Figure 1.--Here Japanese school girls learn to use a lathe, probanly to produce shells, so they can replace workers drafted for military service. We do not know to what extent these children volunteered or were drafted. These girls were reportedly from the Girls' National School, but that is not a school we have heard about. We are not sure about the uniform, it does not look like a Japanese school uniform. It may be some sort of uniform worn by the girls working in industry. Hopefully our Japanese readers will be able to provide some informatiion on this.

Japanese industry even before the carrier strike on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor was on a war footing. When the resultung War prioved not to be a short one as the Japanese miklitary expected, the country set about mobilizing its industrial capacity for total war. The bulk of the Japanese Army was deployed in China, but the vast expansion of the Japanese Empire required more men to garison. And as the Allies recovered from the initial Japanese offensives, more men were needed to fight the increasingly powerful Allied thrusts in Southeast Asia and the Pacific and thus workers and middle-aged men were drafted. Women and children were ordered to work in factories as well as on farms. As the military made increasing demands on manpower, school children were drafted to replace men drafted into military service on far-flung battlefields. Factories were put on a 7-day work day (summer 1944). Trains were increasingly crowded, largely because because fuel was becoming increasinly scarce. Japan had gone to War to obrain peteroleum nd other resources, but by 1943, the American submarine campaign was methodically destroying the Japanese maru (merchant) fleet. Japan was left with the oil fields in Southeast Asia, but no way to get it back to the Home Islands. Petroleum was the biggest problem, but shortages of other raw materials also developed, including rubber, nickel, tin, and others were increasingly duifficult to obtain. The same was true of other cruitical raw materials. Japanese industry, however, proved totally incapable of matching America production in quantity or quality. A good example was the Mitsubishi A6M Zero. It was an extrordinarily effective aurcraft against Allied aircraft (1941-42). The Americanhs rapidly introduced new advanced aircraft types. The Japanese were still using the Zero, albeit with some modifications) at the end of the War. Even running their factories 7 days a week, the Japanese could not begin to match the output of the United States which was rapidly expanding. Even before the strategic bombing campaign, Japan's industry was producing only a small fraction of American output and was severly impacted by raw material shortages.

War Footing

Japanese industry even before the carrier strike on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor was on a war footing. Like Gernmany, however, this was a traditional approach to war, not a prearation for total war tio fight a well armed adversary like the United States. Major concerns were largely ignored or poorly dealt with. Aparticular weakness was mobilization of manpower. The Government also failed to identify and deal with critical choke points in production. Other issues poorly dealt with were food supplies, logistics, air raid shelters, and evacuation of civilians from cities vulnerable to aerial bombardment.

Propaganda

Many historians contend that the Japanese home front was not well organized. The military Government seems more occupied with propaganda than needed economic planning. After Midway (June 1942), the victories stopped. This made the propaganda a little more complicated. The propaganda continued, however, to report nothing, but victories. Those Japanese with a little basiv knowkledge of Japanese, could not help but notice that the battles got increasingly close to the Home Islands.

Total War

When the resulting Pacific War, like the war in China, proved not to be a short one as the Japanese military expected, the country set about mobilizing its industrial capacity for total war. The country was, howeverr, already on a war footing. And Japan making total war came out lacking in the face of Americam industrial capacity. Japan could have doubled its war production and still not have come close to matching just American war production. Actually while the United States masively increased production during the War, Japan was unable to do so based on world economic data. There was a mall increase in 1939, but after tat production stagnate uny\til turning down in 1944. There were limits, however, to which Japan's traditional society would go. But the major reason or the decline was the inability of the destruction of the Japanese maru fleet by the American Pacific Fleet submarines and other American naval forces.

Manpower

The bulk of the Japanese Army was deployed in China, but the vast expansion of the Japanese Empire required more men to garison. And as the Allies recovered from the initial Japanese offensives, more men were needed to fight the increasingly powerful Allied thrusts in Southeast Asia and the Pacific and thus workers and middle-aged men were drafted. Women and children were ordered to work in factories as well as on farms. As the military made increasing demands on manpower, school children were drafted to replace men drafted into military service on far-flung battlefields.

