Figure 1.-- |
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Modern war requires oil. All three Axis countries had a significant problem. They were not self-sufficent in petroleum. Each of the Axis countries attempted to resolve this limitation to varying degrees of success. Japan would require huge quanyities of oil of it planned to wage a naval war in the vast streaches of the Pacific. Japan was a densly populated, resource poor country. Expansion into Korea and Manchuria (Manchuko) managed to acquire many needed resources. The most critical resource that Japan lacked was oil. And to make matters worse, the United States was the major world producer of oil. America was also Japan's principal supplier--the same country the United States would have to fight if it was to seize an empire in the resource-rich South Pacific--especially the DEI which had developed important oil fields. The United States attempted to disuade Japan from waging aggressibe war in China. The United States began a series of trade restrictions until it became clear with Japan's move into southern Indochina that Japan was preparing to launch a major aggressive war in the Pacific. America responded with an oil mbargo. Japan had oil stockpiles that could supply its normal needs for 2 years, but only about 1 year if Japan went to war because of the huge increased requirements to fight a naval war. This set in motion a time table. Japan had either to decide to cease aggression in China or go to war before it ran out of oil.
Japan was a densly populated, resource poor country. The most critical resource that Japan lacked was oil. Japan did have some limited sources of oil. Japan produced about 2.7 million barrels of oil domestically. The domestic wells were located at Akita, Niigata and Nutsu. This was about 0.1 percent of world production (1941). This was approximately comparable to a single day of American oil production. Expansion into Korea and Manchuria (Manchuko) managed to acquire many needed resources. Manchukuo fields provided another 1.0 million barrels. They obtained another 1.0 million tons from fields in Formosa (Taiwan). Japan also had a small synthetic petroleum industry.
And with an industrial economy and a large navy and merchant marine, Japan required large quantities of oil. The ongoing war in China also required large quantities of oil.
Japan was almost totally dependant on imported oil. Japan imported about 90 percent of its oil. To make matters worse for Japan, the United States was the major world producer of oil. America was also Japan's principal supplier--the same country the United States would have to fight if it was to seize an empire in the resource-rich South Pacific.
Japan imported 1.0 million barrels from Soviet Sakhalin. Japan also imported oil from the DEI amd Mexico, but the United States was the primary source. Japan's major source of oil was the United States. Before the invasion of China, Japan had been purchasing 80 percent of its oil in the United States (1937). The United States through its moral persuasion policy had suceeded in convincing American ship owners to reduce shipments to Japan without any formal action. Thus on the brink of war the Japanese were only obtaining 60 percent of theor oil in America (1941).
The United States attempted to disuade Japan from waging aggressibe war in China.
The United States began a series of trade restrictions until it became clear with Japan's move into southern Indochina that Japan was preparing to launch a major aggressive war in the Pacific.
The United States responded with an oil mbargo.
Japan would require huge quanyities of oil of it planned to wage a naval war in the vast streaches of the Pacific. Japan had oil stockpiles that could supply its normal needs for 2 years, but only about 1 year if Japan went to war because of the huge increased requirements to fight a naval war. This set in motion a time table. Japan had either to decide to cease aggression in China or go to war before it ran out of oil.
As Japanese naval commander Yamamoto predicted, spearheaded by a powerful carrier force, Japan in 6 months after Pearl Harbor swept ower Southeast Asian and the central Pacific with largely ineffective opposition. The British position in the Far East was based on Singapore. The fall of Singapore shockjed the world and opened the way for the invasion of Burma. Japan also attacked the American forces in the Philippines, destroying most of the Air Corps planes on the ground, even though MacArthur had reports of the attack on Pearl Harbor several hours before the Japanese struck his air fields. America soon learned of Japanese attrocities during the Battan Death, fueling American hatred of the Japanese. Japanese paratroopers successfully seized the Dutch oil field . Japan then invaded New Guinea in preparation for an assault on Australia.
The Dutch in the the DEI which had developed important oil fields.
