Figure 1.-- |
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DeGualle at the time of World War II was a little known armored officer. Churchill noticed him when he came to England just before the capitulation , pleading for the Britih to fully commit Fighter Command. Churchill was impressed because DeGualle was prepared to fight come what may. Churchill through his support behind DeGualle and the small band that rallied to him in the darkest days of the War. A French reader writes, "Général de Gaulle was not very well understood by President Roosevelt and Primeminister Churchill. Genéral de Gaulle is still highly respected in France." He was often difficult to understand. At one point, Chuchill almost had him arrested. They had several falling outs, the most serious over Syria. Roosevelt not only did not undertand him, he did not like him because DeGualle's focus was not just narrowly focused winning the war, but restoring the country's honor. Churchill had his problem's with DeFualle, but Roosevelt devloped a thorough going dislike of the General. Churchill after D-Day encouraged Rossevelt to invite the General to America, saying, "I think it would be a great pity if you and he did not meet. I fail to see why I should have all the pleasure." Finally when it was clear that the French people were rallying behind DeGualle and the Free French movement, Roosevely made his peace with the General.
The Germans proceeded to conquer virtually all of Western Europe. After a few months of the 'Phony War', France's turn came. The Germans struck on a wide front against the neutral Netherlands, Belgiym, and Luxemburg. The terror bombing of Rotterdam convinced the already hard-pressed Dutch Army to surrender. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) rushed north to aid the Dutch. The Germans then struck in the Belgian Ardenes which allowed them to avoid the formidable Maginot Line. The French and Belgians considered the Ardenes impassable to tanks. The Germans managed to easily penetrate the rough terraine, crossed two substantial rivers, and the XIX Panzer Corps rapidly reached the English Channel--cutting the BEF off from the French and rendering the Maginot Line uselss. The French entrenched behind the Maginot Line simply could not cope with the exposive highly mobil style of Blitzkrieg warfare. The Panzers surrounded the Belgian Army which King Leopold III surrendered. The BEF was within Hitler's grasp. The Panzers were only a few miles south of Dunkirk and facing no serious opposition. Hitler ordered the Panzers to halt. Some believe that he hoped this gesture would help convince the British to comes to terms, other believe that is was just as it was described at the time, aneeded pause to regroup and prepare for a more coordinated assault. [Davidson, p. 408 and Fest, p. 630.] What ever the reason, this 48-hour respite allowed the British to organize a defensive perimter around Dunkirk and begin an almost miraculous withdawl. Nearly 340,000 men were evacuated from Dunkirk, including French and Dutch sholdiers. This is even more important that it sounds as akmost all if the British sholdiers were regulars and would form the corps of the future British Army that would play such an important role in the War. All of the BEF's equipment, however, was lost. Paris soon fell and the French signed a NAZI imposed armistace. The collapse of France after only a few weeks was a disaster of emense proportions. It was the French Army that had provided the bulk of the allied War Western Front in World War I. The German victory was not accomplished with superior numbers or weaponry. In fact they had fewer men, tank, and planes. What they had was a superior tactical doctrine. The Germans were amazed to find, for example, that French tanks were not even equipped with radios, and a more disciplined fighting force. NAZI propaganda began to describe Hitler as " Der grösste Feldherr Allerzeiten " (the greatest field commander of all time). [Davidson, p. 483.]
Even before the German invasion of Poland and the onset of World War II, Prime Minister Chamberlain realized that he had been wrong about Hitler and his policy of apeasement had failed and failed disaterously. Winston Churchill had been warning about Hitler and the NAZIs even before they seized power. Chamberlain brought Churchill back into Government to create a War Cabinent. Churchill was appointed to head the Admiralty (September 1939). One disaster followed another. On the very day that the Germans struck in the West, Chamberlain's Government fell and Churchill was appointed Primeminister (May 1940). In only a few days the Germans broke through the French lines and raced to the Channel. Only the miraculous evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk saved Britain (May 26-June 4). This mean that Britain would have the capability to resist. This did not mean that the British would continue to resist. Many at the time thought that Britain would like France capituale to the NAZIs. Hitler assumed this would occur. If not the terms offered the French probably would have been even more severe. But Churchill was determined to resist and as the BEF began to reach safety in Channel ports, he convinced the British War Cabinet to make the decision to fight on (May 29). "What kind of people do we think we are?" he asked the British people.
Churchill did all he could do to bolster the French. He flew to France several times to meet with French leaders.
Each time he saw the peace party growing. He even offerd a union with France. The shock of the German victories had, however, sapped the French will to resist. The French broight a young general into the cabinet as Undersecretary for Defense--the armored commander Charles DeGualle (June 5). He was little known to the French people and unknown outside of France. He had, however, led the only attack on the Germans that achieved ny succes. He was sent on a desperate mission to Britaoin (June 9). His mission was to convince the Vritish to committ most of Fighter Command's precious few squadrons to the battle of France. This was the first time that Churchill met DeGualle. He was impressed because unlike other French leaders, he clearly was prepared to continue the fight. Churchill would have liked to comply, but he was informed by Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding that if after the losses in France, if fighter Command was weakened further, it could not defend Britain. Despite brave worlds, Churchill realized by this time that France was lost and committing Fighter Command would be a futile gesture, vurtually guaranteeing a German vicytory ober Britain. But he was still impressed with DeGualle. He soon realized he had found a French leader he could support.
