Figure 1.--Gen. de Gualle was allowed to cross the Channel on June 14 to the narrow perimiter in Normandy that was liberatd France. Here he is at Bayeux where the British and Americans first connected their beachheads. The French at the time had only know DeGualle through his resonant voice. A voice that spoke to them through 4 long years of NAZI occuoation--a rare ray of hope during a dark period. The connection was immutable. You can see it here in this image. While the Americans intended to establish a military government, the idea was soon abandoned. It was DeGualle and his Free French movement that the French people tuned to for a provisional government.

De Gualle was given command of a tank brigade in the Fifth Army when the War broke out and then given command of the Fourth Armormed Division. The French had many excellent tanks, but no radio communication. French armored doctrine was different than the Germans. The French used their tanks piece meal rather than forming massed formations. When the German blow came (May 10), the German Panzers were spectaularly successful while the French tanks played only a minor role. De Gualle had been appointed Undersecretary for Defence and was used by Primier Reynard to coordinate with the British Government in the desperate days when German Pazers were driving into the heart of France. He was in London when the Reynard fell from power and Pétain signed an armistace with the NAZIs. De Gualle refused to surrender. He rejected the armistace as well as the Pétain Vichy Goverment. De Gualle was unknown to the French people, but organized the Free French resistance to the Germans and the Vichy French Government which was colaborating with the Germans. He formed the French National Committee in England. The Committe was to become the Free French movemnent. He became convinced that his destiny and that of France were intertwined. [Haskew] He made inspired radio broadcasts to occupied France. It was these speeches that made him a symbol of French resistance. De Gualle quarled with both Churchill and Roosevelt who did not recognize his Free French movement as the Goverment of France. The American and British Torch landings (November 1942) secured Algiers and because of continued disagreements with Churchill moved his headquarters to Algiers. Despite the differences, directed the Free French Forces and the underground in France. After D-Day, De Gualle's popularity helped him to quickly organize a government in the liberated areas. A French reader writes, "Général de Gaulle was not very well understand by President Roosevelt and Primeminister Churchill. Genéral de Gaulle is still highly respected in France. Oone finds his name everywhere . He is for us the real France in his independance, shining through the world. He is the father of our nuclear force; the friendly Franco-German; and peace in the world. President Chirac admired Général de Gaulle. Still to day some anti-American French mentality is coming of this problem, but all the French are aware that the French-American friendly is for ever."

World War I (1914-18)

After graduating from Saint Cyr, De Gualle joined an infantry regiment commanded by the then Col. Philippe Pétain. He quickly imoressed Pétain and other important officers with his intellifence. De Gualle as a junior officer had a gallant record from World War I, fighting in the trenches. He fought courageosly in the Battle of Verdun, arguably the most important battle of the War. He was wouunded three times and captured by the Germans. He was a Prisoner of War (POW) for nearly 3 years. He attempted to escape five times, but never succeeded in escaping.

Inter-war Era

De Gualle during the inyer-war era actively persued his military career. He served on the French military commission to Poland and promoted to major was part of the French occupation force in the Rhineland (1927-29). It was at this time that he became increasingly concerned about Germany, even before Hitler and the NAZIs seized power. He also served with the Army in the Middke East. De Gualle taught at Sait Cyr and was selected for advanced training at the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre (French WAr College) (1923-25). Marshal Pétain appointed him to the staff of the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre (French Supreme War Council). Afterv promotion to lieutenabt colonel, De Guale served on the Vonseil Supéieur de la Défense Council (National Defense Council). De Gualle began to write on military strategy. He persued a range of themes. His most important book was The Army of the Future in which he argued for a small professional army that was highly mecanized. The was in sharp contrast to French defense policy which was the maintenance of a large conscript army and static defense behind the Maginot line. DeGualle was ad advocate for armored, mobile warfare during the 1930s while the French poured massive funding into the Maginot Line [Fenby] When De Gualle began trying to win political support he encountered problems with high army officials including Pétain who attempt to prevent De Gualle from publishing another book.

Maginot Line (1930s)