Japanese Work Force

Pre-War Labor Movement

Unlike Germany, Japan did not have a strong, well developed labor movement. The labor movement had grown steadily in the early 20th century and peaked at 420,000 members (1936), but only a little more than 5 percent of industrial workers. What was unionized was different than in America and Europe-- mostly small and medium sized companies. 【Taira, p. 145.】 The Government initiated a program to promote heavy industry (1931). Unions had little success in organize these expanding companies. Labor disputes could be quite intense, but most companies still maintained strong control of the work force. Labor legislation and the police favored industrialists. he labor situation in Japan was highly varied even among companies in the same industry. Most notable is the high level of women in the work force. Women amounted to nearly 45 percent of the work force (1934). This was one the highest level of World War II belligerents: Britain (37 percent), Germany (38 percent), and the United States (28 percent). 【Lockwood, p. 184.】 Thee were huge differences as to ionization in various industries. The gas and electricity workers were highly unionized--nearly 75 percent (1936). But although miners were in special need for unionization, less than 2 percent were unionized. We suspect that the social class of the workers were a factor. Gas and electricity workers would have been mostly urbanized workers while miners were recruited mostly from the peasantry. Japan did not have a lot of mineral resources, but they did have coal which was vital for rail transport, industry, and electrical generation. (Notably, allied POWs would be put to work in the mines. The textile workers, mostly teenagers and unmarried young women, were an especially compliant work force. Less than 2 percent were unionized. 【Taira, p. 145.】 Most of these women were teenagers who had finished school and young women not yet married. They were thus a very compliant work force which were virtually impossible to unionize. Companies recruited many teenagers and young women from rural areas. They would only work until marriage. Another phenomenon within the labor movement was the politicization. Most unions were associated with either the Social Democratic Part or the National Labor-Farmer Masses Party. The Japanese Communist Party was founded as part of the (1922), but suppressed (1925). It continued engaging in underground activity until legalized after the War when popularity surged. The division in Japanese labor largely ended (1932). The two major unions a nine smaller unions merged forming the Congress of Japanese Labor Union. Membership totaled nearly 65 percent of all Japanese union members. This can, however, be misleading. Unions had very little political influence in sharp contrast to the very substantial influence of industrialists. 【Garon, p. 193.】

Mobilization (1937-41)

Mobilization for war did not begin with Peal Harbor (December 1941). It began 4 years earlier when Japan invaded China (July 1937). The Japanese Army achieved huge military victories, but often neglected by historians is the severe strains the war effort placed on the economy and the impact on the labor force. Mobilizing the economy and work force for war is an important part of any successful war effort. War as a national crisis can sweep away long held conventions and attitudes. The Japanese experiences has been called a 'dark valley'. 【Kazuo】 One of the first to go was the country's nascent labor movement. And while NAZI repression of the vibrant Weimar labor movement required the use considerable police action and the arrest and internment of labor leaders in the newly established concentration camps (1933), Japanese labor leaders proved generally compliant. 【Large, p. 230】 There was little protest and or major strikes. Labor leaders and workers were largely won over by the military dominated government. Organized labor embraced the ultra-nationalism the military adopted. Here the NAZI controlled labor movent was influential in Japan's labor policies. As a result of the mobilization for war, Japanese workers lost the freedom as where they sought employment. One author spells it out, "Workers faced inflation, rationing long hours, and a reduced standard if living." 【Rice, p. 29. 】 Eventually most would lose their homes and many their lives when the American bombing began in earnest (1945). The Japanese labor movement was essentially dissolved. Union membership plummeted as labor unions were incorporated into new patriotic associations. One historian focusing on labor issues writes that Japan's labor policies were a case study in 'the pathology of authoritarian intervention in the economy'. 【Gordon p. 329.】 The Meiji Government and earlier regimes has no tradition of intervening to limit exploitative labor practices. Until the Meiji Restoration (1860s), the vast majority of Japanese were peasant farmers working on aristocratic estates. With mobilization, the Government did begin to get involved, largely to promote 'industrial harmony'. This was not out of any concern over workers' welfare and working conditions, rather the Government did not want strikes that might impair military production. The Government did not plan a full out war with China (1937), but Nationalist Chinese resistance required a major Japanese effort. One result was the National Mobilization Law (1938). This essentially gave to government control over the country's labor force, including authority to conscript workers. The Government was also authorized to regulate the hiring and dismissal of workers, oversee wages and working conditions, prevent strikes and other industrial actions, and a wide of labor matters such as skill determination and training. Business managers in many cases saw the Government as to disposed toward worker rights in mediation. The Army entered the fray, expressing a concern over the deteriorating health of draftees. This led to the creation of a Welfare Ministry (WM) (1938). We are not sue about the details here, but suspect that that inflation and declines in real wages was affecting food purchases. The WM would be the lead agency in Japanese labor-management issues (1939-45). The WM was given control of employment so that high priority war projects go the workers needed. The WM issued regulations requiring companies to set up job training programs (1939). The WM also set up a wage-control system. Training and wages, however, continued to be a problem throughout the War. 【Gordon, p. 264.】 The War in China dragged on. The Nationalists withdrew into the interior which had primitive infrastructure. This made it impossible for the Japanese Army to reach them. The Nationalists even when the Japanese seized all the Chinese ports were able to obtain some supplies through French Indo-China and the British Burma--the famed Burma Road. Japan expanded military production which meant curtailing production of goods for the civilian economy and thus generating more inflation sapping the buying power of workers. Expanding war-based production and military conscription led to shortages of skilled labor (by 1939). Military conscription was indiscriminate. There were no deferments for skilled workers. Companies producing war material found themselves competing for a limited supply of skilled workers. The WM issued anti-turnover regulations, introducing a worker registration system (January 1939), but they proved ineffective. Japanese official studied NAZI methods, introducing a Workbook System (October 1941). This required workers to get permission from their employers to accept mew job offers from other companies. The system did not prevent many workers from switching jobs. Without unions to protect their interests, switching jobs was the only option available to workers who were being mistreated. 【Cohen, pp. 334-40.】 The WM copied NAZI policies to prevent workers from switching jobs. 【Garon, p. 225.】 Some 6 million workers were eventually required to maintain Workbooks--about 75 percent of the workforce. Japanese work force management faced a huge impediment. Unlike other major combatants (America, Britain, and Germany), skilled workers were not given military deferment. The Japanese saw the very idea as unpatriotic. Military recruitment was the unquestioned priority. Thus as as their experienced mostly male workers were co-opted by the military, the competition for skilled workers became increasingly intense providing opportunities for the workers not conscripted, but also leaving many positions unfilled or filled with unskilled workers. .

