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Hitler had always planned another war although he never told the German people. Rearmament was a centrl aspect of NAZI policy from the very beginning. He thought that Germany would be prepared by the 1940s. Successes in the 1930s came with dizzying ease abnd as a result, he advanced his time table. Germany had a large industrial sector, however, there were limits and priorities had to be addressed. And the bulk of the resources were given to the Heer and Luftwaffe. The Kriegsmarine was the lowest priority. Thus when Hitler launched his war (September 1939), the Kriegsmarine was the least prepared of the three services. And within the Kreigsmarine, the Admiralty (OKM) favored surface ships and Hitler large battleships. Thus Admiral Dönitz had only a small, but well-trained U-boat force. Britain as in World War I proceeded to estblish a naval blockade of Germany in the North Sea. Thus also hampered German U-boat operations. Britain in peacetime imported about 60 million tons of food and raw material. In war time it would needed more. Dönitz calculated that with 300 U-boats using the wolf pack tactics he developed, he could sever Britain's Atlantic lifelines. At the outbreak of war, however, Dönitz had only a small U-boat force. His daring commanders, like Günther Prien, scored some starteling successes, such as sinking the battleship HMS Royal Oak in Scappa Flow, while an aging ship it still made an impression. OKM and Hitler planned on using its modern and growing surface fleet in additiion to U-boats to cut Britain's critical sea life lines. The destruction of Graf Spee in the South Atlantic was the first indication that this might not work. The U-boats on the other hand, while few in number, scored some impressive results. The Germans began World War II with a very small U-boat force. It proved more effective than the British and the OKM had expected. It was unable, however, to significantly impair the British war effort because of its small size. The major impact was to alert the British to the potential danger and give the British time to prepare for the massive U-boat campaign which the Kreigsmarine would eventually mount. The British mounted an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) effort, but resources were a first very limited.
NAZI Germany and the Soviet Union surprised the world by signing an alliance--th NAZI-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact a week before launching the War (August 23, 1939). Itvwas a cynical alliance to divide Europe and the European people by the two totalitarian giants. With Stalin on his side and believing that Britain and France would back down again, Hitler ordered the Panzers into Poland (September 1). The NAZI invasion of Poland and the Second World War began when the German World War I battleship Schleswig-Holstein on the pretext of a courtesy call commenced firing on the Westerplatte--Polish fortifications in Danzig (September 1). The devestating Blitzkrieg on Poland followed. The action in Danzig was the Kriegsmarine primary contribution to the Polish campaign. The Kriegsmarine had little advanced warning that the Führer planned to go to war in 1939. The High Command (OKM) on the basis of Hitler's briefings had not anticipated war until the mid-1940s and unlike the Heer and Luftwaffe was unprepared for a major war. Although the British Royal Navy was a much smaller force than the Germans faced in Workd War I, the British Royal Navy outclassed the Kriegsmarine in every vessel class. Hitler did not believe the British and French would honor their guarantees to Poland and go to war. OKM ordered Dönetz to deploy the U-boats for war even before the Panzers crossed the Polish frontier. Hitler insisted that they operate under serious limitations as he was hoping even after the War began that he could avoid a major war with Britain. Stalin ordered the Red Army to strike Polnd from the East (September 17). Both the Germans and Soviets would conduct unvelievbly brutal atrocities in Poland.
OKM dreams of a massive surface fleet to confront the Royal Navy were dashed when Hiler launched the War years ahead of schedule. Hitler had assured the admirals that war was years away. Thus only small numbers of U-boats were built. When war cane, the Kriegsmarine was not prepared and had to adopt a new new war plan. Until modern capital ships could be built, the Germans could not dirctly confront the Royal Navy. Thus the Germans had to return the World War strategy of a commerce war. he Germans with U-boats, surface raiders, and long range aircraft hoped to cut off Britain from its Empire and supply from the United States. The U-boat was a particularly attractive weapon, because a U-boat could be built in 6 months at a fraction of the cost of a surface unit, it was the most logical choice for the Germans, especillafter early actions proved the effectiveness of U-boats. The Germans prepared to use their availablre force as commerce raiders, to prevent supplies from America and the Dominions from reaching Britian and France. The small surface still loomed large in German thinking. The Germans had pocket battleships and converted merchant ships (Q boats) in addition to 57 U-boats. In addition Bismarck was nearing completion.
The Royal Navy repeated its World War I strategy of instituting a blockade in the North Sea to cut off German shipping from international commerce. It was the need to blockade German shipping as well as to bottle up the German fleet that caused the Royal Navy to locate its main base at Scapp Flow. The British blockade of the North Sea involved streaching mine fields and patroling the sea lanes between the island and Norway.
