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"Working obviously paid fewer rewards as things got woirse for Japan: prices rose faster than wages, tavs climed steadily, many employees were frozen in their jobs, forced savings sharnk their incomes, the blzck mrket goughed them ... and and the economy pared down its output for their consumpotion. No wonder some workers compiained or that the government was afrad many more of them would do so."
- Thomas Haven, Historian and Japanologist, Valley of Darkness
The Welfre Minitrt (WM) nwas given substantial powers afterthe War in Vhina began (1937). These powers were increased after Japan launched the Pacific War. Japanese authorities, however, struggled to manage the workforce. There were four basic problems. First there were no deferments for skilled workers. Second, the same companies demanding priorities and worker retention were actively trying to lure workers away from other companies. Third, the American blockade of Japan made obtaining raw materials a greater problem than labor shortages. Fourth, the America bombing began destroying factories as well as causing workers in the cities to flee to the countryside. Prime-Minister Tojo in one of the most misguided decisions in the history of warfare, decided that the way to finally defeat Nationalist China was to go to war against the United States and the British Empire (December 1941). (Similar to how Hitler decided that the way to defeat the British was to invade the Soviet Union.) The primary difference is that the Japanese reached their conclusion after a period of study, the Germans after only ruminations in Hitler's mind. The Pacific War required increased Japanese conscription. Japan had to fight the Pacific War with most of their army bogged down in China. More workers had to be conscripted. It also intensified the problem of keeping workers in vital war industries. The WM issued a Labor Turnover Control Ordinance (January 1942). The idea was to create a permanent work force in key industries. And it became much more difficult to switch jobs, but it was unable to maintain the quality of the work force. To many skilled workers were being conscripted by the military. As a result, skilled workers like machinists in war industries/heavy industry were replaced by textile workers, agricultural laborers, young unmarried women with no factory experience, school children, and Korean forced laborers. Allied POWs were also used, but not in factories. The WF Ministry issued the Ordinance on Labor Management in Essential Industries (February 1942). WM inspectors determined hiring, firing, hours, wages, and other work management issues. This had more of an impact than what t might be expected. World War II involved rapid technological advances. This was specialty the case of electronics. Japan's failure to keep up with American advances proved devastating. A good example of what was occurring was Hitachi--the primary producer of electrical components. The company had 19,000 skilled workers (1936). Toward the end of the War, Hitachi 118,000 employees most with minimal training. Despite regulations prohibiting switching jobs, the companies themselves were actively trying to lure away skilled workers. One study indicates the impact of the loss of skilled workers. There were instances where by the end of the war, three workers were need to do the work of a single skilled worker before the War. 【Cohen, p. 272.】 This helps explains why Japanese radio equipment was not only relatively primitive, but often unreliable. Training was a major factor, but other factors such as long work hours and poor housing, and inadequate food were also involved in declining productivity. The WM continued its concern with workplace harmony and had inspectors empowered to assess safe working conditions. The problem with this was that the Army and Navy did not WM inspectors in their plants. In addition the WM suspended a range of worker protections, including regulations on working hours, child labor, and women working at night. All of these concerns piled as the war war began to go against Japan. Japan seized a huge empire in its initial offensive during the first 6 months of World War II (December 1941-May 1942.. This included European colonies from Burma to the Dutch East Indies and the American Philippine Islands that had important natural resources and food producing capabilities. Japan's maru fleet had trouble supplying Japanese forces in the new empire and delivering raw material and food to the war industries of the Home Islands, but the U.S. Navy did not significantly interdict those shipments (1942 and much of 1943). The U.S. Pacific Fleet Submarine Service had serious problems. These problems were slowly sorted out (1943) and by the end of the year American submarines were finally taking a real bite out of the Maru fleet. The Munitions Ministry was established to deal with the allocation of scarce natural resources (November 1943). Prime-minister Togo took a special interest and aircraft production for the defense of the Home Islands was the priority. Given the falling deliveries of raw material, Japan established the Munitions Company Law (December 1943). This was essentially a nationalization law. All of the major companies producing war material were nationalized-a total of 683 companies. This designation gave them the first priority for workers with even stricter job switching. But in 1944 the United States, primarily the Submarine Service, effectively severing raw materiel shipments and destroyed the Maru fleet. Factories were closing even when workers were available. 【Tsusho, p.592】 The final WM effort was anew National Labor Mobilization Law designed to decentralize production, an effort to adjust to air attacks (1945). Union membership had peaked in 1936, but began a massive decline as Japan moved toward war with the United States and the military government began restricting unions (1940). The last union was closed (1944). The idea of unions to improve wages and working conditions, however, did not die. And as soon as the U.S. occupation authorities repealed bans on union organizing, membership skyrocketed (1945).