France suffered horrendous casulaties in World War I, Many wre killed in costly asssaults or fortified German trenches. As a result, the French army even before the end of the war became defense minded, in sharp contrast to German military doctrine. France decided to base its defense on a kind of massive, hardened defensive line. France's defensive line was named after the War Minister Andre Maginot who began building it. The idea was first proposed by French World War I commander Joseph Joffre and Construction began in 1930. It was a massive system of defences, most of which was built underground. There were three interdependent fortified belts with anti-tank emplacements and pillboxes protecting bombproof artillery casements. These concrete and steel emplacements stretched between Luxembourg and Switzerland. Artilery emplacements and interlocking strong points were designed to stop a German invasion. The Maginot Line has gone diwn in history as a gigantic military failure. Actually the Maginot Line was a formidable barrier. The Maginot Line would stop a German break through. There were, however, seriouseaknesses. First, plans were in place to continue the Maginot Line to the Channel. The French Government, however, spent so much on the Maginot Line that they did not have the money to comolete it. The extension from the Belgian border to the Channel was left uncompleted. Thus the Germanssimply went around it. Second, any defensive line needs a mobil reserve behind it that can rapidly be moved to seal any eneny offensive and possible breakthrough. DeFualle argued for a powerful arnored force. But again money was not available for this, nor was the conservative high command receotive to the idea. Third, the French planners failed to give adequate attention to the French Air Force. Again the problem was partly the money spent on constructing the Maginot Line. Air warfare was a minor aspect of World war I, although becoming more important by the end of thewar. Huge advance in aerinautics were made in the inter-War period. The French failed to react in time to the Hitler's deesion to build a modern airforce. One historian writes, "By the time of the rupture, the Nazis had been girding for war for six years. De Gualle, who had seen the coming of another war with Germany, was now more isolated than ever. He had broken with his mentorand was considered a heretic by the senior commanders of the army in which he served. For all his mighty effort, he had been unable to persuade anyone of real consequencethat the bleakest of days lay just ahead for France." [Haskew]

Phony War (1939-40)

When Hitler and Stalin launched World War II, de Gaulle was largely unknown outide the Army. He was still only a colonel, largely because he antagonized the major French Army commnders during the inter-War era. His views about bold offensive armored movements were rejected by the f=defensice nonded generals who had made the Maginot ine the centerpiece of their military strategy. De Gualle was given command of a tank brigade in the Fifth Army when the War broke out and then given command of the Fourth Armormed Division. He was virtually unknown outside of the Army. The French had many excellent tanks, but no radio communication. French armored doctrine was different than the Germans. The French used their tanks piece meal rather than forming massed formations. A historuan writes, "Undaunted, de Gualle managed to look toward an uncertain future, uncertain for his country, his family, and himself. On the eve of World War II, he was in the province of Alsace, commanding the tanks of the Fifth Armyin support of the fixed fortifications of the Maginot Line." [Haskew]

Battle for France (May-June 1940)

When the German blow came (May 10), the German Panzers were spectaularly successful while the French tanks played only a minor role. DeGualle' major contribution was the Battle of Montcornet (May 17, 1940). The French 4e Division cuirassée, commanded by Colonel De Gaulle, attacked the Germans who had seized the village of Montcornet. The Division retook the village, but had to retreat due to lack of support as the front around them was crumbling and German 88 mm Flak guns, used as anti tank weapons began to take a too. . Luftwaffe attacks wre also important and the rench Air Force provided no air cover. De Gaulle and his tankers fought another engagement at Abbeville (May 27-June 4). He used his tanks to engage the Germans and cut a path through to the Allied forces cut off and trapped at Dunkirk (May 28). Premier Paul Reynaud belaekdy recognizing De Gualles military acumen, appointed him Under Secretary of State for National Defence and War (June 5). This ended DeGualle's combat role in the Battle for France. Renaud assigned him to te task of coording with the British forces in the desperate days when German Pazers were driving into France. Despitethe rapidly deteriorating military situation, he opposed surrender, advocating that the government withdraw to Algeria and carry on the war with what ever forces at hand from France's colonil Empire. At the time, the powerful French fleet was still in tact. DeGualle was in London when the Reynard fell from power and was replaced by World War I hero Pétain who immediately signed an armistace with the NAZIs.

Free French (1940-44)

