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World War I on the Western Front began as a war of movement (ugust 1914)O, but after the Miracle on the Marne (September 1914) evolved into a static war of attrition as the Allies and Germans built a parallel system of trenches from the Swiss border to the English Channel. New weapons such as the machine gun, poison gas, tanks, and airplanes appeared, but the main killer continued to be the artillery. The war was largely an infantry war, decided by the superior resources of the Allies and the arrival of the American infantry. The Americans also bought trucks in large numbers. One reason that both the Germans and Allies had such difficulty breaking through the enemy trench lines is that even if a breakthrough was opened in the enemy lines was achieved, there was no way that assaulting forces could be reinforced and provisioned with supply lines using horse carts. Weapon systems were vastly improved during the inter-War system. The French concluded that these improvements meant that movement would be even more restricted, a huge miscalculation that wouild lead to the fall of France. The Maginot Line was a monument to this flawed view of warfare. The German also assessed World War I to determine why their traditional Prussian war of movement had failed. And they correctly saw that the new weapons development was enhancing rather than restricting movement. The result was the concept of Blitzkrieg (not as term the germans tended to use)--essentially modern warfare. It was the German tactical doctrine rather than the weapons themselves that resulted in stunning German victories against poorly prepared adversaries at the onset of the War. France would be defeated in weeks and only the Channel saved the British. It would take nearly 2 years for the British to understand and adopt the German tactics. The Americans proved to be much quicker study and America industry had the capacity not only to fully mechanize its own forces, but also allied forces. The Germans while conceiving of Blitzkrieg, did not have an army that could fully execute it. Some 80 percent of the German Army was unmotorized infantry. Hitler would send the Ostheer east into the Soviet Union largely on foot with horse-drawn carts (June 1941). Not only was the Ostheer poorly equipped, but the Axis allies were even more poorly equipped. This would lead to disaster at Stalingrad when the Red Amy struck at the the poorly equipped Axis allies guarding the flanks at Stalingrad. While the Ostheer had its limitations, the Red Army was nearly defeated by Operation Barbarossa (1941). Then at the same time as Pearl Harbor, the Red Army badly mauled the Ostheer in a well executed Winter Offenses executed by Gen. Zhukov (1941-42). Then at great cost, the Red Army supported by new divisions and war fctories moved beyond the Urals, superb tanks, and the mobility supplied by American Lend-Lease trucks, the Red Army succeeded in not only stopping the Ostheer, but tearing the heart out of the Wehrmacht in a series of offenses (1942-45). The one countrty that had the capability of fully executing Blitzkrieg was the United States which ardently desired to sty oit of the War and had a minidcule army. Aftervthe fll of france, the Unites States began limitd steps to prepare for war. This all changed with Pearl Harbor (Decembr 1941). The United States begn building a highly mechanized American Army. This results after D-Dy were demonstrated by Gen. Patton's Third Army whose major problem was gas for his vehicles Hulun1944).. American industry not only fully equipped the U.S. Army, but unlike the Germans as well and its allies as well, including the British, French and other allied units.
World War I on the Western Front began as a war of movement (ugust 1914)O, but after the Miracle on the Marne (September 1914) evolved into a static war of attrition as the Allies and Germans built a parallel system of trenches from the Swiss border to the English Channel. New weapons such as the machine gun, poison gas, tanks, and airplanes appeared, but the main killer continued to be the artillery. The war was largely an infantry war, decided by the superior resources of the Allies and the arrival of the American infantry. The Americans also bought trucks in large numbers. One reason that both the Germans and Allies had such difficulty breaking through the enemy trench lines is that even if a breakthrough was opened in the enemy lines was achieved, there was no way that assaulting forces could be reinforced and provisioned with supply lines using horse carts. Weapon systems were vastly improved during the inter-War system.
