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Decolonization took on greater force in Africa as Britain and France begin to grant independence to their colonies. The increasing violence, international pressure, and demands from colonial people who had begun to organize convinced most Europeans, including the Belgians that independence was inevitable. Portugal was the only country determined to resist. The Mau-Mau uprising in Kenya was defeated, but only with brutal repression. The British and others realized that similar operations were not possivle throughout the Empire. And the Belgians realized that they did not have the military capability to hold the vast Comngo by force. The Belgians as part of a belated effort to prepare the colony for the future held municipal elections in Léopoldville (modern Kinshasa) (1957). The Alliance des Ba-Kongo (Abako) won the election. This was a tribal-based party promoting the interests of the Bakongo tribal group. It was headed by Joseph Kasavubu. He championed a an independent Congo based on a federalist structure in which the Bakongo could enjoy adegree of autonomy in their area of the Congo. A firey, more radical political orator emerged during the transition period--Patrice Lumumba. Unlike Kasavubu, he belonged to a minor tribe and wanted a more centralized state. He founded the Congo's first nationwide party, the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) (1958). The Belgian Government sponsored talks in Brussels to consider the limited measures to to fashion a degree of self rule. When they began there was no sense of urgency and conditions in the Congo were calm. This changed with riots in Léopoldville and after aborted elections and rising violence, Belgian authorities concluded that they could no longer govern the Congo. The Belgians tried to arrange a 4-year transition. Congolese delegates from 13 policies at the Brussels Round Table conference demanded immediate independence. The delegates vying for power squabeled about everything with one exception. They were adament on immeduate independence. Belgium wanting no part of a potentially bloody and costly colonial war, gave in. Independence was set for June 30, 1960.
Decolonization took on greater force in Africa as Britain and France begin to grant independence to their colonies. The increasing violence, international pressure, and demands from colonial people who had begun to organize convinced most Europeans, including the Belgians that independence was inevitable. Portugal was the only country determined to resist. The Mau-Mau uprising in Kenya was defeated, but only with brutal repression. The British and others realized that similar operations were not possivle throughout the Empire. And the Belgians realized that they did not have the military capability to hold the vast Comngo by force.
The Belgians attempted to structure a future relationship with the Congo permitting a degree of Congolese autonmy, but still remaining in control. The mechanism was an undemocratic and regionally based electoral system. The Belgians as part of a belated effort to prepare the colony for the future held municipal elections in Léopoldville (modern Kinshasa) (1957).
The Alliance des Ba-Kongo (Abako) won the election. This was a tribal-based party promoting the interests of the Bakongo tribal group. It was headed by Joseph Kasavubu. He championed a an independent Congo based on a federalist structure in which the Bakongo could enjoy a degree of autonomy in their area of the Congo.
A firey, more radical political orator emerged during the transition period--Patrice Lumumba. Unlike Kasavubu, he belonged to a minor tribe and wanted a more centralized state. He founded the Congo's first nationwide party, the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) (1958).
The Belgian Government sponsored talks in Brussels to consider the limited measures to to fashio a degree of self rule. When the talks began there was no sense of urgency and conditions in the Congo were calm.
Complacency in Brussels changed when riots began in Léopoldville (January 4, 1959). The riots were sparked when Belgian colonial authorities banned a scheduled political rally. Belgian authirities did not permit supporters of the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO) assemble for their rally. Rioters looted and burned shops, broke into houses, and attacked Belgians and other Europeans. The police responded with force and many Congelese were killed and wounded. Thirty-four Congolese were killed.
Most Congolese lived in rural areas. The Belgiand could control the cities by force, but the vast countryside was a very different matter. The Léopoldville Riots was a catalyst for raising political
awarness in the country side. The new political parties which were largely based in the cities began organizing in the countryside. The result was that political awareness and discontent with the Belgian colonial regime increased remakedly. The rural populations began protesting Belgian rule just like the urban population--a relatively new phemonenon. The Congolese began to feel empowered to resist Belgian rule. They began ‘testing’ the Belgian authorities in a variety of ways. Political leaders essentially dared them to 'punish' the population, knowing that Belgian attempts to use force would likely only escalate the violence.
But when the Belgians did not respond, this only resulted in empowering the Congolese. This was not just violent actions, but many other acts of resistance to the Belgian administration, Families refused to participate in the cenus. Congolese would refuse to stand at attention before administrators as was expected eralier. Others would respond slowly to orders. Others began to answer back. And altercations or fights with Europeans began to become common place. This was a phenomenal psychological shift which had begun in urban areas. And it created a poplation ripe for political mobilization by the new political parties. The parties began to channel and organize the rage that existed toward Belgian rule.
