Figure 1.--The Germans were absolutely correct that mobility was the key to a successful land campaigns. The American M-3 Sherman was hardly the most poweeful tank of the War, but the U.S. Army had a lot of them and mobility was one of its most imprtant featutes. Combined with air and artillery support, the United States fielded th most highly mobil forces of the War. After D-Day, they raced acros France and after the Bulge into the Reich.

World War II tactics reflected the development of mew weapon systems. They also varied in the differeht theaters. The European theater fought over relatively flat terraine was dominated by what came to be known as Blitzkrieg. It was the Germans who first conceptualized and employed how to most effectively use the new weapons systems (especially tanks and aircraft) developed during World War I. German commanders srtuggling to explain why they lost World war I, conceived of an innovative method of effectively employing the new weapons, a combined arms tactic which has come to be known as Blitzkrieg. In many was Blitzkrrieg involved employing the new weapons in the historically aggresive tactics and high mobility of the Prussian Army. The NAZIs seemed to have believed that racial superiority meant that Germany would be able to create the most poweful weapons. We are not sure Hitler believed this, but his strategy was to divide potential adversaries and striking before his targets were prepared for war. Unfortunately his failure to defeat Britain and the Soviet Union meant that major industrial powers had the time to develop weapons that could match the Germans. And the entry of the United Srtates into the War meant that the enemies Hitler created had had the industrial capacity to produce weapons in quanties beyond the capability of Germany, beyond rge capacity Germany could only dream of building. But it was not just tanks that were needed for mobile warfare, it was other tracked vehicles and the prosaic truck. Blitzkrieg not only involved panzers to pierce the enemy front line. Tanks after the early Blitzkrieg victories proved vulnerable. Infantry weapons were developed allowing a single infantryman or pair to destroy a rtank. Tanks thus needed infantry soldiers to protect them as well as to exploit the gaps opened in the enemy line. And the infantry as well as tanks needed supplies that had to move as rapidly as panzers. The achelies heel of the Wehrmacht was that 1) it was not fully motorized and 2) Germany lacked domestic petroleum resources. The Wehrmacht did not have the trucks needed to fill the logiistical demand of Blitzkrieg. This weakness was not immediately apparent in the short early campaigns conducted on relatively small areas. This changed dramatically with the invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941) and the declaration of war on the United States (December 1941). Barbarossa was Hitler's supreme gamble and it failed largely because of the Whermacht's logistical weaknesses. It was Germany's undefeated adversaries that had the industrial capacity to build both armored vehicles and trucks in huge numbers. The United States not only supplied vehiches in large numbers to its own military, but to its Allies as well. While the Wehrmacht did not have the mobility needed for Blitzkrrieg against an adequately prepared abn armed opponent, the armies fielded by the Allies did. The Soviets were not impressed with American tanks, but they were with American trucks. The NAZIs at the beginning of 1944 still held much of Europe, but the fully mobilized Allied armies in the east and west by the end of the year with the mobility provided by the American trucks not only liberated the occupied territories, but brought the war to the borders of the Reich. In Asia tactics were different. This was in part because The Pacific War was primarily a series of relatively small amphibious operations. The fightingin China and Burma was more conventional, but the teraine and indusrtrial capacity of major participants (China and Japan) resulted in tactics fundamentally different than in Europe. The war did end with a European-style Soviet Blitzkrieg in Japanese held Manchuria.