Mobilization (1942-45)

The WM was given substantial powers which were increased after Japan launched the Pacific War. Japanese authorities, however, struggled to manage the workforce. There were four basic problems. First there were no deferments for skilled workers. Second, the same companies demanding priorities and worker retention were actively trying to lure workers away from other companies. Third, the American blockade of Japan made obtaining raw materials a greater problem than labor shortages. Fourth, the America bombing began destroying factories as well as causing workers in the cities to flee to the countryside. Prime-Minister Tojo in one of the most misguided decisions in the history of warfare, decided that the way to finally defeat Nationalist China was to go to war against the United States and the British Empire (December 1941). (Similar to how Hitler decided that the way to defeat the British was to invade the Soviet Union.) The primary difference is that the Japanese reached their conclusion after a period of study, the Germans after only ruminations in Hitler's mind. The Pacific War required increased Japanese conscription. Japan had to fight the Pacific War with most of their army bogged down in China. More workers had to be conscripted. It also intensified the problem of keeping workers in vital war industries. The WM issued a Labor Turnover Control Ordinance (January 1942). The idea was to create a permanent work force in key industries. And it became much more difficult to switch jobs, but it was unable to maintain the quality of the work force. To many skilled workers were being conscripted by the military. As a result, skilled workers like machinists in war industries/heavy industry were replaced by textile workers, agricultural laborers, young unmarried women with no factory experience, school children, and Korean forced laborers. Allied POWs were also used, but not in factories. The WF Ministry issued the Ordinance on Labor Management in Essential Industries (February 1942). WM inspectors determined hiring, firing, hours, wages, and other work management issues. This had more of an impact than what t might be expected. World War II involved rapid technological advances. This was specialty the case of electronics. Japan's failure to keep up with American advances proved devastating. A good example of what was occurring was Hitachi--the primary producer of electrical components. The company had 19,000 skilled workers (1936). Toward the end of the War, Hitachi 118,000 employees most with minimal training. Despite regulations prohibiting switching jobs, the companies themselves were actively trying to lure away skilled workers. One study indicates the impact of the loss of skilled workers. There were instances where by the end of the war, three workers were need to do the work of a single skilled worker before the War. 【Cohen, p. 272.】 This helps explains why Japanese radio equipment was not only relatively primitive, but often unreliable. Training was a major factor, but other factors such as long work hours and poor housing, and inadequate food were also involved in declining productivity. The WM continued its concern with workplace harmony and had inspectors empowered to assess safe working conditions. The problem with this was that the Army and Navy did not WM inspectors in their plants. In addition the WM suspended a range of worker protections, including regulations on working hours, child labor, and women working at night. All of these concerns piled as the war war began to go against Japan. Japan seized a huge empire in its initial offensive during the first 6 months of World War II (December 1941-May 1942.. This included European colonies from Burma to the Dutch East Indies and the American Philippine Islands that had important natural resources and food producing capabilities. Japan's maru fleet had trouble supplying Japanese forces in the new empire and delivering raw material and food to the war industries of the Home Islands, but the U.S. Navy did not significantly interdict those shipments (1942 and much of 1943). The U.S. Pacific Fleet Submarine Service had serious problems. These problems were slowly sorted out (1943) and by the end of the year American submarines were finally taking a real bite out of the Maru fleet. The Munitions Ministry was established to deal with the allocation of scarce natural resources (November 1943). Prime-minister Togo took a special interest and aircraft production for the defense of the Home Islands was the priority. Given the falling deliveries of raw material, Japan established the Munitions Company Law (December 1943). This was essentially a nationalization law. All of the major companies producing war material were nationalized-a total of 683 companies. This designation gave them the first priority for workers with even stricter job switching. But in 1944 the United States, primarily the Submarine Service, effectively severing raw materiel shipments and destroyed the Maru fleet. Factories were closing even when workers were available. 【Tsusho, p.592】 The final WM effort was anew National Labor Mobilization Law designed to decentralize production, an effort to adjust to air attacks (1945). Union membership had peaked in 1936, but began a massive decline as Japan moved toward war with the United States and the military government began restricting unions (1940). The last union was closed (1944). The idea of unions to improve wages and working conditions, however did not die. And as soon as the U.S. occupation authorities repealed bans on union organization and , membership skyrocketed (1945).

