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Atlantic World War II naval campaigns -- phase 1 1940
Atlantic World War II Naval Campaign: Phase 1 (1940)
Figure 1.--Hitler launched the war several years before he had told nabal commanders that war was likely. As aesult, the Krigsmarine was unprepared for war. They soon found that despite the loss of surace units that the U-boat was a very potent weapon, especially after the fall of France ptoviding access to Atlantic ports. And after the cancellation of Operation Sea Lion, a crash program to build U-boats and train crews was underway. The press caption read, "German youths train for future naval might--Geran boys under 17 are being regimented to even more strictly in a country at war. They are being compelled to join some branch of the training squadron of Germany's 'new generation'. Boys living on the coasts are orgnized into sailor Storm Troops and are being trained to man the huge navy Nazi leaders look forward to having. This series of pictures shows how these boys are being trained to take their places in submarines and ther warships. These youths are shown taking a lesson in navigation. The boy in the foreground is learning how to read the compass. This photograph is dated August 27, 1940 at the height of the Battle of Britain. It ws aime of great success for the U-boats. Eventually U-boat service would prove to be the most deadly assigment of the War. Few of these boys would survive, but for a time threatened the entire Allied war effort.
Admiral Dönitz's U-boat's demonstrated that they were a potent naval weapon in the first months of the War. Soon greter priority was being given to the U-boats. operations were hampered by the rough winter conditions in the first few months of 1940. Döenitz used the time to refit his ships and integrate new boats. Two developments then fundamentally changed the U-boat threat and the Battle of the Atlantic. First, the daring German gambit to take Norway suceeded (April 1940). The German surface fleet was damaged, losing most of their splendid destroyer force, but the German seizure of Norway it meant that the Royal Navy would not be able to seal off the North atlantic as they had done in World war I. It did not open the North Atlantic to commerce, but it did mean that the U-boats and German raiders would have much greater access to the Atlantic shipping lanes. And then even more shocking, France fell to the Germns (June 1940). Not only did the Royal Navy no longer have support from the French fleet, but gave the U-boats for the first time Atlantic ports and direct access to Britain's vital Atlantic sea lanes. And the British woukd have to divert resources to fight a new foe--the Italian Mediterranean fleet. The Germans began deploying their surface vessels, but did it peacemeal. They also deployed raiders desguised as merchant vessels. After the fall of France, OKM focused on Operation Sea Lion which because of the RAF victory was postponed and then cancelled. The U-boats continued to report successes in 1940, the numbers were at first still limited, but the numbers of U-boats were increasing. The British were working hard on ASW efforts, but relatively few U-boats were sunk by the small number of available escorts. Convoys helped to limit ship losses, but the increasing numbers of U-boats would test the convoy system. This is part of the reason Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to the Destroyers for Bases deal. Hitler was surprised that the British did not make peace after France fell. And then surorishingly the Luftwaffe failed to destroy the Royal Air Force. Thus while he turned his attention east, OKM was expected to sever Britain's Atlantic life lines. And the U-boats enjoyed their first Happy Time. The summer of 1940 proved ti be the U-boat Happy Time. Not only did the French ports provide direct access to the Atlantic, but in shortening the time of a mission, a U-boat could could increase the number of missions completed. And Hitler devoted increased resources to U-boat construction, although he was still mesmerized by giabt battleships and lavishing resources on their construction.
The German invasion of Norway was another stunning success. This success, however, came at a hight cost to the Kriegsmarine. Batteries at the Oscarsborg Fortress in the Oslofjord sunk the heavy cruiser Blücher. The Kreigsmarine destoyers were used to land men nd supplies. The British sunk 10 destroyers in the Battle of Narvik, virtually the entire Kreigsmarine destoyer force. The Royal Navy also sustained heavy losses, including the aircraft carrier HMS Glorious. The German victory gave them control of Norwegian resources, especially iron ore. And Norway also provided a route needed to transport Swedish iron ore. It also made it impossible for the Royal Navy to bottle up the U-boats in the North Sea. Norwegian bases also enabled the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe after the launch of Barbarossa (June 1941) to interdict British and American convoys to the Murmansk and Arkangel needed by the embattled Red Army.