It is impossible to know precisely what President Roossevelt was thinking at the Panzers were moving south toward Paris. The President left no memoirs. We know that he had hoped the Allies (Bitain and France) could stop the Germans with American material support. Now it was clear that this was no longer possible. We also know that against all expectations, he decided to run for an unprecedented third term. And if he had expressed his intentions he might not even had been nominated, let alone win the election. And open expression of participaing in the Wa mught even had led to the election of an isolationist candidate. Thus the President did not evn opn up to close adbisers. Mussolini with France clearly beaten declared war on Britain and France (June 10). He did not consulatwith his military cpmmanders, but did not want want to lose out on the spoils, President Roosevelt who had been communicainfg with Il Duce in an effort to keep him out of the War was outraged. He gave a very strong speech. He famousely railed, 'The hand that held the dagger has punged it into the back of his neigbor." Italian Americans were incensed with the language. He also said, "We will extend to the opponents of force thr material resources of this nation." (June 10). Churchill who was secretly in close communication with Roosevelt was encouraged thinking that American intervention might still keep France in the War. He cabeled the President insisting that France had to be kept in the War (June 11). In World war I it was the French Army that stopped the Germans and carried the brunt of the battle for almost 3 years. He flew to Paris and found defeatism growing, especially with Marshal Petain, the orld war I hero and new Defense Minister. Prime Minister Reynaud wanted to contiunue the fight, but was losing support in the Cabinet. Here he mentions DeGuale for the first time.
Churchill on his return to London cabeled Roosevelt, urgging that now was the time to support the French (June 12). In response, President Roosevelt sent a private message to Reynaud (June 13). Churchill flies to France again. He met DeGualle again and told him that he was a man of destiny. President Roosevelt's private message was inadequate. To keep France in the War, Roosevelt would have to come out publically and even this might not have suceeded as America had little in the way of material support to provide. And this was a step the President could not take at the time because of the strength of the isolationists. The President cabled Churchill and
Reynaud (June 14). He told them that his earlier message had not been meant to indicate that Ameica would enter the war. In reality, anything more Would have been a futile gesture. Ameriva was not going to enter the War. The American people were still dead set against it. And apresidential declaration would have destroyed the President politically for no real net gain. Congress would not have voted a seclaration of war.
After the German breakthrough at Sedan and drive to the Channel, France was lost. After a few days rest and refitting, the Pnzers turned south for Paris. French Prime Minister Reynaud outnumbered by defeatist ministers
was forced to resign (June 16). The French Government hd lost the will to resist. He was replaced by Marshall Pétain, the hero of Verdun in World War I. Petain puts out peacefeelers to the Germans. The French asked to be released from the commitment to Britain not to make a separate peace. Pétain immediately asked for an armistace (June 17). France capitulated (June 22). Hitler had found the railroad car in which the Germans had signed the World War I Armistace (1918). The armistace was signed at Compičgne. France was thus out of the War and Britain now faced the Germans alone. The terms of the Armistice are dictated by the Germans. Thgey are harsh, but not as harsh as some had anticipated. The Germans treat France vert ifferently than Poland.The terms of the June 1940 armistace between Germany and France divided France into an occupied and unoccupied zone, with a rigid demarcation or boundary line between the two. The unoccupied zone becoes known as Vichy as aew capital is established there. The French had to agree to hand over anyone the Germans wanted. Former Primeminister Reynaud was among those detained. And they had to pay heavy reparations for starting the War.
DeGualle unwilling to surrender to the Gemans flies to Britin (June 17). He says good bye to his dieing mother makes palns to get wife and children to Britain. He is spirited out on a British plane. The Armistice did not immediately lead to a break with Vichy. Thus Britain did not at first treat DeGualle and his small group of supportrs as a Govrnment in Exile like that of Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium. DeGualle speaks to the French nation for the first time from Britain (June 18). It hs little impct. The French are dispirited and the Germans for the most part begin a 'correct' occupation. Churchill net with DeGualle for the first timeafter the French Armistice (June 22). He tlls him, "You are alone, well I shall recognize you alone." Churchill backs him even though he is a virtually unknown figure. What Churchil sensed him him ws persobal bravery and the will to fight come wha may. Churchill did not fully understabd what he was getting himself into, but hhis respect for DeGualle proved correct. The break with Vichy came soon after. France had the fourth larget nvy in the world. If the Germans could get their hands on the French Navy, Briain could not continue to resist. French Admirals, specuically Admiral Darlan, pledged to keep the Navy out of German hands, but the French had pledged to fight on before surrendeing to the Germans. It was a risk that could not be reasobly taken. It led to the action at Mers-el-Kébir (July 3). As a result, Vichy broke relations with Britain. This made it possible to recognize the French organizing around DeGualle as a kind of government in exile. DeGualle finally broke with Vichy after Petain decalred his plicy was to colaborate with the Germans.
Even in defeat, France was not an unimportant country. In fact the German war economy relied on France more than any other country. France had a substantial industrial and agricultural base. Hitler believed that the East would fuel the Geramn war economy, in fact it proved to be France. France also had military assessts. It had the fourth largest navy in the world. It had a substantial empire with important natural resources. And it had military fomations in those colonies. These forces would paly an imprtant role in the Middle Wst fighting North Africa, Utaly, and the liberation of France. The French also had gold as well as possession of Belgian and Polish gold. Gold was important to the Germans as it had to pay for neeed raw materials and manufactured goos being imported from countries it had not occupied (Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerlad, and Turkey). The raw materials were very important because Hitler had begun the War even though Germany needed to import many critical raw materials needed for the war effort.
Only a few French patriots joined DeGualle at first. FRance was a defeated nation. The French people wantd nothing more to do with the War. Only about 4,000 men joined DeGualle in in Britain. Mot of the French evacuated from Dunkirk returned to France, not staright into German POW camps. Only a few ships from France's large navy went over to DeGualle. All of the colonies at first reconized Bichy's authority. (This was in sharp contrast to the Belgian and Dutch colonies.) DeGualle saw Vichy as traitors. Vichy saw DeGualle as a deserter and rebel and condemned him to death in absentia. Petain at first was a highly respected figure, both because of his World War I role and because it ws widely believed that he had prevented a much more severe German occupation. Except for Jews and a few individuals, the Germans did not conduct the kind of horrendous occuption underway in the East. Of course what Petain and his Vichy associates did not understand was what Hitler and the NAZIs were planning for thm after the Germans had won tew War. French attitudes toward Vichy did not materially change until the Germans began tdemanding albor levys for war work in the Reich and German explotation of the French economy began creating severe shortages (1942).