The Welfre Minitrt (WMP) nwas given substantial powers afterthe War in Vhina began (1937). These powers were increased after Japan launched the Pacific War. Japanese authorities, however, even with these powers struggled to manage the workforce. The WF Ministry issued the Ordinance on Labor Management in Essential Industries (February 1942). WM inspectors determined hiring, firing, hours, wages, and other work management issues.
There were four basic problems. First there were no deferments for skilled workers. Second, the same companies demanding priorities and worker retention were actively trying to lure workers away from other companies. Third, the American blockade of Japan made obtaining raw materials a greater problem than labor shortages. Fourth, the America bombing began destroying factories as well as causing workers in the cities to flee to the countryside. Mbr>
Prime-Minister Tojo in one of the most misguided decisions in the history of warfare, decided that the way to finally defeat Nationalist China was to go to war against the United States and the British Empire (December 1941). (Similar to how Hitler decided that the way to defeat the British was to invade the Soviet Union.) The primary difference is that the Japanese reached their conclusion after a period of study, the Germans after only ruminations in Hitler's mind. The only justification for such a irrationa decision is that the Japanese believed that the Germans had defeated the Soviet Union and destroyed thg Red Army. .
The Pacific War required increased Japanese conscription. Japan had to fight the Pacific War with most of their army bogged down in China. Mem were needed not only for the offendive opertions following Pearl Harbor, but the garison he hge Empire Japan carved out in the SothbPacific and Southeast Asia--the Southern Resorce Zome. This meant that more workers had to be conscripted.
Union membership had peaked in 1936, but began a massive decline as Japan moved toward war with the United States and the military government began restricting unions (1940). The last union was closed (1944). The idea of unions to improve wages and working conditions, however did not die. And as soon as the U.S. occupation authorities repealed bans on union organization and membership skyrocketed (1945)
.
It also intensified the problem of keeping workers in vital war industries,especially skilled workers. The WM issued a Labor Turnover Control Ordinance (January 1942). The idea was to create a permanent work force in key industries. And it became much more difficult to switch jobs, but it was unable to maintain the quality of the work force. To many skilled workers were being conscripted by the military.
Replacements bodies could usually be found. But trained, killed workers were a whole oher issue. As a result, skilled workers like machinists in war industries/heavy industry were replaced by textile workers, agricultural laborers, young unmarried women with no factory experience, school children, and convicts. There were also foreign workes, Chinese contract workers and Korean forced laborers, but not in the factories. Allied POWs were also used, but alao not in factories. The worst experiences were visited on theforeigners including the Allied POWs. They were turned into slaves, poorly fed and over worked. Some 1.3 million Korean workers were transported to Jaoan along with 38,000 Chinese contract lborors. That anount to 4 percent of the Japanese work force. (Foreign workers were 20 percenbt of the German work force.) They were not used in the factories, but did hard labor in the dicks, mines, and construction. They were treated harshly, poorly fed, and received almost no medical care. As a result. some 6,800 Chinese and 38,000 Koreans died. 【Tsusgo, 2: p. 44-45.】
This had more of an impact than what t might be expected. World War II involved rapid technological advances. This was specialty the case of electronics. Japan's failure to keep up with American advances proved devastating. A good example of what was occurring was Hitachi--the primary producer of electrical components. The company had 19,000 skilled workers (1936). Toward the end of the War, Hitachi 118,000 employees most with minimal training.