The fall of Norway (April 1940) and then France (June 1940) dramtically changed the naval calculation. German air forces set up in Norway made it impossible for the Royal Navy to close off the North Sea. After the fall of France, the German Navy rushed into the French Atlantic ports to build massive U-boat facilities. The British also had a smaller navy than in World War I. This made it impossible for the Royal Navy to bottle up the Germans as they had done in World War I. The U-boats thus for a time could run rampant. This was not the case for the German merchant marine. The British maritime blockade was effective because of technological advances. Radar and aerial patrol vessels made it impossible for the Germans to carry out maritime trade. Even if this had not been the case, the Germans with their industries geared for War had little to trade with. This would have been the same for Britain which was essentially bankrupt (December 1940). The difference was that the United States with Lend Lease essentially would write Britain a blank check to continue the War.
Dönitz had 39 operational U-boats and 30 U-boats at sea when the War began. Plan Z had called for having 100 U-boats at sea, but Hitler had begun the War before the Kriegsmarine was ready. Doenitz mustered 46 U-boats, but only 22 were capable of long range operations. They were, however. positioned and ready when the Panzers smashed into Poland. After the British instituted another North Sea blockade, the Germans reponded with U-boat attacks. TheGermans proceeded to harass the Royal Navy with its limited force. The first U-boat victim was the British passageger liner 'SS Athenia' which was not among the ship types Hitler initially allowed to be targeted, in part because of the furor over the sinking of 'Lusitania' in World War I. U-30 commanded by Oberleutnant Fritz-Julius Lemp who would become a U-boat ace sunk the liner September 3. Over 300 Americans were aboard. The Germans denied that they had sunk 'Athenia'. The survivors were brought into Glasgow. D�nitz's first target was British coastal shipping. Mines were deployed from U-boats as well as actual attacks. Soon attacks were extended into the Atlantic. The success of the U-boats soon Karl Donietz and established the U-boat fleet as the darlings of the German War effort. At the same time, the German surface fleet including Graf Spee and Bismarck were steadily eliminated by the Royal Navy. In contrast the U-boats proved highly effective. The Royal Navy had badly calculated their ability to counter the U-boat threat. Theis stage of the War was called by the U-boat men as "The Happy Time". Large numbers of British merchant vessels were sunk. Some military analaysts believe that if the Germans in 1935-39 had focused on U-boats rather than building large surface vessels like Bismarck, the U-boats may have succeeded in forcing the British out of the War. This is probably true, but if the Germans had madeU-bots a priority, the British would have detected that and begun building more escorts and placed more empgasis on anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
The British Admiralty was disatorously complacent in the run up to the War. They seriously underestimated the Grman U-boat threat This was in part because the Admiralty believed that ASDIC (SONAR) made U-boats obsolete. It also replected the Government's misguidedv effort to appease Hitler. This is why the British agreed to allow the Germans to begin building U-boats in the Anglo-Germn Naval Treaty (1935). This over confidence was a serious error which did not become apparent until after the War began. ASDIC was a powerful tool. But it was still fairly primitive at the time the War began. There wre several serious weaknesses. First, the range of the German torpedoes were greater than the range of the BRitish ASDIC sets. Second, when escorts began depth charge runs, the ASDIC operators would lose contact with the U-boats. It did not take long after the War began for this miscalculation to become apparent. It lead immediately to one of the great losses of the War--HMS Courageous. And the Royal Navy had to contend with Ammiral Dönitz's U-boats with a woefully inadequate escort force.