DeGualle understanding that opertions in France were not possible, saw that the on;ly actions open to him ws to begin to gain control of the French colonial Empire which had solidy given their support to Vichy. The first cracks came in central Africa. As soon as it was clear that the British would and could continue to resist the Germans, although the outcome of the Battle of Britain as still in doubt, the French Central African colonies began going over to the Free French. Chad was the first to declare loyalty to the Free French (August 26, 1940). The other colonies quickly followed suit: Cameroon (August 27). French Congo (August 29), and Ubangi-Shari (August 30). Only Gabon retained its ties to Vichy. The allies occupied it (October 27 - November 12). The real prize was Senegal and it valuable port of Dakar. French fleet units were based there and the port could be invaluable to German U-boats. The Banque de France also has stored French, Belgian, and Polish gold there. Churchill issued orders for Operation Menance (August 8). It was to be a joint British-Free French operation. The Royal Navy provided the naval assetts for the operation. Success was based on DeGualle's assurances that the Vichy officials and French naval commanders would come over the Allied side. Churchill optimistially informed President Roosevelt (September 22). The Royal Navy task force reache Dakar (September 23). It proved be a disater. Govenor General Pierre Boisson remained loyal to Vichy. The Vichy forces not only did not go over to the Alies, but fired on and damaged three British ships. A factor here was that the Battle of Britain was raging at the town and many still expected the British to capitulate like the French had done. The Opration has to be abandoned (Septenber 25). The British did not want another Mers-el-Kébir or to get involved in a French civil war. The fiasco proved exteremy damaging to DeGualle. It could have ended his World War II role. Churchil despite the disappointment continued to support him. He stood up for him in the House of Commons debate (October).
The 1940 presidential election is arguably the most important election in American history. The first American President, George Washington, retired after two 4-year terms. This set a precedent that every other president had followed. FDR because of the international crisis decided to run for a third term which became a campaign issue. The national debate over neutrality and isolationism that had been raging since the mid-1930s reached its height. There were powerful spokesmen on both sides. Isolationist groups, such as the American Fist Committee, opposed any risks that could lead to war and shaply attacked the President's policies. International groups and an increasing number of average citizens demanded more active aid to Britain. His Republican opponent was a surprise choice, Wendell Willkie, a wealty busniessman who had swept the Republican primaries. Willkie did not crticise FDR's support for the democracies, by the time of the camapign only England. His nomination was an indication of the shift in public opinion toward intervention. Willkie instead pledged "all aid to the Democracies short of war". He attacked the New Deal on domestic issues, what he referred to as the socialistic policies of the Administration. Roosevelt's foreign policy was, however, an issue in the campaign. The isolationists led by the American First Committee accused Roosevelt of trying to drag America into the war. Speaking in Boston (October 30), the President assured his audinence, "I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." Usually the phrase was "foreign wars" and usually the President added, "unless we are attacked". The election was another victory for FDR, but not the landslide of previous camapigns. Still FDR carried 39 of the 48 states. The election, however, was much closer than suggested by the results. The President saw his re-election as strong pupblic support for a program of military preparedness and aid to Britain.
Churchill after the break with Vichy openly backed DeGualle. President Roosevelt did not. Rather the President played the Vichy option as part of its foreign policy. The President was not sold on DeGualle. Here the Dakar fiasco had been a factor. But there were a variety of factors that made recognizing Vichy a viable option. It was the only French Government operating in France. The President thought that Vichy could possibly be weaned away from the Germans. Vichy had important forces and still governed a subtanial portion of the county. Thus Vichy was more than DeGualle and Petain still enjoyed the spport of the French people. And of course America was still neutral and recognizing DeGualle would open the President up to criticism from the isolationists. The President sent a close associate, Admiral Lehy, to France to cultivate Petain. He sent Robert Murphy, a respected diplomat, to North Africa to cultivate Vichy forces there. He would begin to establish an American intelligence network ther. This would prove important with the Torch landings (November 1942).
After the Luftwaffe's failure in the Battle of Britain, Hitler had to postpone Opertion Sea Lion, the invasion of Britain. It is at this time he convinced himself that the only way to quickly defeat Britain before merica interbened was to invade the Soviet Union and seize the agricultural regions and natural resources of the East. As a preliminary step he met with Generalisimo Franco, Marshall Petain, and Il Duce Mussolini to get their support for his vast new enterprise, someting it is clear from Mein Kampf was his central focus fom an early point. Franco refused to allow Hitler to send German troops into Spain to seize Gibraltar. Petain refused to join the German war effort. He did, however, agree under the pressure of his minister to collaborate with Hitler. AP reports published in papers around the world reported in this development (October 27). One such report read, "LONDON, October 27. -- France has agreed to aid Germany as a result of Hitler's recent interviews with the leaders of the French Cabinet. It was officially announced at Vichy after a meeting of the Petain Cabinet that Marshal Petain and Hitler had agreed on the principle ofcollaboration for the reconstruction of peace in Europe. The method of applying the agreement would be examined later. This announcement indicates that Marshal Petain has succumbed to Hitler's threats and Laval's pressure. No information is available ro show how Hitler will exploit the assistance of the Vichy Government, but it is certain that it will be used to the utmost against Britain. Although the Vichy statement affirms that the collaboration will be entirely political and diplomatic, and not military, it is obvious that military advantages can be attached to it." ["France will aid Germany"]
After the Dakar fiasco, DeGualle visits the French African colonies that had come over to the Free French. He finds himself proclaimed as basically the savior of Frnce. By this time it is clear that there will be no British Vichy and not all hope is lost. Following Petain's collaboration statement, DeGualle proclaims that Vichy can no longer be seen as the legitimate government of France. He declared Vichy unconstitunional and under the control of the German occupier. He tells the people in the French collonies that therewas a 'sacred duty' to liberte Frnce and restore the country's honor. When he returns to London, he informs the asyonished British, "I am France." (November 1940) To the historically inclined, this sounds very much like Louis IV's reported statement, "L'État, c'est moi." ("I am the state.")
