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The Kreigsmarine as they had done in World War I deployed merchant raiders disguised as non-combatant merchant vessels. Improved communications and reconisance capabilities mean that they were not as effective as inbWirld war I. They were of some importnce at the beginning of the War before the British had perfected their operations protecting commerce and D�nitz had only a small U-boat fleet. After 1940-41 they became a mere footnote. These were not purpose-built ships, but rather converted merchant ships. They were, heavily armed. The most famous was Atlantis which sank 22 Allied merchantmen. [Mohr and Sellwood] While not armored and capable of engaging combat ships, the Kormoran sank the Australian cruiser Sydney. They were easily capable of overtaking and sinking merchant shipping. Germany deployed several merchant raiders early in World War II. The Germans sent out two waves of six surface raiders each during the War. They chose refrigerator ships to convert for commerce riding. They were deigned to transport fresh food from the tropics. They were mostly in the 8-10,000 ton range. As they were designed to transport perishable food, they tended to be faster than standard merchant vessels. Speed was of course vital for merchant raiding. They were armed with six 15 cm (5.9 inch) guns and a variety of smaller calibre guns. They also carried mines to lay in the sea lanes as well as torpedoes. The raiders mostly went after single vesseks, not convoys. The German captains did their best to disguise their ships to make them look like Allied or neutral shipping. Italy deployed four "Ramb" class ships as auxiliary cruisers in World War II. The British Royal Navy began the War woefully short of escort vessels to protect convoys. One effort to engage the German raiders and U-boats was Q-ships. The Royal Navy Q-ships were warships desguised as merchant ships, the opposite of a merchant raider. British Armed Merchant Cruisers were converted passenger liners and thus were fast ships. The Royal Navy found nd unk the raider in 1940 and 41. By the middle of 1941, all the raiders had returned to their home ports except Kormoran, Pinguin and Atlantis, which had been caught and sunk by Allied cruisers. The second wave of commerce raiding was the Thor which departed Bordeaux (January 14, 1942) and Michel which left Kiel (March 9). Stier departed Royan (May 20) after losing some of her escorts. She would be sunk by an armed American Liberty ship. Thor and Michael were sunk in the Pacific (1943). The Germans tried to send two more raider out, Komet (October 14, 1942) and Togo (February 10, 1943). Both were sunk by the Allies trying to break out. The Germans ended the effort after Togo. By this time of the War, the Germans had begun losing U-bots in large numbers. The chance of a surface raider breaking out and then surviving were minimal.
The Kreigsmarine as they had done in World War I deployed merchant raiders disguised as non-combatant merchant vessels. Improved communications and reconisance capabilities meant that there were more options than in World war I. They were of some importnce at the beginning of the War before the British had perfected their operations protecting merchant shipping and Dönitz had only a small U-boat fleet. After 1940-41, the Grman raiders became a mere footnote. These were not purpose-built ships, but rather converted merchant ships. They were, heavily armed. The most famous was Atlantis which sank 22 Allied merchantmen. [Mohr and Sellwood] While not armored and capable of engaging combat ships, the Kormoran sank the Australian cruiser Sydney. They were easily capable of overtaking and sinking merchant shipping. Germany deployed several merchant raiders early in World War II. The Germans sent out two waves of six surface raiders each during the War. They chose refrigerator ships to convert for commerce riding. They were deigned to transport fresh food from the tropics. They were mostly in the 8-10,000 ton range. As they were designed to transport perishable food, they tended to be faster than standard merchant vessels. Speed was of course vital for merchant raiding. They were armed with six 15 cm (5.9 inch) guns and a variety of smaller calibre guns. They also carried mines to lay in the sea lanes as well as torpedoes. The raiders mostly went after single vesseks, not convoys. The German captains did their best to disguise their ships to make them look like Allied or neutral shipping. Italy deployed four "Ramb" class ships as auxiliary cruisers in World War II. The Royal Navy found and sunk the raider in 1940 and 41. By the middle of 1941, all the raiders had returned to their home ports except Kormoran, Pinguin and Atlantis, which had been caught and sunk by Allied cruisers. The second wave of commerce raiding was the Thor which departed Bordeaux (January 14, 1942) and Michel which left Kiel (March 9). Stier departed Royan (May 20) after losing some of her escorts. She would be sunk by an armed American Liberty ship. Thor and Michael were sunk in the Pacific (1943). The Germans tried to send two more raider out, Komet (October 14, 1942) and Togo (February 10, 1943). Both were sunk by the Allies trying to break out. The Germans ended the effort after Togo. By this time of the War, the Germans had begun losing U-bots in large numbers. The chance of a sueface raider breaking out and then surviving were minimal.