World War II naval histories focus very intensely on the German U-boat force and the Allied efforts to defeat it. Ironically German admirals before the War wanted a big-gun surface fleet. Hitler with his penchant for military giganitism actually promised them just such as fleet, but then advanced the time table for war. Thus the Kreigsmarine unlike World war I began the War with only a small surface fleet. As a result of World War I, most German and British admirals did not believe the U-boat was a formidable weapon and this were still big-gun battleship enthusiasts. Admiral Döenitz thus had only a small U-boat force when Hitler launched the War, but they were very well trained. The U-boat proved again to be Germany's primary naval threat. Once this became apparent, Hitler ordered a massive U-boat construction program. Churchill after the War wrote that the u-boat campaign in the Battle of the Atlantic was the one threat that really worried him. The fall of France provided the Germans Atlantic ports that they were denied in World War I and which greatly greatly incrased the effectiveness and striking power of the growing U-boat fleet. The effectiveness of the U-boats can be seen when President Roosevelt ordered took the extrodinary action of ordering the U.S. Navy into an undeclared naval war in the Atlantic months before the United State actually entered the war. Even so, Hitler did every thing he could to avoid incidents with the Americans in the Atlantic. He was intent on keeping America out of the war until he completed the conquest of the Soviet Union. His anger at having to do this was so intense that it is probanly the primary reason that after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that he so readily declared war on the United States. This freed the U-boats to launch a highly successful attack on shipping along the Amerucan Eastern Coast. The Battle of the Atlantic would be the decisive campaign waged by the Western Allies. Ironically while the German U-boat campaign is one of the great legends of World War II, endlssly chronicled in film and literature, it was the Americans in the Pacific who waged the only successful submarine campaign--a stark example of what the Germans might have achieved. All of the other Allied campaigns in Europe were contingent on defeating the U-boats in the North Atlantic.
The Battle of the Atlantic is normally portraued as a life-and-death struggle between the Royal Navy joined by the U.S. Navy (September 1941) and the German Navy, primarily their U-boat fleet. Often left out of the history is the Canadoan Navy and their sturdy little corvettes. The Cananadians began thewar virtully without a navy. Beginning as soon as the U-boat threat became apoarent at the onset of the War, the Canadians began building corvettes and other small vessels. They were not ideal for the rough North Atlantic conditions, but the larger destoyers were critically needed for fleet operations. And the corvettes could be built rapidly in the country's small merchant shipyards. The Canadian corvettes were mostly built (1939-41) so they were available as the Germans U-boat construction program began delivering large numbers of U-boats to Admiral Dönitz. It was theCanadian corvettes that fought off the U-boats in the critical firsrt 4 years of the War before Allied aur power closed off the North Atlntic gap. The Canadians virtully created a navy from scratch and by the end of the war were an important naval power specializing in ASW. They would carry that capability into the Cold War.
British Ports
Britain as an island nation had ports all ober the coast. Many had developedf specialty roles based on geograopjhy and histoical precedent in an entirely hapghazard manner. Fioreign trade was vital to the country even befire Britain develooped a vast overseas empire. In abtiquity, Brutain was bital to traders as a siuce if he all imoprtant tin needed to produce broinze. In the medieval era, the wool trade was vital to Britain and the monarchy desdignted a small number of ports permitted to oparticipate--Bostion, London, Sandwich and Southhampton.were especially important. East coast (North Sea) ports were very imprtant. Hull dominted the trade with northern, Europe, Scandanavia, and the Baltics. With the Industrial Revolution, Newcastke ficused in cial exoports. At the time of Wirld War II, seversl Euopean countrues were depenebnt on British coal. This wiuld have an impct as the Germns began to build their Grossraum. With the compeltion of the Suez Canal (169s), London began to focus on the imperial trade with India, the Far East, and East Africa. The ships of the Bitish India Line, Orient Line yhe P&O laregly operasted from there. The most importasnt port on the South Ciast was Southampton which ficused on the passenger trade weith the Notth Atantic runs to North America. The great Cunard ocean liners like Titanic sailed from Southhmpton and the almost completred Queen Elizabeth would do so as well. There were also important West Coast ports. Bristol had been important as Britin began its maritime expsion and was focuised on South America. Liverpool and Birkenhead was vital for trade with North America. Even Birmingham became a port after a canal was dug. It was the center of the Cunard and Blue Star Line and other cargo operastions. Even before the Fall of Frsnce (June 1940), the British realized they would have to shift port activity from he East and South to the less vulnerable West and North. As a result, the U-boat camoign agsin began in the Wesrern Spproches, but germany was building longer rasnge U-boats tking the war out into thr=e Nirth Atamlsbic bd ebn ionyo the South Atlantic. During World War I, ports along the southern coast were vital to supply the British Army on the Western Front. In Wotkd wr II thery were of little use until D-Day. Unfortumately, less thought was guvent to the rail system hich was built to seve the existing port infrastructure. As aresult, cargos were delayed and spoiled during the War because if unadequate rail infrastructure seving the western ports. The Royal Navy aklso had to adjust. The vuklderabke navak based at South =hsmoton, Plymouthm bad Chatam had to be shifted north. Escort vessels needed fior the cinvoys were xshited west abd nirth. The mahor fleet units were moved to Scotland. Scappa Flow again becanme important.
The fall of France in June 1940 tremendosly increased the effectiveness of the German naval campaign, providing indespenseable French Atlantic ports. The U-boats could no longer be bottled up in the North Sea. Within days of the French surrender (June 22), Admiralm Dönitz was in France, surveying the Atlantic ports to privide facilitoes for his U-boats. The Germans set about building bomb-proff U-boat pens all along the French coast with direct access to the Atlantic. This provided Dönitz's U-boats a huge advantage that they did not have in World War I. These pens became major targets of RAF Bomber Command, but the facilities were so massive that the bombing had little affect. More effective was targeting transportation links to the pens. With the fall of France, the Royal Navy stood alone againt the German and Italian navies. The immediate naval concern was the French fleet, but U-boat access to the French ports would become a major factor in the critifal Battle of the Atlantic.