In the midst of the fighting in the Western Desert and the failed mission to rescue Greece, the pro-German governments in Iraq and Iran began to move against Britain thinking that the Germans would soon eliminate the British and Jewish presence in the Middle East. Sensing British weaskness, Rashid Ali in Iraq staged a pro-German coup (May 5) and seized control over much of the country. The Germans now in possession of airfields in Greece and Crete began moving supplies by air to these countries through air fields in Syria (May). Vichy permitted the operation. Churchill ordered a joint British and Free French force to be assembled. They invade Lebanon and Syriafrom Palestine (June 8).
. The British and Free French seized Damascus (June 17). Cut off without hope of resupply and without air cover, Dentz requested an armistice which was quickly signed (July 12). What might have been a splendid instance of British-Free French cooperation, unfortunayely turned into a major upset in the relationship as a result of DeGualle's instrangince. It was based on DeGualle;s belief that the British would grab French cilonies when ever given the chance.
British Gen. Jumbo Wilson commanding the invasion force, negitiated an aristice with the Vichy govenor of Syria. He essentially cut the Free French out of the administration of occupied Syria. This was a matter of military calculation. The operation in Syria and the related action in Iraq was diverting forces from the Western Desert where the Germans under ERwin Rommel were now involved. In a effort to end the fighing in Syria as soon as possible, Wilson striuck a deal with the Vichy authorities. DEGualle was outraged. He flew to Cairo and confronted Oliver Littleton, then Minister of State in the Middle East and close friend of Churchill. The meeting was recorded by Gen Edward Spears, Britain's liason with DeGualle. DeGualle told Littleton that he was removing the Free French from the British command structure (July 24). Spears reported that DeGualle was in the worst mood he had ever observed and outright rude. He looked frightful and was instanigent. He told Littleton that he was not intersted in winniung the war, but only for the position of France. He then went to the American Counsel in Beirut and repeated his complaints. The astionished Counsel reported the meeying to Washington. This helped confirm the growing American assessment thar FeGualle was not only intemperent, but a loose cannon. This was only one of several examples during the War that DeGualle was demanding that the British and later the American spill their in DeGualle's quiotic crusade to restore the honor of France even if it adversely affected the war effort. It was a great deal to ask while most Frenchmen had opted out of the war and collaborating with the Germans.
THe row in the Middle East was in sharp contrast to amitty developing between Britain and America in the last monts of peace for the Americans. President Roosevelt and Primeminister Churchill met at sea off Canada to issue the Atkantic Charter. This was the first step in forging perhaps the closest and most important military alliance in history.
Thus as DeGualle was creating a huge furror in the Middle East, Roosevelt and Churchill were cementing their relationship. And the American British military staffs were preparing the strategy to win the war and liberate France. While at the same time DeGualle was fuming and venbting his spleen against the British. It is likely that DeGualle's temperment was not improved because he was not invited to participate.
The full story of the next chapter in the Churchill-DeGualle relationship is not fully understood, largely because we do not know what was going on in DeGualle's mind. He was surely still stewing about the Syrian episode. The best that be said for DeGualle was that he may not have been aware that the Germans by this time were shooting every Jewish man, woman, and child they could lay their hands on in the East. De Gualle gave an interview with an American corresoundent, George Wellar with the Chicago Daily News (late-August). Wellar was a respected foreign correspondent. And the Chicaho Daily News was a very imporant paper. It did a lot of internatioanal work and syndaiacte more international reports than any other non-agency service. They dispached Weller to Brazzavile on the first anniversary of the Free French take over making Brazzaville the capital of liberated France. His assignment was to write a report on the Free French. DeGualle's comment defy belief. He drew parallels with Britain and Nazi Germany, using Vichy as go between. And the decesion not to fight served both countties purposes. His exact words said without hesitation, 'England is afraid'. (L'Angleterre a peur.) What, in effect, England is carrying on is a wartime deal with Hitler, in which Vichy serves as go-between. Vichy serves Hitler by keeping the French people in subjection and selling the French empire piecemeal to Germany. But do not forget that Vichy also serves England by keeping the French fleet from German hands. Britain is exploting Vichy in the same way as Germany does, the only difference is in the purpose. What is going on is an exchange of advantages which keeps the Vichy Government alive as long as noth Britain and Germany agree that it should exist. If Vichy should lend or lose its fleet to the Nazis, Britain would quickly bring the upanse about recognition to an end. And if Vichy should cease serving Hitler, Germany would dismanle Vichy herself." [Weller, p. 101.] He said a lot more, but drawing a parellel between the British and the NAZIs was unforegiveable. And all the time Churchill had been DeGualle's principal advovate in Allied councils. DeGualle seems to have had second thoughts. He attemptd to have the report cancelled. And Churchill understanably took offense when he heard of the intrview. It was Churchill who plucked DeGualle out of obscurity to make his Free French movement possible. And it was only the valliant British resistance that meant that the liberation of France would be possible. After returning from the Atlantic Charter meeing with President Roosevelt, he schuled a lunch with the General. The two met (September 12). They lunched together. No one knows just what was said, but they managed to patch up their differences.