The British Royal Navy began the War woefully short of escort vessels to protect convoys. One effort to engage the German U-boats were Q-boats. It is nt entirely clear why they were called Q-boats. One source suggests that the international signal code for "What ship are you?" was the letter Q. Also many of the first World War I boats operated out of the Irish port of Queenstown. They were used by the British in World War I with limited success despite deploying some 400 of these decoys, many fishing boats. The Royal Navy Q-ships were warships disguised as merchant ships, the opposite of a German merchant raider. Because the World War I Q-boats had only limited success, the Royal Navy deployed only 10 Q-boats and only in the first years of the War before ASW capability was fully developed. There was some hesitation... Tactics were carefully developed. Interestingly, Commander Johnny Walker who was famous for hunter-killer operation, played an important role in developing Q-boat tactics. At the time the British were desperate to fight off the U-boats. They ranged in size from 500-5,100 tons displacement. They included: HMS Antoine, Brutas, Chatsgrove, Cyprus, Edgenill, Lambridge, Looe, Maunder, and Prunella. The Germans sunk Edgehill and Prunella (June 1940). The others were decommissioned (March 1941). The last British Q-boat was Fidelity converted (September 1940) and operated by a French crew. It had a torpedo net and float planes as well as a torpedo boat and tubes. The Germans sunk it during a convoy battle (December 30, 1942). This was primarily a Royal Navy effort, but the U.S. Navy also deployed a few Q-boats, after German U-boats as part of Admiral Dönitz's Opertion Drumbeat appeared along the American Atlantic coast (January 1942). British armed merchant cruisers were converted passenger liners and thus were fast ships. Their great advantage was that it took much less time and effort to outfit a Q-ship than an ocean worthy destroyer. Q-boats were decoy vessels, often described as special service ships, or mystery ships. They were heavily armed, but the armament was concealed weaponry. The idea was lure German U-boats into making surface attacks. The U-boat captains preferred to use their deck guns because they had very a lmited number of torpedoes. Once their torpedoes were exhausted they had to return to port. Using the deck gun enabled them to lengthen their cruise and sink more Allied merchant vessels. Surfacing was, however, dangerous. Despite their terrifying reputation. A German World war II U-boat was a relatively fragile, lightly armed vessel. The British and Americans began mounting guns on the merchant men. And there was always the danger tht the U-boat could be rammed. The gunners on the merchant men had a difficult job of hitting low silhouette U-boats. The heavily gunned Q-boats upped the anty. Their guns and more skilled gunners could make mince meat of a surfaced U-boat. But actual U-boat kills was not the principal value of the Q-boasts. Even if they did not sink U-boats, their mere presence in the Atlantic meant that it produced a degree of caution in a U-boat captain's thinking that may have caused him to use his torpedoes faster than otherwise might have been the case. This mean shorter cruises and more limited merchant shipping kills. Interrogation of captured U-boat crews suggest that the Q-boats did affect the thinking of U-0bot commanders. Dönitz issued new orders which introduced more caution and authorized the use of torpedoes when deck guns would have normally been used. This was very improtant during first phse of the Battle of the Atlantic when there was critical shortage vof nboh esoprts and air cover.
Mohr, Ulrich and Arthur Sellwood. Ship 16: The Story of a German Surface Raider (Amberley Publishing Limited: 2012), 264 p.
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