Although the British at first had great difficulty finding and sinking U-boats, they were in fact very vulnerable ships. And the British from the beginning of the War had assessed the key to the U-boat threat--aircraft. U-boats can not operate when enemy aircraft are present. The U-boat was not a true submarine. It could not like modern submarines operated for extended periods underwater. It ws actually a surface vessel that could submerge for short periods. Thus if aircraft were present U-boats could not surface. The initial British strategy was thus to use aircraft carriers to protect convoys and then hunt down U-boats. HMS Courageous was one of the first British carriers. She was laid down as a light battle cruiser during World War I. After the War she was converted to a carrier. Courageous was assigned to the Home Fleet in the Channel Force at the start of World War II. she was part of an anti-submarine patrol off the coast of Ireland. Ireland declared herself neutral, and refused to allow British aircraft ot ships to operate from Irish territory. The Courgaeous battle group icluded four escorting destroyers. Two of the destroyers were detached to aid a merchant ship being attacked by a U-boat. At the time, U-29, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Otto Schuhart was staling Courageous. When the carrier urned into the wind to launch aircraft, it moved across the bow of the U-29 which immediateky fired three torpedoes. Two of the torpedoes struck the ship on her port side. Courageous capsized and sank in 15 minutes. There were 518 crew members lost, including her captain. Courgaeous was the fitst Royal Navy warship sunk by the Germans. While the British were correct about the importance of aircraft, commoting a fleet carrier to U-boat patrols was a serious error. The greatest defense of capital ships from U-boats was high speed that the U-boats coukd not match. A carrier in the vicinity of U-boats had to slow down a manuever to launch or take on aircraft, thus presenting an ideal target for a U-boat. Thus the British were endangering a valuabvle capital ship in an effort to sink a relatively unimportant vessel--a U-boat. The answer was of course escort or jeep carriers, but it woukd be about 2 years before the British deployed one and a little longer before the United States began turning them out like sausages.
Scappa Flow since before World War I was the most important base of the Royal Navy. Located off Scotland it was positioned to oppose the break out of the Germany Navy into the convoy lanes of the North Atlantic. It was also here the German Highseas fleet was scuttled following World War I. Because of this, Scappa Flow undobtedly was a trget of major interest to the Kreigsmarine. Dönitz at the very beginning of the War staged a daring raid into the base of the British Home Fleet--Scappa Flow. Günter Preem in U-47 sank the British battleship HMS Royal Oak (October 14, 1939). The Royal Oak was a veteran of the World War I Jutland battle. It was the first German propaganda of the naval war. As a result, the Royal Navy had to move the fleet out of Scappa Flow until the defenses could be upgraded.
Churchill in his memoirs wrote that during the War, it was the U-boats that he feared the most. He wrote, "The only thing that ever really frightened me during the War was the U-boat peril. [HBC note: Here Churchill is apperently engaggeing in an assessment looking back. We know that at the time he was badly shaken after the fall of France even after the BEF was safely home.] Invasion, I thought, even before the air battle, would fail. After the air victory it was aood battle for us. It was the kind of battle which, in the cruel conditions of war, one ought to be content to fight. But now our lifeline, even across the broadoceans, and especially in the entrances to the Island, was endangered. I was even more anxious about the battle than I had been about the glorious air fight called the Battle of Britain." [Churchill, p. 410.] Hitler gambeled when he launched World War II. Germany did not have the resources or industrial capacity to defeat the Allies, especially with the Soviet Union added to the Allied side. The Germans scored great victories, but the weight of the superior resources aligned against them showed fairly early in the War affecting operations in two the three areas of operationss. The Battle of Britain showed that the Germans could be defeated in the air (1940). The Soviet victory before Moscow (December 1941) and subsequent fighting badly crippled the Whermacht and left it unable to launch another offensive acros the entire Eastern Front. Thus it was the Battle of the Atlantic that offered the best chance for Germany to win the War. Ironically, naval warfare had been the one area that Britain had seemed tghe strongest before the War. Britain was turning itself intgo a massive engine for War, but that was all dependent on keeping the Atlantic sea lanes open so that raw materials from the Dominions could reach British factories. American Lend Lease shipments included both raw materials and finished arms. And after the United States entered the War, Ameican military personnel began arriving in large numbers. All this was, however, contingent on victory in the North Atlantic. There were no climatic battles. The outcome in the North Atantic was determined by a simple mathamatical calculation. Could the Germans sink merchant shipping faster than Britain could build them. And for a while the tonnange sunk did exceed the tonage built.
Britain began the War with a merchant fleet of 17.8 million tons (mt), the largest in the world. The Germans suceeded in sinking somw 100 merchant ships during 1939 after the declaration of War. This was not sufficent to undo the British War effort. It was a shock to the Admiralty and the British public. And it was a major achievement for Admiral Dönitz with his very limited forces, much of which was still bottled up in the North Sea. And it did not portend well for the British as Germany had begun to build more U-Boats, including many new Type-IX ocean going ships. The British set its scientiss to improve SONAR and other ASW equioment. Plans were approvd to increase the production of escorts. In the first four months of World War II (Septemnber-December 1939), the Germans sank 0.5 million tons of British mercahnt shipping. This may not sound like much, but given the short period and that Dönitz had only a handful of U-boats, it was onminous indeed. And Britain woukld be inable to buikd many repacements, her shiopyards woild be fully involved in building and repairing Royal Navy vessels. Anither 0.1 mt were lat by bither Allies and 0.3 mt by neutrals. [Roberts, p. 258.] Many soon ti be occupied by the Germans.
