Figure 1.--. |
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Looking back as a historian, it is almost incomprehensible that Japan decided to wage war against the United States. War with Britain and the Netherlands is more understandable. Britain in 1941 looked like if not a defeated nation, at least a severely weakened one. The Netherlands was occupied by Axis ally NAZI Germany. America is a very different matter. The United States was not at war. It had not been weakened by the War. And Japan had no commitment that the Germany would join them if they attacked America. War with America seems like an extrodinarily wreckless decession for a country already mired down in a war with China and that had experienced a sharp defeat in a short war with the Soviets. Why would Japan have decided on war with America, a country with a larger population and a much larger industrial and scientific base. The road to war began early in the history of modern Japan. Wars with China (1895), Russia (1904-05), and Germany (1914-18) proved both short and profitable, enabling Japan to build a small empire. The risring influence of the military brought to power men of limited outlook who saw military action as a legitimate use of sate power. They were backward looking men who saw the European empires of the 19th century as to what Japan should seek to establish. And they were men who were strongly influenced by the historic image of the Samurai and Bushido which convinced them that Japanese racial superiority and martial spirit could prevail over the material supperority of America. Despite the power of American induistry, tgey saw Americans as a weak, decadent people who would not fight. Most of the Japanese militarists who made this judgement on which the very life of Japan would hang, knew no Americans and had little or no experience with Ameica.
Race played a major role in World War II. Usually the focus is on the NAZIs and their obsession with Aryan racial superority. The NAZIs were not alone in their obsession with race and carryingit to murderous extremes. The Japanese decided to persue their goals through war in large measure because of their belief in "shido minozuku"--divine leading race. Some historians believe that the Japanese obsession with this concept exceeded that of the Germans. [Thomas, p. 5.] The German concept led them to believe that racial superority would enable them to create superior weaponry. The Japanese who had an even smaller industrial base, convinced themselves that "shido minozuku" could overcome the material superority of America because Americans would not have the will to fight. According to one historian, the Japanese convinved themselves that "Americns would surrender quickly becuse they were wek and decadent, a nation of frightened housewives, labor agitators, and greedy plutocrats." [Thomas, p. 5.] It was the most ilconceived war plan in modern history. It is difficult today to understand why Japan went to war with such a powerful country as the United States. It is not just Amrican historians that ask this question. So do Japanese historians. And some Japanese authors even suggest that America tricked Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor. There is of course a range of factors that caused Japan to chose war, but central to their decesion was "shido minozuku" and their belief that their racial superiority would allow them to overcome America's material superiority. There were elemements in Japan, especially Admiral Yamamoto, that undrstood that this was noncsence. But Japan's driveto war was lead by the Imperial Army and key Army commanders had almost no understanding of America. Of course Americans were also convinced of white racial superority. But Americn racism did not drive it to attack other countries. It did, however, have the impact of convincing Americans that the Japanese would never dare attack.
The Emperor Taisho (1912-26) is generally seen as a weak emperor. During his reign the center of power in Japan shifted from the Emperor and the oligarchic clique (genro) around him to the Parliament (Diet) and the democratic parties. Japan with little encouragement joined the Allies in World War I. The country played only a minor role in the War, but gained German possessions in the Central Pacific which they proceeded to turn into fortified bases. Japan as a member of the victorious Allied World War I coalition expected to be treated with considerable deferemce. Instead they were largely ignored at the Paris Peace Conference. The convent of the League of Nations was part of the Versailles Treagty. Japan proposed adding a "racial equality clause" to the covenant of the League of Nations. This was rejected by the United States, Britain and Australia. President Wilson promoted national self determination at the Conference, but he was not ad advocate of racial equality. Racist attituides were also common among the other European powers. Japanese diplomats at the Washington Naval Conference (1921) failed to achieve goals and this angered nationalist elements, especially in the Army. Japanese diplomats at the Washington Naval Conference (1921) failed to achieve goals and this angered nationalist elements, especially in the Army. Racist attitudes toward oriental people had plagued Western attitides toward both the Chinmese and Japanese in the 19th and 20th centuries. With the Japanese this began with Commodore Perry's opening of Japanese ports (1850s). Japanese emmigrating to America encounterted both racism and racist laws. Even so, a sizeable Japanese population flourished in both the Hawaian Islands and California. These laws were a sore point in American_Japanese relations. Incidents in the 1920s were widely reported in Japan. America after World War significantly restricted immigration. Restrictive quotas were established for European immigration. The United States enacted the Exclusion Act that prohibited further Japanes eimmigration (1924). Japan in the 1920s and 30s was Asia's only industrial nation. It was, however, an indudtrial nation with few natural resources. It also did not have an agricultural sector capable of feeding the population. Japan was thus the country at the time most dependent on foreign trade, especially exporting its industrial output to finance raw material and food imporys. The country, however. experienced economic difficulties after World war I. The Great Kanto Earthquake did substantial ecionomic damage (1923). The Wall Street stock crash (1929) and resulting Depression caused further problems. The protectionist trade policies in America and Europe in particular adversely affected the Japanese economy. The Japanese military increasingly advovated action to secure markets and raw materials. Japan as part of its late 19th century modernization program began to build modern military forces. The Imperial Army was the dominant service and built on the Prussian model. The Imperial Navy was smaller, but give Japan's island location still of considerable importance. The Navy was built on a British model. After World War I, both services gave considerable priority into building power air wings. In this effort they received invaluavle assistance from the Germans.
The world naval powers convened in London to discuss continued naval arms limitations. The London Conference was strongly promoted by British Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald who desired to continue if not increase the limitations established by the Washington Naval Treaties (1921). The Conference was held as the Wall Street Crash (1929)was spiraling into a serious world-wide economic criis and the major powers desired to cut back on gobernment sopending, especially military power. A Treaty was signed (April 1930). The signatories agreed to build no replacements of capial ships before 1937. American, Britain, and Japan agreed to avoid a arms race in destoyers and submarines. They also for the first time placed limits ob cruisers. America and Britain were allocated a cruisr tonnage about one and half that of Japan. The partipants agreed to another naval arms conferemnce in 1935. The inferior status of Japan has caused considerable resentment after the Washington Naval Conference (1921-22). After the London Conference it set in motion political changes of serious consequences.
Britain and America were pleased with the apparent success of the London Naval Conference, but it was not a major development (1930). A very different reaction occurred in Japan. The Government accepted the continued inquitable treatment of Japan and the Privy Councilratified the Treaty. Elements in the military were outraged. The Chief of the Nsavy Staff resined in protest. A controversy arose in Japan. Military and nationalist forces began to question the authority of the civilian government to reject the advise of the service chiefs on security matters. Here there was some ambiguity in the Constitution. The Constitution provided that the Emperor determined the size of the armed foRces, who acted on advise. The question arose as to who would tender that advise. The militry believe that it should be provided by the service chiefs rather than the Cabinent. [Jones, p. 10-11.] The secret socities such as the Aikyojuku ha raised the intensity of feeling on this and similar matters withn the military.
