Figure 1.--As strange as it may seem because we all know how the War turned out, the Japnese seiously thought they could win the Pacific War. There were several reasons for this. Surely the most important was Adolf Hitler and his starteling military success in Europe. Here we see the ceremonies for Hungary joining the Axis (November 1940), Japan had joined in September. Hitler had already decided to invade the Soviet Union, but there was no joint planning with Japan. The Japanese thought that the early victories in the Soviet Union eould force America to concentrate its forces in Europe. At the time that bombs fell on Pearl Harbor, German Panzers were at the gates of Moscow which was expected to fall at any minute. Stalin himself prepared to evacuate. But on virtually the same day, the Red Army launched a stunning Winter Offensive which would inflict huge losses on the Wehrmacht, losses that the Germans could never replace.

This question is commonly asked in a different way, why did Japan lose the Pacific War? But the answer to that is so obvious that is hardly worth discussing. At the time World War II began, the United States had a economy about five the size of the Japanese economy. (See HBC World Economic Comparisons'.) By the end of the War, the American economy was ten times as large. In purely industrial power the disparity was even greater. And naval war is by definition an industrial war. This in a nutshell is why Japan lost the war. At the time of World War, Japan was essentially bankrupting itself while America was devoting less than 2 percent of its GDP to military spending--yet the two navies were comparable. So why did Japan think they could win a war with the United States? First, the Japanese had defeated one gret power in the past -- Russo-Japamese War. Second, Japan had achieved naval dominance in the Oacufic. No one, not even the American military, understood just how rapidly the American Arsenal of Democracy could convert to military production and how much it could actually produce. Third, the decisons were being made by poorly educted military men with little experience outside of Japan itself. Fourth, the value system of the Japanese milarists did not rank economics and commerce very highly. What was impotant to them was martial spirit and they saw very little of that in America. Few had been to America, but they had seen Hollywood films and the take away was any country that let their women dominate them could not produce warriors. They were asstonished when coinfronting the Marines on Guadalcanal. Their initil reactiin was that the Americns were emplying out their prisons and lunatuc asylums. Fifth, they saw German Panzers racing toward Moscow and thought that the Red Army was defeated. Thus the United States would have to focus its resources on Europe. (The stunning Soviet counter offensive before Moscow showing that the Red Army was not defeated was launched on virtually the sane day as Pearl Harbor.) Sixth, the Peace Preservation Laws (1894) were designed to curtail any critiscism of the military and to supress the Freedom and People's Rights Movement. [Ienaga] By peace the Government meant internal order. Seventh, censorship and the supression of academic freedom.meant that there were no real discussion of wageing war outside of military circles. [Ienaga]

Industrial Disparity

This question is commonly asked in a different way, why did Japan lose the Pacific War? But the answer to that is so obvious that is hardly worth discussing. At the time World War II began, the United States had a economy about five the size of the Japanese economy. (See HBC World Economic Comparisons'.) By the end of the War, the American economy was ten times as large. In purely industrial power the disparity was even greater. And naval war is by definition an industrial war. This in a nutshell is why Japan lost the war. At the time of World War, Japan was essentially bankrupting itself while America was devoting less than 2 percent of its GDP to military spending--yet the two navies were comparable. Assoonm as the American Arsnal of Democracy was unleashed.

Japanese Militarist Vision

So why did the Japanese militarists think they could win a war with the United States and its massive ibdustrial economy.?

Military success

The Japanese had defeated one gret power in the past -- Russo-Japamese War (1904-05). Japan hadearly defeated China bin the Fiurst Suno-Jpoanese Ware (1894-95). Europeans did nit poay much attention shocjked the worlkd by decisively defeating a major European power--Tsarist Russia. Not only were therr victiories on land, but the Japanaese Navy commanded by Adm Tojo uterly destroyed the Russian fleet in the Tsushima Straits (1905). Europe and America begam to take notice. And the Jpnese begn to think tht they could defeat other Western naval powers. The fact that Russia was the lest industrialized of the great powers does not seemed to diminished national elation.

Japanese naval power

Japan by 1941 had achieved a degree of naval dominance in the Pacific. This was done by a naval buiolding proigrm that virtully bakrupted the country. This mean that ythey has well designed and newer ships thn Btitain and France. The Japanese could devoye theuir enbtire fleet to to the Pscific, hile the Amnericans nd especially the British had to focus on the Atlabntuc wear war was raging. The Japanese based in their decesion for war on the balance of naval power in 1941. No on not even the American military understood just how rapidly the American Arsenal of Democracy could convert to military production and how much it could actually produce.

Poorly educated leaders

The decisons were being made by poorly educted military men with little experience outside of Japan itself. They had graduated from military academies weith very limited curruculum beyond military maters. These men made theur assessment by what they saw in the Pacific in 1941.

Martial spirit

There is no doubt that the Japanese militarists suceeded in instulling a martil ethos into Japanese soldiers. Japanese soldierts with few exceotions refused to surrendr. Japanese soldiers fillowed the irdrs of their commabders to charge into fixed poositions against artillery and automatic weapons. TYe Banzai charge became a staple of the Pacific War weven though it usually meant certain death. Inm addition, the value system of the Japanese milarists did not rank economics and commerce very highly. What was impotant to them was martial spirit and they saw very little of that in America. Few had been to America, but they had seen Hollywood films and the take away was any country that let their women dominate them could not produce warriors. They were asstonished when coinfronting the Marines on Guadalcanal. Their initil reaction was that the Americans were employing out their prisons and lunatuc asylums.

Soviet Red Army defeats

Hitler shicked the world when he unleased the undefeated German Wehrmacht on the Soviet Union--Opperation Barbarossa (June 1941). Any reading of Mein Kampf shows that this was from an early point his primary goal. The Japanese militarists saw German Panzers racing toward Moscow and a series of smashed Soviet armies thought that the Red Army was defeated. No aermy in history had suffered such defeats and survived. Thus the United States would have to focus its resources on Europe. The stunning Soviet Winter counter offensive before Moscow showing that the Red Army was not defeated was launched on virtually the sanm day as Pearl Harbor. The point is that the Wehrmacht came uncimfortable close to defeating the Red Army. We today see the Japanese decusion to go to war with America as virtually unfathomable. But if the Germans had succeeded, which the Japanese believed they had, the American war effort would have had to significantly adjust. And the Japanese decision for wa would have made much mor sence.

Military thought control

The Peace Preservation Laws (1894) were designed to curtail any critiscism of the military and to supress the Freedom and People's Rights Movement. [Ienaga] By peace the Government meant internal order. Seventh, censorship and the supression of academic freedom.meant that there were no real discussion of wageing war outside of military circles. [Ienaga]

Fleeting Opportunity: 1941

The Imperial Army commnders were less foicused in industry thn the Imperial Navy. A factgor here was tht the Army was not as modern and mechanized by the Navy. The Army proimarily moved on foot with horses. The Naby was dloedent of modern navl vessels and thus was dependent on industry to a far graeter exrebt vthan the Armyb. And the Navy was eatching deveopments in the UJnited States, especially the Two Ocean Navy Expansion Act (July 1940). They saw ghe Americans beginning to close the naval inballance Joan had achieved in yhe Oacufic. Jpan couild never begin to match Anerican shiop buildiung once the Arsenal of Democracy was turned on. So if Japan was going to go to war wiuth the United States there would never be a better time before the new ships being built in Aneruca had reached the Pacific Fleet.

Sourcs

Ienaga, Saburo. The Pacific War, 1931-1945 (1978). Ienega's book is extensively documented.

Created: 3:46 AM 3/27/2021
Last updated: 3:46 AM 3/27/2021