Hitler could read the battle field reports as well as Churchill. The U-boat sinkings proved very successful compared to the surface vessels that OKM prefrred. As a result, construction priorities were signicantly revised. Hitler gave priority to U-boat building. This is something often not apprecited in Woirld War II histories, the degree of germasn industrial output that was committed to the War in the West While German mnpower wiukld be eventually committed to the Istkrieg, German industry was primrily committed to the War in the West. The RAF victory in the Battle of Britain had blunted the air campaign. And the lossess in Russia were catrostrophic. By 1942 it was the campaign in the North Atlantic that offerred real prospects for German victory. A new summer offensive was launched in the Soviet Union, but it was only a fraction of the size of Barbarossa. German chances for victory were rapidly disappearing. Hitler turned to the U-boats as the center-piece of his naval strategy and efforts to defeat Britain. Dönitz and his U-boat service was given priority in raw materials and shipyard construction. Huge numbers of U-boats with improved design features began to be launched down the slipways. Unlike much of th Ostheer which was equippoed wih horse-drawn carts, the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe required heavy industry to fight. And the priority given to the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe at various stasges of the War meant that the Ostheer was not receiving what it needed to win the decisive campaign of the War.
The Germans began World War II with a very small U-boat force. It proved more effective than the British and the German Admiralty had expected. It was unable, however, to significantly impair the British war effort because of its small size. The major impact was to alert the British to the potential danger and give the British time to prepare for the massive U-boat campaign which the Kreigsmarine would eventually mount. German shipyards began to turn out U-boats in large numbers. The British before these U-boats could be built and deployed had time to develop important anti-submarine warfare (ASW) methods and equipment. The Admiralty did not have a lot of time, but they made good use of the time they had, in part because Churchill at the Admiralty and later as prime-minister strongly supported ASW efforts. Convoys were the principal World war I precaution. The British developed a convoy system, although authors duisagree about the advisability of doing this before the Germans had a more substantial U-boat force deployed. Mineswweping was the most immediate success. Laying mines was given condiderable priority by the Kreigsmarine, despite Dönitz's opposition. Many of the British ships sunk in the opening months of the war struck mines. British minesweeping efforts proved very successful, especially procedures to defeat advanced German magnetic mines. The Double-L system was emoloyed (early-1940). Degausing procedures were implemented for ships. Radar was another ASW effort and as in the air war would prove to be a major success. The British develooped the cavity magnetron which made it possible to minurize radar sets so they could be put on planes. This would ultimately allow ships and planes to detect a U-boat with only the periscope above water. The British would, however, need the Americans to produce the sets in numbers. A BBC science writr claims that "It is impossible to exagerate the importance of Randall and Boot's work. It lifted radar from an electronic stone age to the present day." [Johnson] Code breaking was another important effort. The British effort at Bletchly Park to crack the German Enigma machine made considerable progress. It at first made little progress with the Naval Enigma, primarily because of the strict security procedures Dönitz insisted be followed.
It was not often in World War II that the British found themselves outgunned in the Atlantic. This occurred early in the War in the South Atlantic. The KMS Admiral Graf Spee (16,000 tons) at the outbreak of World War II was the pride of the German Navy. It was a pocket (meaning small battleship/heavy cruiser). After the outbreak of War, the German naval command (OKM) ordered KMS Graf Spee which was at sea and would have had a difficult time returning to a German port to conduct commerce raiding in the South Atlantic. It proved to be a 77 day cruise during which it achieved some success, sinking nine merchant ships (Clement, Newton Beach, Ashlea, Huntsman, Trevanion, Africa Shell, Doric Star, Tairoa, and Streonshalh) totalling over 50,000 tons. The British launched a major search for Graf Spee. Part of this effort was Force G, the South American cruiser squadron commanded by commodore Henry Harwood. Captain Hans Langsdorff managed to use the vastness of the Indian and South Atlantic Ocean to good effect. Harwood reasoned that Langsdorff might attempt to attack merchant shipping off the River Plate where ships from Buenos Aires and Montivedeo could be found. Harwood was correct. He found KMS Graf Spee off Uruguay where the Battle of the River Plate erupted (December 13). The British cruisers Exeter and Ajax accompanied by the light cruiser Achilles (with a New Zealand crew) engaged Graf Spee. The British cruisers were badly outgunned by the larger German vessel's 11 inch guns, but in the best traditiins of the Royal Navy sattscked. Graf Spee's guns were not only larger, but allowed it to engage the smaller