Oil scarcities affected the deployment of the Imperial Fleet. The Japanese inability to being the Dutch East Indies refineries on line as quickly as planned, meant that oil in anticipated quantities did not materialize. This compounded the situation created by the Midway operation. Admiral Yamnamoto's Midway operation involved virtually every major ship in the Fleet. It used huge quantities of oil. As a result in the subsequent naval campaigns, the availability of fuel and the potential fuel usage had to be considered. Japan extensively used in cruiser force in the Solomon's campaign, but only deployed its battleships sparingly (August-November 1942). This was at a time when the American Navy had very few battleships available as a result of the Pearl Harbor attack. The availability of fuel also affected other major naval operations, especially the Battle for Leyte Gulf (October 1944). By this time the American submarine campaign had significabntly degraded the Japnese tanker fleet. The convuluted, complex Japanese battle plan was in part dictated by fuel shortahes.
Japan began World War II with both superior aircraft types and an elite corps of about 400 carrier pilots. Japan's war plan called for a short war with the United States in which the the American Pacific Fleet, especially the carriers, was quickly destroyed early in the War, When the Pearl Harbor attack failed to achieve this goal, the Japanese carrier pilot force was gradually attrited, especially the all in important squadron leaders. The Japanese, unlike the Americans, did nor return especially skilled pilots to flight school to serve as instructors. Thus once lost, their skills and experience were tottaly lost to the Japanese. The United States even before Pearl Harbor had greatly expanded pilot training programs. The Japanese did also, byrt not to the extent of the Americans. The major problem they faced was the shortahe of aviation fuel. The only way to gin experience as for a plot to prticipate in extended in flight training ptograms. And this required large quantities of aviation fuel. Thus after the Ciral Sea, Midway, and the Sollomons, most of Japan's carrier pilots had been lost. This lead to the Japanese disaster in the Philippine Sea (June 1944). It proved to be the last of the great carrier battles of the War. The situation at the beginning of the War was reversed. The Americans had a greatly imroved fighter, the Hellcat, and it was the Americans who were well trained and experienced. The battle as a result, is commonly referred to as the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.
Strategic bombing was a new innovation to warfare in World War II. Air staffs had not yet worked out how to conduct such a campaign and what assetts should be targetted. The United States learned a great deal as part of the strategic bombing campaign against Germany. The seizure of the Marianas (July 1944) brought the Home Islands within the range of the new B-29 Superforts. It took some time, however, to extend the runways and establish the air groups in the Marianaa.
The American Strategic Intelligence Section of the Air Staff reached the conclusion that the Japanese petroleum industry should be targeted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that destroying Japanese refineries cut off fuel to the Japanese military, especially the navy navy and air force which could shorten the war. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, commander of the U.S. Strategic Forces in Europe had noted how the destruction of the German oil industry had shortened the war in Europe.
When he assumed command of the U.S. Army Strategic Forces in the Pacific, Spaatz supported the plans being drawn up to destroy the Japanese petroleum industry. Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, commander of the 20th Air Force, and Brig. Gen. Barney Giles, the deputy commander also supported the effort. The campaign, however, did not begin until rather late in the War. The assignment was given to the 315th Bomb Wing, 20th Air Force. The targets were the oil refineries and the oil storage facilities. The 315th Bomb Wing conducted 15 bombing missions against Japanese oil facilities abd succeeded in causing significant damage (June 26-August 14, 1945). The U.S. Air Force by this poit in the War was able toi hit targets with considerable accuracy. Unlike the campaign in Europe. The Japanese air defenses wee unable to significantly challenge the American bombers. General LeMay wrote to the Wing Commander, Gen. Frank Armstrong, concerning the attack on the Maruzen Oil Refinery at Shimotsu,"you achieved ninety-five percent destruction, establishing the ability of your crews with the APQ-7 to hit and destroy precision targets, operating at night. This performance is the most successful radar bombing of the Command to date." The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), concluded that because the bombing campig against the Japanese oil industry did not begin until May 1945, the naval blockade of Japan had largely cut off oil imports leaving the refineries very little crude oil to refine. [Horowitz]
Horowitz, Manny. "Were There Strategic Oil Targets in Japan in 1945?" Air Power History Vol. 51, 2004.
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