Manchuria is the northeaster province of China. The weak Imperial Chinese Government at the tirn of the 20th century was losing control of the Province. Both Russia and Japan were extending their influence there. This was a major cause of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). Japan at the time was persuing the same policies as the European powers, forcing the weak Imperial Governmrnt unequal treaties giving foreign countries virtual control of major Chinese ports. Japan's influence in Manchuria was strengthened by their victory in the Russo-Japanese war. The Chinese Nationalists which replaced the Imperial regime defeated the war lords and began to rebuild a strong central government. The Nationalists this began to challenge the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. The Japanese move toward war began when the Japanese Army in Manchiera seized what at the time was a Chinese province. Althoughh the Kwantung Army (Japanese military force in Manchuria) acted without Government authorization, the officers involved were not disciplines. The GHovernment in fact set up the puppet state of Manchuko (1932). The Japanese action fomented increased hostility in China toward the Japanese. Boycotts of Japanese goods were organized and anti-Japanese rioting broke out in somre cities. The Japanese bombarded the known-European sections of Shanghai as a punitive measure (1932).
The League of Nations was the first international organization established oin the basis of collective security to preserve world peace. It was created by the Versailles and other peace treaties ending World War I. The unbrialded nationalism that had inflamed Europe in the early 20th century was widely seen as a major cause of World War I. The horendous losses in the War convinced many Europeans that there must never be another war. A League of Nations as proposed by President Wilson was seen as a way of preventing war in the future through a system of collective security. The Laeague was a culminatioin of other political thinkers who had lated the intelectual background, men like the duc de Sully and Immanuel Kant. There had also been the development of international organizations in the 19th century with more limited objectives. These included the International Telegraphic Union (1865) and the Universal Postal Union (1874). The Red Cross, the Hague Conferences, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Hague Tribunal) were all organizations that before World War I were drawing nations together in an expanding web of international relations. President Wilson was unable to convince the American Senate to ratify the Versailles Peace Treaty which included a provision for the League as its leading provision. This weakened the League from the onset as did the exclusion of the new Soviet Union. The victorious Allied nations, Britain and France, during the 1930s refuse to insist on decisive action against Japanese militarists and Italian and German Fascism. Japan's invasion of Manchutria brought international condemnation and Japan withdrew from the League of Nations (1933).
It would be the United States and not the League of Nations that would eventually confront Japan over its aggresive policy. The principal instruments that the United States would use would be diplomacy and a new diplomatic instrument, economic sanctions. The basis for this was the unsucessful League of Nations efforts. President Lowell of Harvard University and firmer Secretary of War Newton Baker suggested that the United States support any sanctions adopted by the League (1932). Senator Borah, a principal opponent of the League and an ardent isolationist insisted "That way lies madness." The failure the Hoover Administration to support the League was a factor discourging the League from pursuing any effective action. [Williams] It would be the Roosevelt Administration that would adopt the policy of using ecinomic sanctions to disuade Japan from aggression and war.
The Americans and the British attempted to convene another naval arms conference (1935). The major naval powers met in London for another round of naval talks to renew the existing limitations decided on at the Washington Naval Conference (1921-22) and London Naval Conference (1930). These limits were due to expire (1935-37). The militarsts in Japan were now in virtual control of the Government. The Japanese demanded parity with America and Britain. When this was not granted, the Japanese withdrew from the planned conference. This meant the exisiting limitations would expire. All three nations initiated battleship rebuilding programs with expiration of the treaty in 1936. Japan initiated the largest building program, a massive program to build 150 ships. The Japanese laid down two super battleships, Yamoto and Musashi, but the actual dimensions of these massive ships were kept secret. They were 69,100 tons, twice the size of treaty limitations. Germany built Bismarck and Tirpitz at 52,600 tons. The falure of the Conference created enough concen in Congress to approve an American naval building program, although a smaller program than initiated by the Japanese, only 100 vessels. Even so the new ships would only bring the Navy up Treaty limits. Two aircraft carriers were laid down in 1936 and 1937, each within Treaty limits. (These were USS Wasp (CV-7) and the larger USS Hornet (CV-8). No one knew at the time just how importnt these carriers would be. Both would reach the fleet in 1941 in time to participate in the critical Pavific battles of 1942. The Rooevelt Administration justified the appropriations in part as they would create jobs. The Isolationists and peace lobby opposed the appropriations with the slogan "Schools, not battleships". New battleships were authorized, but actual keels were not laid until after the war began in Europe. Only the USS North Carolina (BB-55) reached the fleet before Pearl Harbor.
Japanese nationalists were outraged by the Washington Naval Treaties (1922). Ironically Japan was the greatest beneficiary of the treaties. While Japan was the most industrialized country in Asia, its heavy industry was only a fraction of the Ameican industrial capacity. Japan could never had prevailed in a naval arms race. What occurred in the 1920s and 30s, however, was that the United States lulled into a false sence of security, severely limited naval construction. Japan on the other hand spent lavishly, significantly expanding the Imperial Navy to the point that it could sucessfully challenge the United States Navy. Influenced by the innokvative naval commander, Isoroko Yamamoto, gave considerable attention to naval aviation. Japan had four carriers in the early 1930s. Akagi and Kaga were rebuilt, but were not as fast as the American carriers Lexington and Saratoga. Hiru and Soryu were fast, but smaller than Yorktown and Enterprise.
The Japanese resented from the beginning the Washington Naval Treaties because they were not given parity. The Treaties actually limited the United states with a far greater industrial capacity more than Japan. The Japanese seizure of Manchuria led to rising tensions in the Pacific. As the Washington capital ship limits were due to expire in 1936, the London Conferences were organized to prevent another naval arms race (1935-36). The Five-Power Treaty of 1922 and the 1930 Treaty were also set to expire. Thus the major naval powers powers met for a second London Naval Conference (1935).
The Conference failed when when Japan essentially withdrew from the earlier limitation agreements. Japan withdrew from the London Naval Conference (January 15, 1936). The Japanese representative stated " ... as it has become sufficiently clear at today's session of the First Committee that the basic principles embodied in our proposal for a comprehensive limitation and reduction of naval armaments cannot secure general support. ... we regret to state that we cannot subscribe, for the reasons we have repeatedly set forth, to the plans of quantitive limitation submitted by the other Delegations." The
The Japanese Cabinet decided formally not to adhere to the London Naval Treaty (June 23, 1936). A factor here was secrecy. The Washington Treary provided all signatories details on each participating country's naval construction. Here the Japanese saw no real advantage as they could learn about American and British ship construction in the newspapers. (Secrecy and misinformatuiin about Japanese carriers would prove to be a primary reasin that American naval strategists f=did not beliec=ve that an attack on Pearl Harbor was possible.) Japan after withdrawing from the Wahington Naval Treaties began a naval building campaign to surpass the United States. The principal carriers built were Shokaku (laid down 1937) ans Zuikaku (1938). The Japanese called these carriers super cariers and at the outbreak of the Pacific War were the two best carriers in any navy. The Japanese of course did not just build carriers. The Japanese began building the two greatest battleships ever constructed: Yamoto (1937) and Musahi (1937). Their 18 inch guns outclassed every other battleship afloat. They were twice as large as the largest American battleship. Four Kongo-class battkeships were modernized, primarily to give them the speed to keep up with the carriers. Japan upgraded six light carriers to heavy carriers. Two of these cruisers (Tone and Chikuma were equipped to escort carriers by increasing to five the number of catapault launched seaplanes that could be used for reconisance.