The French concluded that these improvements meant that movement would be even more restricted, a huge miscalculation that wouild lead to the fall of France. The Maginot Line was a monument to this flawed view of warfare. The German also assessed World War I to determine why their traditional Prussian war of movement had failed. And they correctly saw that the new weapons development was enhancing rather than restricting movement. The result was the concept of Blitzkrieg (not a term the Germans tended to use)--essentially modern warfare. It was the German tactical doctrine rather than the weapons themselves that resulted in stunning German victories against poorly prepared adversaries at the onset of the War. France would be defeated in weeks and only the Channel saved the British. It would take nearly 2 years for the British to understand and adopt the German tactics. The Americans proved to be much quicker study and America industry had the capacity not only to fully mechanize its own forces, but also allied forces. The Germans while conceiving of Blitzkrieg, did not have an army that could fully execute it. Some 80 percent of the German Army was unmotorized infantry. Hitler would send the Ostheer east into the Soviet Union largely on foot with horse-drawn carts (June 1941). Not only was the Ostheer poorly equipped, but the Axis allies were even more poorly equipped. This would lead to disaster at Stalingrad when the Red Amy struck at the the poorly equipped Axis allies guarding the flanks at Stalingrad. While the Ostheer had its limitations, the Red Army was nearly defeated by Operation Barbarossa (1941). Then at the same time as Pearl Harbor, the Red Army badly mauled the Ostheer in a well executed Winter Offenses executed by Gen. Zhukov (1941-42). Then at great cost, the Red Army supported by new divisions and war fctories moved beyond the Urals, superb tanks, and the mobility supplied by American Lend-Lease trucks, the Red Army succeeded in not only stopping the Ostheer, but tearing the heart out of the Wehrmacht in a series of offenses (1942-45). The one countrty that had the capability of fully executing Blitzkrieg was the United States which ardently desired to sty oit of the War and had a minidcule army. After the fall of France, the Unites States began limitd steps to prepare for war. This all changed with Pearl Harbor (Decembr 1941). The United States begn building a highly mechanized American Army. This results after D-Dy were demonstrated by Gen. Patton's Third Army whose major problem was gas for his vehicles Hulun1944).. American industry not only fully equipped the U.S. Army, but unlike the Germans as well and its allies as well, including the British, French and other allied units.
It would take nearly 2 years for the British to understand and adopt the German tactics.
The French concluded that these improvements meant that movement would be even more restricted, a huge miscalculation that wouild lead to the fall of France. The Maginot Line was a monument to this flawed view of warfare.
The German also assessed World War I to determine why their traditional Prussian war of movement had failed. And they correctly saw that the new weapons development was enhancing rather than restricting movement. It was the Germans who first conceptualized and employed how to most effectively use the new weapons systems (especially tanks and aircraft) developed during World War I. German commanders srtuggling to explain why they lost World War I, conceived of an innovative method of effectively employing the new weapons, a combined arms tactic which has come to be known as Blitzkrieg. In many was Blitzkrieg involved employing the new weapons in the historically aggresive tactics and high mobility of the Prussian Army. Blitzkrieg was not a term the Germans tended to use, but itnwas -essentially modern warfare. It was the German tactical doctrine fgar more than the weapons themselves that resulted in stunning German victories against poorly prepared adversaries at the onset of the War. France would be defeated in weeks and only the Channel saved the British. The Americans proved to be much quicker study and America industry had the capacity not only to fully mechanize its own forces, but also allied forces. The Germans while conceiving of Blitzkrieg, did not have an army that could fully execute it. Some 80 percent of the German Army was unmotorized infantry. Hitler would send the Ostheer east into the Soviet Union largely on foot with horse-drawn carts (June 1941). Not only was the Ostheer poorly equipped, but the Axis allies were even more poorly equipped. This would lead to disaster at Stalingrad when the Red Amy struck at the the poorly equipped Axis allies guarding the flanks at Stalingrad. The NAZIs seemed to have believed that racial superiority meant that Germany would be able to create the most poweful weapons and give then unbeatable fiughting spirit. We are not sure Hitler believed this, but the Germns, Japnese, and Itlians began to believe their prooagabda. Hitler's strategy was to divide potential adversaries and striking before his targets were prepared for war. The achelies heel of the Wehrmacht was that 1) it was not fully motorized and 2) Germany lacked domestic petroleum resources. The Wehrmacht did not have the trucks needed to fill the logiistical demand of Blitzkrieg. This weakness was not immediately apparent in the short early campaigns conducted on relatively small areas. This changed dramatically with the invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941) and the declaration of war on the United States (December 1941). Barbarossa was Hitler's supreme gamble and it failed largely because of the Whermacht's logistical weaknesses. It was Germany's undefeated adversaries that had the industrial capacity to build both armored vehicles and trucks in huge numbers.
