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It was not often in World War II that the British found themselves outgunned in the Atlantic. This occurred early in the War in the South Atlantic. The KMS Admiral Graf Spee (16,000 tons) at the outbreak of World War II was the pride of the German Navy. It was a pocket (meaning small battleship/heavy cruiser). The invasion of Poland (September 1) was no surprise to German commanders. The German Admiralty (OKM) could have ordered the ship home, but apprently OKM accepted Hitler's assessment that Britain would not declare war. When Britin did declare war (September 3), OKM had little choice but to order Graf Spee, which was at sea and would have had a difficult time returning to a German port, to conduct commerce raiding in the South Atlantic. It proved to be a 77 day cruise during which it achieved considerble success, sinking nine merchant ships (Clement, Newton Beach, Ashlea, Huntsman, Trevanion, Africa Shell, Doric Star, Tairoa, and Streonshalh) totalling over 50,000 tons. The Royal Navy as a result, launched a major search for Graf Spee. Part of this effort was Force G, the South American Cruiser Squadron commanded by Commodore Henry Harwood. Captain Hans Langsdorff managed to skillfully to use the vastness of the Indian and South Atlantic Ocean to good effect. Harwood reasoned that Langsdorff might attempt to attack merchant shipping off the River Plate where merrchant shipping from Buenos Aires and Montivedeo could be found. Harwood was correct. He found Graf Spee off Uruguay where the Battle of the River Plate erupted (December 13). The British cruisers Exeter and Ajax accompanied by the light cruiser Achilles (with a New Zealand crew) engaged Graf Spee upon sight. The British cruisers were badly outgunned by the larger German vessel's 11 inch guns, but in the best traditions of the Royal Navy attacked. Graf Spee's 11 incvh guns allowed it to engage the smaller British cruisers at a distance beyond the range of the British 8 and 6 inch guns. These guns, especially, the 6 inch guns could not have penetrasted Graf Spee's armor and sink her, but not all of the German ship was protected by its armor belt and these lighter guns could do serious danage to important parts of the ship. Graf Spee was no Bismarck. Adm. Lanngsdorf's thinking appears to have foucussed primarily on his superior 11 inch guns. And he at first thougt the British ships were destoyers. Actually he violated his orders which were not to engage even an inferior force. This was fundamentally sound given that even limited damage from a lighter vessel was as good as a kill, because a damaged Grad Spee could not have made it home. And remember that France was still in the war at the time, meaning Germany had no Atlantic ports. This of course it just what hppened. The British managed to reduce the German advantage by their battle formation and maneuver, attcking from two directions. Graf Spee concentrated on Exeter to devestating effect, but this alloweed Ajax and Achilles to close the range. As the battle ensued, the British cruisers were severly damaged, but managed to score hits on Graf Spee. During the furious sea battle 72 British sailors were killed and 36 Germns. Exeter was severely damaged, but somehow kept firing until Graf Spee cut off the engagment. Exeter which was reduced to a smoldering wreck had to retire and made for the Falklands where emergency repairs nd medical care were possible. Graf Spee took refuge in Montevideo early in the morning (December 14). This is often seen as a serious mistake. The Uruguyans were more favoravly disposed toward the British than the Argentines. Even more importantly, the German vessel was not damaged strucurally and might have disappeared into the vast Atlantic, although the damage probably would have prevented it from getting home. There was no structural damage, but important systems were damaged like the fresh water system. Her main armour was pierced and she sustained serious internal damage to communication systems, and most of her magazines were cut off. Going into Montevideo gave the Royal Navy time to concentrate a much stronger force, but this would take several days. The only British vessel to reach the two damaged cruisers immediately was the heavy cruiser Cumberland which had steemed full speed from the Falklands. Cumberland arrived a few hours after Graf Spee broke off the engagement. It was also outclassed by Graf Spee, but undamgeded. Uruguay was a neutral nation and despite demands from the German Government granted Cpt. Langsdorff only a 3 day stay as required by international law. The British managed to convince the Germans that a substantial naval force had assembled off Uruguay when actually all that was there were the damaged Ajax and Achilles and the undamaged Cumberland. Langsdorff decided to scuttled his vessel (December 17). We are not sure who gave this order. Some reports suggest that Hitler didn't want the German Navy humiliated by a naval defeat. This is incoirrect. Hitler was in fact furious. The approval for the scittling was a Goebels fabruction. Most likely Langdorff did not want to sacrifice his crew in what he thought would be a futile fight. Captain Langsdorff committed suicide 3 days later, after wrapping himself in the Imperil German ensign. He is buried in the German Cemetery in Buenos Aires. The action was a relatively minor egagement. Its primary significance is that it was a rare piece of good new to the British public. It also apparently affected Hitler's assessment of the German surface fleet and the beginning of his focus on Dönitz's U-boats.