The Japanese withdrawl from the Washington Naval Treaties re-opened the possibility that the United States might fortify Guam. Naval planners waned to fortify Guam to neutralizing the Japanese Marianas Islands (Rota, Saipan, and Tinian) and other Pacific Mandates. The Japanese restricted access to its Mandates and U.S. Naval strategists with good reason believed that they were being fortified. The budget-minded U.S. Congress refused to authorize the funds to fortify Guam or the other American Pacific outposts. As a result, when the Japanese invaded Guam, the small marine garison had no weapons heavier than a few machine guns (December 1941).
The Japanese military led by the Army steeadily expanded their influence during the 1930s. Military commanders viewed civilian politicans as weak and ineffectual. Officials who supported the Washington Naval Treaty limits in pareticvulasr were dispairaged. Politicans who attempted to stand up to the military were assassinated. Communists were also persecuted. An Army revolt in Tokyo failed, but left the Army essentially in control of the Japanese Government (1936). Military rule brought intensified political indoctrination in the public schools. The military also controlled the media. Military officers were appointed to key posts in government agencies.
The NAZI seizure of power in Germany (1933) meant that there was another agrieved power anxious to overturn the existing world order and willing to use force to bring that about. The first formal diplomatic step was the Anti-Comitern Pact (November 1936). This was an agreement betweem Germany and Japan aimed at the Soviet Union. The fondation for the Axis agreement was laid with the signing of the Anti-Comitern Pact. The NAZis when they seized power were hostile to the Soviet Union so Japan with its similar Fascist outlook was a natural ally. Germany agreed to recognize the Japanese puppet regime of Manchuko. Italy subsequently joined the Anti-Comintern Pact (1937). Italy joined the pact aear later (1937). The Pact strengthen the hand of the Strike North Faction as it gave the Japanese a powerful ally in a future war with the Soviets.Hitler subsequently violated the terms of the pact when he negotiated NAZI-Soviet Non-Agression Pact (August 1939).
Japan invaded China proper (1937). Many historians date this as the beginning of World War II. Fighting began with an incident at the Marco Polo Bridge (1937). Japanese forces in Manchuko poured south and a full-scale sar erupted. Again the Kwantung army acted independently, but was soon supported by the Japanese Government now dominated by the military. Within months the Japanese had seized Shanghai and reached the Chinese capital at Naking and conducted one of the most apauling attrocities of modern times, known as the Rape of Nanking. The Japanese occupied the entire coast of China and attempted to move inland to attack Nationalist strongholds. The Japanese seized large areas, but away from the coast wityh China's primitive transportation network andc rugged terraine were unable to defeat the Nationalist Army and the Communists in even more remote areas in the northwerst. Press reports of Japanese cruelty engendered considerable sympsathy for the Chinese in the Western democracies. As the Japanese proved unable to fully fefeat the Chinese, the war thus dragged on absorbing enormous resources. The Chinese were able to get small quantities of military assistance through British and French controllked ports in Burma and Indo China.
China was not the limit of Japan's imperial aspirations. Huge military expenditures were approved by the increasingly military-dominted Diet. Many of these expenditures such as naval expansion and mondernization had nothing to do with the war in China. The attack on the USS Panay was in fact an attempt to spark a war with the United States. At the time the senior Army leadership did not want such a war nor did the Japanese Government. More and more military leadees, however, did desire for Japan to use its growing military might to expand the Empire. The question thus became was not if, but who Japan would attack. And there were two major factions in the Japanese Army--the Strike North and the Strike South Factions.
Japan as a country no longer had an open parlimentary political system by the mid-1930s. Japan was a nation goverened by the senior service--the Imperail Army. Thus Japanese politics was basically a srtruggle within the Army as to what country with which Japan would go to war. The objective was obtaining the natural resources that Japan lacked. There were two primary resource-rich areas that the militarists coveted: Soviet Siberia and Southeast Asia which Japan referred to as the Southern Resource Zone (SRZ). The leading faction was at first the Strike North Faction. And they wanted to attack Japan's old eneny--Russia. The Bolshevik Revolution had incrreased Japanese emnity with Russia. Right-wing military sentiment was stridently anti-Communist and war with the Soviet Union had the advantage that the Soviets had no allies. The Japanese Army had seized control of manchuria (1931). And across the long Manchurian frontier was the virtually endless vastness of Soviet Siberia. And Siberia was a trenmendous attraction to the Japanese militarists. Siberia was lightly populated and had imense natural resources. And Japan with its Manchurian Army was well positioned to attack and seize Siberia. The other principal faction was the Strike South Faction. This was a stronger argument to make. It involved seizing the SRZ. This was a more difficult case to make. The Japanese Army was not in a position to easily reach the area. It would mean war with not only Britain and France, but also the United States. The Anerican possession of the Philippines Islands meant that it would be impossible to transport the oil and other resources of the SRZ without destroying the American Pacific Fleet. And even the Japanese military was unwilling to take on the America, Britain, and France by themselves.
The Japanese militarists got what they had wanted fir some time--a war. This was a war in China. They demonstrated consideranle military prowess and in battle after battle defeated the Nationalist Chinese Army. The quickly seized Bejing and than attacked the Natiinalist capital at Nanking. The brutality of the Imperial Army in Mnchuria had gone relatively unnoticed. The presence of Western diplmats and journalists meant that the Army's apauling brutality was witnessed and reported on in all the gory detail by which the Japanese brutalized the soldiers and civilians in Nanking. The Rape of Nanking to this day stands as a chilling barbarous outrage that stains the reputation of the Japanese nation. It even moved Isolationist-minded America. The Nationalist Army resisted the Japanese drive on Shanghai, but after the city fell, the retreat south began a route. Again Westerners witessed the Japanese barbarity--the bombing of civilians. Despite the military successes, the war in China did not go as the Jpanese militarists had intended. There were several outcomes of the War. First, Japan became branded as a barbarous agressor nation, especially in the United States which because of the missionary movement had close emotional ties with China. Second, there was no quick victory. The Chinese retreated into the mountanous vastness of central China where the Japanese could not bring its military superiority to bare. And the war dragged on fir several years. The Nationalist Government protected by geography began to receive mikitary aid from the Western powers through Indochina and Burma. Third, rather than secure Chinese markets and resources to strengthen the Japanese economy, the war had just the opposite impact. The Japanese were forced to make huge expenditures to continue the war. And rather than obtaining resources, the Japanese had to use its resources to procecute the seemingly endless war. Thus the war in China, rather than satiating the militarists, inctreased Japan's need for raw materials and began to turn the focus of the militarists from the Sovirts to the western powers, especially the United States which became China's principal champion.
