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World War II Japan home front industrial mobilization
World War II: Japanese Home Front--Industrial Mobilization
Figure 1.--Here Japanese school girls learn to use a lathe, probanly to produce shells, so they can replace workers drafted for military service. We do not know to what extent these children volunteered or were drafted. These girls were reportedly from the Girls' National School, but that is not a school we have heard about. We are not sure about the uniform, it does not klook like apanese school uniform. It may be some sort of uniform worn by the girls working in industry. Hopefully our Japanese readers will be able to provide some informatiion on this.
Japanese industry even before the carrier strike on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor was on a war footing. When the resultung War prioved not to be a short one as the Japanese miklitary expected, the country set about mobilizing its industrial capacity for total war. The bulk of the Japanese Army was deployed in China, but the vast expansion of the Japanese Empire required more men to garison. And as the Allies recovered from the initial Japanese offensives, more men were needed to fight the increasingly powerful Allied thrusts in Southeast Asia and the Pacific and thus workers and middle-aged men were drafted. Women and children were ordered to work in factories as well as on farms. As the military made increasing demands on manpower, school children were drafted to replace men drafted into military service on far-flung battlefields. Factories were put on a 7-day work day (summer 1944). Trains were increasingly crowded, largely because because fuel was becoming increasinly scarce. Japan had gone to War to obrain peteroleum nd other resources, but by 1943, the American submarine campaign was methodically destroying the Japanese maru (merchant) fleet. Japan was left with the oil fields in Southeast Asia, but no way to get it back to the Home Islands. Petroleum was the biggest problem, but shortages of other raw materials also developed, including rubber, nickel, tin, and others were increasingly duifficult to obtain. The same was true of other cruitical raw materials. Japanese industry, however, proved totally incapable of matching America production in quantity or quality. A good example was the Mitsubishi A6M Zero. It was an extrordinarily effective aurcraft against Allied aircraft (1941-42). The Americanhs rapidly introduced new advanced aircraft types. The Japanese were still using the Zero, albeit with some modifications) at the end of the War. Even running their factories 7 days a week, the Japanese could not begin to match the output of the United States which was rapidly expanding. Even before the strategic bombing campaign, Japan's industry was producing only a small fraction of American output and was severly impacted by raw material shortages.
War Footing
Japanese industry even before the carrier strike on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor was on a war footing. Like Gernmany, however, this was a traditional approach to war, not a prearation for total war tio fight a well armed adversary like the United States. Major concerns were largely ignored or poorly dealt with. Aparticular weakness was mobilization of manpower. The Government also failed to identify and deal with critical choke points in production. Other issues poorly dealt with were food supplies, logistics, air raid shelters, and evacuation of civilians from cities vulnerable to aerial bombardment.
Propaganda
Many historians contend that the Japanese home front was not well organized. The military Government seems more occupied with propaganda than needed economic planning. After Midway (June 1942), the victories stopped. This made the propagabnda a little more complicated. The propaganda continued, however, to report nothing, but victories. Those Japanese with a little basiv knowkledge of Japanese, could not help but notice that the battles got increasingly close to the Home Islands.
Total War
When the resulting Pacific War, like the war in China, proved not to be a short one as the Japanese military expected, the country set about mobilizing its industrial capacity for total war. The country was, howeverr, already on a war footing. And Japan making total war came out lacking in the face of Americam industrial capacity. Japan could have doubled its war production and still not have come close to matching just American war production. Actually while the United States masively increased production during the War, Japan was unable to do so based on world economic data. There was a mall increase in 1939, but after tat production stagnate uny\til turning down in 1944. There were limits, however, to which Japan's traditional society would go. But the major reason or the decline was the inability of the destrucy\tion of he Japanese maru fleet by the American Pacific Fleet submarines and other American naval forces.
Manpower
The bulk of the Japanese Army was deployed in China, but the vast expansion of the Japanese Empire required more men to garison. And as the Allies recovered from the initial Japanese offensives, more men were needed to fight the increasingly powerful Allied thrusts in Southeast Asia and the Pacific and thus workers and middle-aged men were drafted. Women and children were ordered to work in factories as well as on farms. As the military made increasing demands on manpower, school children were drafted to replace men drafted into military service on far-flung battlefields.
Women
Gearing up for total war involved expanding the labor force. The German approach was slave and forced labor. Large numbers of foreign workers were brought into the Reich to work in the factories and farms. This was not done in Japan, although slave labor was used in the occupied areas. And to some extent in miming on the Home Islands. One of the key aspects in expanding industrial production in the Allied countries (Britain and France) as well as the Soviets was the mobilization of women. Women were half the population and the most underutilized segment of the labor force available to each of the beligerant countries. Both Germany and Japan were, however, reluctant to tap this segment of the potential labor force. Only about 1.4 million Japanese women entered the labor force (1940-44). The Minister of Welfare even made propaganda on this issue He bragged, "In order to secure its labor force, the enemy is drafting women, but in Japan, out of consideration for the family system, we will not draft them." [Havens, p. 108.] The Government did not even tap the resource of domestic servants, mostly women. One report estimates that wealthy families were still employing about 0.6 million servants late in the War. Part of the reason in both Germany and Japan was the strength of traditional gender roles in male dominated socities. Both countries adopted policiies to increase birth rates. And despite the 8.2 million men in the armed forces, marriage rates were increased. There was, however, virtually no increase in birth rates which continued at about 2.2 million babies annually. With so many men serving overseas you might expect a decline. This changed dramatically in 1944 when the birthrate fell off preciipitously. The government reported a 10 percent decline (1944-45) and a 15 percent decline (1945-46).
