Figure 1.--Chancellor Adolf Hitler and President Franklin Roosevelt came to power within weeks of each other (January-March 1933). Hitler launched a massive rearmament program with an emphasis on aircraft, tanks, and other modern weapons systems. This helped to put unemployed men back to work. Roosevekt also had employment projects, which included employing artists, dancers, and writers, but with a few exceptions such as naval construction, not to build arms. Hitler supressed the Labor movement, Rossevelt helped in become a potent force. The United States had a much larger industrial capacity than Germany, but sharply limited military expenditures, especially equipment for the Army like tanks. Many industrial plants were closed or operated on a reduced capacity during the Depression, but began to open again at the end of the decade as war orders from Europe revived the American economy. Even after Hitler and Stalin launched the War (September 1939) while German factories were turning out increasingly powerful tanks, American factories were using steel to produce cars trimmed in chrome, a critical metal. Here we see a family in front of their brand new 1939 Nash. Production of cars like this continued through 1941 until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

The inter-war era was a time of disarmament in most countries. Military budgets were pared back in Britain, France, and America. This was not the case in Japan. After Hitler seized power in 1933, he ordered a major rearmament program in violation of the Versailles Peace Treaty. The democracies did not respond. The public after World War I was appalled by war and desired to avoid another war. As a result, military expenditures were not politically popular. The democracies by the 1930s were more concerned with domestic issues--especially efforts to fight the depression. The German rearmament program, especially the Luftwaffe, had by 1938 had given NAZI Germany a significant military advantage in Europe. The same was occurring in the Pacific with the Japanese. There were warnings about German rearmament. Churchill in particular spoke out on the subject. Hitler demonstrated the force of the Luftwaffe in Spain beginning in 1936. Hitler beginning in 1938 began to use his military advantage. He seized Austria in the Anschluss (March 1938) and then turned toward Czechoslovakia. The Munich Conference (October 1938) was a shock to the democracies. The character of the enemy they faced was made manifest in Kristallnacht. The shocked democracies began a rearmament program. This included America, although there was still considerable public opposition to arms spending in the United States. Germany's seizure of the rest of Czechoslovakia (March 1939) in violation of the Munich Agreement made in obvious as Churchill had warned that appeasement would not work.

Inter-War Pacifism

The initial sentiment in the Allied Nation after the War was one of elation. But this soon changed as a realization of the cost set in with the public, especially the huge casualties. Anti-war sentiment grew. The "Never again" sentiment became pronounced. One aspect of the growing anti-war sentiment was a declining appreciation of the military. In the wake of the World War I disaster, anti-militarism grew in both Europe and in America. This sentiment was one of the major reasons that Britain and France did not effectively confront the NAZIs. Men like Baldwin and Chamberlain were unwilling to either prepare for War or even fight the war aggressively. Even Churchill was very cautious about casualties. Hitler understood better perhaps than anyone in Europe that democratic governments would avoid war so as to avoid casualties. This was a calculation that did not burden him or for that matter Stalin. American attitudes were in part pacifism , but and even stronger sentiment was a desire to disassociate from Europe which was seen as the source of endless political strife. Pacifism was an element in isolationist sentiment in America. The Congress launched a major investigation designed to prove that American arms manufacturers had help involve the United States in the War. It is ironic that the industry that would save Western civilization was during the inter-wars year was being being investigated for disloyalty by Congress. The Committee became known as the Dyes Committee led by Congressman Martin Dyes. After a huge investigation, no evidence was found to justify the charges. Public opinion in America remained staunchly against involvement in World war II until Pearl Harbor. While Socialist inspired pacifism had weakened the Allied response to Hitler, socialist leaders in Germany and occupied countries were targeted by the NAZIs. Some how Hitler and the nationalists managed to shift the war blame from German militarists to the Socialist politicians who signed the peace. Anti-war feeling was string in Germany after the War, but so was resentment toward the Versailles treaty. The future of Germany would be decided on which of these two sentiments would prevail. The anti-war book and film All Quiet on the Western Front was hugely popular in Germany. At the same time ultra-nationalist political parties developed a considerable following, especially after the onset of the Depression. The Socialists warned that Hitler and the NAZIs would bring war. And they were right. Even so, after 6 years of NAZI propaganda, were not enthusiastic as Hitler moved Germany toward war.