While the Strike North Faction was initially the preminent Arny faction, a series of shocking events after Japan's invasion of China led to the victory of thec Strike South Faction within the Imperial Army. The Japanese were shicked at the very vocal American reaction to their war in China. This was of some consequence, not because of the moral outrage, but the fact that Japan was very dependant on America for raw materials, espoecially oil. The American Moral Embargo (July 1938) was thus a very real threat. Next came the NAZI-Soviet Non-Agression Pact (August 1939). NAZI Germany was Japan's principal ally against the Soviet Union which the Strike North Faction wanted to attack. NAZI diplomats had not consulted with the Japanese before signing the pact. This led to the Japanese questiining the value of the Anti-Comintern Pact and their German ally. Perhaps the most important development was an undeclared and poorly reported border war with the Sovirt Union (August 1939). The Red Army routed the Japanese along the Khalka River. This seems to have significantly reduced the Imperial Army's enthusism for invading the Soviet Union. The result was the Strike South Faction emerging as the dominat group in the Imperial Army.
A $25 million loan in 1939 allowed the beleagered Chinese Nationalists to buy American planes for the Chinese Air Force. Since the invasion of China in 1937, the Japanese had been using terror bombings of unprotected Chinese cities as a major part of their war effort.
World War II erupted in Europe when Hitler ordered his Panzers to invade Poland (September 1, 1939). Two days later Britain and France honored their commitments to Poland and declared war (september 3). The world was stunded at the strength of the German Blitzkrieg of Poland. For the Japanese, there was a huge advantage. To seize the Dutch West Indies and other colonies in Southeast Asia, they would have to confront Britain and France, two countries with powerful navies and substantial military forces. War in Europe meant that neither country woukld be in position to resist Japanese aggression with great force. Of their had been any remaining doubt, the Strike South Faction in the Imperial Army was now in firm control. It also meant that the only force capable of resisting the Japanese seizure of the Southern Resource Zone was the United States Pacific Fleet.
A major shift in the Japanese Government set Japan on a course for war. Japanese militarists watched the spectacular German successes in Europe. Yet they were bogged down in China with a costly war and there was no end in sight. The military had to admit that they had made a mistake and withdraw from China or expand the war and finally defeat China. American support of China was a problem because Japan es so dependant on the United states for The ol and other raw materials. The militarists concluded that with the resources from the Southern Resource Zone that Japan could pursue the war in China to a successful outcome. It may seem ilogocal that a country like Japan unable to win the war in China would decide to pursue an even wider war with the Western powers, but the fall of France and the accendancy of NAZI Germany emboldened the Japanese to do what they had wanted to do for somne time. Japan's rekatively moderate government was replaced by a new government headed by Prince Konoye with closer ties to the miklitary. General Hideki Tojo who headed te war party within the Army was appointed WAr Minister. The new government began to put Japan on a full war footing. The government's New Structure was essentially a totalitarian structure along the lines of the Soviet Union and NAZI Germany. The Government moved to supress political parties and labor unions. The government took greater control of the new media. The hours of workers in war industries were lengthened. Government prohibites several luxuries to increase military production.
President Roosevelt's Congressional ally, Congressman Carl Vinson, helped pudh through the the Vinson-Walsh "Two Ocean Navy Act". The President signed the Act which authorized a major increase in the U.S Navy (July 19). The U.S. Navy at the time had 358 ships in service and 130 under construction. The Act authorized the Navy to build 200 more ships including 100 destroyers needed for North Atlantic convoy duty. Also important was the construction of carriers, battleships, and crusiers. The importance of the carriers was not yet fully understood in the era before Pearl Harbor. The Act resulted in the construction of the powerful Essex Class carriers that would overwhelm the Imperial Navy when they began reaching the fleet in late 1943. The act authorized over 1.3 million tons of combat shipping as well as 0.1 million tons of auxiliary shipping. It also authorized te construction of 15,000 aircraft. The Two Ocean Navy Act expanded the Fleet 70 percent. The passage of the act was viewed with considerable concern in Japan. As a result of their larger naval construction program, the Japanese hd achieved naval superiority in the Pacific. This was an achievement that was not fully appreciated at the time even within the U.S. Navy. One of the reasons that led the Japanese to strike at Pearl Harbor was their concern that the American building program approved in 1940 would redress the balance of naval power in the Pacific.
The French after the Japanese invasion of China permitted Nationalist China to land oil, trucks, and other war materiel in Haiphong and ship it to rail to Kunming in China. The Imperial Navy at the time was blockading Chinese ports not allready in Japanese hands. Using the port of Haphog in neutral French Indochina permitted the Chinese to evade the Japanese naval bloickade. Japan complained to the French government about the shipments to noavail. The Japanese had steadfastly refused to declare war on China, referring to the conflict as the China Incident. The French thus rejected the Japanese diplomatic notes. The frustrated Japanese military bombed the rail line (1939-40). Shipments thriygh Haiphong were substantial, about 10,000 tons of material, largely from the United States as of early 1941 were being shipped. The small rail link and the Japanese bombing limited actual deliveries. A pileup of material at Haiphong totaled 125,000 tons (June 1940). NAZI victories in Europe, especially the fall of France (May-June 1940), fundamentally changed the ballance of power. This presented opportunities for the Japanese. France was removed as a potential advisary. After the fall of Frrance to the NAZIs (June 1940). Japan saw an opportunity to establish a position in the French colony of Indochina. As a result of France's defeat by their Axis ally, the Japanese had the opportunity to move south without an actual invasion. The Japanese government presented the French Ambassador in Tokyo with a series of demands (June 19). Tokyo demanded that France immediately cease shipment of all war materiel to China and to amnit a Japanese Control Commission to regulate the border with China. Japanese troops massed on the Chinese border with Indochina and Imperial Navy ships sailed into the Gulf of Tonkin to demonstrate that these were no longr requests. The Japanese Government gave the French 48 hours to comply. The Japanese at the same time demanded that the British cease deliveries of war material to China over the Burma Road. An agreement was finally reached with the new Vichy Government which did not have the capability of resisting the Japanese (August 30). This allowed the Japanese to move military forces into the northern area of French Indochina (1940). A major goal of the Japanese was to cut off the flow of military supplies to China. The Japanese not only chieved that objective, but now could uae French airfiekds to bomb Chinese targets.
President Roosevelt signed the Export Control Act, authorizing the President to license or prohibit the export of essential defense materials (July 2, 1940). Under the authority of this new law, the President within weeks in response to Japanese actions in Indochina prohibited exports of aviation motor fuels and lubricants and No. 1 heavy melting iron and steel scrap (July 31). [Morgenstrern, pp. 322–23, 327–28.] The Roosevelt Administration embargoed exports of aviation gasoline and lubrication oil, scrap iron, and various strategic materials. It did not take the ultmare step, however, of embargoing crude oil. This was the step that would force Japan's hand and the President held back hoping that diplomacy could still divert the Japanese militarists from the path of war.