A Japanese carrier task force attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor (Deceember 7, 1941). America was finally drawn into the War. And combined with the Red army offensoive before Moscow the strategic ballance of the War was irrevocably altered, although not immrdiately the miliary balance. As was the normal practice of the Axis, there was no consultation before the attack. The Germans, Italians, and Japanese wage thre own separate war agaonst the Allies. It was a stunning military victory and perhaps the grreatest strategic blunder in military history. Primeminister Churchill was at Checkers having dinner with the American Ambassador, John Gilbert Winant, when the Japanese attacked. Winant had replaced the isolationist Ambassador Kennedy the year before. They of course had been talking about the War. After dinner, the Primemiister brought out a radio as he always listened to the evening 9:00 pm BBC news broadcast. It was then that he learned of the Japanese attack. He had no idea at the time how serious the attack was or that the Japanese were also attacking British Far East outposts. His first reaction was to declare war in the Japanese, but his advisers pointed out that he could not declare war on the basis of a radio broadcast. So he plsce a call to President Roosevelt. He immediately asked the Presidebnt, "Is it true?" President Roosevelt replied, "Yes we are all in the same boat now." Perhaps the most sanguine and insightful assessment of the Pearl Harbor attack occurred in Britain. Primeminister Churchill later wrote in his menoirs, "Silly people, and there were many, not only in ememy countries, might discount the force of the United States. Some said they were soft, others that they would never be united. They would fool around at a distance. They would never come to grips. They would never stand blood-letting. Their democracy and system of recurrent elections would paralyse their war effort. They would be just a vague blur on the horizon to friend or foe. Now we should see the weakness of this numerous, but remote, wealthy, and talkative people. But I had studied the American Civil War, fought out to the last desperate inch. American blood flowed in my veins. I thought of a remark which Edward Grey had made to me than thirty years before -- that the United States is like 'a gigantic boiler'. Once the fire is lighted under it there is no limit to the power it can generate.' Being saturated and satisfied with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful." [Churchill, p. 507.] The Primneminister the next day moved a declaration of war through Prliament, hours before America declared war. President Roosevelt wanted him to hold off, but his message did not arrive in time. The Primeminister shortly after sailed for Washington to confer with his new war time ally--President Roosevelt (December 22). The White House would never be the same. The Primeminister addresses Congress the day after Christmas (December 26).
Saint Pierre and Miquelon are two tiny islands off Newfoundland at the entrance of Fortune Bay. The population was a mere 4,000 people. They are a residual of the French and Indian War. The French give up Canada, but insist on retaining the islands because they are close to the rich fishing grounds of the Grand Banks. The islands had a dictatorial Vicy administratof that spurned DeGualle and the Free French. On Christmas Eve while Churchill was in Washington conferring with President Roosevelt a tiny Free French naval squadron sailed into Saint-Pierre, the principal population center of the islands. The people are jubilent when the se the ships flying the French flag with the Free French Cross of Loraine. The Islanders embrace the small Free French force. This seemly minor event had unexpected ramifications. DeGualle and breached the action with the Americans and British. The Americans object because it would complicate relations with Vichy. DeGualle says that he will cancel the opration. He then changes his mind.
Secretary of State Hull denounces the action as a 'coup', convinced thatbhe had been deceaved. President Roosevelt who was not at first disturbed by the action backs Hull who threatened to resign if he did get the President;s support. The Isands were of littlke ijnterest to the President. The resignation of the Secretaru of State at the height of the Pearl Harbor crisis was. Churchill attempted to smooth over the whole affair with Hull, but the incensed Secretary refused to back down. Hull suggested a compromise, a Free French withdrawl and neutralization of the Islands. Churchill cabeled Eden to get Degualle assent. The United States threatened to seize the islands from the Free French. DeGualle characterically rejects any compromise. The British War Cabunent supports DeGualle. Hull finally cools down. The whole episode, however, confirmed the American view of DeGualle and unrelaiable and a loose cannon. It is woth noting that the Free French hold on to the islands and they are still French to this day.
After the dustoff over Saint-Pierre and Miquelon had settled down a bit. DeGualle decided he wanted to visit the colonies that had come over to the Free French. Churchill had still not recovered from all the problems DeGualle had created over Syria and with the Americans over two inconsequential islands. He sensed thatDeGualle was going to make more problems. He refused to provide DeGualle a plane, so he was stuck in England for a time.
Churchhill travelsto Washington to plan for Torch, the Anglo-American invasion of Vichy North Africa. Elenor became worried about affect on President Roosevelt's health. Churchill would keep the President up late drinking. The two were in their element. The talks were momentous, the first Allied offensive in the European theater. While in Washington, Rommel's Afrika Korps took the British strnghold of Tobruk and against OKW orders droc=ve into Egyot in an effort to take Suez. Churchill was visibly shaken . President Roosevelt approves masive increase of supplies for the British 8th army. The preliminary discussions over Torch is where the American problems with DeGualle came to the fore and why Secretary Hull made such an issue with over Saint-Pierre and Miquelon. The United States wanted to cultivate Vichy, hoping they could entice Pétain to switch sides. Now Vichy was collabofating with Hitler in a range of ways and by Hune even collaborating in the Holocaust, riunding up and dporting Jews in France. DeGualle was right in the sence that Vichy's hands were not clean. The Americans abd British were understandably concerned about casualties. Turning Vichy could save lives and substantial forces to the Allied orrder of battle. DeGualle's focus was on the hinor of France and and possible Anglo-American casualties of little or no concern. The Americans especially saw this as outrageous for a French leader dependent on America to liberate his country.