De Gualle refused to surrender. He rejected the armistace as well as the Pétain Vichy Goverment. De Gualle was unknown to the French people, but organized the Free French resistance to the Germans and the Vichy French Government which was colaborating with the Germans. He formed the French National Committee in England. The Committe was to become the Free French movemnent. He became convinced that his destiny and that of France were intertwined. [Haskew] He made inspired radio broadcasts to occupied France. It was these speeches that made him a symbol of French resistance. A young Resistance fighter recalls, " How bizarre it all is! Here we are, most of us the wrong side of forty, careering along like students all fired up with passion and fervour, in the wake of a leader of whom we know absolutely nothing, of whom none of us has ever seen a photograph." [October 20, 1940--Haubert] De Gualle quarled with both Churchill and Roosevelt who did not recognize his Free French movement as the Goverment of France. The American and British Torch landings (November 1942) secured Algiers and because of continued disagreements with Churchill moved his headquarters to Algiers. Despite the differences, directed the Free French Forces and the underground in France. General DeGaulle as late as 1942 was not the principal figure in the Resistance. He had been recognized by Prime-minister Churchill, but President Roosevelt had severe reservations. Nor was he seen as the leading figure within France. DeGualle by 1943 was increasingly anxious to unite the different and growing resistance groups under his Free French movement. The various resistance groups had by the end of 1942 begun to coordinate theur operations. The first movement to operate on a national basis (both the occupied and unoccupied zones) was the Communist dominated Front National (FN) (May 1941). The FN's armed wing was the Francs-Tireurs et Partisans Francais (FTRF). Other Resistance groups united to form the Mouvements Unis de Las Resistance (MUR). Its armed wing was the Armee Secrete. It was the MUR which recognised de Gaulle as its leader. The Communists saw DeGualle as a right-wing figure and insisted on retained their independence. Both groups under Moulin's persuasion united in the CNR. And it was through the CNR and his supporters in the MUR that General de Gaulle was able to build his leading position within France. One important factoir here was that supplies and equipment from Britain and Algeria were dropped to the groups which recognised DeGualle and were preoared to accept at leadt some tactical control from the British SOE. And the primary SOE objective was the cross-Channel invasion. The FTPF refused to recognize DeGualle or accept tactical directioin from the SOE. They were thus less well supplied than the Armee Secrete. The two groups of course had fundamnental political differences, but they also differed on tactuics. The Armee Secrete accepted DeGaualle's belief that the Resistance concentrate on preparing for the Allied landing and supporting them when they occurred. The FTPF was not prepared to wait for the Allies. They wanted to conduct harass the German troops before the Allies arrived, including attacks on individual German officers, an action de Gaulle opposed. It is not clear why the FTRF was so intent on atacking the Germans. It was a tactic doomed to failure. Without Allied armies in France, the Resistance did not have the military capability to oppose the well-equipped German occupation forces. And attacks in Germans brought vicious German reprisals. We are not sure if the FTRF independntly deve\loped these tactics or was operating on orders from the Soviets.

Roosevelt and Churchill

DeGualle at the time of World War II was a little known armored officer. Churchill noticed him when he came to England just before the capitulation , pleading for the Britih to fully commit Fighter Command. Churchill was impressed because DeGualle was prepared to fight come what may. Churchill through his support behind DeGualle and the small band that rallied to him in the darkest days of the War. A French reader writes, "Général de Gaulle was not very well understood by President Roosevelt and Primeminister Churchill. Genéral de Gaulle is still highly respected in France." He was often difficult to understand. At one point, Chuchill almost had him arrested. They had several falling outs, the most serious over Syria. Roosevelt not only did not undertand him, he did not like him because DeGualle's focus was not just narrowly focused winning the war, but restoring the country's honor. Churchill had his problem's with DeFualle, but Roosevelt devloped a thorough going dislike of the General. Churchill after D-Day encouraged Rossevelt to invite the General to America, saying, "I think it would be a great pity if you and he did not meet. I fail to see why i should have all the pleasure." Finally when it was clear that the French people were rallying behind DeGualle and the Free Frenc movement, Roosevely made hi peace with the General.

D-Day (June 1944)

There wre Free French forces in Britain, but the French were not a major part of the D-Day build up or given important posts in the D-Day planning. The French were not assifned an invasion beach. Thus DeGualle only days before the lamdings had no details about the planned invasion beyond te obvious that it was coming. He was essentially in the same position as the Germans. He was largely kept in the dark because neither President Roosevelt or Prime-Minister Churchill trusted him, especially the President. Churchill admired the General, but ws constantly frustrated by him. Roosevelt took anintense dislike to him and insisted that Churchill not provide De Gaulle with details of the imminent D-Day invasion, largely because he did not believe that DeGualle could keep the secret. French secreyt codes were considered weak. This was a real security risk and the General insisted thar the Free French used their own codes and not the more secure British or American codes.[Beevor] And De Gaulle refused to even share coded information with the British. They were forced to use Bletchley Park to break the French codes. [Singh] Days before D-Day, DeGualle was still in Algiers. Churchill who had increasing difficulties with DeGualle, finallty decided that he had to be apraised of the D-Day plans. He dispached two passenger aircraft and his cloest adviser, Duff Cooper, to Algiers to bring de Gaulle back to Britain. De Gaulle at first refused. He was infuriated about Roosevelt's intention to install a provisional Allied military government in liberated France until elections could be held. DeGualle saw his Free French movement as the legitimate government of France. Cooper managed to convince him to come. He took off for Britain with Cooper (June 3). He reached RAF Northolt and was given an official welcome (June 4). He was given a ltterfrom Churchill, "My dear general! Welcome to these shores, very great military events are about to take place!" Then aboard Churchill' official train, Churchill informed him that he wanted him to make a radio address. It proved to be atormy ride. The Americans wanted to see te text before it was broacast. AndChurchill informed him that the Americans continued to refuse to recognise the Free French as the legitimate government of Frace. Churchill suggested he request a meeting with Roosevelt to improve their relationship. DeGualle did not take the suggestion kinly. De Gaulle became physcally angry, demanding to know why he should "lodge my candidacy for power in France with Roosevelt; the French government exists". [Fenby] Other stormy exchnges ensued, especially with Labour Minister Ernest Bevin. Then arriving at SHAEF Headquarters, Gen. Eisenhower nriefed him on the D-Day landings. The General began critiquing the operation as if major changes were possible and reacted angrily when it became clear that the brefing was a courtesy and the General wouud have no role in the invasion besidea a radio broadcast to the French people. .