The Tripartite Pact was signed September 27, 1940. The agreement allied Germany and Italy (which were at war with Britain) and Japan (which was at war with China). Germany and Italy has since 1939-40 been at war with Britain. Japan since 1937 had been at war with China. The alliance did not require the partners to join these wars, but it did require them to come to each other's aid if attacked. The alliance became known as the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis alliance, or commonly the Axis. The three Axis partners German hegemony over most of Europe; Italian hegemony in the Mediterranean, and Japanese hegemony in East Asia. After the Axis agreement was signed, several German allies joined the Axis, notably Vichy France and Fascist Spain refused to do so. Japan had no Asian allies, except or the puppet state of Manchukuo and THailand. The Axix provided allies and very powerful Allies indeed. Joining the Axis was seen in Japan as a way of presurin the United States. The Japanese militarists were in effect latching on to Hitler's star. Based on the phenomenal NAZI success, it made considerable success. The Japanese also made the calculation that the vast distances separating Germany from Japan in effect protected them from the new NAZI world order. Membership in the Axis, however, did not have the desired affect on the UNited States, either the American public or the Roosevelt Administration. Rather it confirmed in the American mind the criminal nature of the Japanese militarists. And with the Roosevelt Administation in harded vews toward Japan. America became less willing to offer diplomatic concessions in the on going negotiations.
Japan, Germany, and Itlay signed the Tripartite Pact (September 27, 1940). The agreement allied Germany and Italy (which were at war with Britain) and Japan (which was at war with China). Germany and Italy has since 1939-40 been at war with Britain. Japan since 1937 had been at war with China. The alliance did not require the partners to join these wars, but it did require them to come to each other's aid if attacked. The alliance became known as the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis alliance, or commonly the Axis. The three Axis partners pursued German hegemony over most of Europe; Italian hegemony in the Mediterranean, and Japanese hegemony in East Asia. After the Axis agreement was signed, several German allies joined the Axis, notably Vichy France and Fascist Spain refused to do so. Japan had no Asian allies, except for the puppet state of Manchukuo. While the Axis powers sought to seek national goals through war and German and Japan especially liomuzed war, there proved to be remarkably little cooperation in wageing war. It would prove to be the Allies that waged war in a coordinated manner. The Anglo-American alliance, the two powers that had sought to avoid war would forge the most remarkable and successful alliance in the history of warfare. Ironically, the Axis despite the considerable military power of its member states proved to be a rather feable alliance. The major purpose, especially for Japan was to deter the Unites States. Here it failed uterly. And although there was one common enemy, the Soviet Union, the partners never made common cause. And here Japanese participation in the upcoming war with the Soviet Union almost certainly would have been decisive. Just as the NAZI-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (August 1939) had left Hitler free to deal with the Allies, Japan signed its own Non-Agression Pact, the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact (April 1941). This left the Japanese free to redeploy Manchurian forces south, but fatally for the Axis, it would allow the Soviets to redeloy Siberian forces west when the NAZIs struck.
The Japanese Foreign Office began using the Alphabetical Typewriter 97 (1938). Purple was not an actual code, but an electromechanical coding system. It was a rotor machine like the Germans were using and like the Germans, the Japanese were convinved that the system could not beccracked. The U.S. Army Signals Intelligence Service (SIS) began to work on breaking into the system. Frank Rowlett directed the project. Finally Genevieve Grojan made a critical discovery . The SIS team was thus able to build a duplicate of a maxhine that they had never seen (September 1940). The American code breakers referred to the Japane encryption system as Purple and thus called the duplicate device the Purple Machine. The system was called Purple because of the color binders that were used for the decrypts. The messages were sent through machines and the American cryptologists managed to build their own Purple machine to read the Japanese diplomatic messages. The information gained from Purple decryptions came to be called Magic within the U.S. government because the Foreign Office used it for only their most important messages. [Curtin] The location of the Magic operation in Washington meant that information from the decrypts were not sent to Pearl Harbor unless the War Department decided to send some of the intelligence obtained. The Purple machine was a successor to earlier machines used to read Japanese diplomsatic mesages. The Japanese code system was designed by a Japanese Navy captain. Thus American officials were provide an insight into Japanese plans, albeit not military operations. American officials could thus read Japanese diplomatic dispatches in near real time. This is often misunderstood. Military plans were not transmitted on Purle. Decessions in Japan were made by the military and the nationlist military officers did not entirely trust the Foireign Office and certainly did not entrust them with military secrets. Much more important was the naval code which American cryptologists called JN-25. It was an enciphered code, producing five numeral groups iwhich was what was actually broadcasted. It proved more difficult to break than Purple. It was not until months after Pearl Harbor that the cryptologists at Pearl (Station Hypo) began breaking into JN-25. While it was only partially cracked. JN-25 decrypts played a major role in the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway.
The Roosevelt Administration in reaction to Japan joining the Axis, further expanded the list of embargoed items. He added scrap iron to the now growing list of embargoed items (effective October 16). The actual wording did not mention Japan, it was worded "all exports of scrap iron and steel to destinations other than Britain and the nations of the Western Hemisphere". The measure, however, was clearly aimed at Japan. The President still held back from the ulimate step, embargoing crude oil.
Japan was almost totally dependant on imported oil, primarily from the United States which at the time was the leading producer. Japan imported about 90 percent of its oil. Japan had very limited oil fiekds and a small synthetic petroleum industry. And with an industrial economy and a large navy and merchant marine, Japan required large quantities of oil. The ongoing war in China also required oil. Japan's major source of oil was the United States. Before the invasion of China, Japan had been purchasing 80 percent of its oil in the United States (1937). The United States through its moral persuasion policy had suceeded in convincing American ship owners to reduce shipments to Japan without any formal action. Thus on the brink of war the Japanese were only obtaining 60 percent of theor oil in America (1941). The Japanese were importing American oil (along with Latin American and DEI oil) in Japanese and neutral country tankers.
The Japsanese Thought Police carefully controlled the war news released to the Japanese people. The Japanese war in China dragged on ito 1941. The Japnese had occupied large areas of coastal China and won battle after battle, but were unable to fight the war to a conclusion. The newspapers printed misleading articles about the stalemate. There were also reports that Army officers were stageing contests to find who could sever the mot heads of Chinese prisoners. [Thomas, p. 19.]