British cruisers at a distance beyond the range of their 8 and 6 inch guns. These guns, especislly, the 6 inch guns could not have penrtrasted Graf Spee's armor and sink her, but not all of the German ship was protected by thr armor belt and these lighter guns could do serious danage to important parts of the ship. Graf Spee wsas no Bismsarck. Adm. Lanngsdorf's thinking appears to have foucused primarily on his superior 11 inch guns. And he at first thougt the British ships were destoyers. Actually he violated his orders which werre not to engage even an inferior force. This was fundamentally sound given that even limited damage from a lighter vessel was as good as a kill, because a damaged Grad Spee could not have made it home. And rember thst France was still in the war at the time. This of course it just what hppened. The British managed to reduce the German advantage by their battle formation and maneuver. As the bttle ensued, the British cruisers were severly damaged, but managed to score hits on Graf Spee. During the furious sea battle 72 British sailors were killed and 36 Germns. Exeter was so severely damaged that it had to retire and made for the Falklands where emergency repairs were possible. Graf Spee took refuge in Montevideo early in the morning (December 14). This is often seen as a serious mistake. The Uruguyans were more favoravly disposed toward the British than the Argentines. Even more importantly, the German vessel was not damaged strucurally and might have disappeared into the vast Atlantic, but there was damage which probably would hve prevented it from getting home. Going into Montevideo gave the Royal Navy time to concentrate a much stronger force, but this would take several days. The only British vessel to reach the two damaged cruisers immediately was the heavy cruiser Cumberland which had steemed full speed from the Falklands. Cumberland arrived a few hours after Graf Spee broke off the engagement. It was also outclassed by Graf Spee, but undamgeded. Uruguay was a neutral nation and granted Captain Hans Langsdorff only a 3 day stay as rewuired by international law. The British managed to convince the Germans that a substantial naval force was assembling off Uruguay when actually all that was there were the damaged Ajax and Achilles and the undamaged Cumberland. Langsdorff decided to scuttled his vessel (December 17). We are not sure who gave this order. One report suggests that Hitler didn't want the German Navy humiliated by a naval defeat. More likely Langdorff did not want to sacrifice his crew in what he thought would be a futile fight. Captain Langsdorff shot himself 3 days later. He is buried in the German Cemetery in Buenos Aires. The action was a relatively minor egagement. Its primary significance is that it was a rare peace of good new to the British public. It also apparently affected Hitler's assessment of the German surface fleet.
There has always been a strong isolationist streak in American political life. Americans separated by two great oceans have since the Revolution seen ourselves as different and apart from the rest of the World. Many Americans during the 1920s came to feel that America's entry into the War was a mistake. There was considerable talk of war profiteering. Many were detrmined that America should avoid war at any cost. This feeling was intensified with the Depression of the 1930s and the country's focus was on domestic issues. With the growing military might of a rearmed Germany, war talk in Europe began. At the outbreak of war, the American Neutrality Acts required American neutrality. Convinced that American security lay with supporting the Allies, President Roosevelt began a campaign of guiding American public opinion and supporting the allies within the narrow limits of the Neutrality Acts. Although neutral in the early years of the War, President Roosevelt was determine to support the Allies. The President also begun a campaign to rearm America. A few days after the fall of France in 1940, a shocked American Congress approved the Naval Construction Act, better known as the Two-Ocean Navy Act (July 1940). This was not good news for the Japanese. They were able to build a navy capable of taking on the U.S. Nsvy primarily because the United States had limited naval spending. The ships that ghe United Sytates was now builkding would put them at a serious disadvantage. Powerful figures in Jspn realized thst they would have to act before these shipos joined the American Pacific Fleet. Ametricn isolationist leaders opposed war and military spending to prepsre for war. Others such as, Charles Lindburg, thought that America could not win a war against Germany's vaunted Luftwaffe. Aginst this backdrop, President Roosevelt who did see the dangers from the NAZIs and Japanese militaists, with political courage managed to not only to support Britain in its hour of maximum peril, but with considerable political skill managed to push through Congress measures that would lay the ground work for turning American into the Arsenal of Democracy. This produced a tidal wave of equipment and supplies, not only for the American military, but for our Allies as well, in quantities that no one, especially the Axis powers believed possible.
Johnson, Brian. The Secret War.
Roberts, Andrew. A History of the English Spoeaking Countries since 1900 (Harpoer Collins: Mew York, 2007), 736. This is is a continuation of Winston Chuchill's series.
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