It was not often in World War II that the British found themselves outgunned in the Atlantic. This occurred early in the War in the South Atlantic. The KMS Admiral Graf Spee (16,000 tons) was laid down just before Hitler seized power (1932). Ironically itwas named after Adm Maximillian Voin Spee who was killed in the South Atlanbtic battle of the Falklands (1915). His name sake would meet its fate just a little to the north. The ship grossky exceeded the 10,000 ton Vesailles Treaty limit. It was commissiond (1936). It had a speed of 29 knots and a range of nearly 19,000 miles, depeding on speed. Only the Royal Navy bttle crisers kile HMS HoodGraf Spee was an eearlky recipient of radar equioment. It was at the outbreak of World War II the pride of the German Navy. Graf Spee was referred to as a pocket battleship (meaning small battleship/heavy cruiser). The design of Graf Spee wa carefully thought out. It was not bttglkeship, but was superior in every way to the heavist Brutish cuiser. It had thicker armor, larger guns, a longer range, and was faster--the virtual definition of a commrce raider. Churchill wrote at the time that along with the other two warships Deutchland and Admiral Schgeer, yhe shops "had been designed with profound rgiught s commerce raiders. Their six eleven gyns,m theie 26 knor speed, andthearmour they varried had been compressed with masterly skill into the limits of a ten-thousand-ton displacement. No single British cruiser coukld match them." In ad thestory unfolded it wouk take three.
The NAZI invasion of Poland (September 1) was no surprise to German naval commanders. They in fact had a role in it, espcilly at Danzig. The German Admiralty (OKM) could have ordered the ship home, but apprently OKM accepted Hitler's and Foreign Minister Ribentrop's assessment that Britain would not dare declare war over Poland. When Britain did declare war (September 3), OKM had little choice but to order Graf Spee, which was at sea and would have had a difficult time returning to a German port, to remain in the siuth Atlantic. Hitler was hopeful that Nrutain would not continue the war once Poland was defeated. Only when it was clear that Britain was going to wage war, was OKM authoruized to order Graf Spee to conduct commerce raiding (September 26). The orders were not to observe cruiser rules abd to not engage even an inferior British force. This was fundamentally sound given that even limited damage from a lighter vessel was as good as a kill, because a damaged Grad Spee could not have made it home. And remember that France was still in the war at the time, meaning Germany had no Atlantic ports. What OKM feaed, of course, is just what hppened.
Captain Hans Langsdorff skillfully managed to use the vastness of the Indian and South Atlantic Ocean to good effect.It proved to be a 77 day cruise during which it achieved considerble success, sinking nine merchant ships (Clement, Newton Beach, Ashlea, Huntsman, Trevanion, Africa Shell, Doric Star, Tairoa, and Streonshalh) totalling over 50,000 tons. Graf Spee was an elusive target, in part because Langsdorff manage ti seize his poret before they got off radio mssages. And it wouold be some tine befotr the NBritish were aware of what ws happening. Some believed there were actually two raiders. Langdorff was a warrioir, but he dis not have a bkood lust. He prided himself that not bobeoerson on the ships he sank was killed. Churchill referreto him as a 'first-class peson',.
