NAZI-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (August 23, 1939)

Figure 1.--These boys from Poland or the Baltics receive classroom instruction in weapons handling during the 1930s. After the British and French abandoned the Czechs to Hitler and the NAZISs (September 1938), the small, militarily weak countries of Eastern and Central Europe from Finland south to Greece without any means of defending themselves. The result was the NAZI-Soviet Non-Agression Pact in which the two totalitarian powers cynically divided up the region (August 1939). Withinin a few day of signing the pact, both countries invaded Poland, the first step in carving out their new empire (September 1939). .

NAZI Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and newly appointed Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov on August 23, 1939, signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. At the time of thesigning, British and French delegations were in Moscow trying to reach an understanding with Stalin. Hewas convinced, however, that they were tring to draw him into a war with Hitler. The two countries which until that time had been bitter foes, pledged not attack each other. Any problems developing between the two countries were to be delt with amicably. It was last for 10 years. The Pact shocked the world and the purpose was immedietly apparent. It meant that Germany could attack Poland without fear of Soviet intervention. Thus after defeating Poland, Germany did not have to fear a full-scale European war on two fronts. What was not known at the time was that there was a secret protocol to the pact which in effect divided Eastern Europe betwen the two countries. This protocol was discoered after the end of the World War II in 1945. The Soviets continued to deny this protocol until 1989. The NAZIs 8 days after signing the Pact invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, launching World War II. Britain and France declared war September 3. Poland's fate was sealed on September 17, when the Soviets invaded Poland from the east. Although the Soviet's did not enter the War against Britain and France, the Soviets were virtual NAZI allies as they provided large quantaies of strategic materials, especially oil. Communist parties in Britainand France opposedthe war effort. The Communst Party in America opposed President Roosevelt's efforts to expand defense spending and assist Britain and France.

Munich (October 1938)

The next target was Czecheslovakia which had beeen created by the Versailles Peace Treaty. After the Anchluss, Hitler began to escalate his tirades against Czecheslovakia, claiming that the erhnic Germans in the Sudetenland were being mistreated. The NAZI rearmament program, the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the Anchluss with Austria came as a shock to Czecheslovakia. Even more so, the lack of response from Britain and France. The Czechs who had defensive alliance with France were prepared to fight. Even with the Anchluss, many Europeans chose to see the NAZI actions as domestic German matters. This changed with Hitler's next target--Czecheslovakia. Hitler in 1938 demanded the Sudetenland in Czecheslovakia which had a minority German population. Neville Chamberlin, the British Prime Miniister mused how terrible it was that war should be threatened by a "... quarel in a far away country by people of which we know little." A prominent member of the British parliament displayed even more ignoramce when he told the press, "Why should we bother with those gypsies in the Balkans?", meaning the Czechs who were of course not located in the Balkans. In the end, The British and French gave in at talks held in Munich. Chamberlain flew back to London and stepping off the plane waved the agreement signed ny Herr Hitler which he assured the waiting repoters guaranteed "Peace in our time." Churchill was apauled. Most British anf French people were releaved. One European leader, Soviet Marshall Stalin, who was not at the conference drew the conclusion that the British and French could not be trusted as potential allies against Hitler and that they were trying to engineer a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union.

War Planning

Hitler in Mein Kampf spellsout his view that Germany needed Lebensraum in the East. That mean the Soviet Union. Most Germans did not want the titanic war ht would have involved. Most did support efforts o etrieve th land lost as a result of World War I and the Versailles Peace Treaty. As a result of the Anschluss and the Munich Agreement, much of this was accomplished. Hitler had pledged at Munich that the Dudetenland wa to be Germany's last territorial demands. Prime-Minister Chmberland brought back Herr Hitler' signature and showed it to the newsreels as he steped out of the airplane. Only a few months later, Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to seize the restog Czecheslovakia (Match 1939). This was an are that had never been German and had no significnt German minority. The last maor area lost in World War I was the Polish Corridor. Hitler was determined to destoy te Polish state. He hoped to do so without war with Britain and France. His objective was the East. He was determined to avoid a two-front war which had been the primary reason for defeat in World War I. So despite his hatred of Bolshivism and the Russians, before launching the invasion of Poland, he had to come to terms with eiter the Soviets or the Allies (Britain and France). After Munich, any further agreement with Britain and France was impossible. This left only the Soviets.