Men

Women

Gearing up for total war involved expanding the labor force. The German approach was slave and forced labor. Large numbers of foreign workers were brought into the Reich to work in the factories and farms. This was not done in Japan, although slave labor was used in the occupied areas. And to some extent in miming on the Home Islands. One of the key aspects in expanding industrial production in the Allied countries (Britain and France) as well as the Soviets was the mobilization of women. Women were half the population and the most underutilized segment of the labor force available to each of the beligerant countries. Both Germany and Japan were, however, reluctant to tap this segment of the potential labor force. Only about 1.4 million Japanese women entered the labor force (1940-44). The Minister of Welfare even made propaganda on this issue He bragged, "In order to secure its labor force, the enemy is drafting women, but in Japan, out of consideration for the family system, we will not draft them." [Havens, p. 108.] The Government did not even tap the resource of domestic servants, mostly women. One report estimates that wealthy families were still employing about 0.6 million servants late in the War. Part of the reason in both Germany and Japan was the strength of traditional gender roles in male dominated socities. Both countries adopted policiies to increase birth rates. And despite the 8.2 million men in the armed forces, marriage rates were increased. There was, however, virtually no increase in birth rates which continued at about 2.2 million babies annually. With so many men serving overseas you might expect a decline. This changed dramatically in 1944 when the birthrate fell off preciipitously. The government reported a 10 percent decline (1944-45) and a 15 percent decline (1945-46).

School Children

Older school children meaning primarily teenager (including younger teens) were used to replace male workers in factories who had been drafted for military service. Most factory workers were males, especially in heavy industry where arms were produced. We do not yet have a lot of detail on this. Here Japanese school girls learn to use a lathe, probably to produce shells (figure 1). We do not know to what extent these children volunteered or were drafted. The girls pivtured here were reportedly from the Girls' National School, but that is not a school we have heard about. We are not sure about the uniform, it does not look like Japanese school uniformsthey are wearing. It may be some sort of uniform worn by the girls working in industry. Hopefully our Japanese readers will be able to provide some information on this. We are unsure to what extent the boys were used in factories. We suspect that older boys were more involved in cadet and other military training programs, but we dio not have much detail on this. Many children not involved in war industries were evacauted from the cities. We see children being used in handicraft imdustries in the countryside. This is not, however, where arms and war material were being built. In the German evacuations, the children's education suffered terribly. We do not yet have information on the Japanese evacuations affected school children and provision for continued schooling.