Despite regulations prohibiting switching jobs, the companies themselves were actively trying to lure away skilled workers.
One study indicates the impact of the loss of skilled workers. There were instances where by the end of the war, three workers were need to do the work of a single skilled worker before the War. 【Cohen, p. 272.】 This helps explains why Japanese radio equipment was not only relatively primitive, but often unreliable. Training was a major factor, but other factors such as long work hours and poor housing, and inadequate food were also involved in declining productivity.
The WM continued its concern with workplace harmony and had inspectors empowered to assess safe working conditions. The problem with this was that the Army and Navy did not WM inspectors in their plants. In addition the WM suspended a range of worker protections, including regulations on working hours, child labor, and women working at night.
All of these concerns piled up as the war began to go against Japan. Japan seized a huge empire in its initial offensive during the first 6 months of World War II (December 1941-May 1942. The whole purose of lnching he Pacific War was to seizxe resorce rich areas which Japan called the Souhern Reource Zone (SRZ). The major resorce needed was oil hich Japan was imprting from America. But resource poor Japan needed many other resorces to wage war.
Japan had very few of the raw materials neded. The country had coal but very few other resources. This area seized included European colonies from Burma to the Dutch East Indies and the American Philippine Islands that had important natural resources and food producing capabilities. Japan's maru fleet had trouble supplying Japanese forces in the new empire and delivering raw material and food to the war industries of the Home Islands, but the U.S. Navy did not significantly interdict those shipments (1942 and much of 1943). The U.S. Pacific Fleet Submarine Service had serious problems. These problems were slowly sorted out (1943) and by the end of the year American submarines were finally taking a real bite out of the Maru fleet.
Japanese working ans living conditions began decling when Natioanlist China was not defaeted (1937) and the war began to drag on. This required substantial commitmrnt of nanoower and resources. The detrioiration, however intensified after Japan launched the Pacific War (1941). Japan was still bpgged down in China, but now faced war with countries that had far greater rresources, especially the United States. Japan had no option but to extract resources from the already stressed domestic economy. The WM stressed the idea of domestic harmony, but did not have the resources to meet domestic needs, Compared to the beligrants in Western Europe, including Gemany, Japanese workers faced a actestrophis fall in livingh conditions, especially food. Soviet wokers faced comprabkle conditions and Chinese workers even worse. Japanese workers faced falling wages, long working hours, and falling food aupplies.
Japan was not self sufficent in food and the America naval blockade cut off imports. Japanese forces has seized food supplies in the SRZ, but had no way of transporting it to the Home Islands. Germany faved only minor declines in wages. Food shortages were substantial, but supplemented with food supplies seized in the occpied countries (1939-44). This changed as the Allies closed in on the Reich (1945). Jaspan exoerienced a cop filure because of a droiught (1940). The rice supply in Tokyo dropped to a 1 day supply (December 1940). Shrortages forced the imposition of a rice-rationing system (June 1941). Those with money turned to the black marget. Even before the sea lanes were toitally cut (1943), obtaining food needed for bare subsistence was becoming difficult. The strategic bombing campaign was also destroying the Japanese transport system making it difficult to get the dwindling food supplies into the cities. Black marget rice wa selling for 14 times the offiia; pice (earlu-1944).
Clothing also had to be rastioned and gad became expensive as aresult of the war in China. The primasry material for clothing was cotton which was not grown in Japan. Cotton imports were restriced even before thestart of the Pacific War. The country's cotton mills grdually hd o shift from poducng civilian clohing to making uniforms for the military. The black market was not only for food, but clothes as well. As consumer goods disappeared from the stores, black market prices could be 10 times official or market prices (1944).
Real wages in Japan declined by a third. (1939-44). 【Garon, p. 225.】 In the final year of the war real wages were only a half of pre-War level (1945). 【Genzo, p. 317.】 The greatest problem was food. Many workers were experiencing a food situation approaching starvation levels. And without money, people were unable to turn to the black market.