Japan and the Soviet Union were bitter enemies as the Manchurian Border War (May-September 1939) has shown. Both countries had reason by 1941 to avoid war. Stalin in signing the Non-Aggression Pact with Hitler had anticipated a war in the West in which the Allies (Brutain in France) and Germany would fight along debilitating war as in World War I. He thought that with these countries weakened that he would be able to expand west. The unexpected collpase of the French Army meant that instead he faced a triumphannt NAZI Germany without allies or buffer states. Thus defusing the situation along the Siberian-Manchurian border with Japan was very important. The Japanse having deciding on the Strike South option also wanted a quiet northern border so it could move south. This both countries had strong reason for aiplomatic accomodation. The Neutrality Pact was was signed in Moscow by Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka and Ambassador Yoshitsugu Tatekawa for Japan and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov for the Soviet Union (April 13, 1941), Foreign Minister Matsuoka was returning from an Axis conference in Berlin. The Soviet Union committed to respecting Japanese control of Manchukuo (Manchuria). Japan made the same commitment to the Soviet dominated Mongolian People's Republic. The NAZIs did not inform the Japanese of their plan to invade the Soviet Union. And the Japanese did not inform the NAZIs of their plan to sign the Neutrality Pact with the Soviets. This was one of many instances showing the weakness of the Axis Pact. It is difficult to comprehend how Germany and Japan at this crucial moment could have failed to coordinate policy concerning the Doviet Union.
Japanese diplomats met with German officials to discuss matters associated witn Axis Alliance. On the way back to Tokyo they stopped in Moscow to finalize a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. Only afew days after the sihning eremony in Moscow, Sectrtary of State Hull presented Ambassador Nomura a list of the four conditioins necessary to restore normal trade relations. They included: 1) respect for the territorial integrity of other countries, 2) noninterference in te internal affairs of other countries, 3) equal commercial opportunities, and 4) no territorial changes other than through peaceful negotiatiins.
The Japanese conducted secret talks with the French colonial authorities in Indochina (July 1941). American officials learned of these talks through Purple intercepts. French diplomats also informed Washington of the Japanese demands.
Japanese and Vichy French authorities reacghed an understanding regarding the use of air bases and ports in Southern Indo-China July 24). The Japanese thratened a military invasion if the Japanese did not comply to ther demands. The Japanrse immediately began to occupy southern Indochina. For the Roosevelt Administration, the Japanese move into southern Indochina meant Japanese rejection of Hull's Four Principles and a major military move. President Roosevelt had not been willing to take the key step, embargoing oil. The Japanese move made up the President's mind.
With the Japanese occupation of northern Indochina and the revealing Purple intercepts indicating that the Japanese were untent on seizing the Southern Resource Zone, the Rosevelt Administratin began debating how to respond. The Cabinent was divided. Secretaries Morgenthau, Stimson, and Ickes argued for a real embargo that would really affect Japan--namely an oil embargo. The British wee pushing for such an embargo. State Secretary Hull argued against an oil embargo. He was supported by the Navy Department which would have to fight awar in the Pacific. They argued that an oil embargo were tantamount to declaring war. They were right, but did not understand that the Japanese had were movung toward war w=even without such an embrgo. President Roosevely, understanding tha an oil embargo meant war, vacillated, not yet ready to make such a momentous decesion. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark dispatched a formal memorandum to President Roosevelt clearly stating that an oil embargo meant war (July 24). That same day in the afternoon, Ambssador Nomura, President Roosevelt, Admiral Stark, and Under-Secretary of Stte Welles met in the White House. Roosevelt not yet aware that the Japanese had forced Vichy to consent to the occupation of southern Indochina, suggested to Nomura that an adiplomatic accomodation could be found on the basis of the neutralization of Indochina. He emphasized the key was that no Japanese occupation must take place. Roosevelt spoke openly to Nomura who he respecte. He explained that the United States had abstained from imposing an oil embargo because he had no desire to give Japan an excuse for seizing the oil fields of the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. He also explained that he could not justify continued oil deliveries to Japan if Japan was to continue agression. He said American public opinion would not accept this, especially with gasoline rationing. When Ambassador Nomura returned to the Japanese Embassy, he cabeled Tokyo expressing his opinion that American embargoes were eminent if the Japanese didn't accept the President's proposal on the neutralization of Indochina. The Japanese Government never responded. The Japanese move into southern Indochina finally convinced America that stronger action was needed. Southern Indochina brought the Japanese within striking range of the American Phillipine Islands, British Malaya and Singapore, and the DEI. The final American action was President Roosevelt issuing Executive Order 8832 (July 26, 1941). This froze Japanese funds in America. [Anderson] Britain and the Dutch Government in Exile followed suit. This essentially meant a total trade embargo. Not only could Japan not by oil and petroleum products (aviation fuel) in the United States, but it now did not havec thecforeign exchange reserves to buy oil from other sources, even the DEI. To make the the American position crystal clear, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order ?????? (August 1). This order specifically banned the export of petroleum products to Japan. Britain, the Dutch, New Zealand, and the Philippines followed suit.
President Roosevelt realizing that economic persuasion was not affecting Japanese policy, also ordered a series of military moves. He named General Douglas MacArthur the head of American-Filipino forces (July 26). He ordered squadrins of fighters and bombers to the Philippines.
President Roosevelt and Prieminister Churchill met in Placensia Bay, Newfoundland aboard American and British naval vessels and signed the Atlantic Charter (August 14). This was in essence a strategian alliance against the Axis powers on the basis of eight key princples. For the Japanese it was a clear statement that the war they were preparing to wage would be with America and Britain.
Japan was using about 30 million barrels of oil (1941). This included domestic industry as well as military operations in China and very substantial naval training operations. The military usage was balanced in part by severe civilian gasoline rationing. The mikitary estimated that if war broke out that the country woukd need larger supplies, perhaps 33-35 million barrels. As with so many mikitary assessments, they were widely off on what war requirements would be. Japan after launching the Pacific War, conumed 52 million barrels (1942). The Japanese Navy alone consumed 30 million barrels. The American oil embargo was this a considerable threat. The Japanese had some time to work out the problem. They had built up a reserve of 50 million barrels which was equivalent to 1.5 years of their oil requirements. Without American oil, another source would be required and the source nearest Japan and within the ability of the Navy to seize was the DEI--the most important prize in what the Japanese called the Southern Resource Zone (SRZ).
The Dutch own oil fields in the DEI would be able to provide all of Japan's needs, even the expanded ewquirement needed during war. The DEI was, however, only one part in what the Japanese called the Southern Resource Zone. Southeast Asia offered many other vital resources: bauxite (needed for aluminum ans airplane construction), iron, tin, and rubber. Rubber was another commodity which Japan had to import. Rubber was a particularly vital resource. Here seizure of the Southern Resource Zobe offered other advantages, namely denying rubber to the Americans and British, And rthe great bulk of the world's rubber production came from the SRZ--especially Malaya. There was a major weakness in the Japanese plan to seize the SRZ by force to support their war effort. This was that the oil, rubber, and other resources had to be brought back to Japan. Thus Japan would not only have to swize the SRZ, but maintain permanent command of the sea lanes to allow the Japanese merchant marine to supply Japanese indistry.