German Rearmament

Hitler and the NAZIs planned from the beginning a massive rearmament program. NAZI propaganda promoted the idea that Germany must rearm. [Riegler] The NAZIs did not, however, begin a massive rearmament program immediately upon seizing power in 1933. The Wiemar Republic Government itself has sponsored secret armaments programs in violation of the Versailles Treaty. The NAZIs did sharply expand weapon research. The German military expanded in secret during 1933-34. Hitler by March 1935, felt sufficiently secure to publicize his military. The NAZIs announced that they expansion - which broke the terms of the Versailles Treaty. Europe learned that the Nazis had a modern 2,500 plane Luftwaffe and a Wehrmacht with 300,000 men. Hitler publicly announced that he was instituting a compulsory military conscription and planned to expand the Wehrmacht to 550,000 men. Actual armaments production began in earnest in 1936. The NAZIs in 1936 doubled armaments spending over 1935 levels. It was in 1936 that NAZI arms spending first exceeded the combined total for transportation and construction spending. The nature of arms spending also increased. NAZI arms spending initially focused on research, development, and capital investment. The NAZIs in 1936 began concentrating on producing actual military equipment. This is one of the least economically beneficial types of government spending.

Congressional Investigations

While the NAZIs were venerating German industrialists and allocating vast sums for armaments to them, American politicians were virtually accusing American industrialists of treason. The most notable examples were the Dyes Committee and the Nye Committee. Congress launched a major investigation designed to prove that American arms manufacturers had help involve the United States in the War. It is ironic that the industry that would save Western civilization was during the inter-wars year was being being investigated for disloyalty by Congress. The Committee became known as the Dyes Committee led by Congressman Martin Dyes. After a huge investigation, no evidence was found to justify the charges. The Nye Committee was an important factor in strengthening isolationist thought in America. The U.S. Senate in the 1930s established the Senate Munitions Investigating Committee, a special committee established to study America�s role as an arms exporter. The Committee chairman was North Dakota Republican Senator Gerald P. Nye and the committee became known as the Nye Committee. Many Americans had come to believe that the corporate quest for corporate profits acts to promote war. The Nye Committee conducted a well publicized study during 1934-36. The Nye Committee also studied the possible regulation of the arms trade. Senator Nye was an outspoken isolationist. His solution was to nationalize the arms industry. This was too radical, but his Committee's findings impaired the reputation of many American companies. One practical outcome was the creation of the Munitions Control Board. More importantly, the Nye Committee confirmed the opinion of many that arms exports had involved America in World War I. The created support for the Neutrality Act that would prohibit American companies from selling arms to belligerent countries.

American Investments in Axis Countries and the Soviet Union

American investments in Europe were relatively limited before World War I. The War significantly weakened the economy of the belligerent countries. Unlike World War II, Germany or most of France was not occupied and there were no significant strategic bombing campaign. Even so, the economic damage was significant and this created opportunities for American companies to commit badly needed capital as well as profitably utilize its technology. The American investments provided a boost to the badly weakened European countries. Companies like Ford worked out deals with the Soviet Union (which was at first a NAZI ally). Investments were also made in Italy. Several American companies were involved in Germany. This activity began during the Wiemar years which mean that the investments were in place when the NAZI seized control. They managed to continue to operate during the NAZI years which eventually caused conflict with the U.S. Government after Hitler launched World War II. American industry of course played a major role in winning World War II. Several of the companies involved were at first conflicted, seeking to protect their assets and operations in Germany and other Axis countries.