The British Government developed plans for evacuating 1 million children to the United states and Canada and other overseas domminions. After the fall of France, some this as one way of ensuring that Britain could survive even if invaded. After the German victory in France (June 1940) and the air assault on Britain began (July 1940), the Government began to see America, Canada and other Commonwealth nations as safer havens, nor only from the aerial bombardment, but also from a possible German invasion. The Germans evetually began the Blitz or bombing of British cities (September 1940). Some children were evacuated by ship to British Dominions, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. The first child evacuees, or "guest children" were of the wealthy classes, sometimes entire schools were sent through private arrangements to family or friends in Canada. The British public eventually demanded the government pay so that less privileged children were also eligible. The War situation changed by early 1941. A German invasion was no longer though eminent and the Luftwaffe was forced to wind down its bombing campaign. Two ships carrying child evacuees were torpedoed. One of these was the City of Benares an ocean line with 200 British and foreign civilian passangers and 93 British children with an escort of nurses, teachers, and a clergyman. The ship was torpedoed September 13, 1940. Only two life boatswere ever found, one 8 days after the sinking. Only 15 children survived. Churchill when he learned of the disaster moved to end the overseas evaucation scheme. One of the most moving account of these evacuationscomes from Martin Gilbert, an historian that HBC has drawn on extensively.
The Royal Navy began World War II with only 9? battleships, a fraction of the World War I Grand Fleet. Italy's fleet of fast modern battleships and carriers already outnumbered the Royal Navy in the Mediterranen. The French batleships if they had fallen into German hands would have given the Axis the striking power to confront the Royal Navy. Neither Pétain or the French admirals ordered the French fleet to British ports or scuttled it. Rather the French Government decided to order the fleet to ports where it would be decomissioned under Axis supervision. Churchill's most difficult decission after France fell was the order he gave to neutralize the French fleet. A British squadron was dispatched to Oran (Mers El Kebir) where the French fleet had sought shelter. The French fleet was given the options of joining the British in the fight against the NAZIs, imobilizing their vessels, or destruction. The French rejected the British demands and the British opened fire. About 1,200 French sailors were killed. Only the French battleship Strassbourg survived. Besides aleviating the threat of the fleet falling into German hands, the actioin reportedly convinced Presiden Roosevelt that the British were determined to resist the Germans. 【Lash, p. 165.】
Italian Submarine Operations in the Atlantic
The Germans had a growing surface fleet and the Italian fast modern fleet that threatened to seize control of the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean was important, but it was in the Atlantic that a decisive blow could have been landed and early in the War. A German victory here would have in large measure decided the outcome of the War. Britain could not have continued the War and the Soviet war effort would have been severely damaged. It would have meant severely reduced Lend Lease shipments and German industry would not have been diverted from supporting the Ostheer by the War in the West. Dönitz began the War with only a small fore of only about 26 U-boats and only 5-7 were at sea engaging in offensive operations. 【Dönitz, p. 47.】 The fall of France gave Dönitz the priceless Atlantic ports he needed, but not the boats. The Italian Navy had a substantial submarine force of 115 operational boats. This actually was a substantially larger force than that of the Kriegsmarine. Dönitz would not have 100 U-boats until August 1942. And for most of 1939-40 rarely had more than 20 boats in the Atlantic at any given time. Thus when Mussolini after only one month of after entering the war offered a portion of their submarine force to join the Germans in the Battle of the Atlantic (July 1940). This was the same time that the Germans were beginning to move into the French Atlantic ports. Dönitz was elated. He was anxious to try out his Wolf Pack tactics, but had to few U-Boats. The Italian submarines seemed like a god send. OKM quickly accepted the Italian offer (July 25) and helped the Italians set up an operations named Betasom at Bordeaux in occupied France. Operational command would be given to Dönitz. Liaison officers were assigned to help coordinate operations. 【Führer Conferences】 Soon 27 Italians submarines arrived in Bordeaux. As much propaganda effort had been expended on the German-Italian Axis partnership, there has been no actual military cooperation and planning or joint exercises. Dönitz sought to rectify this with two months of training, something the Germans had been working on for several years. The training focused on command and control (c2). Dönitz later concluded that a few weeks training was insufficient. 【Dönitz, p. 147.】 The Italian submarines began to be deployed (October), but by November the results were a huge failure. Dönitz had hoped that that the very least that the Italians would help locate targets. But this did mot occur nor according to the Germans join into combat. The Italians blamed communication problems resulting from Dönitz's failure to put a communication officer on the Italian subs. The Germans began to question the Italian will to fight. The Italian submarines were not up to the German standards with slower diving times and poor submerged handling. One particularly poor feature was a large conning tower which made the the Italian boats more visible on the surface and a factor in the slow dive times. 【Bagnasco, p. 130.】 Equipment failure was another problem. 【D’Adamo】 Whatever the reason, the Italian results were only a small number of the German results. Even using Italian data, their result were appalling, 26,500 tons sunk compared to the 310,565 tons sunk by the Germans. 【D’Adamo】 And the German figures show an even greater Italian failure. Italian submarines had greater endurance than the Germsn U-boats. They were thus part of the Drumbeat offensive (1942). Here they operated on their own. Again results were disappointing, but they did better than under Dönitz's control. Reports of sinking American battleships led to discrediting the Italian submarine service. 【D’Adamo】 German Admiral Theodor Krancke described entry into the war by the Italians as a burden and described the Italian armed forces including the Navy as inferior despite the number of submarines. to most, despite numerical strengths (a large submarine fleet). 【Bennett and Bennett, p.104.】 One inexplicable aspect of this whole sorry failure was the German unwillingness to share a range of technical advances with the Italians. Hitler himself was involved in these decisions. 【Führer Conferences】 It is almost as if Hitler did not want his allies to become too strong. We see the manse attitude with the German Ostkrieg allies. Although here it is not clear if this was primarily German industrial production limitations or other issues. There certainly was a reluctance to share technical advances with the Japanese until the War went badly for the Germans and could not be reversed.
