain had limited domestic resources. And like Germany, Britain had to import large quantities of food. These resources, however, existed in the Empire and overseas partners. And thanks to President Roosevelt, America's vast resources were available. The Royal Navy existed to ensure access to those resources in time of War, but budget cuts during the inter-War era substantially reduced the ability to safeguard maritime commerce. Many Brits believed that it was war that was the greatest danger and that military sprending was not only weasteful, but actually dangerous. The leadership of the Labour Party advocated inilateral disarmamment. This did not change until 1935 as Labour becane more aware of NAZI suprresion of the free labor movement in Germany. Prime Minister Baldwin and Chamberlain, however, were intent on appeasing Hitler and did not see the need to match German rearmanent. The Royal Navy thus was allowed to decline in strength during the inter-War period. The situation was created by the Admiraltly's assessment that Asdic (SONAR) meant that U-boats were not a threat. Adm. Dönitz realised that Asdic would not be as effective as the British had concluded. As a result, the Battle of the Atlantic became one of thhe central conflicts of the War. And here oil was the most vital of all the raw materials. Before the War, Briatain was imoorting oil from the Middle East, Caribbean, and the United States. When Italy entered the War (June 1940), the Middle Eastern deliveries through the Mediterranean were cut, although Middle Eastern oil supplied the Meditterranean Fleet and British Desert Army. For the rest of the War Carribean sources (Venezuela and Mexico) and the United States supplied Briutain;s oil with thevUnited states becoming increasinglky bimoortantbas the War progressed--all delovered by the perilous North Atlantic convoys and paid for by Lend Lease.
Hitler wanted to do so, but his focus from the ealiest days in Munich with the fledgling NAZI Party was on the East. And when the Luftwaffe failed to bend Britain to his will (July-September 1940), he could not resist delaying any further the titantic conflict in the East that he was determined to launch.
The British war economy hinged on the ability of the Royal Navy to keep the sealanes open, especially the vital North Atlantic routes to America and Canada. Without imported raw material, oil, and food, British industry could not function. Britain's one major natural resource was coal. (The same was true for Germany, although in the German case the imports were delivered by rail.) Thus for Britain, after the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic was the key campaign of the War on which all else depended.
America provided the economic aid Britain needed to continue the War through Lend Lease.
As a result of the fall of France (June 1940), the British adopted rationing and mobilization policies far more severe than the Germans. The Germans would eventually follow, but by the time they did it proved to late to make a difference.
House of Commons Select Committee on National Expenditure. (1940)
Kossoris, Max D. "Hours and efficiency in British industry," Monthly Labor Review (June 1941).
Vernon, M.H. (1939).
"Shorter Hours Do Not Reduce Output," Bulletins From Britain (October 14. 1942), p. 9.
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