A serious problem impacting real wages was inflation. Here Japan failed to control the problem. Here Britain had the worse record in Western Europe and America with prices inceasin 37 oercent (1937-44), about 4.6 percent annually. A little above normal, but not huge given the circumstances. Japoanes workers over the same period experiebce inflation df290 percent or anout 35 percent annully, not including the catistropgic 1945 year. 【Tsusgo, 2: p. 44-45.】 In contrast real wages in America and Britain sactully increased subsntantilly (about 40 and 20 prcent). 【Havens, Valley, p. 93 and Cohen, p. 97.】 Ingflation of course impacted the food situation as many were fvorcrd to tutn to the very ecpnsivve black market.
Another stress Japanese workers faced was long working hour. American workers worked normal 8 hour shifts. Production was incrasedby runnng wae plants 24 hours a day with three shifts. Factory hidtswere long in Japan before the War--10-12 hours. This mean that it was not possible to increase producton much by increasing hours. Factoy workers often got 2 cdays off monthly. Absenteeism was the only way to get additional rest days. Deterioring conditions found worker abseneeism to do high oaiday work or to try to obtain food in the countryide (by 1943). When the bombing began workersbegan fearing air attacks (1944). Whike the nombing was still lmited in 1944 this changeswi massive Amerivan raids (1945). Thgee was ome effort to relocate factories, but this createdan additional problem for workers--finding housing.
Japan's industrial cities became over croded especially with the onset of the Pacific War. The war in Chinacold be conducted pimarily wih manpoweer. The Pasific War requires industrial spport: ships and planes. There wee reports of workers sleeping in unheated fctories. Crowded living situations, long hours, falling wages, inasdequate diet, affected productibvity. We also see a rising level of sickness and incrasung absentism. All of this got bad enough. It got work, much worse. The Americans began bombing the HomeIslkands.(late-1944). The first raids were not very effective, Eventually Gen. LeMay crafted a deadly forumla. They became horifically effective. Some 25 ercent of Japanese housing was destroyed. In some of the major cities destruction reached 50 percent. 【Havens, Women p. 924.】
The Munitions Ministry was established to deal with the allocation of scarce natural resources (November 1943). Prime-minister Togo took a special interest and aircraft production for the defense of the Home Islands was the priority. Given the falling deliveries of raw material, Japan established the Munitions Company Law (December 1943). This was essentially a nationalization law. All of the major companies producing war material were nationalized-a total of 683 companies. This designation gave them the first priority for workers with even stricter job switching. But in 1944 the United States, primarily the Submarine Service, effectively severing raw materiel shipments and destroyed the Maru fleet. Factories were closing even when workers were available. 【Tsusho, p.592】
New The final WM effort was a new National Labor Mobilization Law designed to decentralize production, an effort to adjust to air attacks (1945).
Cohen, Jeome B. Japan's Economy in War an Recostruction (Minneaolis: 1949).
Garon, Sheldon. The Stateand Labor in Modern Japan (Berkeley:1987).
Gordon, Andrew. The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan: Heavy Industry, 1853-1955. (Cambridge: 1985).
Havens, Thomas R. H. Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two (1978).
____________. "Women and War in Japan, 1937-45," American Historical Review Vol. 80 (October 1975).
Kazuo, Okochi. Kurai tanima no rodo (Tohyo: 1970).
Large, Stephen S. Organized Workers and Socilist Politicsin Interwar Japan (Csambridge: 1981).
Lockwood, William. The Economic Development of Japan (Princeton: 1968).
Rice, Richard. "Japanese labor in World War II," International Labor and Working-Class History, No. 38, The Working Class in World War II (Fall, 1990), pp. 29-45.
Taira, Koji. Economic Development and the Labor Market in Japan (New York: 1970).
Tsusho, Sangyoshohem. Sangyo tosei (Tokyo: 1964).
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