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement (1935) permitted Germany to again begin building both battleships and U-boats. The Navy focused primarily on surface ships. Hitler launched the War only 4 years later. The Navy which had been given relatively meager resources was totally unprepared for War. The Kriegsmrine had some excellent ships and well trained crews, but simply did not have a force capable of challenging the Royal Navy. The most successful German surface ship was the battle cruiser Scharnhorst, launched (1936). It the fighting off Norway, aided by German code breakers managed to sink the British carrier HMS Glorious (1940). This was the only carrier sunk by a battleship during the War. (Several carriers were sank by submarines.) Even so, the Kriegsmarine was seriously weakened as its destroyer fleet was largely destroyed in the Norwegian campaign. After Norway, the large German ships (battleships and battle cruisers) were deployed piecemeal in commerce raiding operations and gradually destroyed by the Royal Navy and Royal air Force. Hitler always liked to think big. Two of the principal projects were Bismarck and Tripitz. Both were designed in violation of the the size terms of the Naval Agreement with Britain. Neither were ready when the war began and each was more than a match for any single British battleship. In the end neither had an important impact. Bismarck after sinking Hood was sunk by the Royal Navy in a desperate sea engagement (1941). Tripitz was sunk in a Norwegian fjord (1944?). Both of these were massive building projects. If the resources had been put in U-boats they would have had a very significant impact on the War.
The Kreigsmarine took a back place to the Heer and Luftwaffe as they scored stunning victories, first in Poland and then in the West--especially defeating the vaunted French Army. Final victory in the West, however, required a naval operation--the invasion of Britain. At the very time that the Kriegsmarine had its greatest opportunity, it was almost impossible for the admirals to seize the opportunity. The Allied operation in Norway failed, but the German Navy's highly capable destroyer fleet was virtually obliterated in the process. Not only did the Kreiegsmarine not have destroyers, but the capital ships were also not available. None were in service at this critical junction of the War. The invasion would have to be lsunched by August or September before the weather in the Channel worsened. And the British Army which had been forced to leave its heavy weapons in Belgium and was still not rearmed . The Germans needed July to amass the troops and barges for the Channel crossing. After September, the weather made the Channel crossing impossible and by thst time the British Army would have been rearmed. Graf Spee had been lost in the South Atlantic (December 1939). Lützow, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau had been damaged in the Norwegian campaign (April 1940). Admiral Scheer was under refit and did not sail for combat until October 14. Bismarck and Tirpitz were still under construction. This meant that in the August/September time frame, the largest warship available to the Germans for Operation Sea Lion was the cruiser Admiral Hipper, which itself was in urgent need of a refit, and might well have proved mechanically unreliable in combat. In the end, the Luftwaffee's failure to establish air superority over southeastern England forced Hutler to cancel the invasion.