President Roosevelt cabeled Primeminister Churchill suggesting that the Americansshould run the Totch Offensive (September 2). The reason for this was the Vichy antimpathy to Britain. The British attck on the French fleet during July 1940 loomed large in Vichy. It was believed with good reason that Vichy was more likely to deal with the Americans than the British. Churchill understood this and agreed. And the bulk of the landing force was American. This of course brought the DeGualle issue to the fore. Vichy would have no dealings with DeGualle and this included the Vichy commanders in North Africa. The President cabeled Churchill asking that DeGualle be kept out of the picture (September 16). This put Churchill in a difficult position as he had to keep Torch, the liberaion of french North frica, secret from DeGualle and the Free French. Based on his experiences with DeGualle, however, he undertood the necesity to do so. DeGualle would not only complicate dealings with Vicy commanders, but also make it more difficult to keep the landings secret, a critical element needed for the success of the operation. And the Americans came up with an alterative French leader that they belieced would prove more acceptable to the Vichy commanders--General Henri Honoré Giraud. He had escaped from a German POW camp. (He had done the same in World War I.) The Americans optimistically gave him the code name 'Kingpin'.
As the countdown to the Torch landings approached, Prime Minister Churchill cabeled the President, insisting that DeGualle had to be told (Npvember 5). The Presidented replied that it was inadvisible. At the same time, Admiral Darlan, a top Vuchy official flew to Algiers (November 5). The trip was uunrekated to Torch, but placed him in Algietrs just days before the scheduled landings. Darlan was a leaing collaborator Vichy collaborator, but saw that the course of the War was beginning to shift. He would be the top Vichy commabder in North Africa as Torch progressed. The Allies spirit Gen. Giraud out of France and take him to Gibraltar (November 7). Gibraltar was General Eisenhower's headquaters for Torch. OKW begins to put together what is happening, but the landings will come as a great surprise. OKW can basically thank Hitler for Torch. If Hitler had nor declared war on America immediately after Pearl Harbor, an Anglo-Americann offensive would have been delayed. A group of some 400 French patriot arrest Vichy leaders in Algiers, including Darlan (November 8). At the same time DeGualle is woken up to be informed of the landings. He has lunch with Churchill. Vichy military frees Darlan. He is unsure how to proceed. He decides on a mixed response. He orders a local ceasefire in Algiers, but does not instruct commanders in Casablanca and Oran not to resist. Heavy fighting ensues. He also orders the Vichy commander in Tunisia not to resist German interbention, allowing the Germans to seize the ports and airfields. Hitler only days before the Soviet Stalingrad offensive, orders a major commitment of the Whermacht strategic reserve into Tunisia. Eisenhower flies Giraud inyo Algiers, but finds he has next to no influence with the Vichy commanders there (November 9). It is Darlan that continues to diminate the Vichy command. General Mark Clark lands and persuades Darlan to order a ceasefire. Churchill wanted DeGualle involved and raises the issue with the President (November 11). President Roosevelt did not want DeGualle involved. His attitude was that it was American and British blood being spilled to liberate French soil, the French should do what they were told.
President Roosevelt had no interest in involving General DeGualle in the administration of newly won French North Africa. General Eisenhower whose primary concern was military struck a deal with Darlan (November 13). Here we see a major difference between the American and British military. British commanders had some training and focus on political issues. Here we have a long history of Euopean warfare. West Point graduates were trained in th military arts, but there was a long tradition of abstaining from politicl involvement. It is not accident that Eisenhower wa not prepared to deal with the complicated political issues the allies encountered in North Africa. His interest was to stop the fighting with the Vichy forces as quickly as possible so the business of fighting the Germns could begin. And the fastest route was to make a deal with Darlan, even if he was an arch collaborationist. And Vichy including the NorthAfrican Vichy officials were actively pursuing ati-Semetic policies. Eisenhower's deal involved accepting Darlan
as the head of the French Government in North Africa. Giraud ws given command of the military. The result was a fire storm of criticism in America , revulsion of a deal with an arch collaborator. Eisenbhower's deal made military sense. American and French lives were saved. Politically it was a disastr. President Roosevelt backed Eisenhower. He called it a 'temporary expedient' and explained that it was "OK to walk with devil until you cross the bridge'. Darlan thinking he had won, showed his true colors. He arreste and umprissoned Free French supporters. And he continued to enforce Vichy anti-Semetic laws. This could have developed into a major rift. Thankfully a French patropt shot Darlan (December 24). This ended the affair almost immeditely. There was relief in London. The President called it 'murde in the first degree'. We are not sure about his true feelings, but abtipathy to DeGulle ws surly a factor.
With Morocco and Algeria secured, the Allies held their first war-time conference in the nwly won Morrocan city of Casblanca (January 14-23). The purpose was to to decide how to continue the war. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill brough their civilian and milirary staffs. Major decesions were made just as the Around-the Clock strategic bombardment of Germany. France was of course an important topic. Even though the conference was to be held on French territory, DeGualle was not informed of the Confrence and was still in London. President Roosevelt was insisting that Giraud suceed Darlan as the head of the French administration in North Africa, but he also wanted the two genrals brought together to present a united front. This set in motion one of the most inane charades in World war II diplomatic history. Churchill from Casablanca invited DeGualle (January 16). DeGualle was understandably indignant about being kept in the dark and now summoned to a meeting on French territory. He refleibely refused the invitation (January 17). On the same day Giraud flies in from Algiers. Giraud was a brave man and a competent soldier, but as one observer at the time said, "His nobel brow was never furrowed by effort at thought." Roosevelt was not impressed with GGiraud. He was not a carismatic, inspiring figure. He was, however, suitably compliant. DeGualle in contrast was seen as a loose cannon and all-around pain in the neck. Robert Murphy has stronly recommened Giraud as the man the French would rally around. Roosevelt pronounced him a 'dud'. Even so, Roosevelt continued to support Giraud and as his man was now in Csablanca. and he began needling the British, "I have got the bridgegroom Where is the bride"
Churchill caught in the middle, renewd the invitation to DeGualle (January 18). He also menbtioned that the invitation came from Roosevelt as well. Churchill tells Eden, "The man must be mad to jeporize the whole future of the relation of his movement with the United States." He was summoned again. Not only were personal realtions mixed up in the affair, but DeGualle was particularly distirbed that that the Americans and British were trying to get him as he saw it to 'swallow Vichy'. More British cables follow (January 20). An the French National Committee in London begins to pressure DeGualle. He finally gives in and agrees to fly to Csablanca. He refyues, however to rush. DeGualle arrives in Csablanca (January 22). He has lunch with Guraud. Giraud recounts his escape story with gusto. DeGualle listens and asks "And just how was it that you became captured?" Next was a meeting with Churchill. Here Churchill was pushiung the idea of DeGualle and Giraud serve as joint chairmen of a new French Committe which would include Vichy North African authorities. DeGualle's movement at the time included a small group in Britain and control of colonie with only small French populations and military forces. Allied possession of North Africa was a came changer. North Africa, especially Algeria, had a substantial French population. And the Vichy military contingent, while poorly armed, was larger than all the military forces DeGualle controlled. While not a huge force, France could essentially be back in the War, especially once the Americans armed the French with modern weapons. Cooperation with Vichy authorities was, however, anethma to DeGualle. He tells Churchill, "I don't think you yourself would take the suggestion seriously. This set the stage for the meeting with Roosevelt. Th meeting took place (January 24). DeGualle was still holding out. Roosevelt wanted a show of French unity. He manages to concince DeGualle to shake hand with Giuraud for the photographers. DeGualle is visibly unhappy and even more so when he has to do it again when some photographers mossed the shot. DeGualle did not want to do it the first time. Roosevelt insisted. The Briish taircraft assigned to take Degualle back to Britain broke down. DeGualle's attitude toward the Americans was shown when he refused an American plane saying American pilots did not know how to navigate and he would wind up in occupied France.