U.S. Army

The U.S. Army that was to liberate Western Europe and play an important role in defeating NAZI Germany did not exist in the 1930s. What existed was a very small professional core. The War Department after the Armistice on the Western Front (November 1918) recommended that Congress authorize a permanent Regular Army of about 0.5 million men and a 3-month universal training system that would create a ready reserve that had basic military skills. This would give the United States the capability of rapidly creating a major force to provide for future defense needs. Congress accurately reflecting American public opinion firmly rejected these proposals. Americans thought they had won the "War to End All wars". With Imperial Germany defeated, few Americans saw the need for a large army or major military expenditures. There was a willingness to approve some naval spending, because the Navy was seem as America's shield. Most Americans thought that was all that was necessary. This became the cornerstone of American defense thinking throughout the 1920s and 30s. The world situation, however, changed dramatically in the 1930s. The United States found itself in an increasingly dangerous world. It was a world world in which Stalin was building a vast Red Army and the Japanese were building the Imperial Army which would undertake the conquest of China. Mussolini was building an army of 6 million bayonets. The tipping point was in 1935 when Hitler announced the introduction of conscription. This mean that the totalitarian powers possessed the overwhelming balance of power in the world. In Europe the democracies placed their hope on the French Army, the force that had stopped the Germans in World War I. The United States throughout the 1930s even after Hitler reintroduced conscription, made no effort to significantly expand its army. There was efforts to expand the U.S. Navy and later in the decade the air force. The Army remained, however, a small professional force. Even small countries in Europe had a larger army. Neither were there major efforts to upgrade weaponry.

American Response to NAZI Rearmament (1935-39)

Adolf Hitler became Chancelor (1933). He immediately began preparing for a massive expansion of the German military and massive increases in military spending. This was done secretly, but it was soon apparent what Hitler and the NAZIs were doing, although not the full dimensions. The British resopnse was appeasement. Here the public mood was at first strongly against expanding military spending seeing it as increasing the opossibility of another war. And to mulify critics, the British Government attempted to limit the access of the press to information it was receiving. Eventually the resonse was inceased military spending, but at a much smaller level than that of the NAZIs. America was further away from the NAZIs and the public mood was also opposed to military spebding. The Drepression persisted in America longer than in Europe. The Roseveklt Administration, hiowever, was strongly anti-NAZI abd saw the need to increased military spending, but was faced by a powerful Isolationist Movement and a public mood that opposed participaion in another European war. While the Roosevelt administration was limited in what it could do, his dies not mean that it did nothing.

Unsung Hero: Louis A. Johnson (1891-1950)

Louis A. Johnson is the unsung hero of the American industrial miracle that played such a central role in World War II. He was in fact the architect of American industrial mobilization. He was born in Roanoke, Virginia (1891). Ge was awarded a law degree from the University of Virginia. He then practiced law in Clarksburg, West Virginia. The law firm he founded (Steptoe and Johnson) became one of the most important in Washington, D.C. He was elected to the West Virginia legislature where he rose to leadership positions. He served in France during World War I. After the war practiced law and helped found the American Legion. President Roosevelt appointed him assistant secretary of war (1937). There he strongly advocated military preparation. He was a tireless spokesman for universal military training, rearmament, and expansion of military aviation. There was at first considerable Congressional opposition to military spending, especially from Republicans. Roosevelt often used Johnson as a foil. Johnson would make proposals. If there was strong opposition, he would disavow Johnson. One of Johnson's most important efforts was the fight to build a substantial B-17 force. He laid the groundwork for the massive expansion of armaments following Pear Harbor. Without the foundation Johnson laid, it would have taken American industry much longer to gear up for war production. One very useful tactic when money was still short was to let out small contracts. This mean that when really large appropriations came later that quite a number of companies had the skills and techniques needed for arms production. He had hoped to be appointed Secretary of War, but President Roosevelt seeing the need to gain Republican support for military spending, appoint Republican stalwart Henry Stimson Secretary of War (1940). Johnson was heartbroken, but always remained loyal to the President. Stimson cut back on Johnson's B-17 project. Johnson was given several projects by Roosevelt during the War, the most important a mission to India (1942). Ironically, Johnson finally obtained the prize he wanted. President Truman appointed him Secretary of Defense (1949). (The War and Navy Departments had been combined after the War.) Ironically, Truman assigned him the ask of cutting back on military spending. [McFarland and Roll]