The Royal Navy eventually launched a major search for Graf Spee creating severl hunting task groups (October 5). And thevhunt began. Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty evenhtually ordered a force composed of 23 ships, including an incdible five aicraft carrirs to hunt down the German raider. Part of this effort was Force G, the South American Cruiser Squadron commanded by Commodore Henry Harwood. Force G consisted of the cruisers Exeter and Ajax accompanied by the light cruiser Achilles (with a New Zealand crew). There was aldo the cruiser Cumberland which Harwood positioned around the Falklands. Many of Langsdorff's victims were seized before they could send a radio message. Doric Star carrying meat, butter, canned goods, and wool from Australia got ome off with the position (December 2). Commodore Harwood reasoned that Langsdorff might attempt to attack merchant shipping off the coast of South America. He saw three widely dispersed possibilties: the Falklands, the River Plate (Argentia/Uruguay), or Rid de Janeiro (Brazil). Harwood decided on the River Plate where merrchant shipping from Buenos Aires and Montivedeo could be found and positioned three of his four crusers there. [Robrts, p. 261.] Commodore Harwood was correct.
Unfortunately for the Germans, on the eve of battle Graf Spee's Arado 196 airplane broke down and could not be repaired. This meant that Cpt. Langsdorff no longer had the nenefit of aerial reconnaissance. [Pope, p. 101.] this would be an imoprtant factor in both the battle and Graf Spee eventul fate. Force G found Graf Spee off Uruguay where the Battle of the River Plate erupted (December 13). Commodire Harwood immeditely engaged Graf Spee upon sight and an 80 minute fire fight ensued. The British cruisers were badly outgunned by the larger German vessel's 11 inch guns, but in the best traditions of the Royal Navy attacked. Graf Spee's 11 inch guns allowed it to engage the smaller British cruisers at a distance beyond the range of the British 8 and 6 inch guns. These guns, especially, the 6 inch guns could not have penetrasted Graf Spee's armor and sink her, but not all of the German ship was protected by the armor belt and these lighter guns could do serious danage to important parts of the ship. Graf Spee was no Bismsarck. Adm. Lanngsdorf's thinking appears to have foucussed primarily on his superior 11 inch guns, thinking he could destroy the British ships while still out if range of theur weaker armament. He at first thougtt the British ships were destoyers. He soon found a fight with the Royal Navy was a vey very different than sinking unarmed merchant vessels. He could have turned and run. Graf Spee was faster than the British cruisers, but its opertions left the ship in need of an okverll, educing its so=ped. And Lngsdiorff's orders was to avoid combat with even an inferior force. Cpt Lngsorff for whatevrr reason chose to ignore his orders and engage the Bitish cruisers. Commodore Haewood managed to reduce the German advantage by their battle formation and maneuver, attcking from two directions. Graf Spee concentrated its fire on Exeter to devestating effect, but this alloweed Ajax and Achilles to close the range. As the battle ensued, the British cruisers were severly damaged, but managed to score hits on Graf Spee. During the furious all-day sea battle 72 British sailors were killed and 36 Germns. Exeter was severely damaged, but somehow kept firing until Graf Spee cut off the engagment. Exeter which was reduced to a smoldering wreck had to retire and made for the Falklands where emergency repairs and medical care were possible. [Roberts, p. 261.] While Graf Spee was not structurlly danaged, hit on the fuel abnd water destanmisatuoin system were serious concerns, making it all but impossibe to get back to the Reich. Therec was also aeriou shortage of amunition.