DeGualle tought he came out well. President Roosevelt was putting on a show of amity. There was rising hostility and distrust of DeGualle with both Roosevelt and Churchill because of DeGualle's performance.
DeGualle after Casablanca wanted ro visit the Free Frenh territories. Churchill after the experiences in Casablanca thiught he intended to stir up trouble. He ordered Foreign Ministr Eden not to allow him to leave Britain. DGuallw without aircraft neded British assiatance. Churchill not only ordered that he not be allowed to go, but in a note to Eden authorized the use of force (February 27). This did not prive necessary and the note di not become public until well after the War. Churchill's major concern at the time was the relation with Roosevelt and DeFualle's potential for complicating that relationship. Eden reported to Churchill on essentially th streps taken to cage DeGualle in Britain (March 10). MI5 notified port and airport authoriites and bugged DeGualle's offices.
DeGualle's thinking appears to have crystalized at thgus time. He saw no possibility of a long-term alliance with the 'Anglo Saxons' (America and Britain). He invisioned a future of Europe against the Americans. He told intimates, "We will be reconsiled with the Fritzes." It is unclear just how much he knew about NAZI war crimes at the time or future plans foe France. And DeGualle wanted to go to Moscow to negoitate an alliance with the Soviets. Again we are unsure just what he knew about Soviet war crimes and intentions..
While DeGualle stewed in Britiain, the FrRench people eenbtially settled the issue over the country's. This is what DeGualle wound up with personal ab=nimosities with Roosevelt and Churchill did not fully appreciate. oosevelt and Churchill, however, much they found DeGualle an irritation would in the end accept the judgement of the French people. And here the trend although not entirely visible at the time was in DeGuallke's favor. French forces in North africa were rallying to Degualle's Free French movment and not to and not Giraud. More important, but less inderstood at the time was the shift of opinion in German occupied France. Pétain and Vichy enjoyed comsiderable support after the German victory and occupation (June 1940). The Frrench people were probanly correct that Vichy saved them from the full force of German occupation, but less understood by both Vichy and the French population that this was at the convience of Hitler. He seems to understood in the West what he did not in the East, that auit, quiessent France was a great asset in the German war economy. Nor do the French apear to have understood that when the Germans won the War, Hitler and he NAZIs in the ost-War era could do what they willed with France. General support for Vichy continued in 1941 even when it became clear that Britib would not fall. Support for Vichy only began to change in 1942. German reverses in the East and American entry in the war, began to give hope hat the Germans would not win the War. Amnd even more importantly, German occupation policies began to change. The Germans suffering huge causualties in the Soviet Winter Offensive (December 1941), began to rationalize the ecomomy. And the drafting of workets created lbor shortage. This meant that foreiugn workers had to be consripted to replace conscripted German workers. More than anything, the forced conscription of French workers exposed the fiction that Vichy ws protecting the French people from the Germans. And not only was the French population beginning to shift from Vichy to the Resiistance, but also uniting behind DeGulle.
During this time De Gaulle spoke repeatedly by radio to the French people who came to see him as the real hope of France. There were divisions among the anti-Vichy French, but De Gaulle emerged as the most popular figure in occupied France and the non-Communist opposition to Vichy coalesced around him. The General once an unknown military figure became in the mind of more and more French people, the voice of the nation and symbolized the hope of liberation. This of course was not immediately apparent. Under German occipation the French people had no way of openly expressinbg their alleginces.
The Allies after long campaign and driven the Germans into a small pocket in northeast Tunisia and massed for a final attack on Tunis and Bizerte. At the very moment of victory, DeGualle gives a speech criticizing American efforts (May 4). President Roosevelt was incensed. Here was a nation defeated and occupied for which America was expending its blood and treasure to resue, complaining about that rescue. Roosevelt saw him as not only ungratful, but in his mind a potential Napoleon, meaning military dictator. DeGualle insisted that the Free French wer the soverign government of France. Days later, Americand British armored units entered Bizerte and Tunis (May 7). The remaining Axis troops surender (May 13). Some 230,000 Axis soldiers are taken as POWs. The Allies stage a victory parade (May 20). Giraud in Tunis takes the salute in the victory parade. Roosevelt cables his congratulations to Guraud, but sends no message to DeGualle.
