Figure 1.--Here an American tank factory is shuftung over from the make-shift M-3 Grant to the M-4 Sherman. The United States fought World War II with a much smaller number of Army divisions than had been anticipated--only 90 divisions. A range of factors went into that decision, one of the most important was the need to maintain the American industrial work force for the Arsenal of Democracy. Tanks are an iconic symbol of World War II and the Germans Panzers are the most famous. Amazingly, the Germans despite having a substantial potential, were massively out built by America and the Soviet Union.

One of the central issues the United States Armt had to answer was how many divisions would be beeded to fight World War II . primarily meant what was needed to defeat NAZI Germany. From the beginning, even before entering the War, the Army and President Roosevelt designated Germany/Europe First as the chief objective. The estimates of the number of divisions varied wideky over time. The exitence of the French Army meant that a limited number of divisions might be needed if Amerucan entered the War. The fall of France meant that 1) American would eventually have to come into thr War and 2) a larger commitment than in World War I would be beeded. War Department planner, General Lesley McNair, estimated that over 200 divisions would be needed and that was before Pearl Harbor. After Pearl Harbor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff came up with am estimate of 334 divisions. Overall, Germany with a much smaller pooulation deployed some 300 divisionsm -- actually more if you calculate reconstutted divisions. Of course armies are only part of the miltary equation. Germany mobilized 11 percent of its population. Britain mobilized 8 percent. America would be only slightly below the British level. [Matloff] The final American division number was in part defined by the war in the East. If the Red Army collapsed a higher number of divisions would be needed. As the Red Army held in 1942, Gen. Marshal could bring down that number--finally to only 90 divisions. It was a huge gamble. And Marshal has been criticized for it. One Army historian explains why such a low number was finally set, "The problem as well as the answer stemmed basically from the fact that the Allies had from the beginning accepted the proposition that the single greatest tangible asset the United States brought to the Allied coalition in World War II was the productive capacity of its massive industrial base. From the very beginning, American manpower calculations were closely correlated with the needs of war industry." [Matloff] It was the war that President Roosevelt even before it was clear that America would enter the War. The United States would avoid the costly trench warfare of the World War I Western Front. America would use its industry and technology. Thus the Navy and Air Corps were given priority funding. America as the President phrased it would be the great Asenal of Democracy. It was the way the President decided to fight the War, taking advantage of America's great strength--an anazingly productive capitalist economy. War Production Board Director Donald Nelson's concluded that building a huge army would aversely impact production. Nelson told military leaders that the conversion of the economy to the production of military material was happening to quickly (October 6, 1942). This issue became known as the 'Feasibility Dispute'. The Soviet victory at Stalingrad, and other factors helped Gen. Marshal to cap the Army at 90 divisions. The Battle of the Bulge (December 1944), left America without a strategic reserve, but it proved just enough to win the War.

Sources

Matloff, Maurice. "The 90 Divison Gamble" Strategic Planning and Coalition Warfare Ch. 19 ((Department of the Army: 1959). Matloff was the chief historian of the U.S.Army and an authority on strategic planning in World War II.

Created: 9:37 PM 6/28/2020
Last updated: 9:37 PM 6/28/2020