Food

Food was a major problem in Japan's industrial mobilization. Conscription for military service not only took men out of factories, but also farm laborers. This adversely affected agricultural production. Japan is a mountenous country with a relatively small area of arable land. And with the country industrial expansion, Japan had to depend on increasing quantities of imported food. Early in the War, Japanese seized important food producing areas in Southeast Asia. Food was requisioned abnd shipped back to the Home Islands. This caused food shortages and a horific famine in the Dutch East Indies. This expedient became increasingly difficult as the American submarine camoaign became more effective (1943) and virtually impossible (1944) as the U.S. submariners methodically destroyed the maru fleet. Domestic harvests declined by one-third and imports virtually ceased. Rice had to be severly rationed. The country at the time had only a small coastal fishing fleet and that was affected by the fuel shotages. And eventually as the maru targets became so few in number, the Americans began targetting the fishing boats as well. Milk was also became difficult to obtain. Babies began to decline in weight. The school children evacuate to the country side (1944) were adequately fed. People in the cities fared less well. As the American bombing strategic campaign began, the trasportation system was affected. Thus getting food from rural areas into the cities became a problem. Food was not only a problem for civilians. Most if the Japanese military casualties came during the last year of the War and a substantial number resulted from food shortages in cut off Japanese garrisons. Civilians were able to obtain food through the black market and while shortages developed, there was no starvation. Had the War not ended when it did, however, there would have been a dreadful famine during Winter 1945-46.

Factories

Factories were put on a 7-day work day (summer 1944). But by this time, the Americans had largely destroyed the Japanese Maru fleet. The Pacific Fleet submarimes were the primary instrument of distruction. This was preventing Japanese war industries from obtaining the raw materials needed. Some shipments were still ariving over the East China Sea Inland Sea from China, but by 1945, especially after Okinawa, this route were cut off. Shipments from the conquered Southern Resouce Zone virtually ceased. All that was left was meager shipments from Korea and China over the Yellow Sea. Some factories were closed down. Many operated at a fraction of capacity. In some cases substitute materials were found. Quality of the remaining production declined. Trains were increasingly crowded, largely because because fuel was becoming increasinly scarce. This meant that raw materials even if they could be found could not be delivered to factories and the finished products could not be shipped to the men fighting the War. And this deteiorating situation developed even begore the American strategic bombing campaign began in earnest.

Raw Materials

Japan had gone to War to obtain peteroleum and other resources fom the Southern Resource Zone, but by 1943, the American submarine campaign was methodically destroying the Japanese maru (merchant) fleet. Japan was left with the oil fields in Southeast Asia, but no way to get it back to the Home Islands. There were wearouses stuffed with rice in Southeast Asia min the midt of famine they created. Petroleum was the biggest problem, but shortages of other raw materials also developed, including rubber, nickel, tin, were increasingly difficult to obtain. The same was true of other critical raw materials. And the rice needed to feed the factory workers was also being cut off. With the American seizure of the Phillippiens (October 1944-January 1945), there was no longer any way to get any subtantial supplies from the SRZ back to the Home Islands.

Industrial Performance

Japanese industry, however, proved totally incapable of matching America production in quantity or quality. A good example was the Mitsubishi A6M Zero. It was an extrordinarily effective aurcraft against Allied aircraft (1941-42). The Americans dealt with it through innocative tactics (1942). The Americanhs thenrapidly introduced new advanced aircraft types which titally outclassed the Zero, especially as the well trained pilots disappeared through attrition. The Japanese were still using the Zero, albeit with some modifications) at the end of the War. The Japanes did not anticipate a long War and were unable to develop new, improved weapons. The did experiments with German technology, but did not have the industrial capacity or raw materials to either perfect them or produce them in numbers. Even running their factories 7 days a week, the Japanese could not begin to match the output of the United States which was rapidly expanding. Even before the strategic bombing campaign, Japan's industry was producing only a small fraction of American output and was severly impacted by raw material shortages.

Sources

Cohen, Jeome B. Japan's Economy in War an Recostruction (Minneaolis: 1949).

Garon, Sheldon. The Stateand Labor in Modern Japan (Berkeley:1987).

Gordon, Andrew. The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan: Heavy Industry, 1853-1955. (Cambridge: 1985).

Havens, Thomas R. H. Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two (1978).

Kazuo, Okochi. Kurai tanima no rodo (Tohyo: 1970).

Large, Stephen S. Organized Workers and Socilist Politicsin Interwar Japan (Csambridge: 1981).

Lockwood, William. The Economic Development of Japan (Princeton: 1968).

Rice, Richard. "Japanese labor in World War II," International Labor and Working-Class History, No. 38, The Working Class in World War II (Fall, 1990), pp. 29-45.

Taira, Koji. Economic Development and the Labor Market in Japan (New York: 1970).

Tsusho, SAngyoshohem. Sangyo tosei (Tokyo: 1964).

Created: 7:55 AM 7/1/2011
Last updated: 11:50 AM 3/3/2026