Europe (1939-45)

World War I on the Western Front began as a war of movement (ugust 1914)O, but after the Miracle on the Marne (September 1914) evolved into a static war of attrition as the Allies and Germans built a parallel system of trenches from the Swiss border to the English Channel. New weapons such as the machine gun, poison gas, tanks, and airplanes appeared, but the main killer continued to be the artillery. The war was largely an infantry war, decided by the superior resources of the Allies and the arrival of the American infantry. The Americans also bought trucks in large numbers. One reason that both the Germans and Allies had such difficulty breaking through the enemy trench lines is that even if a breakthrough was opened in the enemy lines was achieved, there was no way that assaulting forces could be reinforced and provisioned with supply lines using horse carts. Weapon systems were vastly improved during the inter-War system. The French concluded that these improvements meant that movement would be even more restricted, a huge miscalculation that wouild lead to the fall of France. The Maginot Line was a monument to this flawed view of warfare. The German also assessed World War I to determine why their traditional Prussian war of movement had failed. And they correctly saw that the new weapons development was enhancing rather than restricting movement. The result was the concept of Blitzkrieg (not as term the germans tended to use)--essentially modern warfare. It was the German tactical doctrine rather than the weapons themselves that resulted in stunning German victories against poorly prepared adversaries at the onset of the War. France would be defeated in weeks and only the Channel saved the British. It would take nearly 2 years for the British to understand and adopt the German tactics. The Americans proved to be much quicker study and America industry had the capacity not only to fully mechanize its own forces, but also allied forces. The Germans while conceiving of Blitzkrieg, did not have an army that could fully execute it. Some 80 percent of the German Army was unmotorized infantry. Hitler would send the Ostheer east into the Soviet Union largely on foot with horse-drawn carts (June 1941). Not only was the Ostheer poorly equipped, but the Axis allies were even more poorly equipped. This would lead to disaster at Stalingrad when the Red Amy struck at the the poorly equipped Axis allies guarding the flanks at Stalingrad. While the Ostheer had its limitations, the Red Army was nearly defeated by Operation Barbarossa (1941). Then at the same time as Pearl Harbor, the Red Army badly mauled the Ostheer in a well executed Winter Offenses executed by Gen. Zhukov (1941-42). Then at great cost, the Red Army supported by new divisions and war fctories moved beyond the Urals, superb tanks, and the mobility supplied by American Lend-Lease trucks, the Red Army succeeded in not only stopping the Ostheer, but tearing the heart out of the Wehrmacht in a series of offenses (1942-45). The one countrty that had the capability of fully executing Blitzkrieg was the United States which ardently desired to sty oit of the War and had a minidcule army. Aftervthe fll of france, the Unites States began limitd steps to prepare for war. This all changed with Pearl Harbor (Decembr 1941). The United States begn building a highly mechanized American Army. This results after D-Dy were demonstrated by Gen. Patton's Third Army whose major problem was gas for his vehicles Hulun1944).. American industry not only fully equipped the U.S. Army, but unlike the Germans as well and its allies as well, including the British, French and other allied units.

North Africa (1940-43)