Soviet Negotiations with the Allies

At the time of the signing, British and French delegations were in Moscow trying to reach an understanding with Stalin. He was convinced, however, that they were tring to draw him into a war with Hitler. It was the Soviets who had initiated these talks. Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litinov presented a proposal for a three-power defensive military alliance (the USSR, France, and Britain) (April 17). This would be a pledge to go to war if the other was attacked as well as to defend Poland, Romania, and Greece (with the British had extended guarantees). The British showed no urgency when they received the Soviet initiative. They consulted the other countries and then gave the Soviets a tentative and uncommital respmse (May 8). Stalin fired Litinov even before this, apparently uphappy with the lack of response from the Allies (May 3). Stalin appointed Molotov (May 3). Stalin rejected the British proposal when it arrived as unequal (May 11). Stalin felt with some validity that the proposed British pact demanded more of the Sv's than Britain and France. (Given the Allied response to the invasion of Poland, he was probably right.) Molotov responded to the Allies with a suggsted joint immediate mutual defense pact and guarantees for the Baltics and Balkans. Molotov invited Foreign Secretary Halifax to Moscow to discuss this. Eden would have also been effctive. Instead Chamberlain sent William Strang, a lower level offical giving Stalin the idea that the Allies did not attach great importance to a Soviet alliance. A draft agreement was reached (July 23). It provided for "immediatly all effective assisatnce" in case of attack. The agreement also covered Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Turkey. Lituania was apparently not covered. Hitler had seized Memel (March 1939) and apprently the negotiators considered it already lost to the NAZIs. [Black, pp. 520-522.] The term "effective assistance was not defined and was far short of war. Hitler of course made a much btter offer, sweetened with acceptance of actual territorial concessions t the Soviet Union--of course the territory of other countries. Not only was the German deal better, but Stalin saw the British as essentially involved in a conspiracy of leading him to a war with Hitler that they could sit out. Stalin saw how the Cechs were abaonded, as well as the Little Entente by France. The American assessments in 1939 was that if the British and French failed to make an arrangement with Stalin, Hitler might well do this.

America

President Roosevelt had hoped to involve the Soviet Union in the effort to stop Hitler. The President in 1939, however, had little to offer the Soviets. [Freidel, p. 319.] The President had without success tried to arrange the construction of a battleship. He was also interested in an exchnge of intelligence. In early August the U.S. Embsssy in Berlin reported that there were diplomatic contacts betweem Germany and Russia. Roosevelt cabled Stalin profetically warning that if France fell, Russia would face Germany alone. [Black 528.] Based on his own experience with the British Foreign Office, Roosevelt had no confidence that the Allies could pull this off.

Preliminary German Contacts

German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop on August 14, 1939, first contacted the Soviets. Ribbentrop flew to Moscow to meet with Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov. An economic agreement was signed August 19. The agreement provided for an exchange of Soviet food and raw materials in exchange for German machinery and manufactured goods. The raw materiald provided by the Soviet played a major role in the Geman war economy and significantly reducd the impact of the Allied blockade.

Agreement (August 23, 1939)

NAZI Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and newly appointed Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov on August 23, 1939, signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.

The Agreement

The two countries which until that time had been bitter foes, pledged not attack each other. Any problems developing between the two countries were to be delt with amicably. It was to last for 10 years.

Significance

The Pact shocked the world. Hitler had spoke so often and with so much vitriol about the Bolshevicks that most assumed that any kind of alliance was impossible. Stalin had been at the forfront of fighting Fascism. Stalin was the only world leader to offer effective assistance to the Republic. The purpose was immedietly apparent to all. It meant that Germany could attack Poland without fear of Soviet intervention. Thus Germany did not have to fear a full-scale European war on two fronts.