U-boat Operations (1940)
U-boats usually went out on 30-60 day patrols. Conditions on U-boats were terrible. The boats stunk of diesel oil. Freshwater had to be ratined. Men could not take showers. They used seawater for washing. The men hot bunked, sharing a bunk with other men, using te bunk when the others wre on duty. Men slept with the torpeodes. Because of the close quarte, a U-boat man had the right to leave a boat as soon as a replacement could be found--no questions asked. when replacemnent available. The U-boats had outsanding officers. The Germans suffered very few losses in the first 9 months of the War. The U-boats were averaging five sinkings on each cruise. The early success of the U-boats and the failure of the Lutwaffe to force Britaibn out of the War casued Hitler to sharply revise his priorities. Huge resources were devoted to building U-boats for the first time. And after the fall of France (June 1940), Dönitz had access to Atlantic ports. The day after the French surrender, Admiral Dönitz drove to Britainy to begin to plan how tob use the French ports now in German possession. Construction was quickly began on bomb-proof U-boat pens. The French ports meant that the U-boats could now strike far out into the Alantic. The U-boat attacks would no longer be limited to the Western approaches. The first German U-boat arrived at L'Orient (July 1940). And for the rest of the Battle of the Atlantic, the port of Lorient would be the most active and largest German U-boat base in France. Dönitz moved his headquaters to L'Orient (November 1940). His headquarters was a villa overlooking the harbor. Here he could put into pkly the U-boat tactics he had been conceiving for some time--wolf packs attacking at night. After the British commando raid at Saint Nazaire (1942), he moved, for security reasons, back to Paris. L'Orient is on the southern coast of the Britany Peninsula--a peninsula which juts out into the Atlantic. This was an advantage that the the U-boats did not have in World War I. A communication centre was established at the Chateau de Pignerolles at Saint-Barthélemy-d'Anjou.
L'Orient was not only made into a major U-boat base, but radio transmissions from Saint-Barthélemy-d'Anjou allowed Dönitz to reach U-boats throughout the North Atlantic and direct operations in detail. This had mixed blessings. The torrent of Enigma transmissions allowed the Royal Navy to follow those directions and take counter measures through Bletchly Park's Ultra decrypts, although there were times that Ultra went dark because of Kreigsmarine Enigma security measures. Dönitz's role in guiding the U-boat campaign through radio messages left the U-boats more vulnerble than any other German force. And L'Orient would become one of the most heavily bombed French cities of the War.
The Kreigsmarine as they had done in World War I deployed merchant raiders disguised as non-combatant merchant vessels. They were of some importnce at the beginning of the War before the British had perfected their operations protecting commerce and Dönitz had only a small U-boat fleet. After 1940-41 they became a mere footnote. These were not purpose-built ships, but rather converted merchant ships. They were, heavily armed. The most famous was Atlantis which sank 22 Allied merchantmen. 【Mohr and Sellwood】 While not armored and capable of engaging combat ships, the Kormoran sank the Australian cruiser Sydney. They were easily capable of overtaking and sinking merchant shipping. Germany deployed several merchant raiders early in World War II. The Germans sent out two waves of six surface raiders each during the War. They chose refrigerator ships to convert for commerce riding. They were deigned to transport fresh food from the tropics. They were mosdtly in the 8-10,000 ton range. As they were designed to transport perishable food, they tended to be faster than standard merchant vessels. Speed was of course vital for merchant raiding. They were armed with six 15 cm (5.9 inch) guns and a variety of smaller calibre guns. They also carried mines to lay in the sea lanes as well as torpedoes. The raiders mostly went after single vesseks, not convoys. The German captains did their best to disguise their ships to make them look like Allied or neutral shipping. Italy deployed four "Ramb" class ships as auxiliary cruisers in World War II. The British Royal Navy began the War woefully short of escort vessels to protect convoys. One effort to engage the German raiders and U-boats was Q-ships. The Royal Navy Q-ships were warships desguised as merchant ships, the opposite of a merchant raider. They were generally 8-10,000 ton ships. British Armed Merchant Cruisers were converted passenger liners and thus were fast ships. The Royal Navy found nd unk the raider in 1940 and 41. By the middle of 1941, all the raiders had returned to their home ports except Kormoran, Pinguin and Atlantis, which had been caught and sunk by Allied cruisers. The second wave of commerce raiding was the Thor which departed Bordeaux (January 14, 1842) and Michel which left Kiel (March 9). Stier departed Royan (May 20) after losing some of her escorts. She would be sunk by an armed American Liberty ship. Thor and Michael were sunk in the Pacific (1943). The Germans tried to send two more raider out, Komet (October 14, 1942) and Togo (February 10, 1943). Both were sunk by the Allies trying to break out. The Germans ended the effort after Togo. By this time of the War, the Germans had begun losing U-bots in large numbers. The chance of a sueface raider breaking out and then surviving were minimal.
U-boat Construction
Germany had the largest submarine fleet during World War II. The Germans built nearly 1,200 U-boats. The Treaty of Versailles had prohibited U-boat construction. Only after the Naval Treaty with Britain was it possible to resume construction (1935). The German Admiralty based on Hitler's instructions believed that it had several years to prepare for war and would have time to build a substantial surface fleet for a war that would not begin until the mid-1940s. Thus the Ubootwaffe (U-boat force) was only a small mpart of the German Navy. Thus the Germans began the War with a very small Ubootwaffe. Only after tge War began and the U-bosts scired important priorities was priority given to U-bost construction. U-boats were relatively small ships and could be built more quickly than larger surface vessels. It took most of 1940 to expand the production facilities and begin the mass production of U-boats.
