Figure 1.--.

The Eisenhower Administration in the 1950s sought to achieve a balance in the Israeli-Arab conflict based on the assuntion that if no country had an advantage, there would be no resumption of fighting. The tripartite U.S.-British-French declaration established the policy of not making arms sales to either side. The Kennedy and Johnson Administratioin continued this policy. Nasser after the War attempted to explain the Egyptian defeat by perpretrating the lie that the Egyptian Aur Force was attacked by the 6th Fleet which was deployed in the Mediterranean. This lie is still widely believed in Egypt. Actually U.S. policy at the time was not at all committed to the defense of Israel. The U.S. Defense Department reportedly secretly drew up operational plans for a military confrontation with the Israel Defense Forces to prevent Israel from occupying territory in Arab countries, especially Egypt. As the crisis developed in May-June 1967, the plan developed by the Defense Department planners involved an attack on Israel in the event it initiated a war with the Arabs. The military plan involved using air attacks, paratroopers, and Marines to stop IDF armored spearheads in the Sinai. This was during the peak of the Viet Nam War. The U.S. military prepares many such contingency plans. I am not sure if there was a similar plan prepared if the Arabs attacked. The primary American effirt at the time to defuse the situation was a diplomativ effort to organize an international convoy to break the Egyptian blockade by sending ships through the Straits of Tiran, suposedly defusing the situation. The plan was code-named Regatta and 26 countries were asled to contribute ships. Conress and 24 of the countries invited rejected the plan.

American Policy

The Eisenhower Administration in the 1950s sought to achieve a balance in the Israeli-Arab conflict based on the assuntion that if no country had an advantage, there would be no resumption of fighting. The tripartite U.S.-British-French declaration established the policy of not making arms sales to either side. The Kennedy and Johnson Administratioin continued this policy. This acrtually was a repetition of the policy in Spain during the Spanish Civil War (1930s). At thsat tme the Fascists supplied Franco with large quantities of arms. In the Middle East, the Soviets shipped large quantities of modern arms to the Arabs, especially Egypt, Sria, and Iraq. The Isrealis managed to convince the French to sell them Mirrage aircraft, largely because of the beneits tonFrench air craft companies. American policy was to maintain the 1949 armistice lines. TheUnited States opposed to Egypt (the stringest Arab state) and allied countries destroying Israel. It was also oppsed to Isrealm seizing the West Bank or Sianai. American pressure forced the IDF back from El Arish in Operation Horev (1949) and from Sinai (1956). This would be repeated when the IDF encircled Egypt's Third Army at the cloes of Yom Kippur War (1973).

President Johnson (1963)

The Kennedy Administration had oppsed the nuclear reactor at Dimona. President Kennedy's assassination brought Vice-President Lyndon Johnson to the presidency. opposition to the reactor at President Johnson was more open to Israel including the reactor issue. Secretaries of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert Macnamara continued in their post. President Johnson appointed three importan national defense advisres that were well disposed toward Israel: Walt Rostow (National Security Adviser, Richard Helms (CIA Director), and General Earle Wheeler (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).

6th Fleet

Nasser after the War attempted to explain the Egyptian defeat by perpretrating the lie that the Egyptian Aur Force was attacked by the 6th Fleet which was deployed in the Mediterranean. This lie is still widely believed in Egypt. Actually U.S. policy at the time was not at all committed to the defense of Israel.

Defense Department Planning

The U.S. Defense Department reportedly secretly drew up operational plans for a military confrontation with the Israel Defense Forces to prevent Israel from occupying territory in Arab countries, especially Egypt. As the crisis developed in May-June 1967, the plan developed by the Defense Department planners involved an attack on Israel in the event it initiated a war with the Arabs. The military plan involved using air attacks, paratroopers, and Marines to stop IDF armored spearheads in the Sinai. This was during the peak of the Viet Nam War. The U.S. military prepares many such contingency plans. The military organization responsible was Strike Command (STRICOM). It had been established by President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara (January 1962). The purpose was to oprovide a fully ready force that could be deployed on very short notice to world trouble spots. At the time they were thinking about Europe and Korea. STRICOM theoretically had 225,000 men at its disposal, organized into eight infantry divisions and more than 50 combat, transport and refueling squadrons. The actual force which could be deployed immediately was a small airborne force to assist a threateed government or rescue civilians. STRICOM deployed forces in the Congo and the Dominican Republic. The Defnse Department planners, however, lagged behind developments and the Israeli Air Force and armored divisions succeeded before interbention could even be considered. The Defense Department instead primarily acted to extricate Americans from Jordan. The commander of Strike Force athe time of the Six Day Warr was was Four-Star General Theodore John ("Ted") Conway. Conway had traveled in the Mddle East. Hre had close relations with Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia and Jordanian King Hussein. He visited Cairo for meetings with chief of staff, Mahmoud Fawzi, shortly before the War. The Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered STRICOM to refresh the emergency plans for intervention in an Israeli-Arab war. There was a plan to aid Israel and anther to aid the Arabs. [Joint Chiefs.] As events unfolded. the IDF air strikes abnd armored drives move faster than STRICOM could adjust its plans. [Weinstein] STRICOM was disbanded (1971) and replaced by Readiness Command which in tutrn was replsaced by Central Command (CENTCOM). This was the command for both the liberation of Kuwait and the invasion of Iraq.

International Convy Plan

The primary American effirt at the time to defuse the situation was a diplomativ effort to organize an international convoy to break the Egyptian blockade by sending ships through the Straits of Tiran, suposedly defusing the situation. The plan was code-named Regatta and 26 countries were asked to contribute ships. Conress and 24 of the countries invited rejected the plan.

Sources

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cable No. 5886, May 20, 1967

Weinstein, L. ""Critical Incident No. 14," Institute for Defense Analyses (Washington), February 1968. This report at the time was classified.

Created: 8:05 AM 6/20/2007
Last updated: 8:05 AM 6/20/2007