The split between Roosevelt and DeGualle became complicatd by personal issues, but there were major differences. nd th primary difference was war aims. For Roosevelt, the primary objective was to defeat the ermans as quickly as possible. Anything or anyone that took the focus away from that single objective was a sistraction and interference. This is the primary objection that the President had with DeGualle. It is akso probably part of the reason that the President did not give due attention to the Holocaust, The POresident believed that winning the war as rapidly as possible was not only the best policy for the Allies, but the bes way of saving the occupied people as well. THis was not how DeGualle saw the Warand at one time even told the British that he did not care who won the War. Prsunably that was said in a pixque of Galic anger, but it exemplified DeGualle's different view of the War. For DeGualle the primary war aim was to restore the honor of France. Thus there could be no cooperation with Vichy. The Free French had to be undisputed leaders of France.
Gen. Giraud despite Roosevelt's support unedrstood that he would have to share power with DeGualle. Church worried that DeGualle was adversely affecting relation with President Roosevelt. The President forwards Churchill a memo on DeGualle. Churchill met with the War Cabinet and asks about wether they should not elimiate DeGualle as a poliitical force. The War cabinet refuses. DeGualle landed in Algiers. He was greeted by Giraud. War aims.. FDR only interested in victory. After intense negoatiations, a 7-member French Committe for National Liberation is established (June 3). DeGualle saw it as an agreement on provision for te futur government of an liberate France. DeGualle and Giraud were co-chairmen. Proceedings within the Committee did not go smoothly. A power struggle began immediately betwwen the DeGualle and Giraud sypporters. DeGualle resigned in protest. For President Roosevelt this was welcome news. It was, howeverm a bluff on DeGualle's part. In fact the Comittee could not function without him. He rejpoined the Comittee days latr (June 14). The Committee wa expanded to 14 members leaving DEGualle and he Free French in control. Robert Murphy reported the developmets to President Roosevelt. The President cabeled Churchill insisting on a break with DeGualle (June 17). But to do this he needed agreemnent from Churchill and the British War Caninet. Eden was not at all impressed with the idea. And Churchill did not want to break up the Comittee. At this point another possibility presented itself possibly providing a way of sispending with DeGualle. DeGualle was trying to remove
Pierre Buossan, the former Vichy Governor General in Dakar who had sitched sides (June 18). It was Buossan who ws instrumental in bating off the Anglo-Free French attempt to take Dakar fom Vichy that had damahed DeGialle's credibiliy (September 1940). Even though Buossan had switched sides, DeGualle wanted him out. President Roosevelt saw the affair asa way of getting DeGualle out. The President cabeled Eisenhower, Keep Buossan (June 22). Both Eisenhower and his close associat Gen. Bedal Smith were disturbed by the President's ords, mainly because it involved in French politics which they were already shown not to be very adept at. The whole affair resolved itself when demonstrations in Dakar convince Buossan to resign (June 24). soon De Gualle wasin contol of the Comittee )Late-Summer). Giraud resigns from the Committee, but retains his military command.
American attitudes toward DeGualle were divided. The President detested him. It is difficult to separate political assessment from personl emnity. At any rate the offical policy wa that the United states should not want to recgonize a French leader until the Grench people chose one in a democratic election. And the President saw DeGualle as an impediment here. Some like Secretary Hull who himself had runins ith DeGualle saw peronal issues as affecting the President's judgment. Thge President alo came to dislike Eden, i part because of his support for DeGualle. The military tended to see DeGualle and the Free Frech differntly. Eisenhower and other generals wer impressed with the fighting spirit of the Free French in North Africa even though they were equipped with largely obsolete arms. Anbd this imprssion ws confirmed in Italy after they were reuipped with modernb American equipmnt. Mny saw DeGualle as the best French fighting leader.
Britain with the U-boats defeated in the Birth tlantic finllyh consented with the Americans to begin planning for an immense cross-Channel invasion to liberate France (November 1943). Presidnt Roosevelt to Gnral Marshal's disappointment chose Gen Eisenhower to oversse the invasion perations (December 1943). General Eisnhower who had been overseeing the Sicily and Italian campaign flews to England to assume his command (January 1944). Presidenbt Roosevelt
made it clear that there would be no political discussions with DeGualle about France's political future. This presented a problm for Eisenhower because the Free French controlled the reistance, an important source of information on German preparations. There was also the problem as to how to keep order in libeated territory. Eisenhower did not want to divert Ameerican resources to this task. Churchill tried with little success to soften thePresident's views.
Jyne 14
- DG arrives in Beueaux.
- Aclaimed by the Fremch. We just have to present the Americans with an accolplisged act. He just priceeded to set up a French Gov, no occupation regume.
- FDR was wring. DG was who the Frebch wanted.
Juky 6
DG arrives in Was, but only 17 gun salute
Cremony and press reports more like head od state
Warmly welcomed by FDR and Hull in Whute Gouse
On to NY heros welcome
FDR reconizes DG Committee as temp civil autority.
FDT free of stain of appeasemet and oppotyism
CgATE, SINF mAR
aUG 25, dg ARRIVES IN pARIS.
oCT fdr AND cHURCH RECONIZE TE fRENCG cMMITTE AS THE PROVISION gov of France
Churchill, Winston S. Memoirs of the Second World War (Bonanza Books: New York, 1959), 1065p. This is the abridged version by Denis Kelly of Churchill's epic World War II memoirs.
Davidson, Eugene. The Unmaking of Adolf Hitler (Univesity of Missouri: Columbia, 1996), 519p.
Fest, Joachim C. Hitler (Vintage Books: New York, 1974), 844p.
Weller, George. Weller's War: Weller's War: A Legendary Foreign Correspondent's Saga of World War II on Five Continents (Random House: 2010), 543p.
"France will aid Germany," The Courier-Mail (Brisbaine) (October 28, 1940), p.1.
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