The success of the U-boats in the early years of the War did not prove decisive because of the small size of the Ubootwaffe. The Germans had steadily increased U-boat construction in 1940-42 anf by 1943 had a very substantial force which had not been significantly reduced by Allied ASW efforts. German U-boat construction reached full capacity (Spring 1943). It is at this time that Allied ASW effirts begin to become increasingly effective. In addition, the American 8th Airforce joined RAF Bomber Command in the around the Clock strategic bombing campaign. U-boat construction sites were one of the bombing priorities. And unlike other major targets were located in coastal cities especially vulnerable to bombing attacks.
Naval mines were extensively used in World War II. The British used them as part of its North Sea blockade as it did in World War I (1939). They also became an important part of the British defenses as they were preparing for the expected German invasion (1940). They were also extensively used by the Unted States in the Pacific War. The most important use of the naval mine, however, was by the Germans in the all importnt Battle of the Atlantic. Hitler did not make the Kriegsmarine a priority in his preparation for war. And Germany's indutrial capacity meant that the war began wih a very weak navy. In addition, thevKriegsmarine gave priority to surface ships. As a result, the country's U-boat force was very small. It made headlines, but took only a minor toll on British shipping. Until U-boat construction cold be increased, the Germans placed a major emphsis on mining the Atlantic sea lanes connecting Britain with America and Canada. This often meant the area arond major ports to increasing the liklihood of sinkings. At first World War I era contact mines were used. Many if these mines were laid by U-boats. The major inter-war innovation was mines tht cold be deployed by aircraft. Ships cold clear the mines and nets cold protect the ports, but even if not sinking a ship, the mines required the British to commit men, mine sweepers, and resorces to the effort. New mines were developed, specifically the magnetic or proximity mine. The British at first were not sre what was causing increased shipnlosses. Than the Bitish fond one of the mines that had dropped by aircraft off Shoeburyness (November 1939). This was southeast Essex at the mouth of the Thames Estuary. At hightide it looks like a sea area, bit when the tides went out, there it was. At the British had the German secret. Naval experts had guessed that they were magneric mines, but now hey had the actual device. The German firing device was ovely sensitive and thus easily defeated through degaussing. 【Jones】 The U.S. Pacific fleet would use a more effective design in its sucessful campign against Japanese shipping.
The Germans developed a pressure-activated mine.
Convoy System
The British needed deliveries of about 1,000 merchant ships monthly to stay in the war. Based on their World War I experience the British armed their merchant men and introduced a new convoy system. ediately introduced a convoy system. This was probably a mistake. The German U-boat force at the onset of the War was very small. Thus disruptions in rapidly adopting the convoy system werre probably greater than the damage that the small German force could inflict. The convoy system was, however, critical as the German force mounted and acquired French ports from which to operate (June 1940). The convoys sailed in zig-zag patterns and were generally organized in four rows surrounded by escort vessels. There were both fast and slow convoys. The convoys were limited to the speed of the slowest vessel. If a ship was hit by a torpedo or developed engine trouble it would be abandoned by the convoy. The crews from sunken vessels were not picked up by the convoy. Stopping would endanger the rest of the convoy. The early convoys provided only limited protection. The Royal Navy was woefully short of escorts. Air ptotection was virtually non existant. The Royal Navy had inadequate convoy escorts. The early Asdac could not determine depth providing little help in setting depth charges.
Corvettes
Just as Dönitz's main problem was initially the lack of U-boats, Admiral Martin Dunbar-Nasmith, who took over responsibility for the Western Approaches at the start of the War, lacked escort vessels to protect the vital Atlantic convoys. The Royal Navy had been substantially downsized in the inter-War era. And with the fall of France (June 1940), the problem became even more severe. Destroyers were needed to protect ocean going escorts. And even though destroyers were smaller naval ships, construction would take time and Bitish shipyards had many other demands. The only sollution open to the the Royal Navy at the start of the War was the corvette which could be used for both patrol and escort duties. They were much smaller than destroyers and did not need specialized shipyards or experienced ship workers to build. They could be built rapidly and in large numbers. The term corvette was an early naval name. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty (1939-40), threw himself into addressing the escort problem and played a role in designating these new vessels 'corvettes'. The designed was based on a whale catcher. (The fast ships with the harpoons.) William Reed, a British naval designer, concived a small ship based on the single-shaft Smiths Dock Company whale catcher Southern Pride. The ship's basic design and mercantile construction standards were perfect for rapid construction in large numbers. And they could be built in Canada which did not not have many large shipyards. The best known of these small ships was the small Flower class. Royal Navy corvettes were named after flowers. Royal Canadian Navy ships of the same class were named after smaller Canadian cities and towns. The Flower-class corvette were well suited for offshore patrol work, but they were not well suited for highseas patrol. They were too small and were bounced around like a cork in heavy weather. And increadibly they even