Isolationist movement

There has always been a strong isolationist streak in American political life. Americans separated by two great oceans have since the Revolution seen ourselves as different and apart from the rest of the World. From the beginning of the Republic, President Washington warned of entangling foreign alliances. For much of our history, Britain was seen as the great enemy of American democracy and of Manifest Destiny. World War I was America's first involvement in a European War and the United States played a critical role in winning that War. Had the Germany not insisted on unrestricted submarine warfare, in effect an attack on American shipping, it is unlikely that America would have entered the War. Many Americans during the 1920s came to feel that America's entry into the War was a mistake. There was considerable talk of war profiteering. Many were determined that America should avoid war at any cost. This feeling was intensified with the Depression of the 1930s and the country's focus was on domestic issues. With the growing military might of a rearmed Germany, war talk in Europe began. Isolationist leaders opposed any war. Others such as, Charles Lindbergh, thought that America could not win a war against Germany's vaunted Luftwaffe. Many not only opposed American involvement, but even military expenditures. Against this backdrop, President Roosevelt who did see the dangers from the NAZIs and Japanese militarists, with political courage managed to not only support Britain in its hour of maximum peril, but with considerable political skill managed to push through Congress measures that would lay the ground work for turning American into the Arsenal of Democracy, producing a tidal wave of equipment and supplies, not only for the American military, but for our Allies as well, in quantities that no one especially the Axis believed possible.

Naval construction

The principal exception to American limited defense spending during World War II was naval construction. Many naval vessels were decommissioned during the 1920s. The Washington Naval Treaties had placed limits on fleet capacity and Congress severely restricted all military spending. Franklin Roosevelt like his cousin Theodore began his Washington career as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. He served during World War I. As President he took a interest in naval affairs, but his initial policy was limiting military spending to focus on the Depression. Developments in Asia and Europe forced a change in priorities. The first military response to Japanese militarism and NAZI military expansion was renewed naval construction. The Washington Naval Treaties did not limit aircraft carriers like battleships. Naval commanders continued to see battleships s the Navy's principal strike force. Even so, the Navy did create a significant carrier arm in the inter-war period. President Roosevelt faced strong opposition to his naval buildup from a powerful pacifist-isolationist lobby. The politics of defense spending was complicated and President Roosevelt had a difficult juggling act. Liberal democrats who supported the New Deals social program were not as enthusiastic about defense spending. Conservative Southern Democrats who were supportive of defense spending were not as enthusiastic about New Deal social programs. In particular, efforts to pursue civil rights or immigration reform would alienate the Southern Democrats the President needed to gain Congressional approval for defense spending. The naval vessels built during this period, however, especially the carriers were the heart of the fleet that after Pearl Harbor managed to stop the Japanese expansion in the Pacific until a vast new fleet could be built to win the War.

Expanding American aircraft production (September 1938)

Not only did President Roosevelt have to take on the isolationists, but he had to rearm America. Here he faced less resistance as even many isolationists favored strengthening America's defenses. One area that the President was especially concerned with was air power. The President on September 28, 1938 called a meeting in which he stressed a need to build a powerful air force. He wanted American aircrafts plants expanded so that thy could produce 20,000 planes a year. The next day he told Hap Arnold that he would be the new chief of the army air Corps. Arnold would play a major role in World War II, especially the air campaign over Northern Europe. Initially he was concerned over the President's desire to use much of the initial output to supply the Allies rather than equip American units. This reflected the major difference of opinion with the isolationists. [Freidel, pp. 308-309.] The President presented his aircraft plans to the military chiefs in greater detail on November 14, 1938. Many of the generals, including Marshall, shared Arnold's concerns about diverting production to the Allies. [Freidel. p. 310.]