The Parti Solidaire Africain only began to organize (May 1959). This was shortly after the Léopoldville Riots. They proved very effective in rural communities. They offered an entitely Congolese institution to rural communties and had a sovialist orientation. Often the first Congolese institution to reach them. As a result they acquired an aural of legitimacy and began to build a sense of national pride and unity. And with this the APC provided a way to resist the Belgian administration. The AOC forged an alliance with the regionally based ABAKO, the other important political party at the time. There were many other smaller parties forming, but APC and ABKO were by far the most important. The PSA leadership organized and dispateched propaganda teams into the countryside to recruit and rural villagers. Many found enthusiastic support for taking action against the Belgians cntroling their lives. As the APC began to grow and gain supporters, they began to provide services formerly provided by the Belgian administration, notably security and judicial systems as well as controlling the tax system. This allowed them to begin to control other systems like heathcare. The PSA began to opperate like a kind of quasi-government. The PSA attempted to pursure their program through non-violence. The PSA urged their supporters to ‘stayg calm and not engage in violence.’ The PSA circulated pamphlets and articles among the party organizers arguing that violence was counter productive criticed those involved with violence. Commenting on a violent incident, Katshunga, a party leader, wrote, “I regret this act of violence, and you do so also, it should not recur because it is against our doctrine. Tell this, and re-tell it, to the children and to all those who are excited especially at such moments.”
The Belgian Government attempted to control the situation by commiting to independence at some unspecified future date. King Baudouin declareed the Government's intention to offer full independence.
Elections for a territorial assembly were previously set for December 1959. The Belgians set up an electoral system that would lead to Congolese leaders favorable to them would winning the election. The Belgian plan was to defeat the radicals by appeasing the populatiom with a moderate government that they could continue to influence. In reality, the Congolese probably would have been better off if they had retained ties with the Belgians. But it is also the case that it was only possible if the Belgians controlled ansd manipulated the electoral process. The Belgians contined to hope that moderate reforms could counter the desire for independence. The electorate was restricted to men. We are not sure just how this affected the vote. When Belgian authorities announced the elections, intense political activity begins. Consequential political activity was a new phenomenon for the Congolese. They had had virtually no say in the colonial adminitration. The parties that emerged were primary established along tribal lines. For most Congolese the tribes were virtually their only alleginces. There was no concept ofCongolese narinlity. The Congolese formed a myriad of political parties. More than 50 parties were officially registered (November 1959). There were two exceptions to the tribal based organization. One was the PSA which had made considerable progress in the countryside, especially in Kwango and Kwilu Districts. The other party without a tribal base was the Lumumba's e Mouvement National Congolais (MNC). The MNC had a nmore national base. Both the PSA and MNC had a strng socialist orientation, an orientation fairly common anong Third world leaders at the time. There were also two other particularly important paries, both tribal-based parties with substantial regional support. Kasavubu's ABAKO party was supported by the Bakongo people in the coastal region. This was the region around Léopoldville and the powerful trading kingdom of Kongo (15th-17th centuries). The other was a party founded by Moise Tshombe in the mineral-rich southeastern province of Katanga. The PSA and MNC urged their menbers to boycott the Belgian-organized elections. Their members were instructed not to register or participae in the election. The PSA had contacts with the Belgium government and there were negotiations as they worked out the precise terms and process of protesting the Belgian electoral system. ABAKO joined the protest. The PSA and ABAKO formulated a joint memo to the Belgian government informing them that they would boycott the December elections “as long as the electoral procedures remain undemocratic” (September 27, 1959). The Belgian Government was determined to continued with the elections. They failed to understad the degree to which political parties like PSA, ABAKO, and MNC had gained support among the Congolese people as well as the anti-Belgian passion anong the population. There was considerable appeal for an election that offered self-government. The PSA and other parties had to work hard and convincing the Congolese people of their view that the Belgians were deceiving them. Belgian authorities began arresting Congolese men who tried to avoid registering for the election. Belgium officials threateed 7 days in jail and a fine of 500 francs. This soon proved impossible because so many Congolese supported the boycott. There were arrests, but they had little impact. This protest movement proved extremely successful for a variety of reasons. The results were stunning and unlike aby other country moving toward independence. In some areas participation ranged about 30-60 percent. These were areas with large European populations or where ABAKO and PSA had not organized. In other areas participation were negligible: Bas-Congo (5 percet) and Kwilu (1 percent). [Weiss] The elections proved to be a non-event. The boycott was so widespread that it essentially invalidated the results. This led to serious violence.
The overwhelming success of the boycott stunned Belgian officials. This and rising violence convinced Belgian officials that they could no longer govern the Congo. And they were not prepared to wage a bloody and probably drawn out colonial war. And there was no support among the Belgian people for such an action because of a general ethical view that colonial people had a right to indeoendence even if it meant breaking ties with Belgium. The potential cist of a colonial war was anoyther factir. The wars in Indonesia, Algeria, and Vietnam were all indicators of what might lie ahead in the Congo. International pressure was also involved. Soviet propaganda was anti-colobial, except for their colonies in Eastern Europe as well as within the Soviet Union itself. And the United States supported de-colonization and self-determination even though the colonial powers were allies.
The Belgian Government after the failed December 1959 election invited 96 individuals from 13 parties to another conference in Brussels -- the Round Table Talks (January 20, 1960). Lumumba, Kasavubu and Tshombe are among the most important Congolese delegates. The Belgian Government proposed a 4-year transition period leading to independence. The delegates juggling for power agreed on virtually nothing with the exception that they were not prepared wait. The mutully aagonistic delegates put up a united front on immediate independence. They refused to compromise on this. Belgium which has no intention of fighting a colonial war, eventually yielded and agreed to a hoplessly flawed rush to independence. Free democratic elections for the new government were set for May. Independence would then be granted -- June 30, 1960.
Weiss, Herbert F. Political Protest in the Congo; the Parti Solidaire Africain during the Independence Struggle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1967)..
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