Older school children meaning primarily teenager (including younger teens) were used to replace male workers in factories who had been drafted for military service. Most factory workers were males, especially in heavy industry where arms were produced. We do not yet have a lot of detail on this. Here Japanese school girls learn to use a lathe, probably to produce shells (figure 1). We do not know to what extent these children volunteered or were drafted. The girls pivtured here were reportedly from the Girls' National School, but that is not a school we have heard about. We are not sure about the uniform, it does not look like Japanese school uniformsthey are wearing. It may be some sort of uniform worn by the girls working in industry. Hopefully our Japanese readers will be able to provide some information on this. We are unsure to what extent the boys were used in factories. We suspect that older boys were more involved in cadet and other military training programs, but we dio not have much detail on this. Many children not involved in war industries were evacauted from the cities. We see children being used in handicraft imdustries in the countryside. This is not, however, where arms and war material were being built. In the German evacuations, the children's education suffered terribly. We do not yet have information on the Japanese evacuations affected school children and provision for continued schooling.
Food
Food was a major problem in Japan's industrial mobilization. Conscription for military service not only took men out of factories, but also farm laborers. This adversely affected agricultural production. Japan is a mountenous country with a relatively small area of arable land. And with the country industrial expansion, Japan had to depend
on increasing quantities of imported food. Early in the War, Japanese seized important food producing areas in Southeast Asia. Food was requisioned abnd shipped back to the Home Islands. This caused food shortages and a horific famine in the Dutch East Indies. This expedient became increasingly difficult as the American submarine camoaign became more effective (1943) and virtually impossible (1944) as the U.S. submariners methodically destroyed the maru fleet. Domestic harvests declined by one-third and imports virtually ceased. Rice had to be severly rationed. The country at the time had only a small coastal fishing fleet and that was affected by the fuel shotages. And eventually as the maru targets became so few in number, the Americans began targetting the fishing boats as well. Milk was also became difficult to obtain. Babies began to decline in weight. The school children evacuate to the country side (1944) were adequately fed. People in the cities fared less well. As the American bombing strategic campaign began, the trasportation system was affected. Thus getting food from rural areas into the cities became a problem. Food was not only a problem for civilians. Most if the Japanese military casualties came during the last year of the War and a substantial number resulted from food shortages in cut off Japanese garrisons. Civilians were able to obtain food through the black market and while shortages developed, there was no starvation. Had the War not ended when it did, however, there would have been a dreadful famine during Winter 1945-46.
Factories
Factories were put on a 7-day work day (summer 1944). But by this time, the Americans had largely destroyed the Japanese Maru fleet. The Pacific Fleet submarimes were the primary instrument of distruction. This was preventing Japanese war industries from obtaining the raw materials needed. Some shipments were still ariving over the East China Sea Inland Sea from China, but by 1945, especially after Okinawa, this route were cut off. Shipments from the conquered Southern Resouce Zone virtually ceased. All that was left was meager shipments from Korea and China over the Yellow Sea. Some factories were closed down. Many operated at a fraction of capacity. In some cases substitute materials were found. Quality of the remaining production declined. Trains were increasingly crowded, largely because because fuel was becoming increasinly scarce. This meant that raw materials even if they could be found could not be delivered to factories and the finished products could not be shipped to the men fighting the War. And this deteiorating situation developed even begore the American strategic bombing campaign began in earnest.
Raw Materials
Japan had gone to War to obtain peteroleum and other resources fom the Southern Resource Zone, but by 1943, the American submarine campaign was methodically destroying the Japanese maru (merchant) fleet. Japan was left with the oil fields in Southeast Asia, but no way to get it back to the Home Islands. There were wearouses stuffed with rice in Southeast Asia min the midt of famine they created. Petroleum was the biggest problem, but shortages of other raw materials also developed, including rubber, nickel, tin, were increasingly difficult to obtain. The same was true of other critical raw materials. And the rice needed to feed the factory workers was also being cut off. With the American seizure of the Phillippiens (October 1944-January 1945), there was no longer any way to get any subtantial supplies from the SRZ back to the Home Islands.
Industrial Performance
Japanese industry, however, proved totally incapable of matching America production in quantity or quality. A good example was the Mitsubishi A6M Zero. It was an extrordinarily effective aurcraft against Allied aircraft (1941-42). The Americans dealt with it through innocative tactics (1942). The Americanhs thenrapidly introduced new advanced aircraft types which titally outclassed the Zero, especially as the vwell trained pilots disappeared through attrition. The Japanese were still using the Zero, albeit with some modifications) at the end of the War. The Japanes did not anticipate a long War and were unable to develop new, improved weapons. The did experiments with German technology, but did not have the industrial capacity or raw materials to either perfect them or produce them in numbers. Even running their factories 7 days a week, the Japanese could not begin to match the output of the United States which was rapidly expanding. Even before the strategic bombing campaign, Japan's industry was producing only a small fraction of American output and was severly impacted by raw material shortages.
Sources
Havens, Thomas R. H. Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two (1978).