Munich (October 1938)

Building the Arsenal of Democracy in many ways began at Munich. Hitler first used his Luftwaffe to aid Franco in the Spanish Civil War. The Luftwaffe and the huge advantage it held over Britain and France was the reason that Hitler could cow the Allies. After Munich, American leaders pledged that they would never allow another Munich to occur. Ambassador Bullitt distilled the lesson of Munich to President Roosevelt, "If you have enough airplanes you don't have to go to Berchtgaden." [Freidel Rendezvous, p. 303.] President Roosevelt was determined that America would never be in that position. The European air campaign despite the early prominence of the Luftwaffe would be dominated by the U.S. Army Air Corps. This was possible because of the steps toward rearmament sponsored by the Roosevelt Administration as well as orders from the Allies following Munich. This was to be the beginning of a massive expansion of the American aircraft industry which would eventually devastate Germany. The initial orders were modest, in part because of the still limited capacity of American aircraft companies.

Kristallnacht (November 1938)

Kristallnacht or the "Night of Broken Glass" was a vicious NAZI pogrom directed at defenseless German and by this time Austrian Jews. A Polish-born German Jew, Sendel Grynszpan, wrote to his son describing how he had been expelled to Poland and mistreated. His son Herschel was a 17-year old boy studying in Paris. Distraught by his parents' treatment, he shot the Third Secretary of the German Embassy, Ernst von Rath. As a reprisal, Hitler personally approved a massive assault on Germany's Jews in their homes and shops and the burning of their synagogues. The attacks began early on November 10. Members of the Gestapo and other NAZI organizations such as the SA and the Labor Front were told to report to the local NAZI Party office and were given their instructions. They then moved out ransacking Jewish shops and synagogues and setting firm to them. Groups of NAZIs broke into Jewish homes, looting them and destroying property that they did not want. Pets were killed before their horrified owners. About 100 Jews were killed which today seems like a small number given the level of violence and what we know now would be the dimensions of the Holocaust. About 20,000 mostly men were dragged off to the Buchenwald, Dachu, and Sachsenhausen concentration camps. The orgy of violence exceed even what the NAZI leadership had planned because of the viciousness of the NAZI rank-and-file. This was of concern to the leadership because they hoped to eventually seize the property that had remained in Jewish hands. The NAZIs required Jews to repair the damage to their shops and homes at their own expense. When the NAZIs realized that Jewish property was insured, Goering issued a decree requiring that insurance payments be made to the German Government not the Jewish holders of insurance policies. An additional 1 billion mark fine was imposed on the already impoverished German Jewish community. Kristallnacht coming after Munich confirmed to many Americans the dangers of war and the nature of the NAZIs, although the full appreciation of their evil was not yet apparent. It was enough to convince many Americans that increased military spending was needed, but many Americans also concluded that America should further distant itself from European affairs.

Chamberlain mindset

Btitih Ptime Minster Necille Chamberlain believed that was uniicall gifted and had the asbility to precent anither War. He recognized that if his policy of appeasement was to work that he has to develop a positive reklatuionship with Hitler and the NAZIs. President Roosevelt was a staunching ctitic of Hitker abd the NAZUIs, but could offer Britain only limited support. This led to a strained relationship with the Roosevelt Administration. Chamberlain tenaciously clung to his policy of 'timely concessions to meet legitimate German grievances'. And dismissed the attempts by President Roosevelt, limited by the Isolatiinists, to offer any real support. Chsnberlain and others in his givernment were suspicions of American intentions. There was a concern that economic expansion at Britain's expense was Roosevelt's real motives. [Rock] He was not entirely wrong about that, but it was not Roosevelt's oprimary motive. . Roosevelt understood the nature of the NAZI more clearly than Chamberlain. In fairness, however, Chamberlasin saw the Siviet threat more ckearly than Riosevelt. Chamberlain obtusely failed to understand, as Churchill did from the beginning, the need to broaden his base of support by establish closer ties to hhe Americasn. We know a great deal about Chanberlain's thinking. His frank and open letters to his sister Hilda asre far more revealing thn ny nmenoir wiuld have been. He rote, "I am trying to jolly the Americans along." "I do wish the Japs would beat up an American or two!" He was convinced thast he abnd inky he could prevent another war. Churchill was out of government until Hitler and Stalin launched the War (September 1939).