Secret Protocol

What was not known at the time was that there was a secret protocol to the pact which in effect divided Eastern Europe betwen the two countries. This protocol was discoered after the end of the World War II in 1945. The Soviets continued to deny this protocol until 1989. The Soviets received the Baltic Repulics (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia). Poland was divided along the Narew, Vistula, and San rivers. These were all areas that had been par of the old Rusian Empire.

Stalin's Calculations

Western historians constantly refer to the affect of Munich on Stalin's psyche. This is undoubtedly true, although there is no way of knowing just what went through Stalin's mind. Even his cloest associates were often not sure and of course there is no memoir, not that they would have been very revealing had they been written. In fairness, however, we often do not know what the calculations Roosevelt was making. We can only guess at Stalin's calculations. Munich was undoubtedly a factor. Another factor was Stalin's suscpicious nature. He not only believed that the Allies were unreliable, but their purpose was to push im in a war with Germany. Thus an arrangement with Hitler would deflect the German armies west. In effect, Stalin was doing to the Allies what he thought the Allies were trying to do to him. Now as President Roosevelt pointed out, a German defea of France would be disastrous for the Soviet Union. Stalin's calculation was, however, that war in the West would not end in a few days. Most at the time credited the French army as a powerful force. Stalin would not have imagined that the French would collapse within only 5 weeks. Rather he reasoned that war in the West would significantly weaken the Germans. Also Stalin had no idea how much his purges had weakened the Soviet military. He had spent vast sums in building the largest army and air force in the world. And as a result of the agreement with Hitler, he was able to push the Soviet bounfaries west, providing a buffe around the Russian heartland of the Soviet Union. In fact even though the NAZIs in Barbrossa penetrated to Lenningrad and Moscow, mist of the fighting in the East was in the Balics, White Russia, Poland, and the Ukraine and not in Russia itself.

Poland (September 1, 1939)

The NAZIs 8 days after signing the Pact invaded Poland launching World War II (September 1, 1939). Britain and France declared war (September 3). The Germans more than any other military, correctly assessed the lessons of World War II. The War in Europe began on September 1, 1939 when the German blitzkrieg smashed Poland in only a few weeks. The Panzers crossed the Polish frontier on September 1 along with a devestating strike by the Luftwaffe. The Polish Army and Air Force was shattered. Britain and France declared war September 3. Within 6 days Cracow, the center of Polish nationhood, fell. Pincer movements began on September 9 to encirle the major remaining Polish forces. Once certain of Polish defeat, Stalin ordered the Red Army to attack from the East. German and Russian forces met at Brest-Litovsk on September 18. Warsaw fell a few days later after a ruthless bombing assault. The Blitzkrieg tactics that were to prove so devestaing in the West during 1940 were all on display in 1939. Neither the British or French showed much attention, abscribing Polish defeat to military incompetance. The French had promissed the Poles an offensive in the West. It never came. [Fest, pp. 602-603.] Poland's fate was sealed on September 17, when the Soviets invaded Poland from the east.

Soviet Support to the NAZIs

Although the Soviet's did not enter the War against Britain and France, the Soviets were virtual NAZI allies as they provided large quantaies of strategic materials, especially oil. The Soviets not only cooperated in the defeat of Poland, but became Germany's most important supplier of strategic materials. Commercial agreemets detailing the deliveries were discussed Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Molotov (September 28, 1939). A final agreement was reached a few months later, the Memorandum on the German-Soviet Commercial Agreement (February 11, 1940). The Soviets agreed to immediately begin deliveries of strategic materials and agreed that industrial goods from Germany would be delivered on a longer time frame, meaning that the NAZIs never paid for most of the Soviet deliveries. The Soviet commitment included: 1 million tons of grain for cattle, and of legumes (120 million Reichsmarks), 0.9 million tons of oil (115 million Reichsmarks), 0.1 million tons of cotton (90 million Reichsmarks), 0.5 million tons of phosphates, 0.1 million tons of chrome ores, 0.5 milliom tons of iron ore, 0.3 million tons of scrap iron and pig iron, and smaller quantities of platinum, Manganese ore, metals, lumber, and numerous other raw materials. I effect throughout 1940 and half of 1941 while America was supplying Britain, the Soviet Union was supplying NAZI Germany. Communist parties in Britain and France opposed the war effort. The Communst Party in America opposed President Roosevelt's efforts to expand defense spending and assist Britain and France.