had an open bridge. The sailors that went to war in these small ships were intrepid young men. But they were all the British/Canadians had in the first years of the War. They were slightly faster than the merchantmen they escorted, but not as fast as the newer German U-boats that appeared after the start of the War. Living conditions on ocean patrols were appalling. They were thus forced into duty to protect the Atlantic convoys and were even used for the Arctic convoys carrying supplies to the enbattled Soviet Union. While the corvettes were primarily built for the rapidly expanding Royal Canadian Navy in the Battle of the Atlantic, they also appeared in the Pacific. The Royal Australian Navy built 60 Bathurst-class corvettes, including 20 for the Royal Navy crewed by Australians as well as 4 for the Indian Navy. These were officially designated mine sweepers in the Royal Australian Navy and minesweeping sloops in the British Royal Navy and named after Australian towns. The Bird-class minesweepers or trawlers were designated corvettes in the Royal New Zealand Navy. Two Kiwi and Moa rammed and sank the massive Japanese submarine I-1 during the Solomons campaign (1943). The corvette a stop-gap sollution, but played a major role in the Battle of the Atlantic, helping to make the Royal Canadian Navy one of the largest navies in the world in only a few short years. As the War progressed the British were able to intrioduce more substantial escorts. The most important was the frigate, which was larger, faster, better armed and had two shafts. There were, however, limits on how many could be profuced by the British. The Royal Navy thus introduyced an improved corvette design (the Castle class) in the last year of the War. The UnitedcStates had a much larger indusyrial capacity. It substntially increased destroyer construction and produced the Fletcher-clsss destroyer. bnt as ships in larger numbers were needed, began laubching destroyer escorts. They were comparable to the Royal Navy corvettes, but much alittle larger and better designed. The U.S. Pacific fleet used their destroyer escorys for radar picket duty and theyb were hammared by the Kamikzees in the final year of the War.
Churchill as the Panzers poured into France pleaded with President Rossevelt for assistance. One possibility was mothballed destroyers, sorely needed to protect the critical North Atlantic convoy routes. The U.S. Navy had "moth balled" 70 destroyers after World War I. In fact FDR as Assisstanat Secretary of the Navy had played a part in this. There were great dangers to America in providing these destroyers to Britain. Not only would it be an act only slightly short of war, but it would weaken the ability of America to rapidly expand its fleet. Even more serious was that if Britain capitualed, the destroyers might even fall into German hands. The President also faced political dangers in that the Republicans could charge him with weakening America's defenses, a serious concern in the middle of the 1940 presidential election campaign. FDR finally agreed on August 14 during the height of the Battle of Britain to provide the British badly needed destroyers for their Atlantic convoys being hard pressed by the U-boats. At this stage of the War any good news was extremely important for the British and Churchill. The executive order was issued August 27, 1940. The United States would trade 50 old Navy destroyers for 99 year leases on British sea and air bases in the Western Hemisphere (most were in the Caribbean and in Newfoundland). The approach was extremely savy politically. It sounded like an actual exchange and involved bases close to the United States. In actuality the British were more than willing to provide America bases. It was also a cold political calculation. It was still unclear as to whether Britain would survive. If there was to be a British Vichy, it would be important to have American bases on the British Atlantic and Caribbean islands. The President also allowed British pilots to train in the United States and British ships to be repaired in U.S. ports. The Flight Ferry Command and Eagle Squadron were created. These were very bold exactions taken by the President Roosevelt without Congressional cover in the middle of the presidential election campaign.
The First Happy Time (Summer 1940)
The NAZI defeat of France proved to be a major advantage for the Kreiegsmarine. Dönitz now had access to the French Atlantic ports. This meant that the U-boats no longer had to expose themselves to the British North Sea defenses based around Scappa Flow. It also meant that the U-boats could spend more time on combat missions in the Atlantic shipping lanes as less time was needed to move back and forth from home bases. In additon the Germans could use their long-range Condor bombers for reconnaissance flights to help locate the convoys. Dönitz could at last implemnent the new tactics he had developed in force--the Wolf Pack and night time attacks. The British were still desarately short of escorts and lack of radar-equipped ships for nighttime surface detection. Dönitz wasted no time in making use of this access. U-boats sank 36 merchant vessels (June), 38 (July), and 56 (August) as facilities in the French ports were organized. The summer of 1940 became known by the U-boat crews as 'The First Happy Time' (July-October 1940). While the Luftwaffe was hammering Britain, the U-Boat fleet was taking a toll on British shipping and the Royal Navy was havingh a hard time fighting them off. U-boat losses were still very low. One British convoy sailing in October with 35 merchantmen from Newfoundland was savaged by the U-boats, 19 merchantmen were sunk. Only the rough weather as the winter approached ended the U-boats summer rampage in the North Atlantic. The First Happy Time was fought out in the Western Approches. The U-boats sunk 282 Allied ships for a loss of 1.5 million tons of merchant shipping (July-August). 【Blouet, p. 131.】 The U-boat crews returned to jouous welcomes. Some were received by Hitler in the Reich Chancelry. Berlin crowds aplauded the crews and threw flowers in Berlin parades. The top U-boat capatins like Günther Prien (1908-41) became instantly recognizable national heros. Prien even published a book recounting his exploits, focusing on the attack in Scappa Flow. 【Prien】