The result was an oil shortage in Japan. The Japanese militarists were unwilling to change their policy of war in China and the oil embargo had the affect of convincing them that they needed to seize the oil rich Dutch East Indies (DEI) (Indonesia) to guarantee future supplies of oil. The DEI was virtually defenseless, but the small Dutch garison there was loyal to the Dutch Government in exile. The only major force standing between the DEI and the Japanese was the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and the British garison at Singapore.
Japan in 1941 had the largest, most advanced caarier force in the world. The commander of the Imperial Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, was a proponent of naval aviation. The Imperial Navy had 13 carriers. It was not just that the Japanese had more carriers, but they had higher performance aircraft and more experienced pilots. The carriers had Mitsubishi Zero fighters which out performed any fighters available to either the U.S. Navy or the U.S. army Air Corps had. Japanese carrier pilots went through a rigorous training program. Many had combat experience from operations over China. The Japanese pilots were the most skilled naval aviators in the world. The U.S. Navy Pacific fleet had two carriers, Lexington and Yorktown. Rising tensions in the Pacific caused the Navy to shift Enterprise to the Pacific to join them. The significance of this disparity in forces was not fully appreciated in 1941 because most naval planners still considered the battleship to be the capital ship. Also most Americans did not consider the Japanese to be capable of building hogh quality ships or planes or the Japanese to be effective fighters.
The Imperial Council was held in the presence of Emperor Hirohito. The most impotant members of the Council were Prime Minister Prince Konoye, War Minister Hideki Tojo, and Chief of the Naval General Staff Admiral Osami Nagano. American actions in response to Japanese aggression, especially the oil embargo, was the immediate cause of the Japanese move toward war. The Japanese had rightly assessed through diplomatic contacts with the United States that there was no real liklihood that America could be convinced to end the embargo without not only a Japanese withdrawl from not just Indochina, but China as well. Prince Konoye understood how the war in China had bogged down and the costs involved as well as the fact that it was becoming unpopular with the Japanese public. He also recognized the potential danger for Japan in a war with the United States. He was prepared to negotiate a settlement. It was the Army, however, that dominated Japanese politics. And the Army was adamently opposed to any concessions to the United States. Not only did the Army feel that the path to empire was Japan's destiny, but they considered the American pressure as an insult to natiinal honor. General Tojo saw this as nothing short of national humiliation. And for Tojo and much of the military high command this was intolerable. If Prince Kinoye had attempted to resist the Tojo and tge Army, the Army would have resorted to a familiar tactic--asasination. And Prince Konoye of course realized this. Admiral Nagano with the full knowledge that war with the United States would be a naval war fought in the Pacific, argued for the war.
The Japanese Imperial Council decided on a "southern advance" policy with the understanding that this could mean war with the United States and the British Empire. This was not a rash decesion. Japan had been preparing for such a war, both diplomatically and militarily. Japan had joined the Axis (September 1940). Japan had also acted to safeguard its northern territories by signing a neutrality pact with the Soviets (April 13, 1941). The NAZI invasion of the Soviet Union (June 22) provided further assurance that there would be no danger of interference from the Soviets if Japan moved south.
The Japanese Cabinet decided to make the final preparations. The Imperial Navy was ordered to convert contigency plans to actual operational plan.
The Army had been the main force pushing for war. The Axis Alliance was useful if Japan was attacked by the Soviets. Neither the Germans or Italians, however, could offer much assistance for a naval war with the United States in the Pacific. The Navy realizing they would have to fight the American and British fleets were less enthusiastic about the Axis Alliance or the possibility of fighting a naval war with the Unites States and Britain. Once the decession was made, however, the Navy dutifully prepared for war.
Hitler set in motion the largest military campaign in history--Operation Barbarossa (June 1941). He hurled the might of the Whermacht against the only other comparable army in the world. The invasion was oif breathtaking proportions along an emense battlefield straching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The German campaign was enormously successful. The Red Air Force was destroyed in only a few days. Soviet divisions were obliterated and whole armies surrendered in mass to the NAZIs. Wehrmacht generals watching seemingly endless columns of Red Army POWs, thought they had won the War. Then because of a combination of Hitler's interference with the Wehrmacht commanders, the huge distances, adverse weather, and the dogged resistance of the Red Army soldier, the NAZI campaign slowed. The Wehrmacht had triumpghed in the relatively small-scale bettlefield of Western Europe where it quickly defeated unprpared opponests. The campaign in the East proved to be a very different matter. As Soviet resistance stiffened, Hitler expected Japan to join his anti-Bolshevik struggle. They did not.
The final step toward war occurred when Prince Fumimro Konoye resigned as prime minister (October 1941). Konoye had been the principal spokesman for peace. General Hideki Tojo replaced him in a cabinet already full of army and navy officers. Tojo had commanded the Kwantung Army in China and played an important role throughout the 1930s in the rise of the Militarists. He emerged as spokesman for the ardently pro-Axis elements in the Army. Konoye stepped aside to avoide a military coup. With the rise of Tojo, the Militarists were now in full control of the Japanese Government. Tojo was not like Hitler and Stalin an absolute dictator, but rather akind of bureaucratic chairman of the board for the militry establishment which was determined to secure for Japan the natural resources the country lacked.
He pursued a hardline in the ongoing negotiations with the United States and his Government authorized the attack on Pearl Harbor that had long been under preparation. Tojo was to lead the Japanese Government through most of the War (1941-44). He finally resgned after Anmerica sezed Saipan and brought the Japanese home islands within range of long range B-29 bombers.
The Japanese decission to strike America rather than Russia, allowed the Soviets to shift Siberian reserves west to stop the Germans. Unlike the Allies, the Axis made no real effort to coordinate their war effort. Hitler did not inform the Japanese or Mussolini about his plans to invade the Sobviet Union nor did the Japanese inform the NAZIs of their plans to strike Pearl Harbor. Mussolini in part out of pique suprised Hitler with his invasion of Greece, a decesion that complicated Hitler's Barbarossa preparations. A German journalist (Soviet agent) in Tokyo informed Stalin well before the actual attack on Pearl Harbor. Most historians agree that the Japanese decesion to strike America rather than join in the NAZI assault on the Soviets was the critical decesion of World War II. America was not yet in the War, but President Roosevelt's diplomatic resistance to Japanese operations in China and Indo-China and decession to move the Pacific Fleet to Pear Harbor appears to have caused the Japanese to confront America rather than the Soviet Union. Their experience in the 1939 border war with the Soviets was probably another factor. The failure of the Axis to coordinate strategy doomed Barbarossa and in the end was a central factor in the eventual Allied victory.
The outcome of World War II and in large measure the trajectory of modeern history was determined in one week in early December 1941. Japan crossed its Rubicon when it moved into southern Indochina (July 1941). This trigerred the United States oil embargo which meant that Japan had to go to war with the Brtain and the United States before it ran out of oil. At the time it seemed a risky, but well-calculate gamble. German Panzers were rushing toward Moscow and most military analysts were predicting an iminent Soviet collapse. With the German victory in Europe, the United States and Britain would be faced with such an enormous struggle that their ability to fight a Pacific War with Japan would be compromised. And the success of the German U-boat campaign even brought unto question Brutain's survival. The Soviets did, however, hold before Moscow. They not only held, but mounted a stunning offensives that damahed the Wehrmacht so severely that NAZI Germany was no longer capable of winning World War II. The Soviets offensive negan only 3 days after the Japanese carrier strike force attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, bringing America into the War. While brilliantly executed, the Pearl Harbor attack was one of the greatest military failures in history, dooming Japan to an unequal war and castrotrophic defeat. Ironically, Japan entered World War II just at the time the Red Army launched te decisive offensive of the War.