While the Ostheer had its limitations, the Red Army was nearly defeated by Operation Barbarossa (1941). Then at the same time as Pearl Harbor, the Red Army badly mauled the Ostheer in a well executed Winter Offenses executed by Gen. Zhukov (1941-42). Then at great cost, the Red Army supported by new divisions and war fctories moved beyond the Urals, superb tanks, and the mobility supplied by American Lend-Lease trucks, the Red Army succeeded in not only stopping the Ostheer, but tearing the heart out of the Wehrmacht in a series of offenses (1942-45).
The one countrty that had the capability of fully executing Blitzkrieg was the United States which ardently desired to sty oit of the War and had a minidcule army. After the fall of France, the Unites States began limitd steps to prepare for war. This all changed with Pearl Harbor (Decembr 1941). The United States begn building a highly mechanized American Army. This results after D-Dy were demonstrated by Gen. Patton's Third Army whose major problem was gas for his vehicles Hulun1944).. American industry not only fully equipped the U.S. Army, but unlike the Germans as well and its allies as well, including the British, French and other allied units.
The European theater fought over relatively flat terraine was dominated by what came to be known as Blitzkrieg.
Fortunstly, Hitler's failure to defeat Britain and the Soviet Union meant that America as well as Britin and the Soviets had the time to develop weapons and tactics that could match the Germans.
And the entry of the United Srtates into the War meant that the enemies Hitler created had had the industrial capacity to produce weapons in quanties beyond the capability of Germany, ctully beyond the capacity Germany could only dream of building.
The headline weapon in ground warfare was the tank. But it was not just tanks that were needed for mobile warfare, it was other tracked vehicles and the prosaic truck. Blitzkrieg not only involved panzers to pierce the enemy front line. Tanks after the early Blitzkrieg victories proved vulnerable. Infantry weapons were developed allowing a single infantryman or pair to destroy a tank. Tanks thus needed infantry soldiers to protect them as well as to exploit the gaps opened in the enemy line. And the infantry as well as tanks needed supplies that had to move as rapidly as Panzers. Too often the real mbsttlefiekd killer isd ihnored--the artillery. About half of World War II combat caulties were inflicted by artillery, some 60 percent of fatal casualties. World War I artillery was mostkly moved by horse. Germans nd Soviets still were primsrily moving rtillery by horse. The United States and Britain moved atillery by motor vehicles. This provided much needed mobility to a very importasnt military arm. The United States not only supplied vehiches in large numbers to its own military, but to its Allies as well. While the Wehrmacht did not have the mobility needed for Blitzkrrieg against an adequately prepared abn armed opponent, the armies fielded by the Allies did. The Soviets were not impressed with American tanks, but they were with American trucks. The NAZIs at the beginning of 1944 still held much of Europe, but the fully mobilized Allied armies in the east and west by the end of the year with the mobility provided by the American trucks not only liberated the occupied territories, but brought the war to the borders of the Reich. One reason the Wehrmachr faltered in 1944 was not only the numerical and material supperority of the Allies, but because OKW was was unprepared for the mobility of the Allies, a molbility the Wehrmacht did not possess even at the heigth of its power.
Griffith, Paddy. World War II Desert Tactics (Osprey Publishing: 2008), 64p.
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