Soviet Aggressions

Although it is the NAZI aggressions that are most commonly addressed in World War II histories, the Soviet Union compiled nearly as long a list of aggressions as the NAZIs. Operating within secret protocols to the Non-agression Pact, Hitler and Stalin were in fact close partners in the waging of aggressive war. The Great Patriotic War fought against the NAZIs after the 1941 German invsion came to be an icon in Soviet history. Left unsaid was the fact that Hitler and Stalin were partners in the virtul partition of Europe.

Molotov-Hitler Discussions (November 1940)

NAZI and Soviet military actions had been so successful that the two powers now bordered each other and had overlapping interests in other areas. Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov came to Berlin to iron out differences resulting from their spectacular successes and to discuss a broad range of political and economic issues. Molotov met with both Ribbontrop and Hitler. The meeting with Hitler is fascinating. Hitler had already decided to invade the Soviet Union and ordered his generals to prepare the plans. (The final orders to the Wehrmacht had not been given, but there can be little doubt that Hitler had made up his mind. Not all historians agree with this assessment, but we believe that the destruction of the Soviet Union and the acquisition of Lebensraum in the East had been central to his thinking since the 1920s. His commanders delivered the draft invasion he requested 3 weeks after his meeting with Molotov. He then issued Directive No. 21 Operation Barbarossa 2 weeks after that.) Despite this, Hitler invited Stalin to join the Tripartite Axis Pact. As an inducement he was offered important parts of the British Empire, namely India. (Hitler was adept at attracting allies by offering other country's territories.) Hitler assured Molotov that Britain was a defeated country. (British air raids while Molotov was in Berlin did not help with this asertion.) He suggested that thus decessions about the division of the Empire needed to be made. Hitler told Molotov that Germany and Italy were interested in Africa, the territory south of Europe. He suggested that the Soviet Union might also want to move to the south against British India. In effect a renewal of the Great Game. What Hitler surely was thinking is that to the extent Stalin moved south and engaged Britain, it would weaken Soviet forces in Europe where he planned to attack. Molotov did not dismiss the suggestion, but his focus was on Eastern Rurope. He wanted to discuss Finland and the Balkans, two areas where Soviet and NAZI interests overlapped. Stalin had fairly cosistently persued a policy of regaining the Tsarist boundaries whivh included Finland. And of course Stalin shared the Tsarist concern in extending Russian interests in the Balkans. Hitler was unwilling for Stalin to expand further in Finland in part or racial reasons. In the Balkans Hitler was unwilling to accecpt significant Soviet expabnsion, primarily because the Ploesti oilfields were Germany's principal source of petroleum. One area to the south that did interest the Soviets was Iran. The Molotov-Hitler agreement (November 26, 1940) addressed the Soviet demand that "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." This of course meant Iran. Interestingly at a time when there was considerable support for the NAZIs in Iran, the same NAZIs were colluding with the Soviet Union in effect to develop a new colonial empire in the Middle East. Hitler was more than willing to agree because it furthered his interest in enducing the Soviets to move south and engage the British.

Sources

Black, Conrad. Franklin Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom (Public Affairs: New York, 2003), 1280p.

Fest, Joachim C. Hitler (Vintage Books: New York, 1974), 844p

Freidel, Frank. Franklin D. Roosevelt: Rendezuous with Destiny (Little Brown: Boston, 1990), 710p.

Created: February 16, 2003
Last updated: 2:28 AM 6/14/2008