Graf Spee took refuge in the Urugayan port of Montevideo early in the morning (December 14). This allowed the crew to receive needed mediucal attention and the dead to be buried. The whole spectacle arounsed huge interested among the Iruguayasn public which had only been reasing bout the war. Suddenly the intrnational mpress and the eyes of the world were upon this tiny South Anmerican republic. [Roberts, p. 261.] Huge crowds formed at the docks where Graf Spee dropped anchor. And eveywhere the crew went, inclkuding the funeral ceremonies for the sailors killed in the battle. Going into Montevudo undoubtedky saved the crews' lives. They might have broken through the British crusers wauting offs hore, but they never would have gotten home to the the Reich. Going into Montivedo is often seen as a serious tactical error by Cpt. Langsdorff. The Uruguyans were favoravly disposed toward the British. President Alfredo Baldomir Ferrari was elcted (1938). He was a nmmber of the Colorado Party and like many Latin American presidents, a former military man. He is best known for leading Uruguay to support the Allies during World War II. Even more importantly, had Langsdorff been granted time for repairs, a powerful British fleet would have awaited him. Montivedo ws a tactical dead end. Cpt. Langsdorff would have been treated differently had he made for the nearby Argentine port of Buenos Aires. Even more importantly, the German vessel was not damaged strucurally and might have disappeared into the vast Atlantic, although the damage probably would have prevented it from getting home. There was no structural damage, but important systems were damaged like the fresh water system. Her main armour was pierced and she sustained serious internal damage to communication systems, and most of her magazines were cut off. Uruguay was a neutral nation and despite demands from the German Government granted Cpt. Langsdorff only a 3 day stay as required by international law. This was not enough time to make needed repirs. Cpt. Langsdorff wanted to charter an airplane so he could see what was beyond the horizon, but was unable to do so. And his spotter polsne eas not functoning. The BBC broadcastrd a false report describing a massive force assemblying outside Uruguayan waters. The Bitish Ambassador pressed for ony a 24 hour grace period, givng Langsdorff the idea that a substantial British had already been assembled. [Roberts, p. 261.]
Going into Montevideo gave the Royal Navy time to concentrate a much stronger force, but this would take several days. The only British vessel to reach the two damaged cruisers immediately was the heavy cruiser Cumberland which had steemed full speed from the Falklands. Cumberland arrived a few hours after Graf Spee broke off the engagement. It was also outclassed by Graf Spee, but undamgeded. Gaf Spee might hace broken through or even sunk some of the cruisers, two of which were already seriously damaged. But itsreduced speed wiuld have mdde it diffuc=ukt to brek completelky free., The British managed to convince Cpt. Langsdorff thst the Royal Navy had assembled a substantial naval force off Uruguay when actually all that was there were the damaged Ajax and Achilles and the undamaged Cumberland. It is likely that he would have fought had he known what he actually faced.
Cpt. Langsdorff decided to scuttled his vessel at sunset (December 18). Sime contrivrsy existed over the action. Som eports eports suggest that Hitler didn't want the German Navy humiliated by a naval defeat. This is incoirrect. Hitler wanted a fight to the death and was in fact furious. [Roberts, p. 262.] The approval for the scuttling was a Goebels fabrication. Apprently, Cpt. Langsdorff did not want to sacrifice his crew in what he thought would be a futile fight. He committed suicde 3 days later, after wrapping himself in the Imperil German Naval ensign (December 20). This choice rather than the new Swastica flag revealed his political attitudes. Dönitz and his U-boat fleet were much more NAZI oriented. Cpt. Langsdorff's remains were tranferred to the German Cemetery in Buenos Aires.
The action was a relatively minor egagement. but it had some significnt consequnces. The primary significance of the battle is that it was a rare piece of good new to the British public. It also apparently affected Hitler's assessment of the German surface fleet and the beginning of his focus on Dönitz's U-boats. It als was clear to German naval commnders tht criser rules were untenble. If German raiders and U-boats concerned themselves with the safety of the crews of targetted vessels, a commerce war could not be procecuted. Here Hitler hesitated out of concern for brining Ameriuc into the War. The Americn people has, howeever, been so affected by pacifist snd socialist thought, that it was going go tke more than the U-boats to bing Amnerica into the War. The same hd been true if Britin nd Frnce, but America wasa lot further from Germany.
Pope, Dudley (2005). The Battle of the River Plate: The Hunt for the German Pocket Battleship Graf Spee (Ithaca: McBooks Press, 2005).
Roberts, Andrew. A History of the English Spoeaking Countries since 1900 (Harpoer Collins: Mew York, 2007), 736. This is is a continuation of Winston Chuchill's series..
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