As the German Panzers having demonstrated a text book execution of Blizkrieg and paraded through Paris (June 1940), fighting moved to the Western Desert (North Africa). Mussolini entered the War and demanded his large, but reluctant army in Libya to attack the British in Egypt (September 1940). This was the beginning of the Desert War. In the wider area, talian troops seized British Somaliland enabling them to dominate the Horn of Africa and laid siege to the all-important island of Malta. The British Army had, however, learned very little from the German demonstration of Blitzkreg in Poland (September 1939) and even the Western campaign that led to the fall of France in France (May 1940). This did, however, not prove critical because the Italians proved so woefully incompetent. This began the first major desert campaign by modern mechanized armies. The majpr belligerants (British, Italians, Germans. and finally the Americans deployed important mechanized forces. Only the German Afrika Corps led by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel began the campaign with a well developed battle doctrine of combined arms attack tactics--Blitzkrieg. [Griffith] Thus the Afrika Korps operating on a shoe string was able to deliver stunning blow to, thanks to the Americans, the well- supplied British with a relatively small German force. The desert was the perfect stage for mechanized warfare, even more so that the life and death struggle being waged by the Whermacht and Red Army on the Eastern Front. There were vast expanses of virtually unpopulated and basically featureless desert. The desert was empty terrain empty, devoid of resources and offering virtually no way of concealing equipment and movement. Some of the gratest World War II tacticians of mobile warfare (Rommel, Montgomery, and Patton) would address the tactical problems of the desert. The British who easily defeated the Italians had trouble with the Germans and the tactical docrrine of Blitzkrieg. In particular, the British had trouble not only with the effective utilization of anti-tank artillery as well as developing an effective gun compable to the German 88. While the Germans had a war-winning battle doctrine and excellent equipment, they had a serious weakness. The desert provided few resources, unlike the Whermacht in the East, they could not appropriate resources from the local population. Both the British and Germans had to bring in virtually all the resources needed. The Germans not only had to cross the Meditrannean, but after entering Egypt trick the supplies and equipment all the way from Tripoli. This exposed the convoys to both the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force (RAF). And the Ultra decrypts gave the British detailed information on Italian convoys. The Royal Navy defeated the Italian Navy in a serie of sharp engagemrnts (1940-41) meaning that the Italian merchant marine convoys were poorly protected. Then the truck convoys along the sole coastal road wer taked ny the RAF Desert Air Force. The British had a much longer supply line. but they could protect their convoys. And unlike the Germans, the Americans provided an virtually limitless stram of equipment and supplies. As a result the British were able to hang on untilmcommanders figured out the complicated tactics of Blitzkrieg. The Americans also did not understand Blitzkrieg, including the ise of tanks, importance of anti-tank gun, nd need for close ur support. Rommel demonstrated this at the Ksserine Pass (Februuary 1943). The Americans prived much quicker learners than the British. The importance of the Desert War was that Rommel essentially yught both the British and Americans how to wage modern mobil war. He did it in a kocation perfect for learning and where because of his logistical situagion he could win battles, but not defeat either the British or Americans.

Asia (1937-45)

In Asia tactics were different. There were two theaters in Asia: 1)Chimna, Burma, India and 2) the Pacific War. The land war in Asia ws primarily fought by China with a smaller second front conducted primarioly by the British and India in Burma and India. The Pscific War was primrily fought by the Americans with the usdtralins playing an important role (1942-43). The CBI on the Asian mainland and the Pacific islands involved very different tactics and operations. The CBI was basically a conventioinl war. The fighting in China and Burma was conventional, but the terrain and indusrtrial capacity of major participants (China and Japan) resulted in tactics fundamentally different than in Europe. In india and Burma the war was fought under jungle comditions. The Japanese mastered them first and their troops needed much less less supplies, thus were not consdtrined to the existung road nd supply network. And the British/Imdian troops were largely colono policemen. Once that began to change and troops proptly trained, the overwheamling material supperority of the Allies began to restblish the balance of power. When the Japanese again attcjed on foot with poorly supplked troopsd at Iphhsl and Kohima, asfter a tough fight they were irtually wiped out (1944). The War in China was basucally a stakemate. Chang did not want o rik his troops , saving them for the show-dowb with the Communists. And he had retreted far enouhh inmto the interior that the Japnese with their primoitive logistical capbility coold not get to him. The vAmricn AGV (Flying Tihers restored balnbce in the air war and stopped a pptentilly dvestting Japnerse invion at the Salween River Gorge a poorly reported. nut imprtant engagement. The war did end with a European-style Soviet Blitzkrieg in Japanese held Manchuria. The Pavufic War was very different operation. This was in part because The Pacific War was primarily a series of relatively small amphibious operations. This allowed the United States to fight the War with a relatively small infntry component. There was only so many soldiers the Japanese could cram on a Pacific atol. And once there they had the difficult task of supplying them. And the re were alot of potential island targets to garrion. In addition, most of the Japonese Army was slredy committed in Chinma.

Sources

Griffith, Paddy. World War II Desert Tactics (Osprey Publishing: 2008), 64p.

Created: 7:04 AM 10/11/2010
Last updated: 6:04 PM 11/21/2014