Not only had the German offebnsive in the Soviet Union grown to a halt because of Red Army resiatance and the winter weather, but the Soviets launched a massive offensive before Moscow (December 6, 1941). The desisive battle of Barbarossa and arguably the entire War was fought before Moscow during the Winter 1941-42. The Japanese decission to strike America, allowed the Soviets to shift Siberian reserves. A Japanese spy in Tokyo had informed Stalin well before the actual attack on Pearl Harbor. These troops, well trained in winter warfare, on December 6, 1941 launched a winter offensive stopping the Whermacht at the gates of Moscow--inflicting irreplaceable losses. The Wehrmacht was stuned at the extent of the Soviet offensive, assuming that the staggering victories in the Summer had crippled the Red Army. There were no preparations made such as winter clothing or assessing the performance of weapons in extemely cold winter conditions. Hitler had assummed that the camapign would defeat the Soviets in a summer campaign before the onset of Winter. Hitler demanded that the Whermacht stand and fight. This probably saved the Wwhrmach from an even greater dissater than what ocurred. An entire Germany Army, the 16th Army of more than 90,000 men, was essentially cut off and only supplied with an enormous effort by the Luftwaffe. A land corridor was not restablished until April 1942. The massive Axis army that invaded the Soviet Union had by January 1942 lost a quarter of its strength amd huge quantities of tanks, artillery, and supplies. These losses of men and material by the Wehrmacht were especially grevious and Germany did not have the manpower resources or industrial capacity to fully repace and reequip a new army.
Rather than join the NAZI war with the Soviet Union, the Japanese instead struck south with a devestating carrier attack at Pearl Harbor (1941). A Japanese carrier taskforce composed of six carriers on December 7, 1941, executed a surprise attack on the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. It was a brilliant tactical victory for Japan, but perhaps the greatest mistake in modern military history as it brought a suddenly united America with its vast industrial capacity into the War. The Japanese launched 360 aircraft which in 2 hours struck Peal Harbor just as the American sailors were waking up on a sleepy Sunday morning. The strike sunk or heavily damaged six of the eight American battleships, thrre cruisers, three destroyers, and most of the Army Air Corps planes on the island. America was at war. While seemingly a devestating blow, the Japanese failed to land a devestating blow. The battleships sunk were obsoletre vessels. The major goal of the attack was to sink the three carriers of the Pacific fleet. None were at Pearl. But not only were tghe carriers not destroyed, but Pearl was not crippled as a forward American base. The oil storange tanks, shipyards, and submarine pens were largely untouched. At the cist of sinking obsolete battleships, Japan was now at war with the mightiest industrial power of the world. Andceven as the boms were falling on Pearl Harbor, the United States was building Essex-class carriers, designing new modern aircraft including the B-29, and prepating to build the atomic bomb.
A fair assessment of the historical record clearly shows that Japan set out on a course for empire with the Sino-Japanese War (1895). The attack on Pearl Harbor was just the latest step in Japanese expansion. America in the 1930s and early 40s attempted to use diplomacy and economic sanctions to disuade Japan from its path toward war. Some Japanse scholars maibntained that the United States forced Japan to go to war by making unreasonable demands. But generally they down play the unreasonable demand was that Japan stop its invasion of China. (America further expanded its demands when Japan occupied Indochina.) America's demands were cucintly summarized in four points--Secretary Hull's Four Principles. All were related to Japanese aggression. Japan planned to build a museum on World war II to mark the 50th anniversary and this issue surfaced causing a furious controiversy. One of the planners resigned "... when he concluded that the Government was trying to use the museum to justify Japan's entry into the war. For example, he said, the Government planned a display suggesting that economic forces in the 1930's compelled Japan to start the war. This is a standard argument of those Japanese who refuse to apologize for the war. They say American economic sanctions and unreasonable demands left Japan little choice but to engage in all-out war. The argument has not been accepted by mainstream historians, nor is it well received by the countries where people were massacred during Japanese rule. In China, 10 million people-the Chinese Government says 35 million-died as a result of the Japanese invasion." [Kristof] The issue has also been picked up by the hate-America academic crowd and the conspiracy nuts in the United States. Of course, a full examination of President Roosevelt's diplomacy is an important issue that needs to be be discussed. When assessing these authors, readers look to see if they are fairly presenting the facr=ts or cherry picking facts to build their case. There are several important facts that these critics often leave out. 1) Japan;s policy of building empire beginning with the Sino-Japannese War (1895). 2) Japan's exploitive policies toward its colonies. 3) Japan's supression of political and social rights in colonies like Korea. 4) while Japan was expanding its empire, America was in the process of granting independence to its principal Pacific possession--the Philippines Islands. 5) Japan invaded Manchuria (1931). 6) Japan withdrew from the Washington Naval Treaty limitations (1937). 7) Japan invaded China (1937). 8) Japan committed horrendous attrocities in China, including the Rape of Nanking and the bombing of civilians. 9) Japan's prepared for a naval war in the Pacific beginning in the 1920s and intensified in the 1930s. 10) The militarists seized control of the government and began to introduce militarist and expanonist ideals to the school curicula. 11) the principle demand that the United States made on China was to stop making war in China. Any author that excludes these facts from his discussion is not fairly presenring the issue.
Anderson, Irvine H. Jr. "The 1941 De Facto Embargo on Oil to Japan: A Bureaucratic Reflex," The Pacific Historical Review Vol. 44, No. 2 (May, 1975), pp. 201-231. Published by: University of California Press.
Curtin, Matt. Brute Force.
Jones, F.C. Japan's New Order in East Asia (London, 1954).
Kristof, Nicholas D. "Japan's Plans for museum on World War II mired in dispute," The New York Times (May 20, 1995).
Morgenstern, George. “The Actual Road to Pearl Harbor,” in ed. Harry Elmer Barnes, Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Its Aftermath (Caldwell, Id.: Caxton Printers, 1953). Critics of President Roosevelt charge that he was provoking the Japanese. This is probably a fair characterization, but the critics often do not provide a nuanced assessment. They rarely mentiined tht the President refrained from the key action, an embargo on crude oil until after it was clear that Japan had ddecided on war. They also do not mention that the President gave Japan n option, they could stop making war and withdraw from Indochina and China. Those were hardly aggressive demands.
Williams, Benjamin H. "The coming of economic sanctions into American practice," The American Journal of International Law Vol. 37, No. 3 (July 1943), pp. 386-396. Published by: American Society of International Law
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