Allied purchase orders

As it became increasingly obvious that Hitler was preparing to launch another War, the Allies (Britain and France) began to rearm, but the NAZI Rearmament Program had given the Germans a substantial advantage, especially in aircraft. This defense gap could not be quickly closed if the Allies relied only on domestic plants. So they turned to American plants. America was less prpared for war than the Allies, but di have an advanced aviation industry. The Neutrality Acts prohibied arms sales to belligerants, but before the War there were no legal restrictions, although the Administration had the authority to restrict sales to unfriendly nations. Britain and France placed major aircraft plane orders with American companies, primarily Curtiss with the P-40 and Bell with the Aircobra P-39 (P-400) fighters and ground attack planes. The P-36 might also have been ordered before the war. We are still working on the details. Much of this was done in secret until a French purchasing agent was killed during aircraft tests ans news leaked to the press. Isolations made a major issue of it. After Hitler and Stalin laubched the War, direct sales were probibited by the Neutrality Acts. Thus repealing the Neutrality Acts became a major objective of the Roosevelt Administration. Here there was major resistance both in Congress and the nedia to such an action. One result was an expanding Isolationist Movement.

American armaments production allocations (August 1939)

President Roosevelt wanted to send war material to assist the Allies. The American military wanted the limited armaments production for its own expansion program. The President in August 1939 agreed to provide 3/8s of American military production to Britain against objection from the War Department. This was possible because the War had not yet broken out and the embargo provision of the Neutrality Acts had not yet been triggered. The President avoided the military opposition by Assigning Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau to deal with the Allied (British and French) purchasing missions, irritating the War Department. [Freidel, p.326.] This allocation was not made public at the time.

Hitler and Stalin Launch World War II (September 1939)

The Germans more than any other military, correctly assessed the lessons of World War II. The War in Europe began on September 1, 1939 when the German blitzkrieg smashed Poland in only a few weeks. The invasion was made possible the preceding week when Stalin signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler. The Panzers crossed the Polish frontier on September 1 along with a devastating strike by the Luftwaffe. The Polish Army and Air Force was shattered. Britain and France declared war September 3. Within 6 days Cracow, the center of Polish nationhood, fell. Pincer movements began on September 9 to encircle the major remaining Polish forces. Once certain of Polish defeat, Stalin ordered the Red Army to attack from the East. German and Russian forces met at Brest-Litovsk on September 18. Warsaw fell a few days later after a ruthless bombing assault. The Blitzkrieg tactics that were to prove so devestating in the West during 1940 were all on display in 1939. Neither the British or French showed much attention, ascribing Polish defeat to military incompetence. The French had promised the Poles an offensive in the West. It never came. [Fest, pp. 602-603.] Poland's fate was sealed on September 17, when the Soviets invaded Poland from the east.

Sources

Fest, Joachim C. Hitler (Vintage Books: New York, 1974), 844p.

Freidel, Frank. Franklin D. Roosevelt: Rendezuous with Destiny (Little Brown: Boston, 1990), 710p.

Gilbert, Martin. A History of the Twentieth Century Vol. 2 1933-54 (William Morrow and Company, Inc.: New York, 1998), 1050p.

McFarland, Keith D. and David L. Roll. Louis Johnson and the Arming of America: The Roosevelt and Truman Years (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 2005), 456p.

Rock, William R. Chamberlain and Roosevelt: British Foreign Policy and the United States, 1937-1940 (1988).

Schama, Simon. A History of Britain.

Created: January 1, 2003
Spell checked: 2:29 AM 4/23/2012
Last updated: 5:46 AM 11/4/2022