Liberation of Paris (August 1944)

The inintial Allied plans were to by-pass Paris as the Allied armies swept north through the French country side. Paris at this point of the War had no real strategic vale and would only slow down the Allied advance. De Gaulle saw more than the allied generals that Paris had enormous political and propaganda value. At any rate, the Resistance took the issue out of Allied hands when they stahed a militaty unrising in the capital (August 18). DeGualle raised the issue of Paris directly with Allied Supreme Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower. We are not sure what persuaded Eienhower, but it became clear that if he did not give the go ahead that French units were sinmoly going to break the chain of command and head to Paris on their own. French troops were ordered to Paris and would be the first. Allied troops to enter the embattled capital. General Leclerc's French Armoured Division entered the outskirts of the city. The German garrison of 5,000 men surrendered (August 5). Scattered firefights continued for several days. Hitler had personally selected General Dietrich von Choltitz to command the garrison with orders to destoy the city. Von Choltitz would explan that he would have done so if it had any military purpose, but ignored the order and surrendered. Hitler reporetedly telephoned him demanding to know if aris was burning. .

Provisional Governments (1944-46)

Some leaders shy away from overt displays of patrioism--not Charles De Gualle. De Gualle's career was nohing short of monumntal. Helping to save France twice. What Churchill and especially Presidebt Roosevelt did not understand that the Free French would not affect the outcome of D-Day or the War. But in the comig Cild War struggle with the Soviet Union, keeping France out of Soviet hand was criticl. And this meant stopping the CiCommunists who were very important in the Resistnce from seizing power. After D-Day, De Gualle's popularity helped him to quickly organize a government in the liberated areas. Here he saved France and perhaps Weestern Europe. This was not what Roosevelt and Churchill wanted, but accepted the facti acompli. De Gualle headed two provisional governents. This is sometimes glossed over by historians, but in fact was of enormous importance. France on the eve of liberation was a time bomb. DeGualle understood this the Allies did not. The Communists were the stringest ellement in the Resistance and had a chance of seizing control, somrhing that would not occur in free elections. DeGualle had, however, a stormy relationship with Primeminister Churchill and President Roosevelt. The President in particular had no intention of setting him up as the head of thr Provisional Government. After D-Day, DeGualle moved to seize control of the liberated areas. He was litterally the only person who could have prevented the Communists from seizing control of large areas of the country, especially the all important Paris. Again the Allies did not understand the importance of Paris. Eisenhower understandingly thinking militarily planned to bypass Paris to better pursue the retreating Germans. DeGualle relaized that if the Allies did not enter Paris, the Communists would seize control and another Commune might result. (The Commune was the 1870 seizure of Paris by leftist parties requiring the Third Republic to begin by a bloody and destructive campaign to regain control of the capital.) French histoy is intricatly tied to the history of Paris more than any other country's history is tied to their capital. DeGualle understood this and eventually convinced Eisenhower to relieve the city which had risen up against the Germans. The Free French and American troops liberating the city combined with DeGualle's appearance forestalled a Comminist takeover. Had this not occurred, France may well have suffered a debilitating civil war like the one which occurred in Greece. De Gualle resigned over a minor matter (1946). Had his career ended here, DeGualle would have been a military and politucal figure of great importance, But of course it did not end here.

Post-war Image

One finds his name everywhere . He is for us the real France in his independance, shining through the world. He is the father of our nuclear force; the friendly Franco-German; and peace in the world. President Chirac admired Général de Gaulle. Still to day some anti-American French mentality is coming of this problem, but all the French are aware that the French-American friendly is for ever."

Sources

Beevor, Antony. D-Day: The Battle for Normandy (Penguin Group: 2009).

Fenby, Jonathan. The General: Charles De Gaulle and the France He Saved (2012), 736p.

Haskew, Michael E. De Gualle: Lessons in Leadership from the Defiant General (2011), 224p.

Humbert, Anges. Resistance: A Woman's Journal of Struggle and Defiance in Occupied France.

Lacouture, Jean. DeGaulle: The Rebel 1890-44 (WW Norton: New York, 1990), 615p.

Singh, Simon. The Code Book: The Science of Secrecy from Ancient Egypt to Quantum Cryptography (Anchor: 2000).

Created: 7:19 PM 12/28/2008
Last updated: 12:49 PM 11/8/2016