Science
Science played a major role in World War II. And one of the most critical such effort was deployed in the North Atlantic by both Allied and German scientists. The Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy did very little work on ASW during the Inter-War Era. Many naval experts though that SONAR (ASDIC) developed during World War I had made submarines obsolete. And the Versailles Treaty prohibited the Germans from building submarines. Even when Britain agreed to allow the German Navy to have submarines in the Anglo-Germah Naval treaty (1935), the British made little effort to modernize ASW. And Dönitzhad worked on new tactics, emphasizing surface attacks. The sucess of German U-boats early in the War shocked the British and they began a major scientific effort to address the U-boat challenge (1939). When Churchill became primeminiter he made the decision to share Britain's weapons research with America which then joined Britain in the scientific effort (1940). America not only had a substantial scietific capability, but perhaps een more importantly, it had the industrial capacity to actually build the devices and weapons the scientists developed and build them in great quantities. Thus a group of some 100 British and American scientists set about perfecting the ideas that would defeat Admiral Döntiz's vaunted Wolf Packs. Perhaps the most important of these scientists was British expeimental physicist Patrick Blackett, a committed Socialist and future Nobel Prize laurelate. He directed the Royal Navy's opperational research. Not only did he and his teams focus on the key problems, but they introduced the scientific approach to solving the many problems. He concentrated on basic mathematics and probability theory. Their unconventional insights were at first resisted by the Admiralty, but ultimately adopted. 【Budiansky】 German scientists were also deployed in the Battle of the Atlantic. The German scientists, however, labored under some major disadvantages. First, Hitler was most willing to devote resources to projects that gave him the ability to strike back at Britain and Anerica, such as the V weapons. Second, because the British and Americans controlled the seas, the German scientists with more resources were often operating in the dark. They were never sure just why their U-boats were being destroyed. All they knew was that a-boat failed to respond to radio signals. Thus the German scientists did not know precisely what Allied weapons they needed to counter. And some of their innovations actually made matters worse. Third, The German scientists did not have the resources to match the Anglo-American effort, especially after Hitler decided to make his major effort in the East. Grmany had achieved superiority in many areas because the Allied politicans were reluctant to massively increase military spending. The single most important Allkied scienticic development was radar sets in large numbers and small enough to be placed on esort ships and eventually aircraft.
Opperation Menance: Dakar (September 1940)
DeGualle understanding that opertions in France were not possible, saw that the only actions open to him ws to begin to gain control of the French colonial Empire which had solidy given their support to Vichy. The first cracks came in central Africa. As soon as it was clear that the British would and could continue to resist the Germans, although the outcome of the Battle of Britain as still in doubt, the French Central African colonies began going over to the Free French. Chad was the first to declare loyalty to the Free French (August 26, 1940). The other colonies quickly followed suit: Cameroon (August 27). French Congo (August 29), and Ubangi-Shari (August 30). Only Gabon retained its ties to Vichy. The allies occupied it (October 27 - November 12). The real prize was Senegal and it valuable port of Dakar. French fleet units were based there and the port could be invaluable to German U-boats. The Banque de France also has stored French, Belgian, and Polish gold there. Churchill issued orders for Operation Menance (August 8). It was to be a joint British-Free French operation. The Royal Navy provided the naval assetts for the operation. Success was based on DeGualle's assurances that the Vichy officials and French naval commanders would come over the Allied side. Churchill optimistially informed President Roosevelt (September 22). The Royal Navy task force reache Dakar (September 23). It proved be a disater. Govenor General Pierre Boisson remained loyal to Vichy. The Vichy forces not only did not go over to the Alies, but fired on and damaged three British ships. A factor here was that the Battle of Britain was raging at the town and many still expected the British to capitulate like the French had done. The Opration has to be abandoned (Septenber 25). The British did not want another Mers-el-Kébir or to get involved in a French civil war. The fiasco proved exteremy damaging to DeGualle. It could have ended his World War II role. Churchil despite the disappointment continued to support him. He stood up for him in the House of Commons debate (October).
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Sources
Bennett, G.H. and Roy Bennett. Hitler’s Admirals (2004).
Blouet, Brian W. Global Geostrategy: Mackinder and the Defence of the West.
Bagnasco, E. Submarines of World War Two (1977).
Budiansky, Stephen. Blackett's War: The Men Who Defeated the NAZI U-Boats and Bought Science to the Art of Warfare (2013), 336p.
D’Adamo, Cristiano. Battle of the Atlantic
Dönitz, Karl. Memoirs.
Jones, R.V. The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939-1945 (1978).
Mohr, Ulrich and Arthur Sellwood. Ship 16: The Story of a German Surface Raider (Amberley Publishing Limited: 2012), 264 p.
Prien, Günther. Mein Weg nach Scapa Flow (Brlin: Deutscher Verlag, 1940).
